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          ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This thesis is an attempt to answer the following question:  
 
Do our moral commitments commit us to constraints on what 
meta-ethical theories we find attractive? 
 
 In order to answer this question, I first demonstrate that meta-
ethical theories can be criticised on moral grounds. I then argue 
that correctness conditions for moral claims imply the thesis of 
explanatory moral realism. I do not claim that this is an 
argument for the truth of explanatory moral realism.  Rather, I 
claim that this is an argument that moral realism is a moral 
commitment. I then look at two objections to the claim that 
moral claims can have built in commitments to a meta-ethical 
theory that takes a stand on the issue of moral realism. The first 
of these is a set of arguments that Simon Blackburn gives for 
quasi-realism.  The second objection is a set of arguments given 
by Ronald Dworkin that attack the presuppositions of debates 
about realism in meta-ethics. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Meta-Ethics has become an increasingly interesting topic within analytic philosophy. 
One thing that adds to its fascination is the apparent disparity between the ways that meta-
ethicists reason about issues that ordinary people outside of philosophy sometimes discuss. 
This is particularly true regarding the issue of moral realism. As of late, many meta-ethicists 
have embraced the idea that the truth or falsity of moral realism is irrelevant to debates about 
conflicting ethical or political views. However, a cursory glance at the general public reveals 
that the truth or falsity of moral realism does indeed have a large impact on the way 
conflicting ethical and political views are debated in the world. This is particularly striking 
because many people outside of analytic philosophy talk as though the issue of moral realism 
is relevant for the justification of specific ethical or political views. For instance, it has 
become commonplace in the political domain to defend various political views using anti-
realism as a purported justification. Issues such as homosexual equality, privacy laws, 
religious toleration, and abortion rights are routinely discussed in ways where the truth or 
falsity of moral realism is used to justify a particular political view. Although such political 
GLVFXVVLRQVGRQ¶WLQYROYHWKHWHFKQLFDOODQJXDJHRIWKHSKLORVRSKHUWKHLVVXHEHLQJGLVFXVVHG
is still the relevance of moral realism to some auxiliary political view. Sometimes an 
argument will be put forward that some civil liberty should be respected or some alternative 
OLIHVW\OHWROHUDWHGEHFDXVHWKHUHDUHQR³REMHFWLYHO\´ULJKWDQGZURQJDQVZHUVWRPRUDO
questions. Looking at academia outside of analytic philosophy, we see that English, Sociology 
and Critical Theory departments often presuppose normative ethics doctrines like subjectivism 
and relativism.1 They too talk as though these doctrines are incompatible with moral realism. 
What is particularly interesting is that in the discussions that happen outside of analytic 
philosophy which deal with moral realism, there is usually no distinction made between 
normative ethics and meta-ethics.  In analytic philosophy, the normative ethics/meta-ethics 
                                                        
1
 For a discussion of this phenomena in arts education, see KIMBALL, Roger. ed. Dee, Ivan, R. 
Experiments against Reality: The Fate of Culture in the Postmodern Age, Chicago Press, Chicago, 
Illinois, USA, 2000 
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distinction is normally cashed out as a distinction between 1st order and 2nd order moral 
claims.  Claims at the 1st order are treated as the typical moral utterances that all human beings 
make when engaged in moral practice.  Such claims include assertions that killing is morally 
wrong, racial equality is morally better than racial inequality, sex outside of marriage is 
morally permissible, and so on.  Claims at the 2nd order are treated as claims that deal 
primarily with the ontological, epistemological or semantic commitments of 1st order moral 
claims. Such claims may include assertions that moral claims involve the postulation of 
metaphysical entities, are known through a mysterious faculty of perception, or that the 
meaning of moral claims is in some way indefinable. 
 Outside of analytic philosophy, these 1st and 2nd order distinctions are generally not 
made. Laymen, to try and show that some 1st order relativism or subjectivism is correct, often 
use the same Darwinian explanations used by analytic philosophers to bolster moral anti-
realism at the 2nd RUGHU/D\PHQZLOORIWHQVD\WKLQJVOLNH³6XEMHFWLYLVP5HODWLYLVPLVWUXH
because morality is just a function of psychological dispositions we inherited from our 
evROXWLRQDU\SDVW7KHUHLVQRWKLQJµREMHFWLYH¶DERXWPRUDOLW\´2XWVLGHRIDQDO\WLF
SKLORVRSK\WKHODFNRIµREMHFWLYLW\¶LVZKDWSHRSOHFLWHDVDGHIHQFHRIWKHLUUHODWLYLVPRU
subjectivism.  In the above example, the lack of objectivity (a 2nd order meta-ethical claim) is 
being used to defend subjectivism/relativism (a 1st order normative ethics theory).  
 For most meta-ethicists, the above example would generally be considered a piece of 
reasoning that is contentious at best, mistaken at worst. Amongst meta-ethicists, it is normally 
DVVXPHGWKDWRQH¶VPHWD-HWKLFVLVQRWUHOHYDQWWRRQHµVQRUPDWLYHHWKLFV2  Meta-HWKLFLVWVGRQ¶W
normally see the realism/anti-realism issue as a debate between those who wish to moralize 
normally and those who want to replace normal moralizing with something like relativism or 
subjectivism.3 Most meta-ethicists, whether realist or not, want to reject doctrines like 
relativism or subjectivism.  Additionally, relativism and subjectivist positions are rarely used 
in either meta-ethics or normative ethics to try and justify concrete political views. The 
                                                        
2 It should be noted that there have been some recent exceptions to this general rule. See FANTL, 
Jeremy. Is Meta-Ethics Morally Neutral? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2006, 87, 22-44.  Also see 
KRAMER, Matthew. Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine. Chichester,UK:Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.  
 
3
 This is because of the prevalence of the 1st and 2nd order distinction 
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general attitude seems to be that insofar as meta-ethical issues are discussed in laymen circles 
in a way that is radically different from how they are discussed among meta-ethicists, the 
laymen are just mistaken. These mistakes are chalked up to either a lack of familiarity with 
meta-ethics literature or a lack of reasoning skills.  
 To a large extent, it is hard to deny that meta-ethical discussions that happen outside 
of philosophy are often unsophisticated and confused.  However, there is a kernel of truth in 
such lay discussions that contemporary meta-ethicists have largely underplayed.  This kernel 
of truth is that we cannot completely separate the way we moralize on the one hand from the 
way we theorize about morality as meta-ethicists.  This separation is exemplified by the 
traditional 1st and 2nd order distinction between normative ethics and meta-ethics.  The 
distinction functions (among other things) as a way to allow the meta-ethicist to safeguard his 
moralizing from any potential threats which might come from the way he theorizes about 
morality. The meta-ethicist relies on this distinction to make sure that any anti-realist 
denouncement or repudiation of moral objectivity at the 2nd order level will leave his 
moralizing unaffected.  Here, it appears the meta-ethicist might be in a position of being able 
to learn something from the laymen.  
 The layman does not assume that a meta-ethical theory that is attractive by the 
standards of the typical meta-ethicist is consistent with our moral commitments as human 
beings. This is an important possibility there has been little discussion of in meta-ethics 
literature. There may be something more to creating a meta-ethical theory that is consistent 
with our moral commitments than simply creating a theory that is attractive by non-moral, 
theoretical standards. To create a meta-ethical theory that is consistent with our moral 
commitments, we may have to create a theory that describes the world in a manner consistent 
ZLWKRXUPRUDOFRPPLWPHQWV%\µRXU¶PRUDOFRPPLWPHQWV,PHDQWKHPRUDOFRPPLWPHQWV
any agent has in virtue of engaging in the practice of morality.  The crucial point is that a 
description of the world that is consistent with our moral commitments may involve making 
postulations that are theoretically unattractive.  
 In contemporary meta-ethics, the above possibility is rarely mentioned, let alone 
attacked. It is generally assumed that adequate truth tracking is a sufficient condition of 
creating a meta-ethical theory that is consistent with our moral commitments. Here, adequate 
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truth tracking happens by looking at whether or not a theory is attractive according to 
theoretical criteria. The theoretical criteria are non-moral.  Thus, the act of truth tracking by 
choosing theories that are attractive by these non-moral criteria is also assumed to be 
consistent with our moral commitments.4 This is why it is rare to find a theorist who insists 
that morality commits us to either a meta-ethical theory or constraints on what sorts of meta-
ethical theories we can postulate.5 Within the orthodoxy of contemporary meta-ethics, it is 
assumed that our moral commitments are compatible with all of the theoretically attractive 
ways the meta-ethicist could describe morality.  Very few consider the possibility that moral 
commitments include commitments about how to adequately characterize morality at the 
meta-ethical level.6 As one might already guess, it is this possibility that interests me. Hence, 
my research question that this thesis will answer is:  Do our moral commitments commit us to 
constraints on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive? 
 As I stated earlier, by our moral commitments, I mean any claims we must affirm or 
presuppose in virtue of engaging adequately in moral practice. By moral practice, I mean the 
social, psychological, phenomenological, or linguistic activities that constitute being a moral 
agent. The social activities include the ability to get along with and coordinate with other 
agents.  The psychological activities include the ability to internalize the right moral 
sentiments for making moral decisions. The phenomenological activities include the 
experience of making moral judgments. The linguistic components include the logical and 
semantic rules one must abide by in order to consistently engage in the other components of 
moral practice.  
 %\³FRQVWUDLQWV´RQZKDWPHWD-ethical theories we find attractive, I mean what 
presuppositions we must accept as criteria for finding a meta-ethical theory attractive.  Such 
presuppositions could be the very non-moral presuppositions normally accepted in meta-ethics 
for adjudicating between rival theories. Such presuppositions include the claim that a theory 
                                                        
4
 This seems to be the dominant assumption of contemporary meta-ethicists. We can observe this by 
noting that meta-ethical debates generally consist of clashing explanatory accounts.  
5
 The exception to this general rule is Matthew Kramer in his latest book, Moral Realism as a Moral 
Doctrine. See Kramer (2009). 
6
 The exception to this general rule is Jean Hampton. See HAMPTON, Jean. The Authority of Reason, 
New York, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1998.  
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which is simpler is more attractive, the claim that a theory which explains more is more 
attractive, and so on.7  Such presuppositions could also be ones that are not normally accepted 
in meta-ethics for adjudicating between rival theories.  For example, such presuppositions 
could be controversial metaphysical or epistemological claims.  What is important here is that 
moral commitments are not normally understood as committing us to anything about the 
attractiveness of a meta-ethical theory. Hence, they are not normally understood as constraints 
on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive.  
  In order to answer this question of whether we are committed to moral constraints on 
what meta-ethical theories we find attractive, we need to answer two supplementary 
questions:    
(A) Can meta-ethical theories be criticized on moral grounds? 
and 
                  (B) What meta-ethical claims does morality commit us to?  
We must answer (A) before we can answer (B) because any answer to (B) presupposes an 
affirmative answer to (A). If meta-ethical theories cannot be criticized on moral grounds, there 
are no moral commitments to meta-ethical claims. This is for the following reason. If meta-
ethical theories are exempt from moral criticism, moral commitments are not the sort of 
consideration that could be used to criticize a meta-ethical theory.  Hence, in order to give an 
adequate answer to (B), we must assert that meta-ethical claims can be criticized on moral 
grounds. Giving an answer to (A) and (B) is what the first half of my thesis will consist in.   
 In chapter one, I will give an affirmative answer to (A). In chapter two, I will answer 
(B) by arguing that there is a meta-ethical claim we are morally committed to. That claim is: 
 
(C) For any meta-ethical theory that is true, that theory must either be an explanatory moral 
realist theory or a theory that is compatible with explanatory moral realism. 
 
                                                        
7This is an outcome of the widespread usage of the inference to the best explanation model of 
explanatory reasoning.  See LIPTON, Peter. Inference to the Best Explanation. London, UK: Routledge, 
1991. 
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Explanatory moral realism is a view that affirms that correct 2nd order explanations of 
morality are irreducibly moral.8 ,QVXFKDQH[SODQDWLRQWKHPRUDOH[SODQDQVFDQ¶WEHUHGXFHG
to or summarized as something that is not moral. The explanans of explanatory moral realism 
must itself be a moral judgment. (C) constitutes the basic answer to my research question. 
This is because it is a moral commitment to a constraint on what meta-ethical theories we find 
attractive. (C) implies that insofar as a meta-ethical theory is incompatible with explanatory 
moral realism, it is a false theory.  If it is a false theory, it cannot be an attractive theory.  
It should be noted that in recent years, it has become difficult within analytic 
philosophy to specify exactly what meta-ethicists believe moral realism is. Moral realist 
theories have traditionally been understood as a group of meta-ethics theories that attempt in 
different ways to explain morality as being such that the world answers to our moral 
assertions.  Recent work in meta-ethics has made this traditional understanding seem both 
unilluminating and uninformative. Advocates of anti-realist positions like expressivism have 
been asserting that there are objective moral truths, and that the surface grammar of moral 
discourse is correct.9 Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have advocated a new anti-realist 
theory called cognitivist expressivism that adds to the expressivist list the claim that moral 
claims are assertions that express beliefs.10 Additionally, very few anti-realists these days 
reject a view best characterized as moral objectivism. According to moral objectivism, there 
are correct and incorrect answers to moral questions and correct and incorrect procedures for 
arriving at such answers. A prominent anti-realist like Simon Blackburn is not only a moral 
objectivist, but states that moral realism is irrelevant for capturing the mind independent 
correctness of moral claims.11 Even error theorists like Mackie who state that our moral 
beliefs are false can be interpreted as affirming moral objectivism within the context of moral 
practice.12  
                                                        
8
 I will elaborate this view more in chapter 2 
9See BLACKBURN, Simon. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. See GIBBARD, Alan.  
Thinking How to Live. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.  
 
10 HORGAN, Terry and TIMMONS, Mark.  Non-descriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New 
Meta-Ethic. Philosophical Papers, 2000, 29, 121-53.  
 
11 See BLACKBURN, Simon. Errors and the Phenomenology of Value. In: T. HONDERICH, ed., 
Ethics and Objectivity. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1992, pp.1-21. 
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Given the startling range of meta-ethical positions that have been proclaimed 
consistent with moral anti-realism, it is difficult to characterize the difference between moral 
realism and moral anti-realism. The meta-ethicist Jamie Dreier has recently expressed concern 
over whether such a distinction is possible.13 None the less, in this thesis, I will understand 
moral realism in the traditional manner. I believe moral realism refers to a range of meta-
ethical theories that attempt to describe the world in a manner where the world answers to our 
moral assertions. However, a more precise point of demarcation between realist and anti-
realist theories can be achieved when we have a deeper understanding of what is meant by this 
traditional conception of moral realism.  
When we say that the world answers to our moral assertions, we mean at least that 
our moral assertions refer to something in the world. This is thus far compatible with anything 
a realist or anti-realist could assert. If by "the world" we mean that which is independent of 
human judgments, we mean only those claims that are compatible with moral objectivism.  
Moral objectivism, we recall, is the view that there are correct and incorrect answers to moral 
questions and correct and incorrect procedures for arriving at those answers. To claim that the 
world answers to our moral assertions on moral objectivism means the world contains correct 
moral claims that are correct independently of human judgments. If this is the case, it follows 
that there are correct and incorrect moral claims. If we add the supplementary premise that 
humans are sometimes able to correctly identify correct moral claims, we get the component 
of objectivism that states that there are correct and incorrect procedures for arriving at correct 
moral claims. Thus far, we have a picture of the world that satisfies the demand for moral 
objectivity that is often associated with moral realism. However, as recent anti-realist theories 
demonstrate, the moral objectivism stated here is compatible with most contemporary anti-
realist theories. The important question becomes how to separate moral realist objectivism 
from an objectivism that is compatible with either realism or anti-realism.  
Moral realist objectivism must be an objectivism that is only compatible with moral 
                                                                                                                                                              
12 This is because Mackie himself states that his moral practice can go unaffected despite his affirmation 
of error theory.  Yet moral practice implies the existence of objective moral facts.  It is hard to imagine 
how a theory could imply the existence of objective moral facts without being a moral objectivist theory.  
See MACKIE, John L. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin Books, 1977.pp. 38-42. 
 
13 DREIER, Jamie. Meta-Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism. Philosophical Perspectives, 
2004, 18, pp. 23-44. 
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realism. It must assert something that an anti-realist theory can't also assert and explain. For 
instance, it is not enough for moral realist objectivism to assert the existence of moral 
properties. An anti-realist theory can give an explanation of moral properties.14 What about 
the assertion that moral states of affairs are things agents track rather than ways that agents 
coordinate the behaviour of others? This too can be accommodated by error theorists who 
insist that agents track moral states of affairs which they describe using false moral claims. 
What cannot be accommodated by the anti-realist is the existence of brute normativity in the 
world. Hence, any moral objectivism which asserts the existence of brute normativity in the 
world is a moral realist objectivism.  
Normativity, I take to be the property whereby a state of affairs possesses some kind 
of positive or negative value. When I say "brute normativity in the world" I mean normativity 
that cannot be reduced to or summarized as something other than normativity. The reason why 
such normativity is incompatible with anti-realism is that this brute normativity can only be 
described in a manner where one is asserting that normativity. For instance, if I say "there are 
objective moral properties in the world" without reducing or summarizing the normativity in 
this claim to something that is not normative, I am making not just an assertion of brute 
normativity. I am also necessarily making a moral assertion. It is only when I can reduce or 
summarize the "objective moral properties" to something that is not normative that my 
assertion may or may not be a moral assertion.  
For example, suppose I say "there are objective moral properties in the world." Then 
suppose I qualify that assertion with, "what I mean by objective moral properties is that there 
are rules for maximizing what is in the long term interests of most human beings." This 
qualification gives my assertion of objective moral properties the capacity to be interpreted in 
two different ways. In the first way, I can interpret my assertion of objective moral properties 
as a normative assertion. In the second way, I can interpret my assertion of objective moral 
properties as purely factual. This is because we can imagine rules for maximizing what is in 
the long term interests of most human beings which are immoral. It is only if I imagine such 
rules and morality as being co-extensive that I can interpret the assertion of objective moral 
                                                        
 
14 For instance, an anti-realist could state that moral properties are descriptive features of the world that 
cause agents to develop moral attitudes. Such features could be the pain of a tortured subject which 
causes an agent to develop a moral stance against torture.  
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properties as a moral assertion. However, even with this latter assertion, there is still a 
Moorean open question we can ask.15 This is because there seems to be no necessary identity 
between morality and rules for maximizing the long-term interests of most human beings.16  
All anti-realist theories have in common the fact that they make meta-ethical 
assertions about moral claims which can be interpreted as factual assertions. This is because 
all anti-realist theories attempt to explain morality in terms of some natural state of affairs that 
is not moral. Hence, for every anti-realist explanation, one can always ask Moore's open 
question. There are, of course, reductive moral realist theories where we can ask that same 
open question.17 However, there are also varieties of moral realism that are not susceptible to 
an open question. The most famous of these is moral platonism which states that there are 
objective moral properties in the world which are best explained as being non-physical, action 
guiding, and with explanations best characterized using final cause explanations.18 2QHFDQ¶W
imagine such platonistic moral properties not being moral. We can, of course, imagine non-
physical, action guiding non-moral properties that are best characterized using final cause 
explanations. This is not, however, what the moral platonist is asserting. He is describing a 
variety of moral property we cannot imagine as being non-moral. Hence, we cannot ask 
Moore's open question when we imagine moral properties that are such as the moral platonist 
describes them.  
This shows a crucial difference between moral realist and moral anti-realist theories: 
Anti-realist theories cannot explain morality by giving explanations that are necessarily moral 
explanations. Moral realist theories can. All varieties of moral anti-realism thus give accounts 
of moral claims that are vulnerable to a Moorean open question. Only some varieties of moral 
realism give accounts of moral claims that are vulnerable to a Moorean open question. I am 
                                                        
15
 This is the same open question that G. E. Moore directed against all naturalistic forms of ethics in his 
Principia Ethica. See MOORE, G.E. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903.  
 
16
 Of course, it does not follow that there actually is no necessary identity. The point is, if there is a 
necessary identity, it does not appear to us from the mere contemplation of the concept of morality and 
the concept of rules for maximizing the long term interests of most human beings.  We can imagine 
counter-examples to this supposed necessary identity.  
 
17
 For an example of this type of moral realist theory, see JACKSON, Frank. From Metaphysics to     
Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 1998. In this moral realist theory, Jackson tries to 
reduce evaluative properties to natural properties.  
 
18Jean Hampton is the only contemporary proponent of this kind of old fashion platonism.  See Hampton 
(1998). 
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not here assuming that the open question argument is evidence against anti-realist theories. 
What I am pointing out is that moral realist theories have the capacity to explain moral claims 
using explanations that are necessarily moral. Anti-realist explanations do not have this 
capacity.  
What we can see from this is the difference in explanatory function between moral 
realist and moral anti-realist theories. Moral Realist theories attempt to explain morality in a 
manner where the world answers to our moral assertions. Moral anti-realist theories attempt to 
explain morality in a manner where the world does not answer to our moral assertions. One 
sufficient condition of explaining morality in a manner where the world answers to our moral 
assertions is to give explanations of morality that are necessarily moral. This is why the moral 
realist has the option of giving this kind of explanation and the anti-realist does not.  Because 
giving an explanation of morality that uses a necessarily moral explanans is a sufficient 
condition of explaining morality in a way where the world answers to our moral assertions, 
the anti-UHDOLVWFDQ¶WJLYHWKLVNLQGRIH[SODQDWLRQ%HFDXVHRIWKLVLWLVDQHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQ
of all moral anti-realist theories that they do not give explanations of morality that are 
necessarily moral.  
Since my thesis will be an attempt to show that morality commits us to moral 
realism, my thesis must show that morality commits us to explaining morality in a way that 
the anti-realist cannot explain morality. This means that my thesis must show that morality 
commits us to explaining morality with explanations that are necessarily moral. Therefore, 
this thesis will utilize a version of moral realism that is not moral platonism but that none the 
less uses necessarily moral explanations. This is the explanatory moral realism referred to 
earlier.  Explanatory moral realism consists of two components. The first component is the 
moral objectivism described earlier. The second component I will refer to as moral 
explanationism. According to moral explanationism, any 2nd order explanation of the 
correctness of a moral claim must simultaneously be a moral assertion.  
When a 2nd order explanation of the correctness of a moral claim is simultaneously a 
moral assertion, that explanation is both a meta-ethical explanation and simultaneously a 
moral assertion. When moral objectivism is combined with moral explanationism, we have a 
meta-ethics that postulates that morality is a phenomenon that can not be adequately explained 
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from a theoretical perspective which does not make moral assertions. We can see here that 
anti-realist theories that attempt to show that the world does not answer to our moral 
assertions presuppose that there are no 2nd order theoretical perspectives that are 
simultaneously moral. This is because the moral anti-realist presupposes there is no 2nd order 
theoretical explanation of how the world really is that involves moral assertions. If moral 
assertions were a part of 2nd order theoretical explanations of how the world really is, this 
would imply that morality is a part of the fabric of the world. Truths about the fabric of the 
world are the target of 2nd order theoretical explanations of any phenomenon. A commitment 
to explanatory moral realism is therefore a commitment to morality being a part of the fabric 
of the world. If morality is part of the fabric of the world then the world answers to our moral 
assertions.  
A defense of the moral commitment to explanatory moral realism constitutes the first 
half of the thesis. In the second half of the thesis, I will rebut objections to the claim that 
moral commitments can commit us to meta-ethical claims. Chapter three involves a critique of 
objections to this claim given by Simon Blackburn. These objections will be in the form of 
GHIHQVHVRI%ODFNEXUQ¶VPHWD-ethical theory quasi-realism. At the end of chapter three, I will 
FRQFOXGHWKDW%ODFNEXUQ¶VDUJXPHQWVEHJWKHTXHVWLRQE\DVVXPLQJIRXUSUHPLVHVKLV
arguments require him to give explicit defenses of. In chapter four, I will look at a different 
variety of objection to the claim that moral commitments can commit us to meta-ethical 
claims. This objection is expressed in a meta-ethical stance defended by the philosopher 
Ronald Dworkin that we will refer to as moral anti-archimedeanism.  Moral anti-
archimedeanism is the view that one cannot validate or undermine moral claims from a 
perspective that is not internal to 1st order moral practice. At the end of section four, I will 
FRQFOXGHWKDW'ZRUNLQ¶VDUJXPHQWVDVZHOODVUHVSRQVHVWRWKHPE\-DPLH'UHLHUDQG
Kenneth Ehrenberg, fail to hit their targets. I will argue that this is because each of these three 
theorists assumes components of moral archimedeanism. This is true even of Dworkin 
himself. In the conclusion, I will give a brief summary of the arguments presented in this 
thesis.  In the epilogue, I will give some explanation of the ways that moral archimedeanism 
conflicts with (C). I will then discuss the pros and cons of siding either with moral 
archimedeanism or (C). I will end the thesis not with an affirmation of moral archimedeanism 
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or (C) but with an encouragement of the reader to make up his or her own mind.   
Some of the argumentation strategies used in this thesis are not presented in the 
traditional style of identifying a position defended in the literature by a theorist that is then 
either endorsed or criticized. In sections one and four, I analyse a debate between three 
theorists.  Rather than endorse the arguments of one of the theorists, I concede that all the 
theorists fail to give successful arguments.  However, in explaining how each theorist goes 
wrong, I show how their failures inadvertently illustrate key issues in my own subsequent 
arguments. Sometimes the failures explicitly illustrate direct premises in those arguments.  At 
other points they contribute to the plausibility of those premises. And yet at other points, they 
create a greater understanding of the theoretical context in which my arguments are being 
advanced. In sections 2 and 3, I adopt the more traditional dialectical strategy of laying out the 
positions of another theorist and criticizing them before advancing arguments of my own. 
 In chapter one, I look at a debate whereby three mid 20th century meta-ethicists 
attempt, in different ways, to show that meta-ethical theories are normative. Mary Mothersill, 
Alan Gewirth, and R.C. Solomon attempt to identify particular procedures that the meta-
ethicist engages in which are normative. They believe that if they are successful at this aim, 
they will have shown that meta-ethics is normative. Mothersill identifies the procedure of 
correctly interpreting a meta-ethical theory so the interpretation specifies which set of 
normative ethics that meta-ethical theory is not compatible with.19 Gewirth identifies the 
procedure of differentiating the moral from the non-moral.  He sees this procedure as a 
counter-example to the two predominant assumptions of his day regarding the scope of meta-
ethics.  These two assumptions are:  
(1) Meta-ethics is non-normative 
and 
 (2) The same meta-ethics is compatible with all forms of normative ethics20   
R.C. Solomon identifies the procedure of studying ethical language so as to differentiate those 
                                                        
19 MOTHERSILL, Mary. Moral Philosophy and Meta-ethics. The Journal of Philosophy, 1952, vol. 49, 
pp. 587-594. 
 
20GEWIRTH, Alan. Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics. New Series, 1960, vol. 69, no. 274. pp.187-    
205. 
 
Page 17 of 227 
 
claims which are truly moral from those claims which are deemed moral by a given society at 
a given time.21 I will show that the attempts by each of these theorists to demonstrate that 
these procedures are normative are unsuccessful.  I will argue that each theorist assumes that a 
particular meta-ethical procedure is normative just because one can interpret the procedure in 
a manner that is normative. I then argue that while these theorists fail to demonstrate that 
meta-ethical theories are normative, their arguments illustrate how certain meta-ethical 
procedures have implications for moral claims. One important implication is that a meta-
ethical theory can affirm or deny other moral claims.  If a meta-ethical theory can affirm 
incorrect moral claims or deny correct moral claims, this means the theory can be criticized on 
moral grounds.  This answers the question of (A).   
 In chapter two, I will argue that explanatory moral realism is a correctness condition 
RIPRUDOFODLPV%\³FRUUHFWQHVVFRQGLWLRQ´,PHDQDFODLPZHPXVWSUHVXSSRVHLQRUGHUWR
consistently affirm a moral claim. Correctness conditions are subsets of moral commitments 
because they are claims we must affirm in virtue of engaging adequately in moral practice. I 
am assuming here that part of engaging adequately in moral practice is to engage in moral 
practice in a manner that is not self-undermining. To engage in moral practice in a manner 
that is not self-undermining, we must presuppose the correctness conditions of moral claims. 
Otherwise, we wind up either denying the very moral claims we assert or we wind up 
agnostics about the moral claims we assert. In either scenario, our lack of consistency is self-
undermining because we destabilize our psychological responses towards moral claims we 
affirm if we simultaneously deny them. Hence, in chapter two I will assume that correctness 
conditions for moral claims are also moral commitments.  
 I will then show that a version of moral realism is implied by correctness conditions 
of moral claims. I will do this by creating a variation on the argument from moral experience 
(also referred to as AME). The argument from moral experience attempts to show that the 
experience of moral practice implies or is best explained by moral realism.  In some ways the 
DUJXPHQW¶VWLWOHLVVOLJKWO\PLVOHDGLQJ7KHDUJXPHQWIURPPRUDOH[SHULHQFHLVQRWDQDWWHPSW
                                                        
21SOLOMON, R.C. Normative and Meta-Ethics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1970, vol. 
31, no. 1, pp. 97-107. 
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to show merely that the phenomenology of making moral claims gives us presumptive 
evidence in favor of moral realism. Rather, the argument attempts to show that the experience 
of moral practice (which includes both its phenomenological and linguistic components) 
implies or is best explained by moral realism.22 Moreover, my strategy for creating a variation 
RQWKLVDUJXPHQWZLOOEHLQIRUPHGE\'RQ/RHE¶VFULWLFLVPVRIWZRLQIOXHQWLDOYHUVLRQVRIWKH
argument from moral experience.23 I will not be creating a variation on this argument that is 
designed to be a presumptive argument for moral realism. Rather, my variation merely aims to 
entail that explanatory moral realism is implied by correctness conditions of moral claims. 
When I say that moral realism is implied by correctness conditions of moral claims I mean 
that correct moral claims depend on the truth of explanatory moral realism in order to 
consistently retain their status as correct moral claims.  
 I will, in constructing my variation on the argument from moral experience, attempt 
to avoid pitfalls with the previous versions of AME pointed out by Loeb. These include the 
fact that proponents of AME overlook observations of moral practice that imply non-
objectivism. The other criticism Loeb directs at AME arguments is that they ignore the degree 
to which aspects of moral practice are compatible with moral anti-realism. From this I 
construct two requirements of any successful version of AME. The first requirement is that 
any successful version of AME must acknowledge that the experience of moral 
phenomenology is not uniform enough to present us with a presumptive case for a 
commitment to moral realism. The second requirement is that the proponent of AME must 
acknowledge that even if the experience of moral phenomenology possessed the 
characteristics other proponents of AME have claimed it does, these characteristics would 
only imply moral objectivism. They would not imply moral realism. My version of the 
argument from moral experience will fulfill these requirements by not relying on first person 
reports of moral phenomenology.  Rather, my version will look at the correctness conditions 
of moral claims.  
                                                        
22
 For defences of AME, see David Brink and David McNaughton. BRINK, David. Moral Realism and 
the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Chapters 6-7. Also 
see McNAUGHTON, David. Moral Vision. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1988. pp. 19-48, 56 
23
 LOEB, Don. The Argument from Moral Experience. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2007, vol. 
10, pp. 469-484. 
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 My version of AME will consist of 3 correctness conditions of moral claims.  These 
correctness conditions, when conjoined, will imply explanatory moral realism. These 3 
correctness conditions are:  
(D) For any correct moral claim X, X is not determined by any agent's judgments about X. 
(E) For any correct moral claim X, the only appropriate explanation is one that is irreducibly 
moral.  
and 
(F) For any correct moral claim X, the only appropriate irreducibly moral explanation is one 
that is a final 2nd order explanation.  
:KHQ,VSHDNRID³ILQDO´QGRUGHUH[SODQDWLRQ,PHDQDQH[SODQDWLRQWKDWZLOOEH
undermined if there is a higher order explanation attempting to explain the final 2nd order 
explanation. Such a higher order explanation would necessarily recharacterize the final 2nd 
order explanation in a manner that would change its content. A final 2nd order explanation is 
such that, it can only fail to be undermined if its content is not modified by any other 
explanations which attempt to explain it. If the arguments in section two are sound, 
explanatory moral realism is implied by the conjunction of the three correctness conditions for 
moral claims. This means we are committed to final 2nd order explanations of moral claims 
which are either explanatory moral realist explanations or explanations that are compatible 
with explanatory moral realism. The thesis of chapter two thus answers question (B).   
 We now arrive at the halfway mark of the thesis.  Thus far, we have worked out 
answers to questions (A) and (B). It has been argued in chapter two that we have a moral 
commitment to (C) (For any meta-ethical theory which is true, that theory must either be an 
explanatory moral realist theory or a theory which is compatible with explanatory moral 
realism). Chapters three and four will be spent looking at objections to a presupposition of 
(C). This presupposition is that moral practice can commit us to meta-ethical claims regarding 
the moral realism/anti-realism debate. Perhaps the most famous set of objections to this 
SUHVXSSRVLWLRQFRPHVIURP6LPRQ%ODFNEXUQ%ODFNEXUQ¶VTXDVL-realism is the most well 
known meta-ethical theory whose justification depends on the claim that moral practice does 
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not commit us to any meta-ethical claims.  
 In the first half of chapter three, I will critique the considerations Simon Blackburn 
raises which purport to show that quasi-realism is true and is a more attractive theory than its 
rivals.  The reason I am choosing this group of considerations (apart from their notoriety) is 
that if they are sound, the arguments in section one and section two will fail. Because quasi-
realism depends on the claim that moral practice cannot commit us to meta-ethical claims, 
arguments in favor of quasi-realism are arguments in favor of the claim that moral practice 
cannot commit us to meta-ethical claims. Thus, I will attack these considerations on the 
grounds that they beg the question by relying on the plausibility of assumptions that other 
theories call into doubt.  These assumptions include: 
(G) Morality is incapable of giving us any evidence of anything external to morality. 
(H) Morality is compatible with all possible meta-ethical truths a theorist could  advocate. 
(I) Philosophical naturalism is true  
and 
(J) Quasi-Realism is true.  
I will argue that Blackburn must defend each of these assumptions in order to show that 
Quasi-Realism is a more attractive meta-ethical theory than its rivals.  
(G) is the assertion that morality is incapable of giving us evidence of claims 
normally made in other non-moral domains. These domains include the natural sciences, 
metaphysics, or epistemology. (H) is the assertion that there are no possible meta-ethical 
truths a theorist could advocate which are incompatible with presuppositions of morality.  (I) 
is the presupposition of philosophical naturalism. Here, I take philosophical naturalism to be a 
conjunction of two views. The first view is metaphysical.  It commits the naturalist to the 
denial of supernatural entities. It also commits the naturalist to the denial of entities that 
cannot be accommodated in descriptions of the world that are consistent with the findings and 
methodological principles of the natural sciences. This aim of consistency with the 
methodological principles of the natural sciences is the epistemological component of 
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naturalism.  It amounts to the claim that an explanation is more likely to be true if it is 
consistent with the inference to the best explanation model of explanation.24 (J) refers to the 
presupposition that Quasi-5HDOLVPLVWUXHZKLFK,ZLOOVKRZLVKLGGHQLQRQHRI%ODFNEXUQ¶V
arguments for Quasi-Realism.  
I will attack five of the main considerations Blackburn presents in favor of quasi-
realism. The first consideration is the fact that quasi-realism allows the theorist to accept the 
metaphysLFDOFRPSRQHQWVRI0DFNLH¶VTXHHUQHVVDUJXPHQWZKLOHVLPXOWDQHRXVO\
accommodating 1st order moral discourse.25 I will argue that this combination of claims 
presupposes (G) (morality is incapable of giving us evidence of anything external to morality) 
and (H) (morality is compatible with all possible meta-ethical truths a theorist could 
advocate).  The second consideration I will attack is the argument from 1st order meta-ethical 
neutrality.  According to this argument, one can incorporate all the features of 1st order moral 
discourse into a meta-ethical theory without making any metaphysical assertions.26 Therefore, 
according to the argument, 1st order moral discourse is meta-ethically neutral. I will critique 
this argument on the basis that it does not show what it needs to show; namely, that a meta-
ethically neutral interpretation of 1st order moral claims is evidence that 1st order moral claims 
are meta-ethically neutral. Moreover, such an interpretation is compatible with 1st order moral 
claims committing agents to constraints on how one should characterize a meta-ethical theory. 
To assume that this is impossible is to presuppose, rather than defend (H) (morality is 
compatible with all possible meta-ethical truths a theorist could advocate).  
 The third consideration I will critique is the argument from moral psychology.27  
According to this argument, motivational internalism and the Humean account of moral 
motivation are the most plausible views of moral psychology.28 According to the Humean 
account of moral motivation, non-cognitive states are completely distinct.  According to 
motivational internalism, moral judgments necessarily motivate agents.  The conjunction of 
                                                        
24
 See Lipton, (1991).  
25
 See Blackburn (1985) and Mackie (1977). 
 
26
 This is the position of quasi-realists.  
27
 See BLACKBURN, Simon, Spreading the Word, New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 1984. 
28
 See Blackburn (1984), Chapter 6.  
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these two views entails that moral judgments must either be non-cognitive states or be 
cognitive states which entail non-cognitive states. Because of the plausibility of the Humean 
account of moral motivation and motivational internalism, Blackburn believes it is reasonable 
WREHOLHYHWKDWFRJQLWLYHVWDWHVVXFKDVPRUDOEHOLHIVFDQ¶WHQWDLOQRQ-cognitive states.  
Therefore, moral judgments must be expressions of non-cognitive states. This is an argument 
for the explanatory superiority of quasi-realism over its moral realist competitors.  
I will critique the argument from moral psychology because the claim that moral 
judgments necessarily motivate is derived, in part, from the claim that desires are what explain 
moral motivations. The difficulty with relying on any version of motivational internalism to 
argue against all forms of moral realism is that motivational internalism presupposes (G) 
(morality is incapable of giving us any evidence of anything external to morality). If morality 
were capable of giving us evidence of things external to morality, it would not be obvious that 
desires are what explain moral motivations.  The obvious explanation of moral motivation 
would be the interaction agents had with moral phenomena (be they moral properties or moral 
facts) that were external to agents. If (G) were false, the interactions agents had with moral 
phenomena would be what morality gave agents (among other things) evidence of. 
Motivational internalism is only plausible if (G) is true.  
 7KHIRXUWKRI%ODFNEXUQ¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQVLQIDYRURITXDVL-realism that I will critique 
is the argument from supervenience.29 According to this argument, it may be the case in our 
world that there is a moral relationship between torture and wrongness.  However, the 
argument proceeds, there is no conceptual reason why in some other world, there is a moral 
relation between torture and wrongness which is not the relation that holds in our world. 
Blackburn then claims that a moral change regarding the correctness of a moral claim, 
QHFHVVDULO\GRHVQ¶WKDSSHQZLWKRXWVRPHFKDQJHLQWKHIHDWXUHVRIWKHVLWXDWLRQWKDWXQGHUOLHV
the correctness of that moral claim. This means it is a conceptual impossibility that there 
should be a possible world where two things are identical in every non-moral respect but one 
is better than the other.  Blackburn believes that quasi-realism can explain this ban on mixed 
worlds where moral realism cannot. I will critique this argument without challenging its 
premises. Rather, I will challenge it on the grounds that it presupposes that moral realism 
                                                        
29
 Ibid. 
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gives us an unattractive explanation of the ban on mixed worlds. This characterization of 
moral realism as an unattractive explanation itself assumes (I) (naturalism is true). I will show 
WKDW%ODFNEXUQFDQ¶WDIIRUGWRDVVXPHQDWXUDOLVPLQDQDUJXPHQWDJDLQVWDOOIRUPVRIPRUDO
realism. This is because some forms of moral realism reject naturalism.  
 The final consideration I will address that Blackburn cites in favor of quasi-realism is 
the argument from practical needs.30 According to this argument, quasi-realism satisfies the 
practical needs of morality for a meta-ethical theory. Blackburn thinks there are two practical 
needs of morality for a meta-ethical theory. The first is that the theory describes how morality 
functions correctly.31 The second is that the theory is consistent with truth tracking methods 
from the natural sciences and analytic philosophy.32 I will critique this argument by showing 
that the way a meta-ethical theory characterizes morality will, in part, determine what the 
needs of a meta-ethical theory are.  Hence, one cannot invoke a practical needs argument in 
favor of quasi-realism unless one assumes (J) (quasi-realism is true).  
 In the second half of chapter three, I will argue that quasi-realism has an additional 
factor that counts against it. This factor is it does not justify moral objectivism. Because 
objectivism is compatible with both realism and anti-realism, objectivism is a view Blackburn 
believes quasi-realism can account for at the 1st order level.  I will argue that quasi-realism 
cannot do this because no anti-realist theory can justify moral objectivism. I will argue that 
this is for two reasons.  The first reason is that one must deny (G) (morality is incapable of 
giving us any evidence of anything external to morality) in order for moral practice to have 
any resources to defend objectivism.  The second reason is that scepticism regarding 
objectivism is such that it requires a 2nd order meta-ethical claim for the scepticism to be 
overcome.  Such a 2nd order claim, I will show, could only be realist.  
 In chapter four, I will examine a different objection to the claim that moral practice 
can commit us to meta-ethical claims regarding the moral realism/anti-realism debate. This 
objection comes from Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin advocates a position we will characterize as 
moral anti-DUFKLPHGHDQLVP$FFRUGLQJWR'ZRUNLQ¶VDQWL-moral archimedeanism, there are 
                                                        
30See Blackburn (1992) 
31
 Ibid.  
32
 Ibid. 
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no 2nd order claims which can validate or undermine 1st order moral claims.33  Dworkin takes 
this to mean that the moral realism/anti-realism debate is constructed out of 2nd order claims 
that, according to Dworkin, are best characterized as 1st order moral claims. For Dworkin, 
there are no moral commitments to meta-ethical claims regarding the moral realism/anti-
realism debate. This is because there are no 2nd order moral claims from which such a debate 
can be had. 
 ,ZLOOFULWLTXH'ZRUNLQ¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKHEDVLVWKDWKLVDUJXPHQWVDUHLQFRQVLVWHQW,
will argue that Dworkin relies on 2nd order claims that are used in the moral realism/anti-
realism debate. Moreover, he does this without first interpreting such 2nd order claims as 1st 
order claims. Dworkin cannot do this since his thesis involves the claim that there are no 
plausible 2nd order claims that can be used to vindicate moral realism or moral anti-realism.  
After all, such claims are the very archimedean claims he is attacking.  He cannot rely on a 
variety of 2nd order archimedean claims to establish the thesis that there are no such claims. 
  In the second half of chapter four, I will analyse objections to Dworkin by Jamie 
Dreier and .HQQHWK(KUHQEHUJ'UHLHUREMHFWVWR'ZRUNLQ¶VGHIHQVHRIPRUDODQWL-
archimedeanism by attempting to show, using matrices from the literature on analytic 
contingencies, that 2nd order  archimedean claims can be morally non-committing.34  If they 
are morally non-committing, according to Dreier, there is no reason to interpret them as 1st 
order claims. Dreier thinks his argument stands even if archimedean claims have moral 
implications. Kenneth Ehrenberg, on the other hand, throws a different set of criticisms at 
Dworkin.  His criticisms are multiple and varied.35  Ehrenberg accuses Dworkin of failing to 
discredit the theoretical perspective from which the meta-ethicist discussing the realism/anti-
realism issue makes his claims.  Ehrenberg also accuses Dworkin of failing to give good 
reasons for the interpretation of 2nd order archimedean claims as 1st order moral claims. Like 
'UHLHU(KUHQEHUJWDNHVLVVXHZLWK'ZRUNLQ¶VDWWHPSWVWRVKRZWKDWPHWD-ethical claims made 
                                                        
33
 DWORKIN, Ronald. Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It. Philosophy and Public Affairs.    
1996, vol. 25. pp. 87-139. 
34DREIER, Jamie. Meta-Ethics and Normative Commitment. Philosophical Issues. 2002, vol. 12. pp.     
241-263.  
 
35EHRENBERG, Kenneth.  Archimedean Meta-Ethics Defended.  Metaphilosophy. 2008, vol. 39. pp. 
508-529 
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in the moral realism/anti-realism debate are morally non-neutral. Ehrenberg also challenges 
'ZRUNLQ¶VDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHPRUDOUHDOLVPDQWL-realism debate does not deal with issues 
that are above and beyond the issues dealt with in 1st order moral discourse. He attempts to 
give counter-examples that show that there are metaphysical issues being dealt with during 2nd 
order moral debates that are distinct from anything discussed at the 1st order.  
 I will show that both Dreier and EhrenbeUJ¶VDWWDFNVRQ'ZRUNLQIDLO7KLVLV
because both Dreier and Ehrenberg assume some component of moral archimedeanism.  
These components are related to the traditional characterization of the 1st and 2nd order 
distinction assumed by moral archimedeans. Dreier assumes that meta-ethical standards about 
how one ought to evaluate moral standards are not themselves moral standards.  He also fails 
to see that one of his own versions of secondary quality theory is actually a moral claim that 
there are 2nd order mRUDOFRPPLWPHQWV(KUHQEHUJ¶VYDULHGFULWLFLVPVRI'ZRUNLQDOOIDLO
because Ehrenberg assumes the falsity of the claim that there can be 2nd order moral 
commitments.  At the end of chapter four, I will explain how Dworkin, Dreier, and Ehrenberg 
either fail to attack archimedeanism or fail to defend it because they presuppose components 
of it.  I will then suggest what might perhaps motivate them to accept these components in 
such a strong way.  
Each theorist, in their own way, does not question the traditional characterization of 
the distinction between 1st and 2nd order claims. It is a part of that characterization that 2nd 
order claims have a greater ability to validate or undermine moral claims than 1st order moral 
claims do. This characterization of the justification capacities of the 2nd order claim is the 
basis of archimedean moralizing. This characterization is what gives the 2nd order claim the 
capacity to function as an archimedean claim. Even Dworkin, in the end, winds up relying on 
this traditional characterization. Moreover, he relies on claims that can only function the way 
he wants them to if he interprets them as 2nd order archimedean claims. This suggests that at 
some level of his thought, he thinks that 2nd order archimedean claims have a greater ability 
to justify 1st order moral claims than other 1st order moral claims do.  
I will explain how Dreier also relies on the traditional characterization of the 1st and 
2nd order distinction during his attacks on Dworkin. Dreier's example of a meta-ethical claim 
that has moral implications but is not morally committing requires the assumption that moral 
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standards cannot be standards regarding how to evaluate moral standards. Dreier, I will show, 
implicitly assumes that moral claims are only made at the 1st order. Moreover, this is 
consistent with the traditional characterization of the distinction between 1st and 2nd order 
claims. Also, I will show that Dreier fails to notice that a rejection of his version of secondary 
quality theory is itself a claim plausibly understood as a 2nd order moral commitment. This 
failure on Dreier's part is again consistent with the traditional characterization of the 
distinction between 1st and 2nd order claims. Ehrenberg's critique of Dworkin relies on the 
traditional characterization of 1st and 2nd order claims because Ehrenberg assumes that 2nd 
order moral claims cannot be moral commitments. Like Dreier's assumptions, this assumption 
by Ehrenberg is consistent with the traditional characterization of the distinction between 1st 
and 2nd order moral claims.  
Chapter 4 will end with a summary of the components of Dworkin's anti-
archimedeanism that are sound and contrast these components with the components that fail. I 
will claim that the aspects of Dworkin's anti-archimedeanism that succeed are the aspects that 
deny that it is the case that moral claims must be justified from an archimedean 2nd order 
perspective. I will explain how Dworkin's fundamental mistake is his inconsistent attempt at 
necessarily ridding ethics of 2nd order metaphysical commitments. I will also explain 
Dworkin's simultaneous failures and successes as an attempt to harmonize two desires. The 
first desire is a desire to not have the truth of 1st order moral claims contingent on the 
pronouncements of archimedean claims that are external to 1st order moral practice. The 
second desire is a desire to justify a morality that cannot commit us to a potentially 
extravagant metaphysics. I will explain that if (C) is correct, the harmonization of these two 
desires is impossible because the second desire is infeasible. This is because the truth of (C) 
implies that there is no moral position from which one could delegitimize potential 
metaphysical commitments of morality. 
 As noted earlier, the conclusion of this thesis will contain a summary of the 
arguments presented in the thesis. The epilogue will consist of a discussion of the ways in 
which (C) and moral archimedeanism conflict.  I will end that discussion with a brief synopsis 
of the pros and cons of affirming either meta-ethical position. It is important to remember 
throughout this thesis that I am not assuming that moral commitments are evidence of 
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anything other than claims one must affirm if one is adequately engaged in moral practice. I 
am merely interested in the question of whether or not we may be morally committed to 
constraints on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive. The affirmative answer I give to 
that question puts the meta-ethicist in a position of having to re-evaluate both his meta-ethical 
and moral commitments.  This is because of the conflict between (C) and moral 
archimedeanism.  
2. META-ETHICS AND MORAL CRITICISM 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I will attempt to give an answer to question (A). (A) is the question of 
whether a meta-ethical theory can warrant moral criticism. I will attempt to answer this 
question by analyzing a mid 20th century meta-ethical discussion by Mary Mothersill, Alan 
Gewirth, and R.C. Solomon. This discussion concerns the topic of whether meta-ethics is 
itself normative.  Each theorist in the discussion attempts to give an argument that 
demonstrates that some meta-ethical procedure is normative. They attempt to infer from this 
the claim that meta-ethics itself is normative.  I will conclude that none of the participants in 
this discussion are successful at demonstrating this claim.  However, each theorist, in a 
different way, illustrates a way in which a meta-ethical theory can affirm or deny moral 
claims. If a moral theory can affirm or deny moral claims, this opens up the possibility that the 
meta-ethical theory could deny correct moral claims or affirm false moral claims. If a meta-
ethical theory can do either of these things, that meta-ethical theory warrants moral criticism.  
 In section two of chapter one, I will give some historical background to the 
GLVFXVVLRQWRSXWLWLQSURSHUFRQWH[W,QVHFWLRQWKUHH,ZLOOH[SODLQ0DU\0RWKHUVLOO¶V
attempt to demonstrate that meta-ethics is normative. Mothersill observes a common meta-
ethical procedure she believes is normative when she observes a meta-ethicist specifying 
which set of normative claims his theory is incompatible with. From this, she infers that meta-
ethics itself is normative. She believes the procedure is motivated by an attempt by the meta-
ethicist to enable his theory to gain explanatory power.  In section four, I will critique 
0RWKHUVLOO¶VDUJXPHQWE\VKRZLQJWKDWWKLVSURFHGXUHQHHGQRWEHLQWHUSUHWHGLQDPDQQHUWKDW
is normative. In section five, I will explain how Alan Gewirth identifies a meta-ethical 
procedure that he thinks demonstrates that meta-ethics is normative. This is the procedure of 
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differentiating the moral from the non-moral.  Gewirth believes that this procedure constitutes 
a counter-example to the two predominant assumptions of his day regarding the scope of 
meta-ethics.  These assumptions are: 
 (1) Meta-Ethics is non-normative.  
              and 
                (2) The same meta-ethics is compatible with all forms of normative ethics. 
,QVHFWLRQVL[,ZLOOFULWLTXH*HZLUWK¶VDUJXPHQWVE\VKRZLQJKRZWKHGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQRIWKH
moral from the non-moral can be interpreted as a descriptive procedure.  This is true even if 
differentiating the moral from the non-moral constitutes a counter-example to (2).  The 
differentiation of the moral from the non-moral is not a counter-example to (1). (1) is the 
important counter-example for  Gewirth if he aims to demonstrate that meta-ethics is 
normative.  In section seven, I will explain how R.C. Solomon believes he has identified a 
normative procedure that meta-ethicists engage in when they differentiate what is moral from 
what is deemed moral at a given place and time. Solomon believes that meta-ethicists develop 
a model of moral language that is morally implicative as a way of differentiating those moral 
claims that are truly moral and those moral claims that are believed to be moral by particular 
societies at particular times. Like Mothersill and Gewirth, he believes the normativity of this 
procedure shows that meta-HWKLFVLVQRUPDWLYH,QVHFWLRQHLJKW,ZLOOFULWLTXH6RORPRQ¶V
claim that distinguishing the moral from the immoral is a normative procedure by also 
showing that one need not interpret the creation of a morally implicative model of language as 
a normative procedure. In section 9, I will conclude that each theorist fails to demonstrate that 
meta-ethics is normative because of an interpretive confusion. Each theorist assumes that 
because they can interpret the meta-ethical procedure they observe in a manner that is 
normative, meta-ethics itself is normative. However, each theorist, in his or her own way, 
illustrates a way in which a meta-ethical theory could warrant moral criticism. Hence, the 
discussion under analysis inadvertently answers the question of (A).  
             2.2   HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION 
 Throughout the 20th century, the dominant position in meta-ethics has been that 
meta-ethics is a morally neutral, 2nd order study of 1st order moral judgments. This position 
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was famRXVO\H[SUHVVHGLQ&/6WHYHQVRQ¶V(WKLFVDQG/DQJXDJH where he stated that,  
³0HWD-Ethics is a morally neutral study which must retain the difficult detachment of 
studying ethical MXGJPHQWVZLWKRXWPDNLQJWKHP³36 
William Frankena presented a more explicit formulation of the distinction between meta-
ethics and normative ethics in 1951.37 Frankena posited that meta-ethics was the study not of 
ethical judgments proper, but of logical, epistemological, and metaphysical statements such as 
"Good means desired," "Right Stands for a Non-Natural Property", and "Ought Implies Can."  
Normative Ethics, according to Frankena, makes ethical judgments and asks what things of 
DFWLRQVVDWLVI\HWKLFDOGHVFULSWLRQVVXFKDV³JRRG³DQG³ULJKW³38  
 Mary Mothersill, Alan Gewirth, and R.C. Solomon challenged this orthodoxy by 
attempting to identify procedures within meta-ethical theorizing and show that these 
procedures were normative. They believed that in showing that such procedures were 
normative, they were also showing that meta-ethics was normative. As noted above, I will 
show that the attempts by each theorist to demonstrate that these procedures are normative are 
unsuccessful. Part of the problem, my analysis will show, is that there is little clarity over 
what it would mean for a meta-ethical theory to be a normative theory. This lack of clarity 
manifests itself in the work by these theorists insofar as each theorist assumes that a particular 
meta-ethics procedure is normative just because one can interpret one of these procedures in a 
manner that is normative. Each writer ignores the possibility that these procedures could also 
be interpreted in a manner that is purely descriptive. However, what these theorists illustrate is 
that the procedures, even if descriptive, have implications for moral claims. If a meta-ethical 
theory can affirm or deny moral claims, this means it can deny a correct moral claim and 
affirm an incorrect moral claim. This is important for my thesis, since these affirmations and 
denials constitute a reason why one could legitimately criticize a meta-ethical theory on moral 
grounds.  
 When a meta-ethical theory can be criticized on moral grounds, I take that as a 
                                                        
36
 STEVENSON, Charles.  Ethics and Language.  USA: Yale University Press, 1944.  
37
 FRANKENA, William. Moral Philosophy at Mid-Century. Philosophical Review, 1951, vol. LX, pp. 
44 
38
 Ibid.                  
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sufficient condition of the adoption of the meta-ethical theory constituting a moral act. This is 
for the simple reason that in order for something to be criticized on moral grounds, it has to be 
morally guilty of an act that is in some way morally negative.  One act that a meta-ethical 
theory could be guilty of is either affirming incorrect moral claims or denying correct moral 
FODLPV:KHQ,VD\DPRUDOWKHRU\FDQEHPRUDOO\JXLOW\RIDPRUDOO\QHJDWLYHDFW,GRQ¶W
want to be taken too literally here. Because a theory is not a moral agent, a theory cannot, 
strictly speaking, be guilty of a morally negative act. However, we do talk in every day 
conversation of various theories warranting moral criticism for various reasons. The most 
popular example is the set of historical theories concerning World War II that deny the 
holocaust.  Here, I think the best way to interpret the claim that a holocaust denying historical 
theory is morally guilty is to think of the claim as another way of saying its proponents 
warrant moral criticism. Hence, when I discuss whether or not a particular meta-ethical theory 
is morally guilty, I mean that its proponents warrant moral criticism in virtue of affirming the 
theory.  
 If a meta-ethical theory is guilty of something that is morally negative, this implies 
proponents of the theory are in some way responsible for doing something morally negative. 
If this is true, this shows that affirming the meta-ethical theory in question is a moral act. It is 
a moral act, on one scenario, because affirming the meta-ethical theory may require an agent 
to either affirm incorrect moral claims or deny correct moral claims in a manner that is 
morally negative. Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that affirming a meta-ethical 
theory can warrant moral criticism for reasons other than the specific implications of the 
theory for 1st order moral claims. However, if the arguments in this chapter are correct, I will 
have shown that it is at least possible that the affirmation of a meta-ethical theory can warrant 
moral criticism. If this possibility is genuine, this opens the door for other potential reasons 
why affirming a meta-ethical theory can warrant moral criticism.  
 One might raise a worry here that there is a morally significant difference between 
affirming an incorrect moral claim and affirming a theory that commits us to affirming an 
incorrect moral claim.  One could raise a similar worry about the moral difference between 
denying a correct moral claim and affirming a theory that commits us to the denial of a correct 
moral claim. According to the rationale of this worry, the choice to affirm a theory is morally 
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distinct from a choice to affirm a moral claim. This is because when we affirm a theory, we 
are primarily truth tracking.  When we truth track, we are prepared to resign ourselves to 
truths we may find morally repugnant.  On the other hand, when we moralize, we are 
deliberately attempting to endorse a set of views that are not morally repugnant.  Hence, if 
during the process of moralizing, one were to affirm a morally incorrect claim, this would be 
at odds with the aim of our moral commitments.  On the other hand, if during the affirmation 
of a theory, one were to affirm a morally repugnant claim, this would not be at odds with the 
aim of the practice of theory selection. This is because, during theoU\VHOHFWLRQZHGRQ¶W
assume that the world will conform to our moral commitments. When we moralize, we do. 
According to this rationale, since truth tracking and moralizing are both morally permissible 
activities, it is morally permissible to affirm morally incorrect claims as long as one only does 
it during theory selection and affirmation.  
 One can answer this worry by noting that the worry assumes that moral claims can 
conflict with facts about the world. This means that if we hold a correct moral claim (a) that 
presupposes worldly fact (b), a theory could commit us to the denial of (b) without forcing us 
WREHPRUDOO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRUUHQRXQFLQJD/HW¶VDVVXPHDLVWKHYLHZWKDWLWLVEDGWR
VSDQNFKLOGUHQ/HW¶VDOVRDVVXPHWKDWWKHZRUOGO\IDFWb) that (a) hinges on, is the claim that 
spanking children psychologically damages children in the long run. Now, suppose we adopt 
some theory of child development that implies that spanking children does not 
psychologically damage them, but instead gives children numerous psychological benefits that 
make children healthier both physically and mentally. Here, we have our theory committing 
us to denying (b). If our moral commitments can conflict with the world, we would not say 
that affirming this theory gave us reason to renounce our moral claim that spanking children is 
bad. Rather, we would say that our moral commitment that spanking children is bad just 
happened to conflict with the facts of the world which our affirmed theory implied.  
 The absurdity of this example illustrates the fact that as moral agents engaged in 
PRUDOSUDFWLFHZHDVVXPHWKDWIDFWVDERXWWKHZRUOGGRQ¶WFRQIOLFWZLWKRXUPRUDOFODLPV:H
assume that if some moral claim we hold hinges on a fact about the world which turns out to 
be false, we ought to consider the moral claim one that we no longer have reason to believe is 
a correct moral claim. Similarly, we think that if a moral claim (a) hinges on a worldly fact (b) 
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which obtains, any theory that denies (b) is a false theory. For example, we hold the moral 
FODLPWKDWWKH1D]L¶VZHUHDQHYLOSROLWLFDOUHJLPHDLQSDUWEHFDXVHWKH\exterminated six 
million Jews (b).  If a historical theory committed us to denying (b), we would justifiably 
believe that historical theory was a false theory. Hence, a presupposition of moral practice is 
that facts about the world do not conflict with our moral claims.  
 Throughout this chapter, I will be using certain terms in a manner that is consistent 
with the way they are used by contemporary meta-HWKLFLVWV,ZLOOUHIHUWRWKHWHUP³PHWD-
HWKLFV´WRGHVFULEHWKHVHWRIWKHRULHVZKHUHE\WKHRULVWVDWWHPSWWRGHIHQGDQGV\VWHPDWL]Hnd 
order moral claims.  When I use the term ³QRUPDWLYHHWKLFV´,ZLOOUHIHUWRWKHVHWRIWKHRULHV
whereby moral theorists attempt to defend and systematize 1st order moral claims. When I use 
WKHWHUP³QRUPDWLYHFODLP´,ZLOOEHUHIHUULQJWRDFODLPRQHFDQQRWDIILUPZLWKRXWDOVR
endorsing a normative state of affairs.  To endorse a normative claim is to affirm the 
normative state of affairs the claim describes. For instance, to endorse the normative claim 
WKDWWRUWXULQJLQQRFHQWFKLOGUHQLVZURQJLVWRVD\³:KHQWKHWRUWXUHRILQQRFHQWFKLOGUHQ
happens, this state of affairs really possesses the property of wrongness.´7KLVLVGLVWLQFWIURP
PHUHO\VD\LQJ³:KHQWKHWRUWXUHRILQQRFHQWFKLOGUHQKDSSHQVWKLVVWDWHRIDIIDLUVSRVVHVVHV
WKHSURSHUW\RIZURQJQHVVDFFRUGLQJWRPRUDOLW\´,WLVDOVRLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWP\
definition of normative claim is not inherently rHDOLVW7HUPVVXFKDV³QRUPDWLYHVWDWHRI
DIIDLUV´DQG³SURSHUW\RIZURQJQHVV´FDQEHXQGHUVWRRGLQHLWKHUUHDOLVWRUDQWL-realist ways. 
A normative state of affairs, for instance, can be understood as the feature of a state of affairs 
that makes a situatLRQVDWLVI\WKHFRQGLWLRQVRIWKHSUHGLFDWH³ZURQJ´7KLVFRQFHSWLRQRID
normative state of affairs is neutral between moral realism and moral anti-realism. Also, a 
SURSHUW\OLNH³ZURQJQHVV´FDQEHXQGHUVWRRGLQDPDQQHUWKDWLVQHXWUDOZLWKUHJDUGVWKHLssue 
RIPRUDOUHDOLVP7KHSURSHUW\RI³ZURQJQHVV´FRXOGVLPSO\UHIHUWRWKHIDFWWKDWDJLYHQ
situation satisfies those conditions that make it wrong.39 What is important is the affirmation 
RIWKHQRUPDWLYHFRQWHQWRI³ZURQJQHVV´ 
In any affirmation of thHQRUPDWLYHFRQWHQWRI³ZURQJQHVV´WKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
                                                        
39For an elaboration of minimalist accounts of properties, facts, and truths, see RAMSEY, P.F. Facts and 
Propositions. Aristotelian Society, 1927, Supplementary Volume 7, 153-170. 
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the wrong act (torturing children, for example) and the wrongness must be normative.  A 
necessary condition of such a relationship obtaining this normativity is that the relationship 
not be a mistake of some sort.  If it were a mistake, this would amount to a denial of the 
ZURQJQHVVLQTXHVWLRQ,IZKDW,PHDQE\³WRUWXULQJFKLOGUHQLVZURQJ´LVWKDWLWLVDPLVWDNH
WRWKLQN³WRUWXULQJFKLOGUHQLVZURQJ´P\DVVHUWLRQDPRXQWVWRDGHQLDORIWKHFODLP³WRUWXULQJ
FKLOGUHQLVZURQJ´,IWKHFODLP³WRUWXULQJFKLOGUHQLVZURQJ´LVRQO\LQWHQGHGWRPHDQWKDW
morality entails the disapproval of torturing children, the claim is not normative either.  This 
is because in this interpretation of the claim there is no specification that morality is not just a 
VHULHVRIPLVWDNHV,IWKHFODLP³WRUWXULQJFKLOGUHQLVZURQJ´LVRQO\LQWHQGHGWRPHDQWKDWZH
FDQFODVVLI\DFWLRQVLQWRµULJKW¶DQGµZURQJ¶FDWHJRULHVDQGWKHWRUWXUHRIFKLOGUHQILWVLQWRWKH
µZURQJ¶FDWHJRU\WKLVPHDQLQJRI³WRUWXULQJFKLOGUHQLVZURQJ´LVDOVRQRWQRUPDWLYH2QH
FDQFODVVLI\WKHDFWRIWRUWXULQJFKLOGUHQLQWRWKHFDWHJRU\RIµZURQJ¶ZLWKRXWHQGRUVLQJWKDW
the categories themselves are anything but mistakes of some sort. Hence, a necessary 
condition of any genuine normative claim is that the normative content of the claim must be 
explicitly endorsed. It cannot be ambiguous whether such content is endorsed or not.  
7KHUHDVRQ,GRQ¶WGHILQHDQRUPDWLYHFODLPDVPHUHO\DFODLPWKDWKDVnormative 
implications is that definition seems to have problematic counter-examples.  There seems to 
EHDOLWDQ\RIGHVFULSWLYHFODLPVWKDWKDYHQRUPDWLYHLPSOLFDWLRQVWKDWGRQ¶WVHHPLQWXLWLYHO\
like normative claims. Such claims include, ³:RPHQDUHVLJQificantly less intelligent than 
PHQ´³$OOOLEHUDOVDUH3HGRSKLOHV´RU³7KH+RORFDXVWLVDP\WKFUHDWHGE\-HZLVKPHGLD´
What is of importance here is that while it may be the case that such seemingly descriptive 
claims are actually normative, further argumentation is required to show this.  On the other 
hand, to say that a normative claim involves a claim one cannot affirm without also endorsing 
a normative state of affairs is trivially true. There does not seem to be any obvious 
counterexamples here.  It just seems bizarre to say that one could make a normative claim 
without endorsing the normative state of affairs the claim describes.  
 :KHQ,XVHWKHWHUP³GHVFULSWLYHFODLP´,PHDQDFODLPWKDWFDQEHDIILUPHGZLWKRXW
committing one to endorse the normative content of any normative claim. This way, some 
claims about morality can count as descriptive. Such descriptive claims can include statements 
about what is considered moral under various moral systems. Also, when I say that a meta-
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ethical theory is ³GHVFULSWLYHO\DGHTXDWH´I mean it is a meta-ethical theory that is in the class 
of theories that contains a sufficiently detailed and illuminating collection of universally 
affirmed moral claims. Such an endorsement is not, on my definition, normative because the 
endorsement does not presuppose that the universally affirmed moral claims are not in some 
sense mistakes 
)LQDOO\ZKHQ,PHQWLRQWKH³LQWHUSUHWLYHFRQWH[W´RIDWKHRU\,ZLOOEHWDONLQJDERXW
the appropriate framework of interpretation that a reader should approach the theory with.  
Such a framework could include inclusions or exclusions of a range of normative claims. This 
depends on the meta-ethicist at hand.  If a meta-ethicist assumes that a 1st order normative 
ethics like moral relativism is absurd, he could instruct the reader to interpret his meta-ethical 
theory in a manner where it is taken for granted that relativism is false. Moreover, there could 
be a tacit assumption on the part of the meta-ethicist that his reader already believes moral 
relativism is absurd. Hence, his meta-ethical theory could be designed to reflect the normative 
ethics assumptions of his readers as a way of offering a better meta-ethical account of those 
assumptions.  
Before my analysis of Mothersill, Gewirth, and Solomon begins, it is also important 
WRKLJKOLJKWDZLGHVSUHDGFKDQJHWKDWVHHPVWRKDYHKDSSHQHGVLQFHWKH¶VDQG¶V7KH
contemporary desideratum of meta-ethical theories is that an adequate meta-ethical theory 
should both accommodate the face value of moral practice and place that practice within a 
wider understanding.40 By accommodating the face value of moral practice, it is meant that a 
meta-ethical theory will describe moral practice in a manner consistent with the pre-
theoretical appearances of 1st order morality that are the datum from which meta-ethical 
theories are constructed. By placing that practice within a wider understanding, it is normally 
(although not necessarily) meant that the meta-ethicist will be describing the ontological and 
epistemological elements of moral practice within a naturalistic framework.  
 What differentiates Mothersill, Gewirth, and Solomon from contemporary meta-
ethicists is that contemporary meta-HWKLFLVWVGRQ¶WXQLIRUPO\DJUHHDERXWZKHWKHUDPHWD-
                                                        
40See the introduction of Morality without Foundations by Mark Timmons.  TIMMONS, Mark, Morality 
without Foundations, Oxon, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999. pp. 11-12.  
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ethical theory becomes more or less attractive in virtue of its moral implications.41 These 
earlier writers I am analyzing, in contrast, seemed to presuppose that if a meta-ethical theory 
contains 2nd order moral claims which are incompatible with absurd 1st order moral claims, 
this counts in favor of that theory.  The idea, roughly speaking, is that a theory gains 
explanatory power insofar as that theory contains 2nd order claims which are incompatible 
with absurd 1st order claims.42  This means that if a meta-ethical theory contains a 2nd order 
FODLPVXFKDV³PRUDOXQLYHUVDOLVPLVDQHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQRIPRUDOMXVWLILFDWLRQ³WKLVPHWD-
ethical theory is incompatible with absurd forms of normative ethics such as moral relativism.  
These writers did not see this incompatibility as an example of a meta-ethics overstepping its 
bounds into the field of normative ethics.  Rather, for these writers, it was an example of a 
meta-ethical theory explaining more than its rivals. I will not attempt to take a stand on the 
earlier or more recent views on this issue. However, my aim in pointing out this difference is 
to clarify the motivations of the writers I am discussing for wanting to demonstrate that meta-
ethics was normative.  For these early writers, the more correct normative claims a meta-
ethical theory took a stand on, the more illuminating of a meta-ethical theory it became.  
 To contemporary readers, many of the examples cited by these theorists may seem 
unlikely candidates for anything resembling meta-ethics. This is because contemporary 
readers have more firmly entrenched the idea that if a claim appears to be normative or have 
normative implications, it is, ipso facto, a non-meta-ethical claim.43  This was not true of the 
meta-HWKLFLVWVRIWKH¶VDQG¶V$PXFKPRUHSDUDGoxical situation existed for them.  
Like contemporary meta-ethicists, they accepted, by and large, that meta-ethics was a morally 
neutral study of 2nd order moral claims.  However, one can find examples in the meta-ethical 
theories of this time of rather blatant normative claims.  These claims all came from published 
papers and books on the subject of meta-ethics.44  They were either advocated as explicit 
components of meta-ethical theories or advocated in a way where there was no attempt by the 
                                                        
41,GRQ¶WPHDQWRVXJJHVWWKLVLVDQXQFRQWURYHUVLDORXWFRPHRILQIHUHQFHWRWKHEHVWH[SODQDWLRQ$OVR
there could be other considerations which make a morally implicative meta-ethical theory lose 
theoretical virtues.  
42This is a consequence of the theory being able to say more if it more precisely identifies the correct set 
of moral claims.  
43
 For evidence of this, see the discussions in Chapter 4. 
44
 All of the examples high lighted by all three authors do this. 
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author to differentiate these claims from the other meta-ethical claims happening in the same 
piece of writing. No one thought that these claims stopped the meta-ethical theories they 
appeared alongside from being meta-ethical theories.  Nor did they assume these claims were 
non-meta-ethical in virtue of being normative.   
 It would be quite bizarre to claim that these were not meta-ethical claims because 
contemporary meta-ethicists would not consider these claims as part of the province of meta-
ethics.  This would be confusing the beliefs of particular meta-ethicists at a given time with a 
necessary condition of meta-ethics. This is the equivalent of excluding Miles Davis from the 
FDWHJRU\RIµMD]]PXVLFLDQ¶EHFDXVHMD]]PXVLFLDQVRIWKH¶s did not believe jazz could 
encompass electric guitars or synthesizers.  Like jazz, meta-ethics is a practice defined both by 
what its practitioners have done and what they currently do.  Since there is no current 
consensus (or arguments for that matter) suggesting that the meta-ethics of the mid-20th 
century was actually normative ethics, I will assume that the meta-ethicists of the mid-
twentieth century were engaging in the same practice as contemporary meta-ethicists.  After 
all, both the original and contemporary meta-ethicists have created theories of 2nd order moral 
claims that say very little, if anything, about normative ethics. Both contemporary and older 
meta-ethicists ask the same kinds of questions regarding the relationship of 1st to 2nd order 
moral claims. This is why WKHWHUPµPHWD-HWKLFV¶ZLOOEHXVHGLQWKLVGLVFXVVLRQWRUHIHUWRDOO
2nd order moral theories about 1st order moral claims. This is a definition of meta-ethics that is 
compatible with both the older and more contemporary meta-ethics theories. Whether we are 
dealing with a meta-HWKLFLVWRIWKH¶VRURIWRGD\ZHFDQVD\WKDWWKHPHWD-ethicist is 
attempting to advocate and explain 2nd order moral claims about 1st order moral claims.   
               2.3 MARY MOTHERSILL 
 The first major challenge I will consider to the claim that meta-ethics is non- 
normative came from Mary Mothersill. Mothersill noticed that exponents of various meta-
ethical theories seemed to commit themselves to normative claims in the midst of their meta-
ethical theorizing.  She noted, for example, that intuitionists such as W.D. Ross45 committed 
                                                        
45ROSS, W.D. The Right and the Good. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1999. pp. 122 
 
 46 See Mothersill (1952), 587-594. 
  
47 PERRY, R.B. General Theory of value. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926. pp.659-692.  
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themselves to the view that states of mind are good, to the extent that they are characterized 
by moral virtue, intelligence, and pleasure.  For her, this view was normative because it gave a 
normative evaluation of various states of mind.46 Moreover, Mothersill noted that this view 
DSSHDUHGZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIDGLVFXVVLRQRI5RVV¶VLQWXLWLRQLVWPHWD-ethical theory. There 
was no attempt by Ross to differentiate this view from his meta-ethics because this view had 
normative implications.  Hence, Mothersill, in keeping with the assumptions of her day, 
assumed that Ross was simply advocating a meta-ethical theory that had a normative 
component. She similarly observed that the ethical naturalist R.B. Perry had concluded his 
meta-ethical treatisH³*HQHUDO7KHRU\RI9DOXH´ZLWKDFKDSWHURQ³7KH+LJKHVW*RRG´47 For 
Mothersill, this was another example of a meta-ethicist including a 1st order normative view 
within his meta-ethical theory.   
 Mothersill additionally gave a normative interpretation of a comment made by C.L. 
Stevenson in his famous work, Ethics and Language.  In this work, Stevenson insisted that his 
meta-HWKLFVLQWKLVFDVHQRQFRJQLWLYLVPGLGQRWµFRQILQHRQHWRDSDVVLYHRUF\QLFDO
QHXWUDOLW\¶48 This comment, in particular, seemed to suggest to Mothersill that Stevenson was 
excluding his meta-ethical theory from compatibility with a certain sort of normative ethics. 
Stevenson in the same work went on to say that ethical ideals must be fought for with the 
ZRUGVµULJKW¶DQGµZURQJ¶DQGVXSSRUWHGZLWKµFOHDUPLQGHGUHDVRQV¶49 This, again, looked 
suspiciously to Mothersill like a meta-ethical theory taking moral positions against a certain 
kind of normative ethics.  
 3DUWRI0RWKHUVLOO¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI6WHYHQVRQZHFDQDVVXPHLVPRWivated by the 
LGHDWKDW6WHYHQVRQ¶VWKHRU\ZRXOGJDLQH[SODQDWRU\SRZHULQVRIDUDVLWZDVLQFRPSDWLEOH
with a normative ethics of µSDVVLYHDQGF\QLFDOQHXWUDOLW\µ7KHLGHDKHUHLVWKDWDPHWD-
ethical theory gains explanatory power insofar as it explains more features of moral practice.  
If it turns out that one of those features is that moral practice is incompatible with a passive 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
48 Stevenson (1944), 122. 
  
 
 
 
 
49Ibid., pp. 107.  
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and cynical normative ethics, a meta-ethical theory gains explanatory power insofar as it 
countenances that feature. We can assume this for two reasons.  The first is that Mothersill 
writes as though this incompatibility with passive and cynical neutrality is a positive attribute 
of the theory.  The second is that nowhere does Mothersill ever mention that there may be a 
lack of DOLJQPHQWEHWZHHQDWKHRU\¶VDSSURSULDWLRQRIDMXVWLILHGPRUDOVWDQGDQGWKDWWKHRU\¶V
assessment of the truth about ethics.50 We can assume that Mothersill believed that insofar as 
a meta-ethical theory appropriated a justified moral stand into its explanations, the more about 
ethics it was explaining.  
 Nonetheless, her interpretation of Stevenson is obviously at odds with the 
interpretation of Stevenson by contemporary meta-ethicists.  The contemporary meta-ethicist 
would interpret Stevenson as meaning that his meta-ethics (in this case, noncognitivism) 
simply did not entail a normative ethics of passive and cynical neutrality. However, he would 
not be interpreted as claiming that his meta-ethical views entail that a 1st order normative 
ethics of passive and cynical neutrality is false. The contemporary meta-ethicist may think that 
6WHYHQVRQ¶VWKHRU\ORVHVQRWKLQJLQIDLOLQJWREHLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKDQRUPDWLYHHWKLFVRI
passive and cynical neutrality.  For the contemporary meta-ethicist, it may be enough for 
6WHYHQVRQ¶VWKHRU\WREHDEOHWRH[SODLQZK\UHODWLYLVPLVZURQJ51 There may not be any 
GLUHFWHQWDLOPHQWVIURP6WHYHQVRQ¶VWKHRU\WRWKHIDOVLW\RIUHODWLYLVP,WLVUHDVRQDEOHWR
assume this is because there does not seem to be a widespread, recent agreement regarding 
whether or not meta-ethical theories gain explanatory power by excluding absurd normative 
ethics. Thus, it seems unreasonable to assume that contemporary meta-ethicists would find 
6WHYHQVRQ¶VWKHRU\XQDWWUDFWLYHMXVWEHFDXVHLWIDLOHGWR entail that relativism was false.  
 Mothersill admitted that the normative claims she cited from Stevenson and other 
meta-ethicists could be interpreted as something over and above the meta-ethics theories in 
the books in which these claims occur.  However, she observed that there was no indication in 
the works themselves that these comments were meant to be taken as something distinct from 
                                                        
50This feature counts in favour of this interpretation. 
517KLVLVZKDW%ODFNEXUQ¶VTXDVL-realism does in regards to relativism. See Blackburn (1998), Chapter 9 
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the meta-ethical theories being produced.52 Hence, Mothersill believed that the correct 
interpretation of such meta-ethicists was that they were taking stands on normative claims. 
Moreover, she saw that such stands were outcomes of the meta-ethics theories themselves. 
She reasoned that the attractiveness of a meta-ethical theory depended on it being understood 
³LQFRQWH[W³7KHFRQWH[WIRU0RWKHUVLOO53 was the set of recommendations for interpreting 
such theories made by their proponents.   
 This suggested that for every meta-ethical theory, there was a possible way of 
interpreting that theory which was compatible with a normative ethics the meta-ethicist 
disapproved of.  The meta-ethicist, in order to keep himself from advocating a theory 
compatible with a dubious normative ethics, would recommend that one interpret his meta-
ethical theory in a manner that excluded that normative ethics. This recommendation for 
interpreting his theory was a way for the meta-ethicist to ensure that the reader understood his 
meta-ethical theory in the interpretive context of his choosing. The correct context would be 
whichever interpretation of the theory the meta-ethicist felt aided the overall theory. Hence, 
for Mothersill, this meant the interpretation that gave the theory a higher explanatory power.  
After all, a meta-ethics that was incompatible with a dubious normative ethics had more 
explanatory power than a meta-ethics that was compatible with that normative ethics. Hence, 
the most charitable interpretation of Stevenson would be one where his noncognitivism 
excluded a 1st order normative ethics based on passive, cynical neutrality.  
 For Mothersill54, differentiating the correct and incorrect interpretations of such 
noncognitivist theories was, as far as ordinary language was concerned, a normative endeavor. 
Curiously, Mothersill55 said very little in the way of explaining why such differentiation was 
normative. Regardless, one can easily identify the reason why Mothersill might have thought 
the differentiation was normative.  Figuring out the right context of interpretation for a meta-
ethics theory involves asking oneself whether the interpretation is consistent with one¶VPRUDO
                                                        
52See Mothersill (1952), 587-594. This distinction seems to be a product of later theoretical assumptions 
about the nature of meta-ethical theory. 
53See Mothersill (1952),  587--594. 
54
 Ibid. 587-594. 
55The other theorists would pick up where she left off in this regard. 
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judgments. This means the agent interpreting the theory must first be able to identify the set of 
moral claims he affirms. In order to identify these claims, he must have some degree of 
confidence that they are in fact, the moral claims he affirms. Confidence that one knows a set 
RIFRUUHFWPRUDOFODLPVLPSOLHVDZLOOLQJQHVVWRDVVHUWWKRVHFODLPV7KXVLGHQWLI\LQJRQH¶V
moral claims is a process whereby an agent decides that he has a willingness to assert a set of 
moral claims. This seems rather straightforwardly like a normative activity. Any time an agent 
engages in an introspective act that ends with the agent affirming a normative claim, this act 
seems to involve a normative endorsement. 
 Of course, one could object that all an agent needs to do in order to correctly know a 
set of moral judgments is consult empirical claims regarding which moral judgments people 
actually hold.  The difficulty with this objection is that what moral judgments society holds at 
a given time may be mistaken. Thus, the individual meta-HWKLFLVWPXVWFRPSDUHVRFLHW\¶V
moral judgments with his own if his goal is to find the set of moral judgments that are both 
correct and socially accepted.  This seems to be the actual goal of the meta-ethicist if the 
meta-ethicist attempts to create a meta-ethical theory that is incompatible with a dubious 
normative ethics. If Stevenson were trying to create such a version of noncognitivism, he 
would not want to exclude a normative ethics of passive, cynical neutrality only because 
western society frowned upon passive, cynical neutrality.  He would also have wanted to 
exclude a passive, cynical morally neutral normative ethics from his noncognitivism because 
such a normative ethics was incompatible with his own moral judgments about what is right. 
2. 4 CRITIQUE OF MOTHERSILL 
 :HFDQVHHWKDWQRQHRI0RWKHUVLOO¶V argument shows that the interpretive context 
Mothersill believes meta-ethical theories require is normative.  This is because that 
interpretive context may just be a specification by the meta-ethicist of how he intends the 
reader to interpret his theory. To give an example, suppose a meta-ethicist defends a version 
of moral realism. Lets then suppose that the meta-ethicist states that the correct interpretation 
of his version of moral realism is one where that moral realism does not imply moral 
absolutism. Here, the interpretive context merely means that the reader interpret this version 
of moral realism as a version of moral realism that does not imply moral absolutism. This 
context is not normative because the claim made was the outcome of a classification 
Page 41 of 227 
 
procedure. It need not have also been the outcome of the endorsement of morality where 
morality is excluded from being conceptualized as a series of mistakes. All the meta-ethicist 
endorses is the view that morality does not imply moral absolutism and that this is an 
interpretive assumption he wishes his reader to make in order to adequately understand his 
meta-ethical theory. Moreover, the reader can understand perfectly well that the meta-
HWKLFLVW¶VYHUVLRQRIPRUDOUHDOLVPGRHVQRWLPSO\PRUDODEVROXWLVPUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHUHDGHU¶V
opinions about the plausibility of moral absolutism.  
 To illustrate this point more clearly, let us imagine a reader sympathetic to moral 
absolutism. Now let us suppose the reader sees that the meta-ethicist who crafted this theory 
specifies that his version of moral realism, interpreted in the right context, does not imply 
moral absolutism.  Does the reader need to agree with the meta-ethicist about the 
incompatibility of moral absolutism and morality in order to understand how to correctly 
interpret the meta-ethicist¶VWKHRU\",WVHHPVQRW$OOWKHUHDGHUPXVWXQGHUVWDQGLVZKDWWKH
meta-ethicist specifies as the appropriate context to interpret his theory.  If the reader finds 
that this context involves 1st order moral assumptions that are dubious, this only makes the 
UHDGHUILQGWKHWKHRU\LPSODXVLEOH,WGRHVQRWFKDQJHWKHUHDGHU¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHWKHRU\
The reader does not have to assume that the meta-ethicist is correct in creating a version of 
moral realism that does not imply moral absolutism. All the reader must do is attempt to 
understand what the theorist means when the theorist specifies the theory he communicates to 
the reader. Some interpretation may be involved in this activity, but none of it seems 
normative. It is not clear how one must endorse any normative claim in order to understand 
what someone else was trying to say.  
 7R0RWKHUVLOO¶VFUHGLWKHUDUJXPHQWGRHVVKRZWKDWPHWD-ethical theories can include 
or exclude certain normative ethics theories. These inclusions and exclusions may, of course, 
EHQRUPDWLYH+RZHYHUWKHUHLVQRWKLQJLQ0RWKHUVLOO¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWVKRZVWKDWWKH\PXVW
be. In order to show this, Mothersill would have to show that the exclusions and inclusions 
involve endorsements of the normative states of affairs described by normative claims. It is 
not clear that all judgments about the correctness or incorrectness of normative ethics theories 
are themselves judgments that involve the endorsements of the state of affairs described by 
normative claims. If a consequentialist rejects Kantianism on the grounds that Kantianism is a 
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descriptively inadequate theory of what human beings do when they make moral decisions, it 
is not clear that this rejection is normative. The consideration, which led to the rejection, in 
this case, seems purely descriptive.  Moreover, this consideration seems to suggest nothing 
about whether or not the moral decisions of human beings are mistakes. We can imagine a 
second example where a moral theorist endorsing a version of consequentialism does so 
because he believes consequentialist reasoning is what human beings do when they make 
moral decisions they are willing to endorse. It does not seem here that the moral theorist is 
endorsing consequentialism on the basis of any endorsement of a normative state of affairs. 
Both of these examples illustrate just how one can affirm a normative ethics theory because of 
descriptive considerations. The affirmation of the normative ethics theory does not show that 
the descriptive considerations which motivated the affirmation are also normative.  
,QRUGHUIRU0RWKHUVLOO¶VDUJXPHQWWREHVXFFHVVIXOVKHZRXOGKDYHWRVKRZWKDWD
meta-HWKLFLVW¶VH[FOXVLRQRIDQRUPDWLYHHWKLFVWKHRU\IURPKLVPHWD-ethical theory could only 
happen because of the meta-HWKLFLVW¶VHQGRUVHPHQWRIDQRUPDWLYHVWDWHRIDIIDLUV7KLVZRXOG
show that necessarily, when a meta-ethicist excludes a normative ethics theory from 
compatibility with his meta-ethical theory, that exclusion is normative. Since she fails to do 
this, her argument that meta-ethics theories are normative fails to succeed. If it were the case 
that sometimes meta-ethicists excluded a normative ethics theory from their meta-ethical 
theories because of the endorsement of a normative state of affairs, this would only show that 
meta-ethicists sometimes engage in normative activities. In this case, it would be ambiguous 
whether or not the meta-ethicist was simply overstepping his bounds as a meta-ethicist and 
engaging in an act of normative ethLFVWKHRUL]LQJ,QRUGHUIRU0RWKHUVLOO¶VDUJXPHQWWREH
successful, she would have to show these normative activities were an essential component of 
a meta-ethics procedure which was itself an essential component of meta-ethical theorizing.  
However, the fact that the argument fails to establish what it sets out to establish does 
not mean it does not give us another important insight into the nature of meta-ethics. 
0RWKHUVLOO¶VDUJXPHQWGRHVVKRZDPRQJRWKHUWKLQJVWKDWWKHSURFHVVRIWU\LQJWRFUHDWHD
descriptively adequate meta-ethical theory can end in the rejection of moral claims. Moreover, 
her analysis shows that one meta-ethical theory may not be compatible with all moral claims 
just in virtue of being a meta-ethical theory.  Furthermore, if a meta-ethical theory is not 
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compatible with all moral claims, that means a meta-ethical theory is committed to the 
rejection of certain moral claims.  If such moral claims happen to be true, this opens up the 
possibility of that meta-ethical theory warranting moral criticism.  
 A descriptively adequate meta-ethical theory can end in the rejection of moral claims 
because the meta-ethicist has to decide which set of moral claims constitutes morality. This is 
the case because he has to identify the phenomenon of morality before he can give his 2nd 
order explanations of individual moral claims. This identification can¶WEHWHUULEO\
comprehensive.  After all, the meta-HWKLFLVWFDQ¶WZULWHDOLVWRIDOOWKHPRUDOFODLPVKHWKLQNV
are correct that he wants his meta-ethical theory to describe. However, the meta-ethicist can 
eliminate certain moral claims or normative ethics theories at the beginning of the 
construction of his meta-ethical views.  He can, for instance, eliminate moral relativism or a 
1st order ethics that FRQVLVWVRIDµSDVVLYHDQGF\QLFDOQHXWUDOLW\¶$OVRWKHPHWD-ethicist can 
VSHFLI\WRWKHUHDGHUWKDWKHZLVKHVWRHOLPLQDWHFHUWDLQPRUDOYLHZVIURPKLVWKHRU\¶V
consideration by suggesting to the reader how to interpret his theories. Although I am not 
suggesting Stevenson actually does this, Stevenson could have suggested to the reader that the 
reader interpret his theory in a manner that implies the denial of a passive and cynical 1st order 
ethics.  After all, if it turns out that a passive and cynical 1st order ethics is not moral, a meta-
ethics that countenanced this could increase its descriptive adequacy. This is one respect in 
which Mothersill was entirely correct.  
 She was correct because a meta-ethicist is attempting to give 2nd order explanations 
of 1st order moral claims. Insofar as that meta-ethicist starts with a more detailed set of 
assumptions about what the set of 1st order moral claims include, the more detailed his meta-
ethical explanations can be. After all, different sets of 1st order moral claims are best explained 
by different meta-ethical explanations. If a normative view like moral relativism were true at 
the 1st order, the best meta-ethical explanation of relativism would be quite different to the 
best meta-ethical explanation of a 1st order view like moral absolutism. The plausibility of 
meta-ethical explanations like motivational externalism or motivational internalism would be 
quite different if relativism or moral absolutism were true. If the meta-ethicist began the 
construction of a meta-ethical theory without first deciding whether relativism was true at the 
1st order, this would limit to a large extent what the meta-ethicist could say in his theory.  
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 Mothersill is also correct that a meta-ethical theory may not be compatible with all 
forms of normative ethics just in virtue of being a meta-ethics.  The trivial example of this is 
the fact that a meta-ethical theory can be incompatible with a 1st order moral relativism.  A 
more interesting example would be the meta-ethical theory that denies a set of 1st order moral 
claims that are correct.  My purpose here is not to defend an example of this kind of meta-
ethical theory. Rather, my purpose is merely to point out its possibility.  It is this possibility 
WKDW0RWKHUVLOO¶VDUJXPHQWVillustrate.  Moreover, it is this possibility that demonstrates the 
additional possibility of a meta-ethical theory warranting moral criticism. If a meta-ethical 
theory can be incompatible with any set of 1st order moral claims, this means that meta-ethical 
theory could possibly deny correct 1st order moral claims. Moreover, it can possibly affirm 
incorrect 1st order moral claims. Whether or not it does this depends on which moral claims 
the meta-ethicist excludes in his attempts to identify morality prior to theorizing. 
               2.5 ALAN GEWIRTH 
This point would be elaborated by further theorists attempting to attack the 
traditional characterization of meta-ethics as non-normative. Nine years after Mothersill, Alan 
Gewirth presented a different challenge to this characterization.56 He aimed his challenge at 
what he saw as the two prevailing assumptions grounding the discussion: 
(1) Meta-ethics is non-normative  
              and 
              (2) The same meta-ethics is compatible with all forms of normative ethics.57   
With regards to (2), Gewirth meant that for any meta-ethical theory, that theory was 
compatible with all forms of normative ethics.58 Gewirth claimed that meta-ethicists routinely 
violate (2) in order to explain the difference between moral and non-moral agents.59 In other 
words, Gewirth noted that in order to explain the meta-ethical differences between Jesus and 
Al Capone, meta-ethical theories had to give answers to some 1st order moral questions. These 
answers would be classification oriented. While a meta-ethicist, for Gewirth, would not be 
                                                        
56See Gewirth (1960). 
57
 Ibid., 190²191. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 Ibid. 
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committed to any particular normative ethics, his rejection of certain normative claims for 
being non-moral would entail the denial of certain varieties of normative ethics. It seems, like 
Mothersill, Gewirth is presupposing that meta-ethical theories gain explanatory power when 
those theories exclude dubious forms of normative ethics (the normative ethics of Al Capone, 
for instance). Moreover, Gewirth believed that the meta-ethical theories of his time contained 
answers to moral questions in virtue of the attempt to differentiate the moral from the non-
moral.  Hence, for Gewirth, meta-ethicists routinely violated (1).  
  In order to make more persuasive his claim that meta-ethicists make moral claims, 
Gewirth distinguishes between ethical and non-ethical interpretations of claims. If we take a 
claim like, "John is a good carpenter", we can give this claim either an ethical or non-ethical 
interpretation. If we give the claim an ethical interpretation, we interpret it as meaning that 
John is an ethically good carpenter. Such an interpretation might be based on the fact that 
John does decent carpentry at reasonable rates and provides a service that substantially assists 
the community that John is a part of. We can also give "John is a good carpenter" a non-
ethical interpretation. Under this latter interpretation, "John is a good carpenter" is simply 
taken to mean that John is highly skilled at doing the work that carpenters do. For our 
purposes, we can say that this distinction illustrates that a single claim can be given both 
normative and descriptive interpretations. This is important for Gewirth because Gewirth is 
claiming that meta-ethicists engage in normative procedures that result in the making of moral 
claims. This means we should interpret Gewirth as meaning that meta-ethicists engage in 
procedures that result in the making of claims which are best understood as having an ethical 
interpretation. Moreover, those ethical claims result in the meta-ethicist violating (2). If meta-
ethicists violate (2) by making claims that are best understood as having an ethical 
interpretation, Gewirth believes this shows that (1) is also false.  
  Gewirth refers to R.M. Hare in attempting to illustrate that the differentiation of the 
moral from the non-moral is a normative procedure.60 Gewirth believes that Hare, when 
discussing moral justification, gives an account of a complete justification of a decision which 
explicitly takes a stand on moral issues.61For Hare, a complete justification of a decision 
                                                        
60HARE, R. M. The Language of Morals. Oxon, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991.  
61*HZLUWKDVVXPHG+DUH¶VDFFRXQWRIPRUDOMXVWLILFDWLRQZDVSDUWRIKLVPHWD-ethical theory. 
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consists of a complete account of its effects, together with a complete account of the 
principles that it observed, and the effects of observing those principles.62 For Hare, an 
attempted moral justification of a claim that either does not consist of a complete account of 
its effects, the principles that it is observing, or the effects of those principles, is not an 
adequate moral justification.  Here, Gewirth clarifies that Hare is making a distinction 
between good and bad moral justification. This distinction, according to Gewirth, is answering 
DPRUDOTXHVWLRQLQRUGHUWRJLYH+DUH¶VPHWD-ethical theory an explanatory depth absent in 
rival theories. Answering this question involves taking a moral stand on the difference 
between good and bad moral justification.63  
 Gewirth claimed that Hare was not the only meta-ethicist to take moral stands in this 
way. Gewirth claimed that Stuart Hampshire took a moral stand against versions of 
expressivism that completely characterize moral judgments as reports of feelings and 
attitudes.64 HampshLUH¶VSRVLWLRQZDVWKDWVXFKH[SUHVVLYLVPLVPLVOHDGLQJO\LQFRPSOHWH
because it ignores the typical procedures of deliberation on which moral judgments are 
based.65 For Gewirth, Hampshire is here accusing expressivism of confusing a non-moral 
procedure of deliberation with a moral one. Of course, this comment from Hampshire was 
published in 1949 when the versions of expressivism being offered were not as sophisticated 
as more contemporary versions of expressivism.66 Within contemporary expressivism, there is 
a much more salient desire on the part of theorists to accommodate the face value of 1st order 
moral discourse. Nonetheless, the point remains that Hampshire was critiquing an early 
version of expressivism on the grounds that it failed to differentiate the moral from the non-
moral.   
 Gewirth believed this differentiation to be normative because it is grounded in the 
making of a moral judgment.  Because a moral judgment is an ethical evaluation, it is a claim 
                                                        
62
 See Hare (1991), 160 
63This is an example where the identification of a set of moral claims and the endorsement of a set of 
moral claims can seem, for practical purposes, like the same act.  
64
 HAMPSHIRE, Stuart. Fallacies in Moral Philosophy.  Mind, 1949, vol. LVIII, pp. 541-544.  
65See Hampshire (1949) 
66I am thinking of those versions of expressivism which attempt to account for the 1st order of moral 
practice with no revisions at all.  
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that one can only interpret correctly as long as one interprets it as an ethical claim. Although 
he did not explain why, one can easily imagine why Gewirth just thought it was intuitively 
obvious that the differentiation of the moral from the non-moral required the making of a 
moral judgment. Agents, in everyday life, routinely differentiate the moral from the non-moral 
when they make moral judgments. A small child being pressured by his friends to steal a 
FDQG\EDUPLJKWUHVSRQGWRWKHPZLWKVRPHWKLQJOLNH³,FDQ¶WGRWKDW,WZRXOGQRWEHULJKW´
Here, the child is not merely classifying the act his friends would like him to perform within 
the category of wrongness. He is endorsing the moral claim that to steal would be wrong.  
Because this is the endorsement of a moral claim, it is also, by definition, a moral judgment.  
,WLVWKLVPRUDOMXGJPHQWWKDWFRPPXQLFDWHVWRWKHFKLOG¶VIULHQGVWKHUDWLRQDOHEHKLQGKLV
refusal to steal the candy bar. Likewise an adult being persuaded by a potential lover to cheat 
RQWKHLUVSRXVHPLJKWUHVSRQGZLWK³$VHQWLFLng as the offer is, I must decline. Cheating on 
P\VSRXVHZRXOGEHZURQJ´+HUHWKHPRUDOMXGJPHQWWKDWWKHDFWZRXOGEHZURQJH[SODLQV
the reluctance of the agent to cheat. It seems reasonable to assume that it is common 
occurrences like these, which led Gewirth to believe that the act of differentiating the moral 
from the non-moral involves making a moral judgment.  
 According to Gewirth, Hampshire was not the only meta-ethicist to differentiate the 
moral from the non-moral. Gewirth also claimed that W.D. Falk employed the same strategy 
LQKLVSDSHU³2Q*XLGLQJDQG*RDGLQJ´67 Falk went to great pains to assert that there is a 
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQPRUDOSHUVXDVLRQDQGZKDWKHFDOOHG³XQSULQFLSOHGJRDGLQJ´$JDLQ
Gewirth interpreted the differentiation between moral persuasion and ³XQSULQFLSOHGJRDGLQJ´
as a differentiation of the moral from the non-PRUDO$OWKRXJKKHGLGQ¶WH[SODLQZK\68, one 
can plausibly assume the reason was that ordinary agents typically differentiate moral 
persuasion from unprincipled goading in real life situations where the differentiation involves 
making a moral judgment. In such situations where an agent notices he has been the victim of 
XQSULQFLSOHGJRDGLQJKHGRHVQRWQRUPDOO\VD\³,ZDVWDNHQLQE\DGHOLEHUDWLRQSURFHGXUH
whicK,PLVWDNHQO\EHOLHYHGZDVDPRUDOGHOLEHUDWLRQSURFHGXUH´+HFRQWUDVWVWKH
unprincipled goading from the category of the moral by saying something like, ³WKH
                                                        
67FALK, W.D. On Guiding and Goading. Mind, 1953, vol. LXII, pp. 167.  
68See Gewirth (1960), 197.  
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XQSULQFLSOHGJRDGLQJZDVQRWVRPHWKLQJ,VKRXOGKDYHEHHQWDNHQLQE\,WZDVEDG´$JDLQ
this looks like a moral judgment rather than a mere classification. For Gewirth, any meta-
ethicist, which, qua meta-ethicist, elaborates on the distinction between the moral and the non-
moral, is violating (1).  
 With regards to (2), Gewirth, like Mothersill, claimed that meta-ethicists often make 
claims that exclude various forms of normative ethics from being consistent with their 
theories.  Here we can assume that Gewirth¶VYLHZZDVPRWLYDWHGOLNH0RWKHUVLOOE\WKH
claim that a meta-HWKLFDOWKHRU\¶VLQFRPpatibility with an absurd normative ethics lent that 
meta-ethical theory explanatory power. Gewirth gave the example of a meta-ethical claim 
made by Duncan Jones that "a man cannot be making a moral judgment unless his attitude is 
free from partiality for particular places, ages, and social groups, and from self-partiality."69 
This claim seems to rule out varieties of normative ethics that reject impartiality. Stephen 
Toulmin70 was another meta-ethicist Gewirth made use of to illustrate his point regarding 
violations of (2). Toulmin made the claim that the justification of a moral action requires that 
our reasons can be traced back to universal principles.71 Toulmin then made the more strident 
claim that moral justification that refers to reasons that cannot be traced back to universal 
principles is not moral justification at all.72 Here, Toulmin seems to be separating the moral 
from the non-moral in a way that rules out aretaic varieties of normative ethics.73 Another 
example Gewirth gives of a meta-HWKLFLVW¶VYLRODWLRQRIFRPHVDJDLQIURP50+DUH74  
+DUHPDNHVWKHFODLPWKDW³WREHFRPHDPRUDOO\DGXOWPDQLVWROHDUQWRUHFRQFLOHFRPSHWLQJ
claims of tradition and novelty by making decisions of principle.´  This claim, in a brazen 
gesture, excludes aretaic ethics from descriptions of the behavior of morally adult agents. 
Here, Hare seems to clearly exclude a wide range of normative ethics theories from his meta-
                                                        
69JONES, Duncan. Butler's Moral Philosophy. Hammondsworth, UK: Penguin Books (Pelican 
Philosophy Series), 1952.  
70TOULMIN, Stephen. An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1950.  
71See Toulmin (1950), 168 
72
 Ibid.  
73Toulmin is basically denying that all forms of normative ethics which are not either Consequentialist or 
Deontological can properly said to be called ethical.  
74See Hare (1991), 69 
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ethics.  
 Gewirth even went so far as to claim that traditional philosophers exclude certain 
normative ethics from their accounts of morality by making meta-ethical claims about moral 
motivation.75 Gewirth claimed that, for Aristotle, an account of moral motivation specified the 
psychological conditions in an agent in virtue of which his actions deserved an ethical 
predicate.76 This meant that this account of appropriate moral motivation would exclude a 
UDQJHRIQRUPDWLYHHWKLFVWKHRULHVWKDWZHUHQRWFRPSDWLEOHZLWK$ULVWRWOH¶VDFFRXQWRIPRUDO
motivation.  According to Gewirth, the same is true for Kant. This is because, for Kant, acts 
motivated by principles are what differentiates good from bad acts.77 In both cases, what is 
good in an act consists partially of mental dispositions in the agent.  Thus, for Gewirth, the 
normative ethics of Aristotle and Kant were constrained by meta-ethical positions regarding 
moral motivation. Thus, it seemed even the classical philosophers violated (2) by excluding a 
range of normative ethics views from consideration because of meta-ethical claims. 
2.6 CRITIQUE OF GEWIRTH 
Although Gewirth is keen to observe that one can give a claim an ethical or non-
ethical interpretation, he fails in his arguments to show that claims invoked by meta-ethicists 
must have an ethical interpretation. After all, a meta-ethicist could advocate a meta-ethics 
theory that is incompatible with a normative ethics theory for reasons which need not be 
claims that require an ethical interpretation. We can see here that Gewirth has not established 
that the violation of (2) is itself an indication that a meta-ethical theory is normative.  A meta-
ethical theory could be incompatible with a normative ethics theory for reasons that are 
GHVFULSWLYH/HWµVLPDJLQHDPHWD-ethical theory that contains an Aristotelian account of moral 
motivation.  Let us suppose that this meta-ethical theory is incompatible with a variety of 
FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVPZKHUHDQDJHQW¶s motivation is irrelevant to the moral goodness of his 
actions.  Must this incompatibility be based on a moral judgment about the value of actions 
                                                        
75See Gewirth (1960), 199-200.  Here Gewirth notices that part of the project of traditional normative 
ethicists have been to specify the appropriate psychological conditions in an agent to make an action 
qualify as being appropriately motivated. Here, the project of contemporary meta-ethicists and 
traditional normative ethicists seems to overlap.   
76Ibid., 201 
77Ibid., 201 
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with certain motivations? It does not seem so.  The proponent of this meta-ethics could simply 
affirm that a morally good act is one  that requires that it be done with certain 
motivations. He could affirm this while simultaneously affirming that, in some sense, morality 
is a series of mistakes. Of course, the Aristotelian account of moral motivation could be 
interpreted in a normative way where, in the context of this meta-ethical theory, morality, in 
some sense, is not a series of mistakes.  This normative interpretation of the Aristotelian 
account of moral motivation could be what this meta-ethical theory uses to explain why good 
acts must be coupled with the right motivations in order to count as good acts.  But this need 
not be how we interpret the claim: 
                 ³$PRUDOO\JRRGDFWLVRQHWKDWUHTXLUHVWKDWLWEHGRQHZLWKFHUWDLQPRWLYDWLRQV´ 
                 We can interpret it as a purely classificatory claim, on a par with the claim: 
  ³$GDQFHLVDQDFWLYLW\ZKLFKUHTXLUHVWKDWWKHGDQFHUPXVWEHDEOHWRPRYHKLVERG\´ 
It is not clear that defining X as a necessary component of morality is the same thing as a 
normative endorsement of X being a necessary component of morality. If the former, we are 
merely claiming that X is a necessary component of morality.  If the latter, we are making a 
normative endorsement of the content described by the claim that X is a necessary component 
of morality.  The former claim can be given a non-ethical interpretation because the claim 
seems to be capable of being interpreted in a manner where it does not preclude morality from 
being a series of mistakes.  Gewirth does nothing to show that the non-ethical interpretation of 
this claim is either untenable or that the claim itself does exclude morality from being a series 
of mistakes.  
 There LVDELJGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHHWKLFDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI³;LVDQHFHVVDU\
FRPSRQHQWRIPRUDOLW\´DQGWKHQRQ-ethical interpretation of this claim. The non-ethical 
interpretation could be asserted by a sentient computer who lacks a moral sense and has no 
desires. The ethical interpretation could not. This is because a sentient computer with no 
moral sense and no desires is incapable of making moral judgments.  After all, one necessary 
condition of making a moral judgment is to be able to endorse rather than merely report. The 
only propositions the computer I have described could report about morality would be 
descriptive propositions about what morality consists of.  If it turned out that morality was 
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Kantian rather than Aristotelian, this computer would reSRUW³0RWLYDWLRQIURPSULQFLSOHVLVD
QHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQRIDULJKWDFW´%XWLWLVQRWFOHDUWKDWWKLVZRXOGEHWKHVDPHWKLQJDV
HQGRUVLQJWKHHWKLFDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI³0RWLYDWLRQIURPSULQFLSOHVLVDQHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQRI
DULJKWDFW´7KHFRPSXWHUcan only report the non-ethical interpretation because this 
interpretation can be reported without its normative content being endorsed.  
Moreover, it is not clear that all meta-ethicists cited by Gewirth who take stands on 
normative ethical theories must be taking such stands because of claims that can only be given 
ethical interpretations.  This is because it is not clear that these meta-ethicists are making 
PRUDOMXGJPHQWVTXDWDNLQJVXFKVWDQGV)RUH[DPSOH+DUH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHDSSURSULDWHXVH
of moral principles for obtaining moral justification need not be grounded in a moral 
judgment. It can just be a claim about what kind of principles count as moral principles that 
obtain moral justification. Such a claim can be based solely on the theoretical practice of 
REVHUYDWLRQDQGFRQMHFWXUH7KHVDPHLVWUXHIRU6WXDUW+DPSVKLUH¶VVWDQGDJDLQVWYHUVLRQVRI
expressivism that completely characterize moral judgments as reports of feelings or attitudes.  
Hampshire may not be making this claim on the basis of a moral judgment that adequate 
meta-ethical theories do not characterize moral judgments as reports of feelings and attitudes.  
What motivates the claim may be the further claim that a meta-ethical theory that 
characterizes moral judgments as reports of feelings and attitudes is descriptively false. But 
arriving at this claim seems to require nothing more than making observations and conjectures 
about what agents seem to mean when they make moral claims.  Empirical observations, 
rather than moral judgments cDQEHWKHGULYLQJIRUFHEHKLQG+DPSVKLUH¶VFODLPV 
 :KDWDERXW)DON¶VFODLPWKDWWKDWWKHUHLVDGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQPRUDOSHUVXDVLRQDQG
ZKDWKHFDOOV³XQSULQFLSOHGJRDGLQJ´"$JDLQWKLVFODLPPD\MXVWEHDQRWKHUZD\RIVD\LQJ
that moral persuasion and unprincipled goading are distinct practices.  Of course, what 
PRWLYDWHV)DON¶VFODLPFRXOGEHDPRUDOMXGJPHQWWRWKHHIIHFWWKDWPRUDOSHUVXDVLRQDQG
unprincipled goading are distinct practices.  But what motivates this claim could also be the 
purely descriptive observation that agents differentiate moral persuasion from unprincipled 
goading as part of their moral practice.  All that is required to make this claim is the ability to 
observe agents and understand what they mean. The same is true for Duncan JoQHV¶FODLPWKDW
a man cannot be making a moral judgment unless his attitude is free from partiality for 
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particular places, ages, and social groups, and from self-partiality. This claim can be derived 
from a purely non-moral interpretation of the claim that impartiality is a necessary condition 
of moral judgments. One could, again, arrive at this claim through nothing more than 
observation and conjecture.  Moral judgments do not seem to be required.  
 The same is true for the claim made by Steven Toulmin that moral justification that 
refers to reasons that cannot be traced back to universal principles is not moral justification at 
all.  This, of course, may strike many as a wildly implausible claim.  But it is not a claim that 
requires a moral judgment in order to be made. All that is required in order to make this claim 
is a view about moral reasons and such a view can come out of observations about what 
DJHQWVGRZKHQWKH\UHIHUWRPRUDOUHDVRQV(YHQ+DUH¶VVWURQJO\.DQWLDQFODLPWKDW³WR
become a morally adult man is to learn to reconcile competing claims of tradition and novelty 
E\PDNLQJGHFLVLRQVRISULQFLSOH´FDQEHPDGHRQJURXQGVWKDWGRQ¶WLQYROYHPRUDO
judgments.  Hare could have made the claim because he observed that people who were 
referred to, aV³PRUDOO\DGXOWPHQ´VHHPHGWRUHFRQFLOHFRPSHWLQJFODLPVRIWUDGLWLRQVDQG
novelty by making decisions based on principles.   
 None of this shows that any of the above claims are plausible meta-ethical claims.  
Moreover, it could be the case that as claims derived from descriptive judgments; they are 
implausible in the extreme.  For instance, it could be the case that looking at how human 
agents behave, we find a wide variety of moral deliberation procedures.  It could be that the 
only meta-ethical judgments that can plausibly separate the morally correct deliberation 
procedures from the incorrect ones are moral judgments. But this is not obvious and needs 
VRPHGHIHQVHWKDWLVDEVHQWLQ*HZLUWK¶VZULWLQJV7KLVLVZK\*HZLUWK¶VFODLPWKDWWKHVDPH
meta-ethics is not compatible with all normative ethics (and thus violates (2)) is not a 
conclusive reason to think that meta-ethics is normative.  Making a descriptive claim that 
entails the negation of a normative claim is not obviously an example of making a normative 
claim. We can imagine all sorts of descriptive claims that entail the negation of normative 
claims without having to assume such descriptive claims are also normative.  As Quentin 
Smith has observed, the claim that the universe is infinitely expanding could entail that one 
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could never increase the overall level of value in the universe.78  The latter claim implies all 
VRUWVRIQRUPDWLYHFODLPV)RULQVWDQFHLWLPSOLHVFODLPVVXFKDV³JRRGGHHGVGRQRWPDNHWKH
ZRUOGDEHWWHUSODFH´ZKLFKDUHREYLRXVly normative.  It does not seem to follow that the 
cosmological claim that the universe is infinitely expanding is a normative claim. Of course, it 
may turn out to be the case that this cosmological claim is also a normative claim.  But further 
argumentation is needed to show this. Gewirth, as we have seen, has not provided such 
argumentation.    
 :KDWDERXW*HZLUWK¶VFODLPWKDWPHWD-ethics theories that differentiate the moral 
from the non-moral are normative and thus violate (1)? Again, Gewirth seems to be assuming 
that the meta-ethical theory that makes a claim which entails the denial of a normative claim is 
a theory that is making a claim that cannot be given a non-ethical interpretation.  As before, it 
is not clear why this must be the case. Perhaps a reason Gewirth assumes this is because he 
has not considered the possibility that different meta-ethical theories entail different 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIPRUDOFODLPV7RLOOXVWUDWHWKLVSRLQWOHW¶VH[DPLQHWKHVWUDLJKWIRUZDUG
PRUDOFODLPWKDW³7RUWXULQJEDELHVIRUIXQLVZURQJ´2QRQHPRUDOUHDOLVWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI
this claim, it amounts to the statement that an agent who tortures babies for fun is an agent 
ZKRLVGRLQJVRPHWKLQJWKDWSRVVHVVHVDQHJDWLYHPRUDOSURSHUW\FDOOHGµZURQJQHVV¶7KXV
when the aJHQWDIILUPVWKLVUHDOLVWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI³7RUWXULQJEDELHVIRUIXQLVZURQJ´KHLV
DIILUPLQJPRUHWKDQMXVWWKHFODLPWKDW³7RUWXULQJEDELHVIRUIXQLVZURQJ´+HLVDIILUPLQJD
realist characterized existence of wrongness, a realist characterized account of moral 
normativity, and the claim that the act of torturing babies exemplifies this realist wrongness. 
Any meta-ethical theory that affirms a moral claim, under this realist interpretation, is making 
an explicitly normative claim. This is because the agent who affirms this realist interpretation 
FDQ¶WVLPXOWDQHRXVO\DIILUPWKDWWKHFRQWHQWRIWKHFODLPLVLQVRPHVHQVHDPLVWDNH 
 <HWWKLVLVQRWWKHRQO\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHFODLP³7RUWXULQJEDELHVIRUIXQLV
ZURQJ´2QDVHFRQGDQWL-realist inteUSUHWDWLRQ³7RUWXULQJEDELHVIRUIXQLVZURQJ´FRXOGMXVW
mean that an agent who tortures babies for fun is doing something that possesses a negative 
                                                        
78
 See SMITH, Quentin. Moral Realism and the Infinite Spacetime Imply Moral Nihilism. In: Heather 
DYKE, ed., Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection. AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2003, pp. 43-54.  
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PRUDOSURSHUW\FDOOHGµZURQJQHVV¶ZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIPRUDOLW\7KXVZKHQDQDJHQW
affirms a moral claim on this second interpretation, he is not also affirming the same set of 
additional claims as the proponent of the realist interpretation.  Even though both agents who 
DIILUP³7RUWXULQJEDELHVIRUIXQLVZURQJ´RQWKHUHDOLVWDQGDQWL-realist interpretation, affirm 
ZURQJQHVVWKH\PHDQGLIIHUHQWWKLQJVE\µZURQJ¶7KHDJHQWZKRDIILUPVWKHDQWL-realist 
interpretation of the claim affirms that the act of torturing babies for fun exemplifies 
wrongness.  However, it is not the same wrongness affirmed by our realist. There is room, on 
the anti-UHDOLVWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQIRUµZURQJQHVV¶WRFRQVLVWRIDPXOWLWXGHRIGLIIHUHQWWKLQJV
The anti-realist need not take wrongness to be a reason not to torture babies, or even a reason 
to endorse the claim that torturinJEDELHVIRUIXQLVZURQJ7RVD\³WRUWXULQJEDELHVIRUIXQLV
ZURQJ´RQWKHDQWL-UHDOLVWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQFDQEHDQDORJRXVWRVD\LQJ³,Q&KULVWLDQLW\SUD\HULV
DZD\IRUPDQWRFRPPXQLFDWHZLWK*RG´7KHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQRXUUHDOLVWDQGDQWL-realist 
interpretation is akin to the difference between someone who merely reports what Christians 
believe (while this person may or may not be a believer) and someone who endorses 
Christianity.  
 In much the same way that the believer can agree with everything that the person 
who reports what Christians believe says, our moral realist can agree with the moral anti-
UHDOLVWLQVRIDUDVERWKDIILUPWKHVHQWHQFH³WRUWXULQJEDELHVIRUIXQLVZURQJ´7KDWLVZK\LW
ORRNVDVWKRXJKWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHVHQWHQFH³WRUWXULQJEDELHVIRUIXQLVZURQJ´LVQHXWUDO
with regards the realism issue.  The neutrality obviously benefits many meta-ethicists who 
want a way of speaking about moral claims where the most robust realist and the most staunch 
anti-realist can agree on what is meant when either affirm a moral claim.  If we assume that 
the anti-realist interpretation is shared by both our realist and our anti-realist, this agreement 
can happen.  The meta-ethicist can stand outside his everyday moral judgments and reflect on 
the legiWLPDF\RIWKRVHMXGJPHQWV7KLVELUG¶VH\HYLHZRIHWKLFVZLOODOORZWKHPHWD-ethicist 
to choose a theory that he believes adequately describes the nature of the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of his own moral judgments.  Moreover, he may or may not want to revise his 
FRQFHSWLRQRIZKDWWKRVHMXGJPHQWVDUHRQFHKHLVLQWKLVELUG¶VH\HSHUVSHFWLYH79 Our anti-
                                                        
79
 7KLV%LUG¶V(\HSHUVSHFWLYHLVZKDW'ZRUNLQUHIHUVWRDVPRUDODUFKLPHGHDQLVP0RUHRQWKLVZLOOEH
expanded upon in chapter four.  
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UHDOLVWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI³WRUWXULQJEDELHVIRUIXQ´DOORZVDOOWKHVHSRVVLELOLWLHVIRUWKHPHWD-
ethicist while simultaneously allowing him the ability to communicate with other meta-
ethicists who hold different meta-ethical positions.  
 What is important for Gewirth about this anti-realist interpretation of straightforward 
moral claims is it seems to be uncontroversially descriptive and the interpretation that enables 
standard meta-ethics to function normally.  However, Gewirth needs to show that this anti-
UHDOLVWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHFODLP³WRUWXULQJEDELHVIRUIXQLVZURQJ´LVHLWKHULQWHUQDOO\
problematic, question begging, or at odds with what meta-ethicists actually mean when they 
make moral claims.  This is partially because this anti-realist interpretation of straightforward 
moral claims is a descriptive interpretation.  It is also because an alternative moral realist 
account can interpret straightforward moral claims in a manner that is descriptive. In order for 
*HZLUWK¶VFODLPWKDWPHWD-ethical theories that differentiate the moral from the non-moral are 
violating (1) to be true, Gewirth must exclude the possibility of the descriptive interpretation 
of straightforward moral claims.  As we saw, this is because there is no reason to think that a 
descriptive claim that entails the negation of a normative claim is itself a normative claim.  If 
straightforward moral claims can be given descriptive interpretations by a meta-ethical theory, 
it does not follow that the meta-ethical theory is normative. This is true even if the moral 
claims that are part of the meta-ethical theory entail the negation of other moral claims.  As 
long as such moral claims are given a descriptive interpretation by the meta-ethical theory, 
that meta-ethical theory does not seem to be normative.  
 Gewirth does not exclude the possibility of descriptive interpretations of 
straightforward moral claims and thus fails to show that meta-ethics is normative.  The fact 
that meta-ethical theories have normative implications only shows that descriptive claims 
have the capacity to show the falsehood of normative claims. Moreover, the fact that the same 
meta-ethics is not compatible with all varieties of normative ethics does not show that meta-
ethics is normative.  It merely shows that the meta-ethics is not morally neutral. In order for a 
meta-HWKLFDOWKHRU\WREHWUXO\³QRUPDWLYH´LWUHTXLUHVWKRVHZKRDIILUPLWWRHQGRUVHWKH
content of a normative claim.  In order for that endorsement to happen, a moral judgment must 
be made where a moral agent endorses the content of a normative claim. A necessary 
condition of this endorsement is that the possibility that the endorsed content is, in some 
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sense, mistaken, must be excluded. Gewirth, as we have seen, fails to provide an argument for 
this exclusion.  
 In sum, Gewirth has not successfully shown that a meta-HWKLFDOWKHRU\¶VWDNLQJD
VWDQGRQQRUPDWLYHLVVXHVLVLWVHOIDQH[DPSOHRIWKDWWKHRU\¶VVWDtus as a normative theory. He 
has also not successfully shown that a meta-HWKLFVWKHRU\¶VLQFRPSDWLELOLW\ZLWKDQRUPDWLYH
HWKLFVWKHRU\LVHYLGHQFHWKDWWKHIRUPHUWKHRU\LVQRUPDWLYH:KDW*HZLUWK¶VDUJXPHQWVGR
VKRZLVVLPLODUWRZKDW0RWKHUVLOO¶VDUJXPent shows.  They show the multitude of different 
ways that a meta-ethical theory can have moral implications.  The differentiation of the moral 
from the non-moral is one such way. As noted earlier in the critique of Mothersill, the 
identification of what morality is involves preliminary rejections of false moral claims.  What 
*HZLUWK¶VDUJXPHQWVDGGWR0RWKHUVLOO¶VLQVLJKWLVDIXUWKHUVSHFLILFDWLRQRIWKHZD\LQZKLFK
a meta-ethical theory can deny normative ethics theories.  
 For example, Hare, in defending his meta-ethical theory, denies moral claims that are 
inconsistent with his view of what adequate moral justification is. This means he must reject 
any moral claim that presupposes a contrary form of moral justification. Let us imagine a 
consequentialist asserting that moral justification need not take into account moral principles 
LQWKHZD\WKDW+DUH¶VYLHZVRIDGHTXDWHPRUDOMXVWLILFDWLRQVSHFLI\7KLVPHDQVWKDWWKLV
consequentialist is committed to moral claims that Hare is committed to denying.  The 
consequentialist, for instance, is committed to the moral claim that an agent can morally 
MXVWLI\DQDFWLQDPDQQHUWKDWLVFRQWUDU\WR+DUH¶VVSHFLILFDWLRQV7KHUHLVDUDQJHRI
VLWXDWLRQVZKHUHDJHQWVGRQ¶WPRUDOO\MXVWLI\DQDFWDFFRUGLQJWR+DUH¶VVpecifications that the 
consequentialist is committed to claiming is a set of adequate examples of moral justification.  
Hare on the other hand, is committed to affirming that this is not a set of adequate examples of 
moral justification.  
 We can see the sDPHG\QDPLFDWZRUNLQ6WXDUW+DPSVKLUH¶VFULWLFLVPRI
expressivism. Hampshire in his meta-ethical theorizing commits himself to the rejection of 
any claim that identifies moral judgments with expressions of attitudes or feelings. This means 
he is committed to a potential rejection of moral claims that satisfy a possible expressivist 
criterion of moral justification. W.D. Falk, in his meta-ethical theorizing, can reject moral 
claims that are incompatible with his specifications of the differences between moral 
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persuasion and unprincipled goading. Duncan Jones, in his meta-ethical theorizing, can 
potentially reject moral claims that are incompatible with his claim that moral judgments are 
not free from self-partiality. Hare can reject claims that are incompatible with his claim that to 
become a morally adult man is to learn to reconcile competing claims of tradition and novelty 
by making decisions of principle.  
 One may object here that contemporary meta-ethicists are less likely to create meta-
ethical theories that brazenly imply the denial of various positions within normative ethics.  
However, what is important about Gewirth is not whether meta-ethicists actually commit 
themselves to the rejection of such a wide range of normative ethics positions.  What is 
important is that his arguments illustrate the ways in which meta-ethicists can reject these 
normative ethics positions just in virtue of the meta-ethical theories they affirm.  Gewirth may 
have failed to show (1) (Meta-Ethical theories are not normative).  He may also have failed to 
show that the falsity of (2) (The same meta-ethics is compatible with all forms of normative 
ethics) implies that meta-ethics theories are normative. However, he did show the falsity of 
(2). This is because he showed, in a multitude of different ways, how a meta-ethical theory 
can conflict with a variety of different normative ethics claims.  
2.7 R.C SOLOMON 
 In 1970, R.C. Solomon made an attempt, in a similar vein to Gewirth, to show that 
meta-HWKLFVZDVQRUPDWLYH6RORPRQ¶Vattack was motivated by the idea that an adequate 
meta-ethics cannot be a sociological study of how people (in our culture) have, in fact, used 
ethical terminology.  This is why, according to Solomon, the meta-ethical study of ethical 
language is aimed at providing a criterion of evaluation for ethical arguments and utterances.80 
The idea here is that such a criterion will allow the meta-ethicist to differentiate between that 
which is truly ethical and that which is deemed ethical by a given society at a given time. 
Whether one thinks (as Brandt81 did) that meta-ethics is the study of the justification of ethical 
propositions or (like Stevenson82) that meta-HWKLFVVKDUSHQVRQH¶VWRROVIRUQRUPDWLYHHWKLFV
                                                        
80SOLOMON, R.C. Normative and Meta-Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1970, 
vol. 31, pp. 98-99.  
81BRANDT, Richard, Ethical Theory, New Jersey, USA: Eaglewood Cliffs, 1959. 
82
 See Stevenson (1944).  
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the differentiation of the ethical from the beliefs of a society is an indispensable component of 
an adequate meta-ethical theory.  In order for this differentiation to happen, Solomon 
postulates that the meta-ethicist needs a model of moral language that is morally implicative.83 
This means that such a model must contain propositions that are both the product of the 
analysis of how human beings use ethical language (hence being meta-ethical) and 
propositions that can entail normative propositions.  Hence, Solomon claims that such 
propositions are both meta-ethiFDODQG³QRUPDWLYHO\ORDGHG´84 
 Solomon differentiates normative ethics propositions from normatively loaded meta-
ethical principles by separating normative ethics propositions into deviant and non-deviant 
classes.  The deviant classes consist of ethical principles that are excluded on the grounds that 
they violate a syntactic or normative rule of ethical discourse. An ethical proposition that 
violates a syntactic rule of ethical discourse can include a flat out contradiction, a nonsense 
word, a category mistake, or an ethical utterance that violates the rules of English.85  Morally 
unacceptable normative propositions are also included in the deviant class.86  The non-deviant 
FODVVHVRIQRUPDWLYHHWKLFVSURSRVLWLRQVLQFOXGHHWKLFDOSURSRVLWLRQVWKDWGRQ¶WJHWexcluded 
on the grounds of being morally unacceptable. However, the non-deviant classes include 
normative ethics propositions that get excluded on one other basis not covered by the deviant 
classes: meta-ethical grounds.  If a normative ethics proposition in a non-deviant class is 
unacceptable, its lack of acceptability can be explained by its violation of a meta-ethical 
rule.87 Thus, if a normative ethics proposition can be shown to be unacceptable without either 
being a member of the deviant class or being unacceptable on normative grounds, this 
proposition must be unacceptable for meta-ethical reasons. The possibility that a normative 
                                                        
83
 See Solomon (1970), 98-99. According to Solomon, this explains why ethical sentences which are 
problematic for meta-ethical reasons can be ruled out as being incapable of obtaining the status of an 
ethical utterance.  
84
 Ibid., 97.  
85
 Ibid., 99 
86
 Ibid., 98-99.  For Solomon, meta-ethical rules have normative implications precisely because they rule 
out ethical utterances for being unable to satisfy the conditions of being an ethical utterance. 42. Ibid. 98-
99.  7KLVLVWKHXQVSRNHQEXWQHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQRI6RORPRQ¶VFODLPUHJDUGLQJWKHHWKLFDO
unacceptability of an ethical proposition in a non-deviant class.  
87
 Ibid., 98-99. 7KLVLVWKHXQVSRNHQEXWQHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQRI6RORPRQ¶VFODLPUHJDUGLQJWKHHWKLFDO
unacceptability of an ethical proposition in a non-deviant class.  
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ethics proposition could be excluded by a meta-ethical principle is proof, for Solomon, that 
meta-ethics is morally implicative. The morally implicative nature of meta-ethics also 
demonstrates, for Solomon, that meta-ethics is normative.  
 According to Solomon, there is at least one meta-ethical principle (exemplified by 
+DUH¶s universalizeability88 DQG%UDQGW¶s consistency89) that is capable of entailing that a 
QRUPDWLYHHWKLFVSURSRVLWLRQLVXQDFFHSWDEOH/HW¶VFDOOWKLVSULQFLSOH..VWDWHV 
(K): If some evaluation (or evaluative term) applies in a particular case, then, for any other 
case exactly similar to that one, or similar in all relevant aspects, that evaluation applies. In 
other words, if E is any evaluative term and A and B are acts, events, or persons, then if A is E 
and B is relevantly similar to A, B is E.  
Solomon saw this principle as a text book case of a meta-ethical principle because any ethics 
proposition which violated it was not unacceptable for any syntactic or moral reasons. Citing 
the agreements of contemporary meta-ethicists, Solomon claimed that ethical propositions that 
violate universalizeability are violating the rules of ethical language in a way where they are 
not even candidates for moral consideration. Solomon noted that Hare stated that 
universalizeability is a necessary condition of any ethical statement.90 +HUHIHUUHGWR%UDQGW¶V
claim that any ethical proposition must past two crucial tests: consistency and generality.91 He 
TXRWHG6WHYHQVRQ¶VFODLPWKDWSULQFLSOHVRIJHQHUDOLW\DQGFRQVLVWHQF\DUHQHFHVVDU\IRUDQ\
intelligible ethical statement, even though these principles are psychological rather than 
logical.92 He finally noted that Frankena93, like Hare, endorsed consistency and 
universalizeability as necessary conditions of an adequate ethical judgment.  In all the above 
examples, propositions that violate this meta-ethical principle violate the necessary conditions 
of being an ethical proposition.  
                                                        
88
 HARE, R.M. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963. pp. 32.  
89See Brandt (1959), 16-26 
90
 See Hare (1963), 32.  
91See Brandt (1959), 16-26. 
92STEVENSON, Charles, Lectures, University of Michigan. 1964-65 
93
 See Frankena (1951), 43.  
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After citing these agreements from fellow meta-ethicists regarding 
universalizeability, Solomon went on to claim that this principle could not be imported into a 
meta-ethical theory without such import being normative.94 Moreover, he made the more 
strident claim that this principle had no content apart from normative considerations. 
6RORPRQ¶VUHDVRQIRUPDNLQJWKHIRUPHUFODLPZDVWKDWKHIHOWWKDWWKHLPSRUWDWLRQRIVXFKD
principle into a meta-ethical theory required that the principle had the power to negate 
SRWHQWLDOQRUPDWLYHHWKLFVSURSRVLWLRQV6RORPRQ¶VUHDVRQLQJIRUPDNLQJWKHODWWHUFODLPZDV
that meta-ethical principles were best explained as very general, well accounted for moral 
principles.95 In situations where a normative ethics principle and a meta-ethical principle 
clash, Solomon claimed that the meta-ethical principle could triumph over the normative 
ethics principle only if it was itself a well supported moral principle. This was how he 
explained the possibility of normative ethics propositions being ruled out on meta-ethical 
grounds alone. What allows a meta-ethical principle to be well supported, for Solomon, is 
whether every serious normative ethics theory is encompassed by it.96 Solomon believes that 
meta-ethical claims that entail normative claims are themselves normative because they are 
not morally neutral. For Solomon, we cannot assume that the moral neutrality of meta-ethical 
claims is analytic.97 Moreover, Solomon believes the ultimate explanation of why a false 
moral principle can be an abuse of ethical language  is that such a principle lacks moral 
justification.98 This is true regardless of whether the moral principle is a normative ethics 
principle or a meta-ethics principle. 
Finally, Solomon believes that there are no good reasons to distinguish normative 
from descriptive ethical propositions.  Descriptive ethical principles Solomon describes as 
principles that describe ethical discourse.99 Solomon believes normative ethics propositions 
FDQ¶WEHGLVWLQJXLVKHGIURPGHVFULSWLYHHWKLFDOSURSRVLWLRQVEHFDXVHRIWKHGXELRXVQHVVRIWKH
                                                        
94See Solomon (1970), 100-101. 
95
 Ibid., 104.  
96
 Ibid. 
97
 Ibid., 105-108 
 
98 Ibid. 
 
99 Ibid. 
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analytic-synthetic distinction.100 Solomon believes that one can only separate normative 
ethical propositions from descriptive ethical propositions if the analytic-synthetic distinction 
holds. Although Solomon does not provide a sub-argument for this claim, we can assume he 
asserts it because he thinks normative ethical principles are analytic. This is because 
normative ethical principles are traditionally thought of as necessary propositions. 
Correspondingly, we can also assume that Solomon believes that if descriptive ethical 
propositions could be differentiated from normative ethics principles, it would have to be 
because descriptive ethical propositions are synthetic. This is because descriptive ethical 
propositions are thought to describe the contingent practices of how people actually use 
ethical discourse.   
Solomon believes that even if it were somehow possible to distinguish between 
normative ethical propositions and descriptive ethical propositions in some other way, we 
could still not distinguish them in our own ethical discourse.  This is because normative 
HWKLFDOSURSRVLWLRQVLQZKLFKWHUPVOLNHµJRRG¶DUHXVHGDUHQRUPDOO\WDNHQWREHQormative.  
This is because such principles actually tell us something about what things in the world 
actually are good. According to Solomon, it seems odd to say that descriptive ethical 
principles that PHQWLRQWKHHYDOXDWLYHWHUPµJRRG¶DOVRVD\QRWKLQJDbout what things in the 
world actually are good.101 This is because one cannot give an account of the meaning of 
evaluative terms without also giving some indication of how these terms are to be applied. 
You cannot assert a descriptive ethical proposition about an evaluative term without also 
saying something about the possible states of affairs that satisfy the description of that 
evaluative term. Hence, for Solomon, you cannot assert descriptive ethical propositions 
without asserting normative ethical propositions.  
 2. 8 CRITIQUE OF SOLOMON 
 We can agree with Solomon that the study of meta-ethics must provide a criterion for 
the evaluation of ethical arguments and utterances.  We can also agree with Solomon that such 
a criterion requires a model of moral language that allows us to differentiate that which is 
truly ethical from that which is deemed ethical by a given society.  We may even accept 
                                                        
 
100 Ibid.  
101 Ibid. 
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6RORPRQ¶VFODLPWKDWVXFKDPRGHOLVPRUDOO\LPSOLFDWLYH:KHUH6RORPRQLVPLVWDNHQLVLQ
his reasons for thinking that a morally implicative model of meta-ethical language shows that 
meta-HWKLFVLWVHOILVQRUPDWLYH7KHFUX[RI6RORPRQ¶VPLVWDNHLVKLVDVVHUWLRQWKDW meta-
ethical propositions that are capable of negating normative propositions are themselves 
normative propositions.  This view is mistaken because of cases where descriptive claims 
entail normative claims yet the descriptive claims have no obvious normative content.  To 
LOOXVWUDWHWKLVPDWWHUOHW¶VORRNDWWKHIROORZLQJWZRQRUPDWLYHFODLPV 
,I\RXUFKLOG¶VWXWRULVSODQQLQJRQRSHQLng up a canister of poison gas tomorrow during a 
maths lesson, you should prevent your child from going to school tomorrow.  
 and  
              (5) You should prevent your child from going to school tomorrow.  
As is obvious, claim (5) does not follow from claim (3). (5) can only follow from (3) if there 
is a second claim which, when conjoined with (3), entails (5).  What could this second claim 
be?  It seems plausible that it could be the claim:  
<RXUFKLOG¶VWXWRULVSODQQLQJRQRSHQLQJXSDFDQLVWHURISRLVRQJDVWRPRUURZGXULQJ   a 
maths lesson.   
Need this claim be normative?  It seems not since there is nothing in the claim that amounts to 
anything other than a description of a purely factual state of affairs.  And yet it seems that the 
entailment of (5) by (4) hinges on this (4) being conjoined with (3).  
 How is this possible?  The entailment of (5) by the conjunction of (3) and (4) is 
explained by the fact that normative claims can be hypothetical.  What this means is that a 
normative claim can be contingent on a descriptive state of affairs.  In other words, not all 
normative claims are restricted to making clams about normative states of affairs in the actual 
world.  Some normative claims can describe what normative states would obtain if the world 
were a certain way.  A descriptive claim can then satisfy the conditions specified in the 
normative claim regarding what the world would have to be like in order for the normative 
state to obtain.  The fact that these descriptive claims can satisfy the conditions specified in 
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the normative claim does not show that the descriptive claims themselves are normative.  
 If they did, most descriptive claims would simultaneously be normative claims. This 
is because most descriptive claims can satisfy the conditions specified in hypothetical 
normative claims. Even claims about sub-atomic particles can do this.  For instance, if certain 
formations of sub-atomic particles were enabling conditions of the world and the world had 
SRVLWLYHYDOXHZHFRXOGLPDJLQHWKHK\SRWKHWLFDOQRUPDWLYHFODLP³,IWKHVXE-atomic 
particles of the universe enable the universe to be as it is, those sub-atomic particles have 
SRVLWLYHYDOXH´,IGHVFULSWLYHFODLPVWKDWVDWLVI\the conditions specified in a normative 
FODLPVZHUHWKHPVHOYHVQRUPDWLYH³7KHVXE-atomic particles of the universe enable the 
XQLYHUVHWREHDVLWLV´WXUQVRXWWREHDQRUPDWLYHFODLP7KLVVHHPVKLJKO\LPSODXVLEOH
given how we normally differentiate normative and descriptive claims. Given the 
implausibility of this scenario, some argument is needed to demonstrate that a descriptive 
claim that satisfies the conditions specified in a hypothetical normative claim is itself a 
normative claim.  
Although Solomon does not give this argument, he gives something like this 
argument when he states that one cannot distinguish between normative ethical propositions 
and descriptive ethical propositions.  Here, Solomon is attempting to demonstrate that claims 
made within normative ethics cannot be distinguished from claims made within meta-ethics.  
7KLVGHPRQVWUDWLRQLVJURXQGHGLQ6RORPRQ¶VLGHDWKDWPHWD-ethical claims are claims about 
how to correctly assert claims within normative ethics.  For Solomon, normative ethics claims 
are normative in virtue of the information they convey about evaluative terms. Meta-ethical 
claims also convey information about evaluative terms that Solomon does not see as different 
in the relevant ways necessary to establish that normative ethics is normative and meta-ethics 
is not.  
The difficulty here is that Solomon has overlooked the possibility that the distinction 
between normative and descriptive ethical propositions need not require that descriptive 
ethical propositions cannot support or negate normative ethical propositions.  The distinction 
between the two may be that descriptive ethical propositions report claims about evaluative 
terms whereas normative ethics propositions also report claims about evaluative terms that 
could potentially be endorsed.  If this distinction holds, it may be the case that meta-ethics is 
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non- normative despite the fact that it is morally implicative.  Solomon simply assumes this 
distinction is untenable without giving any argument that this is the case.  If it turned out that 
morally implicative meta-HWKLFVSURSRVLWLRQVZHUHLQVRPHVHQVHQRUPDWLYH6RORPRQ¶V
claim about meta-ethical claims being general, well supported moral claims would be more 
plausible.  But Solomon must provide some reason to cast doubt on the above distinction in 
order to provide compelling reasons to think that morally implicative meta-ethics propositions 
are normative propositions.  His argument that one cannot distinguish between normative 
ethical propositions and descriptive ethical propositions fails to do this because he fails to 
rebut the distinction between normative and descriptive ethical propositions described above.  
:KDWDERXW6RORPRQ¶VFODLPWKDWPHWD-ethical principles such as universalizeability 
must be normative because they have no content apart from normative considerations? Here, 
Solomon needs to provide an argument as to why he believes it is obvious that such 
considerations can only be interpreted in a manner that is normative.  As we saw earlier, a 
meta-ethical principle such as universalizeability can be conceived as a rule of ethical 
discourse while ethical discourse can simultaneously be conceived as a series of mistakes. In 
that case, universalizeability could be conceived as a background presupposition of ethical 
GLVFRXUVHLQPXFKWKHVDPHZD\WKDWWKH³QRKLWWLQJEHORZWKHEHOW´UXOHLVDEDFNJURXQG
SUHVXSSRVLWLRQRISURIHVVLRQDOER[LQJ/LNHWKH³QRKLWWLQJEHORZWKHEHOW´UXOHWKHUHLVQR
reason why the agent who asserts universalizeability as a background presupposition of ethical 
discourse must normatively endorse universalizeability.  
 0RUHRYHU6RORPRQ¶VVHSDUDWLRQRIHWKLFDOFODLPVLQWRGHYLDQWDQGQRQ-deviant 
classes seems confused. If a meta-ethical principle like universalizeability has no content apart 
from normative content, it seems odd to posit that ethical claims that violate 
universalizeability are distinct from ethical claims that are unacceptable on moral grounds.  
After all, what is the difference between a meta-ethical principle that has no content apart 
IURPQRUPDWLYHFRQVLGHUDWLRQVDQGDQRUPDWLYHSULQFLSOH",IZHDFFHSW6RORPRQ¶VDQVZHUWKDW
the difference lies in that the former is a general, well accounted for normative principle, this 
has counter-intuitive consequences.  If it were true that meta-ethical principles were general, 
well accounted for normative principles, the remaining normative principles would be the 
only principles that were genuine cases of normative ethics principles.  In other words, only 
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specific principles that were not well accounted for would be normative principles. This 
suggests that the only ethical principles we would refer to as normative would be the ones that 
JHQHUDWHGFRQWURYHUV\6RORPRQ¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQHWKLFDOSURSRVLWLRQVWKDWYLRODWH
normative principles and ethical propositions that violate meta-ethical principles creates more 
problems than it solves. 
 ,QVXP6RORPRQ¶VDWWHPSWDWVKRZLQJKRZFODVVLILFDWLRQVRIPHWD-ethical claims are 
normative in virtue of differentiating the moral from the immoral is unsuccessful for a number 
of reasons.  He asserts, without giving good reasons to the contrary, that any descriptive claim 
that entails a normative claim is itself a normative claim. Solomon also fails to adequately 
show that meta-ethical claims have no content apart from normative considerations.  
0RUHRYHU6RORPRQ¶VFODVVLILFDWLRQRIHWKLFDOSURSRVLWLRQVLQWRGHYLDQWDQGQRQ-deviant 
FODVVHVLVFRQIXVHG6RORPRQ¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQFODLPVWKDWDUHXQDFFHSWDEOHRQQRUPDWLYH
grounds and claims that are unacceptable on meta-ethical grounds is difficult to cash out 
without making the former claim implausibly rare.   
 +RZHYHURQHVKRXOGQRWIRUJHWWKDW6RORPRQ¶VDUJXPHQWVOLNH0RWKHUVLOODQG
Gewirth, demonstrate that meta-ethical theories can deny moral claims. Moreover, Solomon, 
we remember, postulates that a meta-ethicist needs a model of moral language that is morally 
implicative.  If a meta-ethicist were to employ such a model at a highly detailed level, it is 
doubtful he would not be affirming and denying a wide variety of different moral claims. 
Moreover, a model of moral language that was morally implicative would have to be 
constructed by a meta-ethicist with a good understanding of which moral claims are true and 
which moral claims are false.  A meta-ethicist with a poor understanding of the set of correct 
moral claims could conceivably construct a morally implicative model of moral language that 
implied either that a set of correct moral claims was false or that a set of false moral claims 
was correct. The ways in which such a model of moral language could be reflecting a poor 
understanding of the set of correct moral claims is quite vast. Hence, a morally implicative 
model of moral language that reflected a poor understanding of the set of correct moral claims 
could be criticized on moral grounds.  
 To give an example, suppose a morally implicative model of moral language 
presupposed meta-ethical principles like (K). As we recall, the principle states that if E is any 
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evaluative term and A and B are acts, events, or persons, then if A is E and B is relevantly 
similar to A, B is E. If this principle were false, it would commit the morally implicative 
model of moral language to a vast array of denied correct moral claims and affirmed incorrect 
moral claims. Moreover, a similar situation would arise if the meta-ethical principle was 
correct and a rival model of moral language presupposed its falsehood.  This rival model of 
moral language would commit its proponents to many denied correct moral claims and 
affirmed false moral claims.  For instance, if (K) were false, this would imply that the moral 
similarities between shooting a person and repeatedly stabbing them would not give agents 
evidence that repeatedly stabbing a person was morally similar to shooting them. If this were 
the case, some alternative reason would have to be given for the badness of stabbing someone 
that had nothing to do with the characteristics that make it morally similar to shooting 
someone. Any reason that presupposed (K) would have to be denied by the proponents of a 
morally implicative model of moral language that presupposed the falsehood of (K). Either 
model could warrant extensive moral criticism, depending on whether or not (K) is correct.  
               2. 9 CONCLUSION  
 As we have seen, the attempts by Mothersill, Gewirth, and Solomon to show that 
meta-ethics is normative have failed.  However, each theorist, in their own way, illustrated a 
way in which a meta-ethical theory could affirm or deny moral claims. Mothersill 
demonstrated that meta-ethical theories could affirm or deny moral claims as a way of gaining 
explanatory power. Gewirth demonstrated that a meta-ethical theory could affirm or deny 
moral claims in the pursuit of differentiating the moral from the non-moral. His examples 
showed a variety of different ways in which this could be done.  Finally, R.C Solomon 
demonstrated how a morally implicative model of moral language could commit a meta-
ethical theory to the extensive denial of moral claims that were inconsistent with the meta-
ethical principles presupposed by the model. The examples illustrated by all three of these 
theorists showcase the ways in which a meta-ethical theory can warrant moral criticism.  
 However, none of the examples given by Mothersill, Gewirth, and Solomon were of 
contemporary meta-ethical theories that denied any correct moral claims. In the next chapter, I 
will demonstrate a moral commitment that wide ranges of contemporary meta-ethical theories 
imply the denial of.   
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          3. AME AND (C) 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 In chapter one, I presented an affirmative answer to question (A)(Can meta-ethical 
theories be criticized on moral grounds?). The reason given for this answer was that meta-
ethical theories are capable of both denying correct moral claims and affirming incorrect ones. 
However, there was no concrete example of how a range of contemporary meta-ethical 
theories either denies a correct moral claim or affirms an incorrect moral claim.  In this 
chapter, I will give such an example.  I will argue that all meta-ethical theories that deny 
explanatory moral realism are committed to the denial of all correct moral claims.  
 I will do this by first showing that explanatory moral realism is a correctness 
condition of moral claims. The argument used will be a resuscitated version of the argument 
from moral experience (referred to as AME). AME is normally a presumptive argument that 
attempts to show that there is presumptive evidence for moral realism.  In my rehabilitation of 
the argument, I aim to show not that there is presumptive evidence for moral realism, but 
rather that moral realism is a commitment of moral claims. In my version of AME, the 
conclusion entailed will be an expression of the moral commitment to explanatory moral 
realism: 
(C): For any meta-ethical theory that is true, that theory must either be an explanatory moral 
realist theory or a theory that is compatible with explanatory moral realism.  
My version of AME will also demonstrate how all meta-ethical theories that deny (C) 
are committed to the denial of all correct moral claims. If a meta-ethical theory commits its 
proponents to the denial of all correct moral claims, this is a sufficient condition of the meta-
ethical theory warranting moral criticism. Hence, chapter two will present the first answer to 
my research question. By the end of chapter two, it will be shown that (C) is one meta-ethical 
claim that moral agents have a moral commitment to.  (C) will also constitute the answer to 
my research question.  This is because (C) happens to be a moral commitment to a constraint 
on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive. (C) implies that insofar as a meta-ethical 
theory is incompatible with explanatory moral realism, it is a false theory.  If it is a false 
theory, it cannot be an attractive theory.  
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 In section two of this chapter, I will give a brief history of AME and a summary of its 
normal functions.  I will also talk about specific issues my version of AME must address to be 
successful at showing a commitment to any variety of moral realism.  These issues will 
include the necessity of irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations.  I will give a 
comprehensive explanation of what an irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanation is and then 
discuss the compatibility of such an explanation with various normative ethics theories.  This 
will lead into the introduction of the premises of my version of AME and explain the rationale 
behind them.  In section three, I will discuss Don LoeE¶VUHFHQWFULWLFLVPVRIDOOYHUVLRQVRI
AME.  I will then explain his criticisms of two particular versions of AME given by David 
%ULQNDQG'DYLG0F1DXJKWRQ7KHVHFULWLFLVPVVKRZFDVHZKDW/RHEEHOLHYHVLV$0(¶V
fundamental weaknesses. In section four, I ZLOOHYDOXDWH/RHE¶VFULWLFLVPVRI$0(MXGJLQJ
them to be mostly correct.  I will then take heed of his insights in refinements of the defense 
of my version of AME. I will set out a strategy for defending my version of AME that consists 
in showing that the premises of my version of AME are correctness conditions of moral 
claims. I will show that in the case of the correctness condition of an asserted moral claim, 
one cannot deny that correctness condition without inadvertently denying that moral claim.   
In section five, I will defend my version of AME. Here, I will defend three correctness 
conditions of moral claims that imply explanatory moral realism. It will be shown that insofar 
as one coherently affirms any moral claims at all, one must implicitly affirm these correctness 
conditions.  Hence, insofar as one coherently affirms any moral claims at all, one must 
implicitly affirm explanatory moral realism.  
3.2 HISTORY AND FUNCTION OF AME 
 AME, in its original form, attempts to show that the experience of moral practice 
LPSOLHVRULVEHVWH[SODLQHGE\PRUDOUHDOLVP,QVRPHZD\VWKHDUJXPHQW¶VWLWOHLVVOLJKWO\
misleading. AME is not an attempt to show merely that the phenomenology of making moral 
claims gives us presumptive evidence in favor of moral realism. Rather, the argument 
attempts to show that the experience of moral practice (which includes both its 
phenomenological and linguistic components) implies or is best explained by moral realism. 
The phenomenological components include the experience of making moral judgments. The 
linguistic components include the linguistic presuppositions of this procedure. These linguistic 
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presuppositions include the correctness conditions for moral claims. These phenomenological 
and linguistic aspects of moral practice, according to AME, constitute presumptive evidence 
for moral realism. They are presumptive in the sense that their status as evidence is capable of 
being defeated by considerations that suggest that these components of moral practice are 
false or misleading. However, the burden of proof lies on the opponents of AME to show that 
this is the case. This is because, according to the conclusions of AME, our moral practice is 
evidence for moral realism.  According to AME, this is because our engagement in moral 
practice presupposes the truth of moral realism. This is evidence for moral realism, according 
to AME, because the act of engaging in moral practice is one reliable method of learning 
about moral practice.   
 The main assumption that AME relies on is that the commitments of morality 
constitute evidence (albeit presumptive evidence) in favor of the truth of those commitments.  
The reasoning seems to be that if morality commits us to the claim that causing pain for fun is 
prima facie bad, this is evidence for the claim that causing pain for fun is prima facie bad. If 
this moral claim presupposes some additional claim about the world, the evidence for the 
claim that pain is prima facie bad is also presumptive evidence for this additional claim about 
the world. To give a basic example, if the moral claim that causing pain is prima facie bad 
SUHVXSSRVHVWKDWWKHUHDUHPRUDOIDFWVLQWKHZRUOGWKHQWKHIDFWWKDWZHVD\WKLQJVOLNH³SDLQ
LVSULPDIDFLHEDG´LVDOVRSUHVXPSWLYHHYLGHQFHIRUWKHFODLPWKDWWKHUHDUH moral facts in the 
world.  
 As noted earlier, I have decided to refashion AME into an argument that 
demonstrates the commitment of morality to moral realism.  I have not decided to refashion 
AME in order to demonstrate that moral realism is true.  This is for two reasons.  The first is 
that I have a general worry that the conclusion that moral realism is true could not be 
established without a systematic attack on philosophical naturalism. Since such an attack is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, I am not presenting any arguments in favour of the truth of 
realism.  The second reason I am choosing AME to show a moral commitment to moral 
realism is because AME is an argument which deals with the only features of moral practice 
which can establish what the meta-ethical commitments of 1st order moral practice are. There 
is nothing apart from linguistic and phenomenological components of moral practice that 
Page 70 of 227 
 
could conclusively establish a commitment to moral realism (let alone any meta-ethics).  
 It seems a brute fact about moral practice that we must be able to take for granted 
that phenomenological and linguistic components of our moral practice give us information 
about what the commitments of our moral practice are.  If the correctness conditions of 
phrases like ³ZURQJ´RUWKHSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIPRUDOUHYXOVLRQWHOOXV
nothing about what morality commits us to, then we must deny moral practice as well as any 
meta-ethical theories about moral practice. After all, there is no other way to understand moral 
practice except as the practice by which moral phenomenology and linguistic presuppositions, 
(among other things) are used by moral agents in the act of making moral judgments. Hence, 
to understand the moral commitments of moral agents demands an understanding of the 
presuppositions agents rely on when making moral judgments. It is important to note here that 
in arguing that explanatory moral realism is a moral commitment of moral claims, I am 
arguing that explanatory moral realism is a claim we must affirm and presuppose in order to 
engage in moral practice adequately. I am assuming that part of engaging competently in 
moral practice is to engage in moral practice in a manner that is not self-undermining. To 
engage in moral practice in a manner that is not self-undermining, we have to presuppose the 
correctness conditions of moral claims. If we do not, we wind up either denying the very 
moral claims we assert or we wind up agnostics about the moral claims we assert. If we are 
agnostics this amounts to a denial, since asserting a moral claim one later becomes agnostic 
about amounts to a denial of the initial assertion. Since the denial of all moral claims involves 
denying correct moral claims, I will assume that meta-ethical theories that deny correctness 
conditions of moral claims warrant moral criticism.  
 As noted above, my version of AME will show that explanatory moral realism is a 
commitment of moral claims because it is implied by correctness conditions of all moral 
FODLPV$³FRUUHFWQHVVFRQGLWLRQ´RIDPRUDOFODLPLVDQ\FODLPZHPXVWSUHVXSSRVHLQRrder 
to consistently affirm a moral claim. Correctness conditions are subsets of moral 
commitments because they are claims we must affirm in order to engage competently in moral 
practice. In order for correctness conditions of moral claims to imply any form of moral 
realism, it is not enough for such correctness conditions to entail the descriptive content of 
either moral objectivism or moral realism.  Moral objectivism, as we recall, is the view that 
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there are correct and incorrect answers to moral questions and that there are correct and 
incorrect procedures for arriving at these answers. This is distinct from moral realism because 
moral objectivism is a 1st order moral doctrine that is compatible with both realist and anti-
realist 2nd order explanations.  Moral realism, by contrast, is a 2nd order doctrine that is the 
contrary of moral anti-realist 2nd order explanations.  
 7KHFRUUHFWQHVVFRQGLWLRQVRIPRUDOFODLPVFDQ¶WRQO\LPSO\WKHGHVFULSWLYH
components of moral objectivism because moral anti-realist explanations are compatible with 
PRUDOREMHFWLYLVP0RUHRYHUWKHFRUUHFWQHVVFRQGLWLRQVFDQ¶WRQO\LPSO\WKHGHVFULSWLYH
components of any moral realism because those components are often compatible with the 
content of anti-realist meta-ethical theories. In most versions of moral realism, there is nothing 
in the descriptive content of such realism that prevents an anti-realist from adding a 2nd order 
explanation to the realism which converts it to a form of anti-realism.   Thus, if our 
correctness conditions are to imply a version of moral realism, it must be a version of moral 
realism that cannot be compatible with additional, 2nd order anti-realist explanations.  Such a 
version of moral realism should imply that morality is undermined by 2nd order anti-realist 
explanations. This way, it can block any 2nd order anti-realist explanations from being tacked 
on to the descriptive content of moral realism in a way that re-characterizes that content in a 
manner that is anti-realist. 
 In order to generate a version of moral realism that is incompatible with moral anti-
realism, our moral realism must be one that commits its proponent to the judgment 
independence of the correctness of moral claims.  This is the standard view that what makes a 
moral claim correct is the correspondence with some moral state of affairs, not the beliefs or 
desires of the agent making the claim. The judgment independence of the correctness of moral 
claims is compatible with 1st order moral objectivism. The compatibility with 1st order moral 
objectivism is what gives moral realism the stability that stops moral agents from being able 
to change the correctness of moral claims by changing their beliefs and desires. It is also what 
stops moral claims from being completely determined by the beliefs, desires, traditions, or 
laws of a given society. Although many anti-realists insist that judgment independence is 
compatible with anti-realism, judgment independence is essential in any version of AME that 
attempts to show that moral practice is committed to moral realism.   
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 Judgment independence is a necessary condition of the inference from moral practice 
to moral realism.  There is no way one could infer moral realism from a 1st order subjectivist 
view.  Hence, we need a 1st order moral objectivism if we are going to infer moral realism 
from correctness conditions of all moral claims.  If the correctness of moral claims could be 
determined by the beliefs and desires of agents, there would be no reason to think the 
relationship between the correctness of moral claims and the agent beliefs and desires was 
judgment independent. Morality would be on a par with a game of cricket, a game whose rules 
were determined by and could potentially be changed by human agents.  If this were the case, 
an explanation of morality could not itself be irreducibly moral.  
 Any sound version of AME that shows the commitment of moral practice to moral 
realism must include the view that any sound explanation of a correct moral claim is an 
irreducibly moral explanation. An irreducibly moral explanation is a moral explanation that 
cannot be reduced to or summarized as any other non-moral type of explanation.  Anyone who 
understands an irreducibly moral explanation necessarily understands a moral assertion.  What 
this means is that any agent who adequately understands a moral explanation of a correct 
moral claim is also understanding a moral assertion about that claim.  Conversely, any 
explanation of a correct moral claim that can be understood by an agent without the agent 
understanding a moral assertion is not an irreducibly moral explanation.  A moral assertion 
about a moral claim is not merely an assertion of a descriptive state of affairs that induces a 
certain moral attitude on the part of the agent who understands this assertion.  For example, it 
is not an irreducibly moral explanation of the wrongness of child abuse to say such abuse 
prevents children from being able to form romantic relationships during adulthood.  Although 
this explanation may produce a moral attitude on the part of the agent who understands this 
explanation, this explanation is not irreducibly moral.  The agent who understands the claim 
that child abuse prevents children from being able to form romantic relationships during 
adulthood is not understanding any moral assertion.  He may, of course, infer a moral 
assertion from this claim.  He may even have a strong moral attitude about this claim. 
Nonetheless, this claim about the causal relationship between child abuse and romantic 
relationships is still purely descriptive.  
 An irreducibly moral explanation of why child abuse is wrong could be an 
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elaboration of the claim that child abuse is wrong.  The elaboration could be a 2nd order 
explanation.  It could involve metaphysical, psychological, or epistemological elements. 
However, this explanation of the wrongness of child abuse would have to be such that an 
agent understanding it would also understand the moral state of affairs being described in the 
explanation of the wrongness of child abuse. If the irreducibly moral explanation of the 
wrongness of child abuse involved a metaphysical component, the explanation might be: the 
wrongness of child abuse consists in the act possessing a non-physical moral property that 
gives us a reason to try and prevent child abuse.  Putting aside the plausibility of such an 
explanation, the point remains that it would certainly count as an irreducibly moral 
explanatioQ7KLVLVEHFDXVHRQHFDQ¶WXQGHUVWDQGLWZLWKRXWDOVRXQGHUVWDQGLQJDPRUDO
assertion.  That moral assertion consists in the wrongness of child abuse possessing the non-
physical moral property that gives us a reason to prevent child abuse. Likewise, an irreducibly 
moral explanation of the wrongness of child abuse might involve a psychological component.  
Such an explanation might be:  the wrongness of child abuse consists in the act warranting a 
negative psychological response from human agents.  Whether or not we find this explanation 
plausible, we can say with certainty that it is an irreducibly moral explanation with a 
psychological element.  It is irreducibly moral because an agent cannot understand this 
explanation without understanding a moral assertion about a warranted psychological 
response to child abuse.  The fact that the explanation has a psychological element does not 
stop it from being irreducibly moral. Similarly, an irreducibly moral explanation of a correct 
moral claim can have an epistemological element without ceasing to be irreducibly moral.  
Such an explanation might be: the wrongness of child abuse consists of the act possessing 
certain features, which when observed by human agents under certain epistemic conditions, 
justify the belief that child abuse is morally wrong.  Again, whether or not we agree with this 
H[SODQDWLRQZHFDQ¶WGHQ\WKDWLWLVERWKLUUHGXFLEO\PRUDODQGFRQWDLQVDQHSLVWHPRORJLFDO
element.    
 It is important to note that I am not claiming that all irreducibly moral explanations 
are moral realist explanations.  What I am claiming is that all moral realist explanations that 
are incompatible with moral anti-realism are irreducibly moral explanations that are meta-
ethical.  It should not be taken for granted that all normative ethics theories are compatible 
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with irreducibly moral explanations that are meta-ethical.  The compatibility depends on 
whether the normative ethics theory attempts to give accounts of the correctness of moral 
claims using a non-moral explanans.  Whether the explanans is moral or not depends on 
whether the normative ethics account is a complete account of what makes correct moral 
claims correct or an account of how to track correct moral claims.  If it is an account of how to 
track correct moral claims, it is compatible with irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations 
of correct moral claims.  If it is a complete account of what makes a moral claim correct, it is 
not compatible with any irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations of correct moral claims.  
 A Kantian may, for instance, give an account of how to track correct moral claims 
that is perfectly consistent with irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations.  He can say that 
to track a correct moral claim is to test whether or not the claim can be universalized 
according to a standard of rationality that the Kantian characterizes as the categorical 
imperative.102  This right tracking Kantianism is perfectly compatible with irreducibly moral 
meta-ethical explanations of correct moral claims.  This is because this Kantian account only 
specifies how to determine which moral claims are correct. It does not give a complete 
account of what makes a moral claim correct.  Therefore, there is space left open in this 
account for further irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations.   
 Such an irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanation will explain what it is that makes 
correct moral claims correct. Moreover, it will do this using a moral explanans.  Such an 
explanation may even reference the categorical imperaWLYH+RZHYHULWZRQ¶WVLPSO\DVVHUW
the categorical imperative.  It will assert a claim one cannot understand except as the assertion 
of a moral claim. Such an explanation might be that the categorical imperative possesses a 
special moral normativity that allows it to be the standard by which one measures whether or 
not a moral claim is correct.  Whatever irreducibly meta-ethical explanation we invoke, it 
must be an explanation one cannot understand without understanding the assertion of a moral 
claim.  If the Kantian identifies moral correctness with that which is universalizeable 
according to the categorical imperative, there is no room left for an irreducibly moral meta-
                                                        
102 KANT, Immanuel.  The Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary J. Gregor in Immanuel 
Kant, Practical Philosophy. Trans and ed. by Mary J. Gregor.  Cambridge, UK: Cambridge, 
1996.  
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ethical explanation.  In this latter Kantian explanation, moral normativity is being identified 
by a procedure that can be understood without understanding a moral assertion.  An agent can 
understand a series of moral claims being compatible with the categorical imperative without 
understanding that any moral assertions have been made.  All non-Kantians can understand 
this Kantian explanation in this way.  Since this latter Kantianism gives a complete account of 
the correctness of moral claims, it is presenting an account of correct moral claims that is 
incompatible with irreducibly moral meta-ethical claims.  There is simply no room here for an 
irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanation.  All that can be said about correct moral claims 
has already been said using an explanans one can understand without understanding it as a 
moral assertion.  
 A similar situation arises for consequentialists.  Consequentialist varieties of 
normative ethics theories postulate that the consequences of an act are the basis upon which 
one adequately judges the moral state of that act.103 A consequentialist theory may or may not 
give an account of the correctness of moral claims that utilizes a moral explanans. If the 
consequentialist theory gives an account of the correctness of moral claims which states that 
looking at the consequences of an act is the only appropriate method of tracking which moral 
claims are correct, the account is compatible with irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations.  
This is because such an account of the correctness of moral claims only gives an account of 
how to adequately track correct moral claims.  There is room for an additional irreducibly 
moral meta-ethical explanation of what constitutes correct moral claims.  Such an explanation, 
as noted before, one could only understand by understanding a moral assertion.  It could be an 
explanation to the effect that the consequences of actions possess a special normative property 
that makes such consequences the soul determinant of the moral states of those actions. 
However, consequentialism could not give a complete explanation of correct moral claims by 
postulating an identity between correct moral claims and those moral claims that describe 
certain sets of consequences.  In this latter explanation, there is no room to make a moral 
assertion that explains why there is an identity between correct moral claims and those moral 
                                                        
103 There are different ways of cashing out consequentialism.  However, all versions of consequentialism 
seem to have the feature of looking at the consequences of an action in order to adequately judge the 
moral state of that act. See ARMSTRONG, Walter Sinott. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 
Consequentialism. Copywright 2006 (viewed February 2nd, 2011).  
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claims that describe certain sets of consequences.  In other words, there is no room for further, 
irreducibly moral explanations. Rather, the identity between correct moral claims and those 
moral claims that describe certain sets of consequences is the explanans.  Because the 
explanans is an identity relation rather than a moral assertion, this consequentialist 
explanation of moral claims is incompatible with irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations. 
 It might be objected here that this identity relation is itself a moral claim.  However, 
it should be noted in response that the identity relation can only be a moral claim at the 1st 
order. This is because, at the 2nd order, it becomes an explanation of the identity between all 
correct moral claims and those moral claims that describe certain sets of consequences.  If the 
1st order identity is explained by a 2nd order meta-ethical claim which is a restatement of the 
identity, the identity is explaining the identity.  If this 2nd order meta-ethical explanation is 
taken to be a complete explanation of the 1st order identity, the identity is all that can be stated 
at the 2nd order level. Whether one thinks this explanatory move is plausible or not, we cannot 
say that it is compatible with any irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations.  The identity 
postulated at the 2nd order is both descriptive and all encompassing.  There simply is no room 
for any additional 2nd order meta-ethical explanations that are irreducibly moral.  On this 
version of consequentialism, the identity postulated at the 2nd order explains everything.  
 This situation remains regardless of whether we are dealing with a utilitarian variety 
of consequentialism or not.  If the utilitarian gives an account of correct moral claims that 
consists in those claims describing states of affairs in which pleasure is maximized, this 
account may or may not be compatible with irreducibly moral meta-ethical claims.  If the 
account merely consists of the claim that we track correct moral claims by identifying those 
claims in which pleasure is maximized, the account is compatible with irreducibly moral 
meta-ethical claims. This is because this account is consistent with a further explanation of 
why correct moral claims describe pleasure maximizing states of affairs that utilizes a moral 
explanans.  This further explanation might be that correct moral claims describe pleasure 
maximizing states of affairs because pleasure maximizing possesses a particular moral 
property.  This further explanation would be incompatible with the utilitarian account if the 
account simply posited a complete 2nd order explanation of the correct moral claims that 
asserted an identity between correct moral claims and those moral claims that describe 
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pleasure maximizing states.  As noted above, there would be no room for an irreducibly moral 
explanation because the explanans of the complete 2nd order explanation would be an identity 
relation rather than a claim that could only be understood as a moral assertion.  Moreover the 
identity would explain everything there is to be explained.  
 All forms of consequentialism are in the same boat in this regard.  Whether we are 
dealing with rule consequentialism or act consequentialism, compatibility with irreducibly 
moral meta-ethical claims requires that either account not give a complete 2nd order meta-
ethical explanation of the correctness of moral claims that uses an explanans which is not 
moral. Welfare maximizing (rather than pleasure maximizing) consequentialism is also 
compatible with irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations on the proviso it does not give a 
complete 2nd order meta-ethical explanation of the correctness of moral claims using an 
explanans that is not moral.104  Hence, a welfare consequentialist account is not compatible 
with irreducibly moral meta-ethical claims if it gives a complete 2nd order meta-ethical 
explanation of the connection between correct moral claims and welfare maximizing by 
postulating an identity between the two.  This same situation holds in cases where we are 
dealing with an agent centered consequentialist account or an agent neutral consequentialist 
account.  In order for either account to be compatible with irreducibly moral meta-ethical 
explanations, a complete 2nd order meta-HWKLFDOH[SODQDWLRQRIFRUUHFWPRUDOFODLPVFDQµW
simply postulate an identity between correct moral claims and the set of moral claims 
described by the agent-centered or agent neutral consequentialist account. 105  
 In the case of contractarian normative ethics theories, the standard interpretation of 
such theories is that they are incompatible with irreducibly moral meta-ethical claims.  This is 
because the contractarian is (among other things) normally taken to be giving a complete 2nd 
                                                        
104 For a collection of essays centered around the defence of Welfare Maximizing Consequentialism, see 
SEN, Amartya.  Rationality and Freedom. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.  
 
105 For a defence of Agent-Neutral Consequentialism, see SCHEFFLER, Samuel. The Rejection of 
Consequentialism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1982.  For an example of Agent-Centered 
Consequentialism, see PORTMORE, Douglas W. Can an Act-Consequentialist Theory be Agent-
Relative? American Philosophical Quarterly, 2001, Vol. 38, 363-377.  
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order meta-ethical explanation of correct moral claims that identifies their correctness as being 
identical with the outcome of a procedure. This procedure is normally taken to be a procedure 
that satisfies the interests of hypothetical rational agents. Such contractarian accounts are not 
normally taken be giving 2nd order meta-ethical explanations of how to track correct moral 
claims viz a viz these procedures.  Rather, the accounts are normally taken to be meta-ethical 
explanations of how correct moral claims obtain their status as correct moral claims.  Such 
explanations utilize a non-moral explanans, since they explain the correctness of moral claims 
in terms of such claims being the outcome of a procedure. The procedure is non-moral, since 
one can understand the mechanics of any contractarian procedure without understanding that a 
moral assertion has been made.   
 However, this standard interpretation is not essential to any interpretation of 
contractarianism. It is still the case that whether a contractarian theory is compatible with 
irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations depends on how we choose to interpret the 
contractarian theory.  This is particularly true of the famous contemporary version of 
FRQWUDFWDULDQLVPHVSRXVHGE\-RKQ5DZOV$OWKRXJK5DZOV¶FRQWUDFWDULDQLVPLVRQO\DWKHRU\
of correct moral claims that relate to justice (rather than substantive conceptions of the good), 
the theory none the less gives a comprehensive explanation of how those claims obtain their 
status as correct moral claims. According to Rawls, a set of correct moral claims is the 
outcome of a procedure whereby hypothetical rational agents choose to affirm moral claims 
under a veil of ignorance.106 The veil of ignorance requires that the hypothetical rational 
agents in this position do not have knowledge of their economic and social position, nor do 
they have knowledge of any comprehensive moral or theological doctrines regarding what the 
good life ought to be.107 This is what Rawls refers to as the original position.108 While in the 
original position, hypothetical rational agents will choose, under fair conditions, mutually 
acceptable moral claims that will extend basic liberties to citizens while ensuring that 
                                                        
106RAWLS, John. A Theory of Justice. Harvard College, USA: Harvard University Press, 1971. pp. 102-
171.  
107 Ibid,. 47-101. 
 
108 Ibid., 10-19, 102-171. 
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permissible inequalities benefit the worst off in society.109   
  As we can see, the correct moral claims Rawls is attempting to explain are principles 
of justice that are made correct in virtue of being what hypothetical rational agents would 
choose in the original position.  Here, we can interpret Rawls two ways.  We can interpret him 
as giving a complete 2nd order meta-ethical explanation of how a set of correct moral claims 
(principles of justice) obtain their status as correct moral claims. The explanation does not rely 
on a metaphysics nor does it rely on particular conceptions of the good. However, the 
explanation is not compatible with irreducibly moral claims that could explain how principles 
of justice can obtain their status as correct moral claims.  The explanans for this obtainment is 
the procedure that hypothetical rational agents would engage in while in the original position.  
This explanans is not moral because one can understand this procedure without understanding 
that any moral assertion has been made.   Since the explanans of this complete 2nd order meta-
ethical explanation is not moral, there is no room left for any further explanations that consist 
of irreducibly moral meta-ethical claims.  
 On the other hand, we can also interpret Rawls as merely giving a 1st order account 
of how to track a set of correct moral claims.  On this second interpretation, Rawls is not 
giving us an explanation of what these correct moral claims consist in.  Rather, he is merely 
outlining the procedures hypothetical rational agents must engage in order to adequately track 
these correct moral claims. There is still room for a 2nd order meta-ethical explanation of why 
this procedure is the procedure that tracks the set of correct moral claims that Rawls says it 
does.  Such a further explanation could be a claim that one could not understand accept as the 
assertion of a moral claim.  On this second interpretation of Rawls, there is room for 
explanations of correct moral claims that involve a moral explanans.  Hence, there is room on 
this interpretation for irreducibly moral meta-ethical claims.  I am not meaning to take a stand 
as to which interpretation of Rawls is the correct one.  I am merely pointing out that the 
compatibility of the Rawls theory with irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations depends 
on our interpretation of Rawls. If we interpret Rawls as offering a complete 2nd order meta-
ethical explanation of this set of correct moral claims, the explanans is non-moral and 
incompatible with irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations.  
                                                        
109
 Ibid., 47-101.  
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 $VLPLODUVLWXDWLRQDULVHVIRU706FDQORQ¶VYHUVLRQRIFRQWUDFWDULDQLVP6FDQORQ¶V
contractarianism attempts to give a 2nd order meta-ethical account of those correct moral 
claims that deal with right and wrong actions.110  6FDQORQ¶VFHQWUDOFODLPLVWKDWDPRUDOFODLP
LVFRUUHFWRULQFRUUHFWLILWFRXOGRUFRXOGQ¶WEHMXVWLILHGWRRWKHUVRQJURXQGV others could not 
reasonably reject.111  Unlike Rawls, Scanlon imagines reasonable hypothetical moral agents 
rather than rational hypothetical agents in constructing his theory.  Reasonable moral agents 
are agents that presuppose a certain body of information and a certain range of reasons taken 
to be relevant.112 To justify a moral claim is to engage in the procedure such reasonable moral 
agents would engage in order to justify a moral claim. That procedure, for Scanlon, is merely 
the procedure of pointing out that a moral claim has strong reasons in its favor.113  Reasons, 
for Scanlon, are considerations that count in favor of a moral claim or that count against it.  
Wrong moral claims, for Scanlon, are those claims that such reasonable hypothetical agents 
would reject on the grounds that it has been shown that there are reasons that count against 
VXFKPRUDOFODLPV6FDQORQEHOLHYHVWKDWPRUDOMXVWLILFDWLRQLVµEDVLF¶LQWKHVHQVHWKDWZH
should take reasons as both primitive and normative.114  This means that for Scanlon, the 
objective normativity of reasons is something that we must take as a brute fact that cannot be 
analyzed in terms of any set of natural facts.  Moral principles, for Scanlon, are general 
principles about the status of various reasons for action.  
 6FDQORQ¶VDFFRXQWOLNH5DZOVLVFRPSDWLEOHZLWKLUUHGXFLEOHPRUDOPHWD-ethical 
FODLPVGHSHQGLQJRQKRZRQHLQWHUSUHWVLW,IZHLQWHUSUHW6FDQORQ¶VDFFRXQWDVDFRPSOHWHnd 
order meta-ethical explanation of how a set of correct moral claims obtain their status as 
FRUUHFWPRUDOFODLPV6FDQORQ¶VDFFRXQWLVQRWFRPSDWLEOHZLWKLUUHGXFLEO\PRUDOPHWD-ethical 
explanations.  On this interpretation, the correctness of a set of moral claims (dealing with 
right and wrong actions) is identical with those claims being what hypothetical reasonable 
agents could agree were moral claims there were strong reasons to endorse.  Here again we 
                                                        
110SCANLON, T.M. What We Owe To Each Other. Harvard College, USA. Harvard University Press, 
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have an explanation of a set of correct moral claims where the explanans need not be 
understood as a moral assertion. The process by which hypothetical reasonable agents agree 
that there are strong reasons to endorse a moral claim is a process one can understand without 
understanding that the endorsement of a moral claim is being made.  This is because one can 
differentiate the pURFHVVE\ZKLFKDJHQW¶VMXVWLI\PRUDOFODLPVE\PDNLQJUHIHUHQFHWRUHDVRQV
on the one hand, and the inherent justification of such reasons on the other.  The latter 
phenomenon is certainly incapable of being understood without understanding that a moral 
assertion is being made.  The former phenomenon, however, one can understand perfectly 
without understanding that a moral assertion is being made.   
 This is because one can conceive of it being a contingent matter whether or not 
reasonable agents are correct in their procedure of identifying correct moral claims by making 
reference to reasons. One cannot imagine it being a contingent matter whether or not a moral 
claim is justified if the reasons that would justify this moral claim obtain.  To say that there 
are moral reasons to endorse moral claim X is to make a claim that can only be understood as 
a moral assertion.  This is not true for the claim that a hypothetical group of reasonable agents 
agreed that there were reasons to endorse a particular moral claim.  If we interpret Scanlon as 
offering a complete 2nd order meta-ethical explanation of what makes a set of moral claims 
correct, this interpretation has no room for any further irreducibly moral meta-ethical 
explanations.  The explanans in this explanation (the procedure of the reasonable agents) is 
both all encompassing and capable of being understood as a claim that is not a moral 
assertion.  
 Nonetheless, we can also interpret Scanlon as merely offering a 1st order account of 
how to track a set of correct moral claims. If we interpret him this way, we have room for 
further 2nd order meta-ethical explanations which can contain an explanans that can only be 
XQGHUVWRRGDVDPRUDODVVHUWLRQ6FDQORQ¶VDFFRXQWRQWKLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQEHFRPHVDQ
account of correct moral claims that accounts for how to track such claims by looking at the 
procedures of hypothetical moral agents for tracking such claims.  It is not a complete 2nd 
order meta-ethical explanation of such claims, on this interpretation.  Hence, SFDQORQ¶V
account can be interpreted in a manner where it is consistent with explanatory moral realism.  
To a large extent, what determines the range of interpretations we can give to a contractarian 
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theory is to what extent the theory can be interpreted as a purely 1st order normative ethics 
theory. 
 Perhaps the easiest contemporary contractarian theory to interpret as a 1st order 
normative ethics theory is the contractarianism defended by David Gauthier in his book 
Morals by Agreement.115  2Q*DXWKLHU¶VFRQWractarianism, morality is a rational constraint on 
the pursuit of self-interest.116  Practical reason is a means of satisfying self-interest while 
rational constraints have a foundation in the interest they constrain.117  Gauthier claims that in 
situations involving interactions with others, a moral agent chooses rationally only insofar as 
he constrains the pursuit of his own interests to conform to principles expressing the 
impartiality that is characteristic of morality.118  For Gauthier, morality can be generated as a 
rational constraint from the non-moral premises of rational choice.  A rational agent is an 
independent centre of activity that attempts to direct his capacities and resources to the 
fulfillment of his interests. A rational agent becomes a moral agent when the rational agent 
makes the distinction between what it is possible for him to do and what he ought to do.119 
When the rational agent becomes a moral agent, he adopts moral principles that are the objects 
of fully voluntary ex ante agreement with other rational agents.  Although the agreement is 
conceptualized by Gauthier as a hypothetical agreement, the parties to this agreement are 
conceptualized as real, determinate, individuals who are distinguished by individual 
capacities, situations, and concerns.120 
 This agreement is such that each rational agent prefers to conform to it provided most 
other rational agents do.  However, each rational agent prefers not to conform to it provided 
most other rational agents also do not conform to it.  Also, rational agents prefer that other 
rational agents conform to this agreement rather than conform to no agreement at all.  In this 
way, the agreement exemplifies the property of being a piece of mutually beneficial, 
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coordinative action.121  Mutually beneficial coordinative actions require constraints on the 
behavior of rational agents.  These constraints must be such that to abide by them is 
advantageous for the rational agents they constrain.122  For Gauthier, this requires that each 
rational agent is in an initial bargaining position from which to accept these constraints in the 
hypothetical agreement.  This bargaining position is described as the least he might accept in 
place of no agreement and the most he might accept in place of being excluded by others from 
agreement.123 In order for the rational agent to rationally be able to accept constraints on his 
behavior from his initial bargaining position, there is a requirement that the greatest 
concession of the rational agent (measured as a proportion of what is at stake for him), be as 
small as possible.124 Gauthier expresses this requirement as a principle of maximum relative 
benefit and believes this principle captures the idea of fairness and impartiality in a bargaining 
situation.125  
 Gauthier characterizes the rational agent who rationally accepts constraints on his 
behavior in the initial bargaining position as a constrained maximizer.  A constrained 
maximizer is a rational agent who puts constraints on his pursuit of self-interest that allows 
him to enjoy the benefits of co-operation that other agents lack.  Gauthier admits that 
constrained maximizers sometimes are exploited when they act cooperatively in mistaken 
expectations of reciprocity from others.126 However, Gauthier believes that under plausible 
conditions, the net advantage that constrained maximizers get from co-operation exceeds the 
benefits that others expect from exploitation.127  Gauthier concludes from this that it is rational 
to be disposed to constrain maximizing behavior by internalizing moral principles that will 
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JRYHUQRQH¶VFKRLFHV128  However, no rational agent should be worse off in the initial 
bargaining position than he would be in a non-social context of no interaction.129 For 
Gauthier, this is a proviso that constrains the base from which each ratiRQDODJHQW¶VUHODWLYH
concession and benefit are measured.  The constraint winds up inducing a structure of 
personal and property rights that Gauthier believes are basic to rationally and morally 
acceptable social arrangements.130  
 There are some superficiaOVLPLODULWLHVEHWZHHQ*DXWKLHU¶VFRQWUDFWDULDQLVPDQGWKH
contractarianism of Rawls.  Both theories postulate that principles of justice are the objects of 
DUDWLRQDOFKRLFH/LNH5DZOV*DXWKLHU¶VFRQWUDFWDULDQLVPSRVWXODWHVWKDWWKLVUDWLRQDOFKRLFH
is represented as a bargain or agreement among persons who need not be aware of their 
identities.  Where Gauthier differs from Rawls is that Gauthier advocates an interest 
maximizing conception of rationality where the rational person seeks the greatest satisfaction 
of his own interests.  This contrasts with the Rawlsian universalistic conception of rationality 
whereby the rational person believes that what makes it rational to satisfy an interest does not 
depend on whose interest it is.  Also, Gauthier makes very explicit that he intends his 
contractarianism to be a form of 1st order normative ethics.  He sees his contractarianism as a 
theory that justifies rather than explains moral principles.131 With Rawlsian contractarianism, 
LWGRHVQ¶WVHHPWREHWKHFDVHthat Rawls has excluded his theory from the ability to explain 
and not merely justify moral principles.132 
 %HFDXVHRI*DXWKLHU¶VH[SOLFLWTXDOLILFDWLRQRIKLVWKHRU\DVDIRUPRIst order 
normative ethics, there is nothing in his theory that explicitly contradicts explanatory moral 
UHDOLVP5HJDUGOHVVRIZKHWKHURQHILQG¶V*DXWKLHU¶VFRQWUDFWDULDQLVPSODXVLEOHRQHFDQJLYH
irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations of the central concepts put forward by Gauthier.  
For instance, we can give irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanations of the normativity of 
interest maximizing rationality.  Since this is the case, the justification of the constraints 
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UDWLRQDODJHQWVDFFHSWZLWKLQ*DXWKLHU¶VWKHRU\FDQEHH[SODLQHGXVLQJLUUHGXFLEO\PRUDOPHWD-
ethical explanations.  Since such constraints are justified because of their ability to maximize 
the interests of agents, one can give an irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanation of this 
justification.  Again, how plausible this explanation would be is an entirely different matter.  
What is of importance is that one could give such an irreducibly moral meta-ethical 
H[SODQDWLRQRIDOOWKHFRQFHSWVRI*DXWKLHU¶VFRQWUDFWDULDQLVP 
 One can modify an irreducibly moral explanation by giving it a greater level of detail 
and depth. However, for the explanation to remain irreducibly moral, one cannot use an 
H[SODQDQVWKDWLVQRWLWVHOIPRUDO7KLVLVEHFDXVHRQHFDQ¶WXQGHUVWDQGDPRUDOVWDWHRIDIIDLUV
if the explanans used to describe that state of affairs is not itself moral. In meta-ethics, there 
are often explanations of a moral state of affairs where the explanans used has descriptive and 
moral components.  However, without the moral components, the explanation stops being 
LUUHGXFLEO\PRUDO:HFDQ¶WH[SODLQDPRUDOFODLm unless using an irreducibly moral 
explanans unless we use an explanans that is capable of describing a moral state of affairs.  A 
completely non-PRUDOH[SODQDQVFDQ¶WGRWKLV:LWKDQLUUHGXFLEO\PRUDOH[SODQDWLRQWKH
moral explanans is where the explanation ought to end.  If anyone attempts to give a deeper 
explanation of the moral explanans that either reduces or summarizes the moral explanans to 
something else, they are, in effect, robbing the explanation of its moral irreducibility.  
 The indispensability of irreducibly moral explanations is a requirement for any 
version of AME that demonstrates the moral commitment to explanatory moral realism. 
Explanatory moral realism must imply that the correctness of a moral claim obtains because of 
an irreducibl\PRUDOUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHIDFWVRIWKHZRUOGDQGWKHFODLP¶VFRUUHFWQHVV
Moreover, this irreducibly moral relationship cannot be described in terms of any states of 
affairs that are not moral.  All anti-realist explanations of correct moral claims attempt to 
either reduce or summarize the correctness of those claims as a function of some state of 
affairs which is not moral. This is true even for deflationary forms of anti-realism.  This is 
because the deflationary account is, in effect, an attempt to give a summary explanation of a 
moral claim using something other than a 2nd order moral explanans. This brings us to our 
final requirement for a sound version of AME. 
 The third requirement of any sound version of AME is the finality of 2nd order 
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irreducibly moral explanations.  What this means is that such explanations cannot be 
significantly re-characterized in a way where the explanation of the claim no longer describes 
a moral state of affairs. The moral state of affairs described by the claim must be the final 
explanation of why the claim is correct. There can be no higher order explanations that are 
over and above the explanation of the moral claim that uses the moral states of affairs 
description. However, in order to get explanatory moral realism, we have to assume the 
finality of irreducibly moral explanations is itself 2nd order. This is, strictly speaking, because 
2nd order moral explanations are meta-ethical. Moreover, meta-ethics, unlike normative ethics, 
deals with metaphysical issues.  
 Meta-ethics is also the only domain of moral inquiry that can give us ultimate 
explanations of how to appropriately interpret the meaning and function of moral claims. This 
is why the finality of irreducibly moral explanations must be a meta-ethical finality. If the 
finality of irreducibly moral explanations were 1st order, there could always be a 2nd order 
theory of that finality which re-characterizes it in an anti-realist fashion. If the finality is itself 
2nd order, this re-characterization is impossible.  After all, 2nd order explanations of moral 
claims are final, theoretical explanations of what moral claims are.  If we take an irreducibly 
moral explanation as a final, theoretical explanation of what makes a moral claim correct, we 
have explanatory moral realism.  
 In order to be invulnerable to an anti-realist re-characterization, our version of AME 
must include the following moral commitments: 
(D) For any moral claim X, X is not determined by any agent's judgments about X 
(E) For any moral claim X, the only appropriate explanation is one that is irreducibly     
moral. 
 and 
(F) For any moral claim X, the only appropriate irreducibly moral explanation is one that is 
a final 2nd   order explanation. 
              3.3 LOEB, BRINK, and MCNAUGHTON 
Don Loeb begins his discussion of AME by noting the importance that writers give 
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to moral experience.  He notes that it is part of the background assumptions of meta-ethical 
debate that moral experience, particularly the disposition to use our moral vocabulary in 
certain ways, is among the best evidence we have for what it is we are thinking about when 
we talk about morality.133 Loeb observes that this assumption implies that moral discourse is 
talk about a realm of putative fact.134  Loeb then goes on to explain how this assumption has 
been the driving force behind AME. AME, according to Loeb, usually manifests itself in two 
versions.  The first version infers the objectivist seeming character of morality from our 
experience of talking about morality. The second version infers the objective seeming 
character of morality directly from features of the phenomenology of moral experience.  Here 
we should interpret Loeb as meaning the phenomenology of affirming particular moral claims. 
According to Loeb, both versions of this argument are consistent with the idea of an inference 
from morality seeming a certain way (or our practices somehow presupposing it to be that 
way) to the reasonableness of the presumption that it is that way.135 
 The influence of AME has been fairly widespread because it is widely believed that 
the objective seeming character of our moral experiences supports a presumption in favour of 
objectivist meta-ethical theories. Such theories can include moral realism or quasi-realism or 
certain constructivist theories.  According to AME, the presumption in favour of objectivist 
theories can be defeated only if the arguments against such theories prove to be successful.136 
Loeb cites David Brink137 and David McNaughton138 as two contemporary authors who claim 
that AME shifts the burden of proof to the proponent of anti-objectivist theories.   Loeb also 
illustrates how each author defends one of the two main versions of the argument.139  For 
Brink, the AME is an inference from the way we speak about morality to an objectivist 
conception of morality.  For McNaughton, the AME is an inference from features of the 
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phenomenology of moral experience to an objectivist conception of morality.  
 According to McNaughton, it is part of the phenomenology of moral experience that 
morality appears to be in the world apart from our happening to encounter it.140  He asserts 
that morality seems to exist independently of our subjective experiences.141 This means that 
moral claims appear to be correct independently of the means by which agents experience 
them as being correct. Here, McNaughton is bringing in an epistemological dimension to the 
character of moral phenomenology. After all, if we know morality by experiencing it in a way 
where morality seems to exist independently of us, it seems as though morality is there to be 
experienced rather than a product of our experiences.  McNaughton develops this line of 
thought by stating that agents have moral perceptions which are partially analogous to visual 
perceptions insofar as they seem to be perceptions of something outside of agents.142 
McNaughton then adds that the rightness or wrongness of conduct is something agents also 
experience as a perception of something outside agents. Moreover, when agents are moved to 
DFWPRUDOO\LWVHHPVWREHLQYLUWXHRIWKHLUUHFRJQL]LQJPRUDOLW\¶VDXWKRULW\RYHUWKHP143 
 Brink, by contrast, delivers a version of the AME that is based on linguistic 
SUHVXSSRVLWLRQVRIPRUDOGLVFRXUVH%ULQN¶VYHUVLRQRI$0(LVEDVHGRQWZR observations 
about the linguistic features of moral discourse. The first observation is that the structure of 
moral discourse presupposes that moral claims commit one to the objective properties of 
morality.  In support of this observation, Brink contends that stated beliefs regarding moral 
claims contain implicit references to moral properties, facts, or knowledge.144 Here, he means 
WKDWZKHQHYHURQHMXGJHVDEHOLHIUHJDUGLQJDPRUDOFODLPVXFKDV³*LYLQJWR&KDULW\LV
*RRG´RQHLVDOVRYRLFLQJDEHOLHILn the evaluative components of the state or activity 
described in the claim.  So if one believes that giving to charity is good, one also believes that 
giving to charity has the property of goodness.  Moreover, according to Brink, an agent who 
affirms this claim is also implicitly affirming that it is an objective fact that giving to charity is 
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good and that this fact, if known, constitutes moral knowledge.145 
 7KHVHFRQGRI%ULQN¶VREVHUYDWLRQVDERXWWKHOLQJXLVWLFIHDWXUHVRIPRUDOGLVFRXUVHLV
the implicit assumption that there is a correct answer to moral questions. Brink notes that 
moral utterances are often in the declarative mood, and thus appear to be statements of fact.  
Moreover, agents disagree with the moral views of others, in part because agents believe 
others can be mistaken.  This means that agents take themselves to be capable of making 
mistakes as well as being correct about the answers to moral questions.  This second 
observation is about the rules one must follow in order to be able to intelligibly participate in 
moral discourse. It seems impossible to attempt to participate in moral discourse without 
presupposing that there is a correct answer to moral questions. Moreover, agents must also 
assume that they are capable of knowing what such a correct answer is.  Most importantly, 
agents must assume that they are capable of being mistaken about what such a correct answer 
could be.  
 /RHE¶VPDLQFULWLFLVPRIVXFKDUJXPHQWVLVWKDWWKHSURSRQHQWVRI$0(RYHUORRN
observations of moral practice that imply non-objectivism or are compatible with moral anti-
realism. According to Loeb, philosophers are too ready to generalize about complex, subtle, 
and largely empirical matters of what constitutes moral practice. These generalizations, 
according to Loeb, merely reflect the experiences and intuitions of the particular philosophers 
and may not reflect the experiences and intuitions of humanity as a whole.  Moreover, these 
philosophers overlook features of the experience of morality that do not support their thesis. 
Loeb claims that there are certain features of moral experience that suggest that agents 
experience morality as something that is not objective. 146   
 For example, agents talk about moral feelings and attitudes just as much as they talk 
about moral beliefs. There does not seem to be any reason to think the belief talk reflects the 
nature of moral experience more than the talk about moral feelings and attitudes. Moreover, 
people often say things that reflect a seeming incompatibility with objectivism. For instance, 
SHRSOHRIWHQVD\VHQWHQFHVOLNH³,W¶VDOOUHODWLYH´RU³:KDWLVULJKWIRUDSHUVRQGHSHQGVRQ
WKDWSHUVRQ¶VRZQGHFLVLRQV´/RHELQVLVWVWKDWZHFDQQRWGLVPLVVVXFKVWDWHPHQWVDVWKH
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products of confusion merely because they appear to conflict with a view that we think is 
widely accepted.147 For Loeb, the burden of proof is on the proponent of AME to show that it 
is the anti-objectivist claims of ordinary agents, rather than the objectivist claims, which are 
products of confusion.  
 Loeb thinks there are additional problems for the claim that we experience morality 
as a realm of fact.  First, this claim is undermined by the fact that anti-objectivist theories can 
explain many of the features of moral practice which objectivists claim support objectivism. 
The procedure of moral reasoning is something Loeb believes moral anti-realism can give a 
plausible account of viz a viz explanations which do not presuppose objectivism.  Thus, it is 
not clear that reasoning about the correctness of particular moral claims entails that the moral 
UHDVRQHUVDUHDVVXPLQJWKDWPRUDOFODLPVDUHDUHDOPRIIDFW/RHEFLWHV-RKQ0DFNLH¶VYLHZ
that it is entirely appropriate to reason about questions of value despite the non-objectivity of 
values as evidence that reasoning about questions of value is a moral practice that does not 
support objectivism.148  $FFRUGLQJWR/RHEWKLVLVZK\%ULQN¶VYHUVLRQRI$0(IDLOVWR
demonstrate the case for moral realism being a presupposition of moral discourse. Since moral 
practice is compatible with non-objectivist explanations of it and Brink has not shown that 
PRUDOUHDVRQHUVH[SHULHQFHPRUDOLW\DVDUHDOPRIIDFW%ULQN¶VYHUVLRQRI$0(IDLOVWR
supports moral realism. 
 Additionally, moral utterances could be in the declarative mood while not implying 
moral objectivism. When a sentence is in the declarative mood, this means the content of the 
sentence is asserted as though what is being asserted is an objective fact.149  For Loeb, there is 
no incompatibility between moral claims being asserted in a declarative mood and those moral 
claims not presupposing objectivism. This is because we can talk about something in the 
declarative mood even though the subject matter is something we create. Discussions of topics 
UDQJLQJIURP³WKHEHVWLFHFUHDPIODYRU´WR³ZKLFKVSRUWVWHDPLWLVEHWWHUWRVXSSRUW´DUH
framed within statements that are in the declarative mood. And yet no one ever assumes that 
such discussions involve claims whose correctness obtains independently of the preferences of 
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agents.  This is true despite the fact that we seem to have experiences of the comparative 
goodness of certain ice cream flavors and sports teams.150  
 Here Loeb is not simply saying that agents can trade in normative claims whose 
correctness is admitted by the agents to be determined by their own preferences.  This would 
only show that declarative mood statements are compatible with moral objectivist forms of 
moral anti-realism.  We must take him to also be claiming that agent preferences can 
determine the correctness of these normative claims in a manner that is incompatible with 
moral objectivism. It is reasonable to assume here that Loeb believes agent preferences can 
determine the correctness of normative claims in a manner that is relativistic.  On this view, 
UHDVRQLQJDERXWQRUPDWLYHFODLPVFDQPHUHO\EHDZD\RIGHFLGLQJZKDWRQH¶VRZQIHHOLQJV
about the correctness of the claims are. The decision need not be constrained, for instance, by 
the presupposition that there are objective procedures that agents must partake in, so as to 
reason correctly about the normative claims they are discussing.  Since this kind of relativistic 
GLVFRXUVHKDSSHQVDOOWKHWLPH/RHEVHHVLWDVDGLVFRQILUPDWLRQRI%ULQN¶VFODLPWKDWWKHZD\
we talk when we engage in moral reasoning supports moral objectivism. If there are good 
reasons to think the discourse of reasoning over normative issues (like ice cream flavors or 
sport team allegiances) is not uniformly objectivist, it is implausible to think that moral 
reasoning is uniformly objectivist. If the way we talk when we engage in moral reasoning 
does not support moral objectivism, this reasoning certainly does not support moral realism.  
 Also, Loeb claims that the references to moral properties, facts, and knowledge that 
Brink observes as being part of moral discourse do not imply moral realism. This is because it 
is possible to give accounts of such things from within an objectivist, anti-realist framework. 
%ODFNEXUQ¶VTXDVL-realism is the classic example of such an anti-realist theory.151 Since the 
features of moral discourse highlighted by Brink are compatible with both objectivist moral 
realism and objectivist anti-realism, Brink needs to do more than simply point out these 
features in order to present a compelling presumptive argument for Moral Realism. He must 
show that these features can only be interpreted on a moral realist understanding. And this is 
precisely what he has failed to do, according to Loeb.  
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 /LNHZLVH0F1DXJKWRQ¶VDUJXPHQWVIDLOWRVKRZWKDWWKHIHDWXUHVRIPRUDO
experience highlighted by McNaughton support moral realism rather than objectivism. The 
fact that morality seems to be in the world independently of our happening to encounter it is a 
feature of moral phenomenology that is compatible with an objectivist moral anti-realism. 
This is because there is a distinction between versions of anti-realism whereby agents adhere 
to a morality that obtains because of the individual preferences of those agents and versions of 
moral anti-realism where agents adhere to a morality that obtains independently of the 
individual preferences of agents.  In the second kind of anti-realism, the morality that is 
independent of agents is a set of norms providing the agents with the ability to satisfy the 
collective long-term interests of humanity. In this version, the single agent may have beliefs 
and desires that are at odds with this morality. However, the morality itself is grounded in the 
collective desires and interests of humanity. This, according to Loeb, can account for why the 
agent experiences morality as being something independent of his happening to encounter it.  
$92,',1*/2(%¶6 PITFALLS 
/RHE¶VFULWLFLVPVRI%ULQNDQG0F1DXJKWRQFDQEHXVHGWRJHQHUDWHWZR
requirements for any version of AME. These requirements are that any successful version of 
AME acknowledge:  
(L) The experience of moral phenomenology is not uniform enough to present a presumptive 
case for moral realism. 
and 
(M) Even if the experience of moral phenomenology possessed the characteristics proponents 
of AME have claimed it does, those characteristics would only imply moral objectivism, not 
moral realism.  
With regards to (L), it seems obvious that Loeb is correct in his explanations of how Brink 
and McNaughton have not shown that (L) is false. Neither Brink nor McNaughton adequately 
deals with the lack of uniformity in the experience of moral practice. There is no serious 
acknowledgement in either argument that different agents routinely make different meta-
ethical claims when they try to articulate the nature of what it is they do when they do 
morality. Some agents say that their condemnation of torture is merely an expression of 
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certain disapproving emotions. Other agents say that their condemnation of torture reflects the 
appropriate response to a categorical imperative. These controversies account for much of the 
debates regarding what constitutes moral phenomenology. Neither theorist attempts to show 
that these controversies can only be explained by moral realism.  
 With regards to (M), Loeb is correct that Brink and McNaughton have failed to show 
that (M) is false. As we saw, the way Brink and McNaughton interpret the characteristics of 
the experience of moral practice only implies moral objectivism. Objectivism, as noted above, 
is distinct from moral realism in that objectivism only entails that there are correct and 
incorrect answers to moral questions, and there are correct and incorrect universal procedures 
for deriving these answers.152  
This means that objectivism is thus compatible with both moral realism and moral 
anti-realism.  This is because a moral anti-realist, like a realist, can claim that there are correct 
and incorrect answers to moral questions as well as correct and incorrect methods for arriving 
at those answers.  An anti-realist might, for instance, say that the correct answer to the 
question of whether or not one should give to charity is affirmative. Moreover, they could say 
that the correct universal procedure for arriving at this answer is to examine the amounts of 
suffering alleviated by giving to charity. They can say this without having to be moral realists 
because the correctness of giving to charity and the procedure for arriving at it is one they can 
explain as being sound within moral practice. Such a procedure was done correctly, they could 
assert, because moral agents identified the features that warrant giving to charity.  Moreover, 
such agents had appropriate moral sentiments and reasoned about what to do without making 
any moral mistakes. The agents did what one should do when engaged in moral practice. This 
practice, the anti-realist could argue, is just a system of attitude co-ordinations whose function 
is to satisfy the interests of human beings.   
 This explanatory move, incidentally, would be the very thing morality must be 
incompatible with in order for morality to be committed to moral realism. Here, the anti-
realist is giving a 2nd order explanation of morality that is not irreducibly moral. The 
assumption behind this explanation is that it leaves 1st order moral objectivism without any 
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additional linguistic, phenomenological, or moral difficulties. Thus, in order for the moral 
realist to show that morality is committed to realism, he has to show that this anti-realist 
explanatory move in some way imbues the 1st order objectivism with some difficulty that was 
not there before. This difficulty should be such that moral prDFWLFHFDQ¶WIXQFWLRQDGHTXDWHO\
but in its absence.  The only way to remove the difficulty must be in a tacit acceptance of 
moral realism. This is what a sound version of AME must ultimately show.  
 Of course, we should remember that a sound version of the presumptive version of 
AME should also show that this tacit acceptance of moral realism is evidence for moral 
realism.  As noted earlier, this is not my aim in rehabilitating an AME argument. My version 
is not a presumptive argument for moral realism. I am leaving open whether or not my version 
of AME shows that the commitment to moral realism has the status of presumptive evidence 
in favour of moral realism.  The reader can decide that for him or herself. What I am not 
leaving open is the fact that my version of AME will entail the moral commitment to moral 
realism. The aim of my version of AME is to establish that commitment to moral realism, 
UDWKHUWKDQWKDWFRPPLWPHQW¶VVWDWXVDVHYLGHQFHfor moral realism.   
 7DNLQJKHHGRI/RHE¶VFULWLFLVPVP\version of AME must imply the denial of (L) 
and (M). The argument has to show that there is some element of the experience of moral 
practice that is uniform enough to imply a meta-ethics.  Moreover, this meta-ethics must be 
realist, rather than merely objeFWLYLVW)XUWKHUPRUHHYLGHQFHIRUWKLVPRUDOUHDOLVPFDQ¶WEH
based on first person reports of moral phenomenology.  This is because there are too many 
examples of agents who say things about their moral phenomenology which do not support 
any version of moral realism. If such agents do have a moral realist phenomenology, it is not 
clear that they can adequately articulate it.  Moreover, if such agents report that they are anti-
realists, there seems to be no way of knowing whether that report is an adequate 
characterization of their moral phenomenology.  My version of AME has to show that all 
moral agents, independently of their meta-ethical views or characterizations of their own 
moral experiences, are moral realists. We must be able to show this commitment in ways that 
are not dependent on the content of 1st person reports.  In order for the experience of moral 
practice to imply moral realism, it has to do so independently of whether agents are aware of 
the fact that the correctness conditions of their moral claims imply a version of moral realism.  
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The correctness conditions of moral claims presupposed by anti-realists must be committed to 
this same moral realism as those of the moral realists.   
 In order to examine whether or not agents have a commitment to any meta-ethics, we 
VKRXOGILUVWHODERUDWHDELWPRUHDERXWZKDWFRUUHFWQHVVFRQGLWLRQVRIPRUDOFODLPVDUH/HW¶V
imagine a hypothetical moral claim and call it X.  A correctness condition of a moral claim X 
is an additional claim that is a presupposition of X.  The additional claim enables X to be 
understood as such that it can to do all the things that a moral claim does.  To give an 
example, a moral claim X can entail that an agent is morally obligated to perform a certain 
action.  One necessary condition of this entailment is that X describes a state of affairs that is 
a possibility. This is a simple example of a correctness condition of any moral claim. It is a 
correctness condition because it enables the state of affairs consisting of the agent being 
obligated to perform a certain action.  It does this by asserting the possibility of the action 
itself.  It also asserts the possibility of the obligation that is the moral outcome of the 
possibility of the action.  
 Moral claims describe states of affairs in virtue of what they affirm.  If I, for instance, 
PDNHWKHPRUDOFODLP³NLFNLQJGRJVIRUIXQLVZURQJ´,DPGHVFULELQJDVWDWHRIDIIDLUV
whereby if one kicks dogs for fun the act is wrong.  It does not matter whether we interpret 
this state of affairs in a realist or anti-realist fashion.   If this description refers to a state of 
DIIDLUVWKDWLVQRWPRUDOO\SRVVLEOHLWFDQ¶WEHWKHFDVHWKDWNLFNLQJGRJVIRUIXQLVZURQJ7R
say that a state of affairs is morally possible is to say that it is both naturally possible and 
morally possible.  To say it is naturally possible is to say that the natural facts given in a 
description of the situation could actually obtain.  To say a state of affairs is morally possible 
is to affirm that the moral claims affirmed in the description of it can be entailed by the natural 
facts that are part of the description of that state of affairs.  For example, to kick dogs for fun 
is naturally possible because it is physically possible to kick a dog for fun.  It is not morally 
possible that kicking dogs for fun is morally good.  This is because it is not possible to kick a 
dog for fun (all other morally relevant conditions being normal) while engaging in an act with 
a positive moral status.  
 Moreover, there is a method for determining the correctness conditions of any moral 
claim an agent actually holds.  All one need to do is examine what correctness conditions are 
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presupposed by the moral claims he affirms.  This method is more effective for gathering 
knowledge about our meta-ethical commitments than first person introspection for a number 
of reasons. In looking at the correctness conditions for moral claims, agents can gain direct 
access to at least some of their meta-ethical commitments. If agents can have said access, they 
can more effectively see how much their theoretical views coincide with what they affirm qua 
affirming the correctness conditions of moral claims. Furthermore, having access to this 
information will allow agents to better understand their moral phenomenology as well as their 
meta-ethical commitments. If an agent comes to know the correctness conditions for his moral 
FODLPVWKHQWKHDJHQW¶VVWSHUVRQUHSRUWVRIKLVPRUDOSKHQRPHQRORJ\ZLOOQRORQJHUEHD
source of confusion.  
 Moreover, in examining the correctness conditions for moral claims, an agent can 
find himself affirming meta-ethics presuppositions without having yet formed a deliberate, 
well considered meta-ethical judgment. For instance, if a correctness condition of a moral 
claim is that the claim can only be given an appropriate 2nd order explanation which is 
irreducibly moral, this means the agent who holds the claim holds both a moral claim and a 
meta-HWKLFDOMXGJPHQWDERXWWKDWPRUDOFODLP+HFDQ¶WPHUHO\DIILUPWKHPRUDOFODLPZLWKRXW
also affirming its correctness conditions.  This is because to affirm the moral claim while 
denying the correctness conditions of that moral claim is to contradict oneself.   
 Although this may not seem obvious, it follows from the nature of what such an act 
consists in.  To deny a correctness condition of a claim one affirms, logically, is to deny the 
claim one has just affirmed.  For example, suppose I affirm that the torture of children is 
ZURQJ/HW¶VVD\WKDWDFRUUHFWQHVVFRQGLWLRQRIDQDIILUPDWLRQRI the above claim is a 
correctness condition we will call X.  If I affirm that torturing children is wrong and then deny 
X, I am denying the very thing that the truth of the wrongness of torturing children depends 
on.  Hence, I am contradicting myself.  I may not be aware that I am contradicting myself.  
Moreover, the fact that I am contradicting myself may stop none of my moral fervor towards 
the claim that torturing children is wrong.  However, I am still contradicting myself if I assert 
a moral claim and then deny one of its correctness conditions. If I choose to affirm a moral 
claim while remaining agnostic on its correctness conditions, then I am, if I am consistent, an 
agnostic about whether or not the moral claim I affirm is correct.  Of course, I can be 
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inconsistent and claim that I am agnostic about the correctness conditions of a moral claim 
and simultaneously affirm that claim.  On the other hand, if I am made to understand that I am 
agnostic about a correctness condition of a moral claim I assert, I will most likely lapse into a 
consistent position.  I will most likely either assert the correctness condition or deny the moral 
claim I assert.153 
 If it can be shown that the moral claims an agent affirms imply explanatory moral 
UHDOLVPDQDJHQWFDQ¶WFonsistently deny he is a moral realist without denying the moral 
claims he affirms.  This is because a meta-ethical theory being a correctness condition of 
moral claims requires that agents affirm both if they choose to affirm those moral claims 
which have that meta-ethical theory as a correctness condition.  If we can show that 
explanatory moral realism is a correctness condition of all moral claims, we would be 
showing that one had to affirm explanatory moral realism if one wished to consistently affirm 
aQ\PRUDOFODLPVDWDOO0RUHRYHUZHZRXOGEHVKRZLQJWKDWDPRUDOFODLPFDQ¶WIXQFWLRQDV
a moral claim unless explanatory moral realism were one if its correctness conditions.   
As we noted earlier, for my version of AME to work, the state of affairs entailed by 
the correctness conditions of moral claims must be incompatible with any anti-realist 
explanation of that state of affairs. The state of affairs has to be such that describing it in an 
anti-realist fashion would be tantamount to undermining the state of affairs described by the 
moral claim. This means the correctness conditions must entail a state of affairs that is 
irreducibly moral. This is because an irreducibly moral state of affairs cannot be explained in 
a way where its irreducible morality is either reduced to or summarized as something which is 
not irreducibly moral. All forms of moral anti-realism give explanations of moral claims that 
are not irreducibly moral.  Whether the anti-realist theory is an attempt to account for morality 
as an evolutionary adaptation, a coordination procedure for maximizing the self-interests of 
agents, or the expression of psychological attitudes, all forms of anti-realism aim to give an 
account of morality in terms of some state of affairs which can be understood without 
understanding the description of a moral state of affairs. What differentiates more traditional 
                                                        
153
 This seems to be a psychological feature of human beings who come to know they are affirming 
contradictory propositions. 
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forms of anti-UHDOLVP$\HU¶VQRQFRJQLWLYLVP154 for instance) from more contemporary 
YDULHWLHV%ODFNEXUQ¶VH[SUHVVLYLVP155, for instance) is that the explanations that are not 
irreducibly moral are only 2nd order for the latter.  In the early versions of anti-realism, any 
aspect of moral discourse that could not be explained using a non-moral explanans was simply 
denied.  The consequence of this was that any explanation of morality that had a plausibly 
objectivist interpretation at the 1st order was simply denied. This is why, for example, these 
early versions of moral anti-realism denied that the correctness of moral claims had some sort 
of mind-independence that was reflected in the rules of moral discourse. Hence, these early 
YHUVLRQVSDUWLFXODUO\$\HU¶VQRQFRJQLWLYLVP156) were seen as revisionist because they rejected 
rules of ordinary moral discourse in order to adequately explain that discourse.  The more 
contemporary forms of anti-realism have as their aim the ability to give a 2nd order 
explanation of moral discourse which is not irreducibly moral while simultaneously 
accommodating all the rules of moral discourse.157  
Blackburn, for instance, is willing to countenance the fact that in moral discourse, we 
VD\WKDWDPRUDOFODLP¶VEHLQJFRUUHFWLVVXFKWKDWLWVFRUUHFWQHVVLVQRWFRQWLQJHQWRQDQ\
agent judgments.  So far, this makes it sound as though Blackburn could be a moral realist. 
However, where Blackburn departs from all forms of moral realism is in his insistence that the 
YLHZWKDWDFODLP¶VFRUUHFWQHVVLVQRWFRQWLQJHQWRQDJHQWMXGJPHQWVLVLWVHOIDKLJKHURUGHU
desire that regulates other desires.158 Such a desire expresses a moral commitment to the 
correctness of the claim not being contingent on agent judgments. However, this desire has an 
explanation that does not describe any moral state of affairs. This is because desire regulation 
is an activity that may or may not have a positive moral status. Nonetheless, regardless of its 
moral status, the activity can be completely accounted for using purely descriptive language. 
One can understand the regulation of such desires without understanding the content of any 
                                                        
154
  See AYER, A.J. Language, Truth, and Logic. London: Gollancz, 1936.  
155
  See BLACKBURN, Simon. Essays in Quasi Realism, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993 
156
  It is not part of Ayer's theory to accommodate in any way the part of moral practice where one says 
that a moral claim is correct in a manner that is mind-independent.  
157
 For an in-depth treatment of this situation in the anti-realist camps, see Dreier (2004).  
158
 See Blackburn (1992).  
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PRUDOFODLP7KXV%ODFNEXUQ¶VH[SODnation is not irreducibly moral. This illustrates 
something important for my purposes. A correctness condition of moral claims which is 
incompatible with this kind of anti-UHDOLVPFDQ¶WMXVWLPSO\WKDWWKHFRUUHFWQHVVRIPRUDO
claims holds independently of agent judgments.  Rather, it has to claim that the correctness of 
moral claims holds independently of agent judgments and that this judgment independence 
condition cannot have a 2nd order explanation which is not irreducibly moral. If it is possible 
that agent judgment independence can be given a 2nd order explanation which reduces or 
VXPPDUL]HVLWDVVRPHWKLQJZKLFKLVQRWLUUHGXFLEO\PRUDOZHKDYHQ¶WEORFNHGDOODQWL-realist 
explanations.   
 This is an important point because merely giving a moral realist account of moral 
claims does not block the anti-realist explanations from giving a higher order anti-realist 
explanation of the moral realist explanation.  An anti-realist can almost always add a higher 
order anti-realist explanation to any moral realist account. This is why it so difficult to show 
that some aspect of moral practice can only be explained by moral realism.  To give an 
example, suppose as a naturalist moral realist, I make the claim that goodness is reducible to 
states of affairs that have the highest overall aggregate of pleasure over pain. An anti-realist 
FDQDGGDKLJKHURUGHUH[SODQDWLRQRIP\FODLPZKHUHKHFDQVD\³DQGWKLVLVWUXHZLWKLQWKH
practice of morality whose priPDU\IXQFWLRQLVWRFRRUGLQDWHDWWLWXGHV´,QWKHFDVHRID
synthetic naturalist who denies that moral claims are reducible to descriptive states of affairs, 
an anti-realist can attach a higher order anti-UHDOLVWH[SODQDWLRQ+HFDQVD\³IURPZLWKLQWKH
practice of morality, moral claims cannot be reduced to descriptive states of affairs.  However, 
WKHIXQFWLRQRIWKLVSUDFWLFHLVPHUHO\WRFRRUGLQDWHDWWLWXGHV´ 
 Even non-naturalistic varieties of moral realism can be vulnerable to this strategy.  
/HW¶Vsay a non-naturalist along Moorean lines states that moral claims refer to all actions that 
PDQLIHVWWKHSURSHUW\RIJRRGQHVV/HW¶VDVVXPHWKDWJRRGQHVVRQWKLVDFFRXQWLVDVLPSOH
indefinable, non-natural property.  The anti-realist can step in and sD\³)URPZLWKLQWKHst 
order practice of morality, goodness is a simple, indefinable, non-natural property that actions 
can manifest.  From the perspective of 2nd order moral claims, a simple, indefinable, non-
QDWXUDOSURSHUW\FDQ¶WH[LVW+RZHYHUWKLV just shows that 1st order moral claims can be made 
WUXHE\VRPHWKLQJZKLFKGRHVQRWH[LVW´+HUHRXUK\SRWKHWLFDODQWL-realist is giving a 2nd 
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order account of a version of non-naturalistic moral realism that saves the first order 
component of the non-naturalism.  In other words, it saves the view that actions can manifest 
goodness where goodness is a simple, indefinable, non-natural property.  It is a thoroughly 
anti-realist account since it asserts that the property of goodness does not exist. Most 
importantly, it attempts to preserve the 1st order moral practice the non-naturalism describes 
while dispensing with the non-naturalism.  
 Given that all these versions of moral realism can be given anti-realist interpretations, 
the situation looks as though it is a battle of explanations.  For most versions of moral realism, 
the anti-realist can give a 2nd order interpretation of the content of what the moral realism 
affirms.  The anti-realist can then proclaim that his explanation is superior because it 
preserves the characterization of 1st order moral practice present in the realist explanations.  At 
the same time, it can dispense with the ontological, epistemological, or psychological 
commitments of the various moral realisms. It looks difficult for realism to stand a chance in 
this explanatory battle.  The commitments of moral practice, even if they imply moral realism, 
GRQ¶W\HWVHHPWRLPSO\WKHIDOVLW\RIPRUDODQWL-realism.  
 ,QP\YHUVLRQRI$0(LWZRQ¶WEHHQRXJKPHUHO\IRUWKHDQWL-realist to preserve the 
content of 1st order moral practice while giving a 2nd order explanation of that practice which 
is not irreducibly moral. My explanatory moral realism will demand a 2nd order explanation 
which is irreducibly moral in order for the set of all correct moral claims not to be denied. 
This irreducibly moral meta-ethical explanation will be both a 2nd order explanation and a 
final explanation.  It will not be capable of being given an anti-realist interpretation without its 
content being fundamentally changed.  Hence, the anti-realist will either have to affirm 
explanatory moral realism or deny the set of all correct moral claims.  
 3.5 THE DEFENSE OF MY VERSION OF AME 
 As noted earlier, in my version of AME, the correctness conditions of moral claims 
are as follows: 
(D) For any moral claim X, X is not determined by any agent's judgments about X 
(E) For any moral claim X, the only appropriate explanation of X is one that is irreducibly 
moral.  
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and 
(F) For any moral claim X, the only appropriate irreducibly moral explanation of X is an 
irreducibly moral explanation that is a final 2nd order explanation. 
(D) commits moral discourse to agent judgment independence conditions. Thus, (D) is a 
correctness condition that gives our moral realism the judgment independence element it 
needs. (E) commits moral claims to irreducibly moral explanations of the correctness of moral 
claims. And (F) commits moral claims to irreducibly moral explanations of the correctness of 
moral claims that are final 2nd order explanations of the correctness of moral claims.  Here, we 
can see that the implication of moral realism from (D)-(F) is the result of (D)-(F) implying 
that the only appropriate explanation for the correctness of moral claims is a final, irreducibly 
moral explanation. This illustrates the aspect of explanatory moral realism which is 
fundamentally incompatible with moral anti-realism: The insistence that there are 
explanations for moral claims from within morality and that only these explanations are 
appropriate for explaining moral claims at the 2nd order level.  
 Much of the resistance to moral realism is grounded in the notion that using moral 
explanations is implausible as a method of explanation for moral claims.  In fact, moral 
realists themselves are sympathetic to this antagonism towards moral realism.159 This is why 
realists have been attempting to combine moral realism with an explanation of morality that 
reduces or summarizes moral claims as combinations of natural properties.160 What is 
overlooked is the possibility that morality itself is committed to the explanation of moral 
claims being irreducibly moral. While the contemporary meta-ethicist may find irreducibly 
moral explanations implausible as methods of explanation, morality itself may be committed 
to what the meta-ethicist finds implausible.  If the arguments I present for (D)-(F) are correct, 
this is indeed the case.   
 Before we can defend claim (D), we need to, in a more detailed fashion, clarify what 
                                                        
159
 There is the most plausible explanation of why the majority of moral realists are naturalistic moral 
realists.  
160This is the view of Blackburn and most contemporary anti-realists. For the most famous enunciation 
of this view, see BLACKBURN, Simon. How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist.  Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy , 1988, vol. 12, pp. 361-375.  
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is meant by (D). (D) states that for any moral claim X, the correctness of X is not determined 
E\DQ\DJHQW¶VMXGJPHQWVDERXW;:KHQ,VD\WKDW;LVQRWµGHWHUPLQHG¶E\DQ\DJHQW¶V
judgments about X, I mean that the agent judgments by themselves cannot imply that X is 
FRUUHFW%\µDJHQWMXGJPHQWV¶,PHDQEHOLHIVRUGHVLUHVRQWKHSDUWRIDQDJHQWWKDW;LV
correct or incorrect.  When I say that the correctness of X is not determined by such 
judgments, I mean that agent judgments on their own do not possess the moral justification to 
make X correct.  This claim, however, is not a claim that denies that agent judgments about X 
can ever be reasons to believe that X is correct.  It is, however, a claim that asserts that in 
order for such judgments to constitute reasons to believe X, the judgments have to be 
grounded in some kind of moral justification. Moreover, this moral justification must be 
distinct from other agent judgments. The only way we can cash out this justification is to talk 
about the things which give us reasons to act as having a positive or negative moral status.  
This moral status is what determines that such things are reasons for or against certain courses 
of action.  
 If we deny (D), moral claims cease to be correct in the manner that allows them to 
function adequately within moral practice. To see how this works, let us take an 
XQFRQWURYHUVLDOPRUDOFODLPDQGFRQMRLQLWZLWKWKHGHQLDORI'7DNHWKHFODLP³,WLVZURQJ
WRWRUWXUHEDELHVIRUIXQ1RUPDOO\ZHWKLQNRIWKHFODLP³,WLVZURQJWRWRUWXUHEDELHVIRU
IXQ´DVMXVtifying the decision to not satisfy the potential desire to torture babies. This is not 
the case if we deny (D). If we deny that moral claims are not determined by any agent 
MXGJPHQWVWKLVOHDYHVRSHQWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDWWKHFODLP³,WLVZURQJWRWRUWXUH EDELHVIRUIXQ´
could be determined by agent judgments.  If this claim could in fact be determined by agent 
MXGJPHQWVWKLVPHDQVDQDJHQWMXGJPHQWFRXOGFKDQJHWKLVFODLP¶VFRUUHFWQHVV,IWKH
wrongness of torturing babies is grounded in an agent (or set RIDJHQW¶VMXGJPHQWVDERXW
torturing babies for fun, this means beliefs, desires, or both determine the correctness of the 
claim. This implies that the correctness of the claim is a consequence of agent judgments 
being what they are and what they could be.  Moreover, if the agent judgments were different 
from what they are, the correctness of the claim would also be different.  
 7RLOOXVWUDWHPDWWHUVOHW¶VLPDJLQHWKDWZKDWGHWHUPLQHVWKHFRUUHFWQHVVRIWKHFODLP
³,WLVZURQJWRWRUWXUHEDELHVIRUIXQ´LVDQDJHQW¶VGHVLUHQRWWRFDXVHSDLQWREDELHV/HW¶V
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then assume that the agent undergoes a psychological change whereby he suddenly discovers 
WKDWDGPLQLVWHULQJSDLQWREDELHVLVLQFUHGLEO\IXQ/HW¶VDVVXPHWKDWWKHMR\RIDGPLQLVWHULQJ
pain is so great that the agent would prefer to experience this joy with all the possible social 
consequences which would result of his decision to torture a baby. If we deny (D), there 
seems no reason to think that the previous desire not to torture babies can override the new 
GHVLUH¶VGLVDEOLQJRIWKHFRUUHFWQHVVRIWKHFODLP³,WLVZURQJWRWRUWXUHEDELHVIRUIXQ,QWKLV
scenario, the correctness of the claim is disabled precisely because it was dependent on a 
desire to do what the claim prescribed.  In the presence of an alternate desire that induces an 
agent to do the opposite of what the claim prescribes, it seems the correctness of the claim has 
no grounds to sustain itself. 
 $SDUDOOHOVLWXDWLRQZRXOGKDSSHQLILWZDVDQDJHQW¶VEHOLHILQWKHFRUUHFWQHVVRIWKH
FODLP³7RUWXULQJEDELHVIRUIXQLVZURQJ´ZKLFKGHWHUPLQHGLWVFRUUHFWQHVV,QWKDWFDVHZH
can imagine the agent undergoing a psychological change whereby he suddenly believes that 
the claim is false.  Is there anything about his prior belief that can stabilize the correctness of 
this moral claim despite the change in belief?  It seems not.  Like the case where we imagine 
that an agent desire is what determines the correctness of a moral claim, here the correctness 
of the claim seems to be contingent on what psychological state the agent actually has.  If the 
agent believes the claim is true, this can make it true.  If he believes it is false, this can make it 
false.  The same holds true if we imagine the correctness of the claim is grounded in the agent 
judgments of society rather than an individual agent.  In this case, the correctness of the claim 
is still grounded in the psychological states of the agents whose judgments determine the 
correctness of this claim.  Thus, if society changes its judgments about the wrongness of 
WRUWXULQJEDELHVIRUIXQLWFDQFKDQJHZKHWKHURUQRWWKHFODLP³,WLVZURQJWRWRUWXUHEDELHV
IRUIXQ´LVFRUUHFW 
 The agent judgment independence of moral claims described in (D) is what gives the 
correctness of moral claims stability. By stability, I mean the ability of the correctness of a 
moral claim to refrain from changing in the face of efforts by agents to make the claim 
incorrect by changing their judgments about the claim. If any moral claim can be made 
incorrect because RIDQDJHQW¶VMXGJPHQWVWKDWFODLP¶VFRUUHFWQHVVLVQHYHUVWDEOH,IWKH
FODLP¶VFRUUHFWQHVVLVQHYHUVWDEOHWKLVPHDQVWKHUHDUHQRUHDVRQVZK\DQDJHQW¶VMXGJPHQWV
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about a moral claim should be one way rather than another.  Any correct moral reason why an 
DJHQWVKRXOGHQGRUVHDPRUDOFODLPFDQDOZD\VEHFKDQJHGE\WKHDJHQW¶VFKRLFHWRIRUPD
different moral judgment.  If this is the case, a moral claim can never be correct in the stable 
way that moral claims are correct.  Thus, in order to sustain this stability of the correctness of 
moral claims, we must affirm (D): that the correctness is not determined by agent judgments.  
 At this point, it might appear as though (D) is begging the question against ideal 
observer theory.  An ideal observer theory could challenge (D) on the grounds that the claim 
³[LVZURQJ´LVQRWDFODLPDERXWZKDWDQDJHQWGHVLUHVEXWLVDFODLPDERXWZKDWDQDJHQW
would desire if the agent was rational and fully informed.  Here we could respond that (D) 
does not beg the question against ideal observer theory but rather constitutes a difficulty for 
ideal observer theory.  This difficulty is that it seems as though a fully rational and informed 
agent could have wildly unstable moral sentiments.  If an agent being rational and fully 
informed means that he knows what combinations of natural facts constitute moral facts, then 
the agent is just a fully informed, fully rational moral realist.  If the agent is not a moral realist 
but is fully rational and informed, it does not seem as though any piece of non-moral 
information could constrain the direction his moral sentiments go in.  If the agent were to have 
sentiments that changed dramatically, then he could change moral claims as the negation of 
(D) shows. There does not seem to be anything in the concept of being fully informed and 
rational which involves having stable moral sentiments. The burden of proof here is on the 
ideal observer theorist to show otherwise.   
 Claim (E) is a correctness condition of moral claims that deals with explanations for 
moral claims. Specifically, it states that for any moral claim X, the only appropriate 
explanation of X is one that is irreducibly moral.  As we noted earlier, an irreducibly moral 
explanation is one that is an explanation of a moral state of affairs.  Such an explanation is 
necessary to ground the correctness of a moral claim because moral claims have a moral 
necessity, which only an irreducibly moral explanation can describe. What this moral 
necessity amounts to is a set of counterfactuals about the moral claims in the world, given 
certain possible natural states of affairs. The fact that certain facts about the world obtain 
implies that there are moral claims about those facts. In any morally possible world, if the 
same set of natural facts were to obtain, you would get the same set of correct moral claims.  
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 It should be noted that I am not advocating a particular, fleshed out theory of 
supervenience in my defense of (E). All I am making is the claim that any theory of 
supervenience, insofar as it does not undermine moral claims, must satisfy (E). (E) does not 
require any supplementary views about supervenience in either moral or non-moral domains. 
Within meta-ethics, (E) is compatible with a wide variety of supervenience theories with a 
morDOUHDOLVWFDVW)RULQVWDQFHLWLVFRPSDWLEOHZLWK'DYLG%ULQN¶VV\QWKHWLFQDWXUDOLVP
whereby moral properties are discovered aposteriori as being identical with natural properties 
despite the fact that moral properties cannot be conceptually reduced to such natural 
properties.161 ,WLVDOVRFRPSDWLEOHZLWK)UDQN-DFNVRQ¶VPRUDOIXQFWLRQDOLVPZKHUHE\PRUDO
properties are reducible to the various combinations of natural properties that instantiate 
them.162 ,WLVHYHQFRPSDWLEOHZLWK5XVV6KDIHU/DQGDX¶VQRQ-naturalist supervenience theory 
that moral properties are constituted by natural properties even though they are not identical 
with such natural properties.163    
There is no intuitive or philosophical problem with the idea that explanations of 
moral claims must be irreducibly moral.  We need the explanation, as noted above, to ground 
the correctness of moral claims because moral claims have a moral necessity that only an 
irreducibly moral explanation can describe.  The moral necessity is modal in the sense that it 
is a set of counterfactuals about what moral claims can be correct, given possible 
combinations of natural states of affairs.  Moreover, the moral necessity is distinct from other 
kinds of necessity. It is a global rather than a local necessity. What this means is that moral 
necessity is a necessity of the sort that presupposes that for any two worlds w1 and w2, if w1 
and w2 are base indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible. In other words, if w1 and 
w2 contain the same base properties (which in this case are the physical states that constitute 
moral situations), both worlds contain the same moral properties. This is distinct from local 
necessity, which presupposes that for any two objects x and y, if x and y are base 
indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible.164  
                                                        
161
 See Brink (1989). 
162
 See Jackson (1998).  
163See SHAFER-LANDAU, Russ, Moral Realism: A defence. Oxford; Clarendon Press, 2006. pp. 55-79 
164 See Blackburn (1984), chapter 6.  
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The reason moral supervenience is global rather than local is that moral situations are 
not mere objects which can be isolated from the worlds in which they occur. Rather, moral 
situations are ways that the world is at a given time rather than an object or collection of 
objects in the world. Of course, moral situations can involve collections of objects. However, 
it is not the objects themselves but rather the relationship of the objects and the world that 
constitute moral situations. The moral relationship of an object to the world is a property of 
the world because the world, rather than the object, is what constitutes a moral situation. The 
existence of an atomic bomb is a moral situation in our world precisely because our world has 
causal laws that allow atomic bombs to detonate in explosions that cause massive amounts of 
destruction and suffering. In a world with different causal laws, the existence of an atomic 
bomb could create an entirely different moral situation than the one it creates in this world. 
Hence, the moral situation created by the object that is the atomic bomb is dependent on 
properties of the world that the atomic bomb exists in. The moral situation created in a world 
with an atomic bomb is not dependent on whether the atomic bomb merely exists in that 
world. Rather, it is dependent on the relationship of the atomic bomb to the causal laws of that 
world. Hence, moral supervenience is global rather than local.  
We can distinguish between strong and weak forms of moral supervenience. A weak 
supervenience relation presupposes that for any world w, for any two situations x and y in w, 
if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible. Applied to moral 
supervenience, weak supervenience entails that for any world w, for any two moral situations 
x and y in w, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are supervenient-indiscernible. For 
example, if for any two moral situations x and y in a world like ours, both situations involve 
the base properties of unwarranted cruelty to children, both x and y possess the property of 
wrongness. By contrast, a strong supervenience relation states that for any worlds w1 and w2, 
for any two situations x in w1 and y in w2, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are 
supervenient-indiscernible. Applied to moral supervenience, strong supervenience entails that 
for any two moral situations x in w1 and y in w2, if x and y are base-indiscernible, they are 
supervenient-indiscernible. To give an example, if for any two moral situations x in w1 and y 
in w2, if x and y both involve base properties of unwarranted cruelty to children, both x and y 
possess the property of wrongness.  
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This kind of strong supervenience is inapplicable to moral necessity, because it is not 
obvious that the base properties of unwarranted cruelty to children would instantiate the 
properties of wrongness in a world that was vastly different to ours. We can imagine a world 
in which children are identical to children in our world in every way accept that children in 
this world can only internalize moral sentiments on the proviso that they are exposed to high 
amounts of adult cruelty. We can also imagine that, in this world, the cruelty has no negative 
effects on the psychological well being of the children. Moreover, it is the lack of cruelty that 
we can imagine producing negative effects on the psychological well being of the children. 
Because there is no reason to think such a world is, in any way, impossible, strong 
supervenience is too strong a constraint on moral necessity. Weak supervenience seems a 
better description of moral necessity, since such supervenience is constrained by the unique 
properties of our world. Weak supervenience can accommodate the fact that the universal 
psychological damage to children who are exposed to adult cruelty instantiates the correct 
universalizeable moral claim that unwarranted cruelty to children is wrong. At the same time, 
weak supervenience can accommodate the possibility that in worlds with different causal, 
metaphysical, or psychological properties, it may not be correct to say that unwarranted 
cruelty to children is wrong. Hence, when we speak of moral necessity, we must remember we 
are referring to a necessity of weak, global supervenience.  
It should be noted that the weak, global supervenience of moral necessity is distinct 
from other forms of necessity. Moral necessity is not identical with metaphysical necessity 
even though moral necessity is a kind of metaphysical necessity. Moral necessity can exist 
independently of whether we postulate other metaphysical necessities. Also, other 
metaphysical necessities that are not moral can exist independently of moral necessity. What 
moral necessity assertions demand is that insofar as we assert moral necessity, we are 
asserting one kind of metaphysical necessity. This means that if there is such a thing as moral 
necessity, there is at least one kind of metaphysical necessity. Moreover, we can distinguish 
between logically possible and morally possible worlds.  The set of all logically possible 
worlds could include a world where there is no moral normativity. The set of all morally 
possible worlds cannot.  
 To give an example, if the physical facts about the world are the way they were in 
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1945, it follows that it is morally permissible to kill Adolf Hitler. This is true even in a 
possible world. The facts about the world entail that necessarily, killing Hitler is morally 
permissible as long as those facts obtain. There is no morally possible world where the facts 
about the world are the way they were in 1945 and it is not morally permissible to kill Hitler. 
Of course, it is not necessarily morally permissible to kill Hitler in a world where Hitler is a 
medic working to inoculate children in Africa from various diseases. This is because the kind 
of necessity that a moral claim has normally does not obtain independently of how the world 
is. But when a morally possible world contains a set of facts X and X entails moral claim Y, 
this entailment is necessary. No morally possible world can contain X without also being a 
world where Y obtains. Thus the correctness of moral claims has a necessary relationship with 
the facts about the world that make the moral claim correct. 
 The reason why only irreducibly moral explanations can adequately describe this 
necessity is because the necessity is itself moral. To explain a moral necessity (in a way where 
the explanation is not a debunking explanation) is to affirm the moral necessity. Hence, only 
an irreducibly moral explanation can affirm the moral necessity since only irreducibly moral 
explanations can morally affirm anything.  Also, one cannot substitute anything but moral 
necessity when explaining exactly what the necessity of a moral claim is. Logical or non-
normative metaphysLFDOQHFHVVLW\ZRQ¶WGRWKHMRE7KLVLVEHFDXVHLWLVORJLFDOO\SRVVLEOH
that all the facts about the world might be as they were in 1945 without those facts entailing 
the moral permissibility of killing Hitler. All we have to do in order to imagine this is imagine 
a world where an extreme version of error theory is true. The same goes for metaphysical 
necessity laws that are not normative. One can imagine a world that is the closest possible 
world to ours that error theory holds in. We can imagine this to be a world in which all the 
non-normative metaphysical laws are exactly the same as they are in our world. We can also 
imagine this as a world where all the physical facts are the same as they were in 1945 and yet 
there is no entailment from the physical facts to the claim that it is morally permissible to kill 
Hitler. Only a morally possible world in which moral claims have a moral necessity will be a 
world where it is morally permissible to kill Hitler, given the physical facts of 1945.  In any 
world that is physically identical to ours where there is no moral necessity, the claim that it is 
morally permissible to kill Hitler will simply be false.  
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 Also, a world which had moral necessity but which has different physical facts could 
be a world in which iWZDVQRWSHUPLVVLEOHWRNLOO+LWOHULQ7RJLYHDQH[DPSOHOHW¶V
VWDUWE\DVVXPLQJWKDWWKHFODLP³,WZDVPRUDOO\SHUPLVVLEOHLQWRNLOO+LWOHU´LVWUXH,Q
order to explain this claim, we will describe the facts about the world that make it correct.  We 
will also have to explain something about what it is about the features of the world that make 
this moral claim correct.  In giving our explanation, we might first talk about how Hitler was a 
totalitarian dictator who violated international law, terrorized his own country, and killed 6 
million Jews.  Then, we might explain why it is the case that killing becomes morally 
permissible in the face of a man like Hitler. So far, so good.  However, what if we have a very 
different set of hypothetical fDFWVDERXWWKHZRUOGWKDWPDNHWKLVFODLPFRUUHFW/HW¶VVXSSRVH
that there is an international conspiracy by the Jews to dominate all the governments of the 
ZRUOG0RUHRYHUOHW¶VDGGLQDGGLWLRQDOGHWDLOVDERXWWKHLUSODQVWRPDVVDFUHPLOOLRQVRI
Germans as well as some facts about the Jewish cultural tradition of torturing non-Jewish 
FKLOGUHQHYHU\6XQGD\)LQDOO\OHW¶VDOVRFODLPWKDW$GROI+LWOHUZDVWKHRQO\OHDGHUFDSDEOH
of stopping the Jewish plan of world domination.  As is obvious, these hypothetical facts 
about the world undermine the claim that it is morally permissible to kill Hitler.  The reason is 
that if these hypothetical facts turned out to be correct facts, it would be false that it is morally 
permissible to kill Hitler. The correctness RIWKHFODLP³,WLVSHUPLVVLEOHWRNLOO+LWOHU´LV
conditional on certain correct facts being a certain way.  If, in the explanation of the 
correctness of our moral claim, we deny relevant facts of our world that are relevant to the 
correctness of our moral claim, we are in effect denying the correctness of our moral claim.  
 We also cannot on the one hand say that there is a set of facts about the world X that 
entails moral claim Y but simultaneously deny that the relationship between X and Y is one of 
QHFHVVLW\6LPLODUO\ZHFDQ¶WVD\WKDW;HQWDLOV<QHFHVVDULO\EXWGHQ\WKDWWKHQHFHVVDU\
entailment is one that is moral. If we deny that the relationship between X and Y is necessary, 
we are indirectly asserting that the relationship between X and Y is contingent. This means 
that if the facts of the world are as they were in 1945, this would not necessarily entail the 
permissibility of killing Hitler. Moreover, given the lack of necessary entailment between the 
facts of the world and the permissibility of killing Hitler, it is hard to make sense of the notion 
that this moral claim is correct. If it is only contingently true that the facts about the world 
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entail the permissibility of killing Hitler, there could be a possible world where the facts are as 
they were in 1945 and it is not the case that it is morally permissible to kill Hitler. If there is a 
possible world where the facts were as they were in 1945 and it is not morally permissible to 
kill Hitler, this means that whatever makes this moral claim contingently true in the actual 
world has nothing to do with any facts of the actual world. After all, if we can get a world 
with all the same facts where it is not permissible to kill Hitler, it does not seem to be the facts 
about the world that make the claim correct. In this scenario, the facts in that world and the 
PRUDOVWDWXVRIWKHIDFWVLQWKDWZRUOGGRQ¶WVHHPWRKDYHDQ\WKLQJWRGRZLWKRQHDQGRWKHU 
 This is a point that Russ Shafer-Landau elaborates in the supervenience chapter of his 
book Moral Realism: A Defense (2003).165 He states that if the moral fails to supervene on the 
non-moral, the non-moral world does not control the moral world.166 The basic idea is that if 
the non-moral world does not control the moral world, the moral world becomes out of 
control.  What Shafer Landau does not point out is the specific way that the moral world 
becomes out of control.  If the moral does not supervene on the natural, there is an 
epistemological gap between moral agents and moral facts.  This is because, in our current 
world, the physical facts fix the moral facts.  Thus, to get a reading of what some moral facts 
are in a given situation, we consult the physical facts that constitute that situation.  If 
supervenience did not hold, we would not be able to do this.  
 Moreover, in a world where supervenience did not hold, no moral claims could be 
identified as being correct.  This is because, in such a world, there would never be any 
evidence of the correctness of moral claims.  We could never, in this world, point to a set of 
physical facts which had a moral status and infer from that status a moral claim.  The hallmark 
of the moral status of a physical state of affairs is that the state of affairs necessarily has that 
status.  If we can imagine that same state of affairs without the moral status attached to it, this 
undermines the idea that the state of affairs has this moral status.  In the absence of such moral 
status, we cannot derive any moral claims. Hence, if we GHQ\WKDWWKHFODLP³,WLVPRUDOO\
SHUPLVVLEOHWRNLOO+LWOHU´IROORZVQHFHVVDULO\IURPWKHPRUDOVWDWXVRIFHUWDLQIDFWVDERXWWKH
world, we are denying that the Hitler claim is correct.  Thus, to give an explanation of the 
                                                        
165See Shafer-Landau (2006), Chapter 4.  
166+HGRHVQ¶WVD\ZKDWFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKLVDUHWKRXJK 
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FODLP³,WLVPRUDOO\SHUPLVVLEOHWRNLOO+LWOHU´WKDWGHQLHVWKHPRUDOQHFHVVLW\RIWKLVFODLPLV
to give an explanation of the claim that stops the explanation from describing a moral state of 
affairs.  If the explanation does not describe a moral state of affairs, it is not an irreducibly 
moral explanation. If it is not an irreducibly moral explanation, (E) is violated. When (E) is 
violated, this undermines the correctness of the Hitler claim.  
 A further important point is we undermine the correctness of moral claims even if we 
admit of a necessity but deny its moral status.  If I give an explanation of why it is the case 
WKDW³,WLVPRUDOO\SHUPLVVLEOHWRNLOO+LWOHU´DQG,GHQ\WKDWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHIDFWV
about the world and the correctness of the claim is moral, I undermine the correctness of the 
Hitler claim. This is because there is simply no other relationship between the facts of the 
world and the correctness of this claim that could create an entailment between the facts and 
the correctness of this claim. Logical necHVVLW\FDQ¶WFUHDWHDQHQWDLOPHQWEHWZHHQIDFWVRIWKH
world and a moral claim. After all, we can imagine a world that is logically possible where the 
facts about Hitler are as they were in 1945 and yet it is not the case that it is morally 
permissible to kill Hitler. This is just a world where a view like error theory or moral 
scepticism happens to be true.  In such a world, there is an absence of the moral necessity 
required to allow facts about the world to entail moral claims.   
 The same goes for non-moral metaphysical necessity.  We can imagine a world 
where all the non-moral metaphysical laws are the same as they are in this world. We can also 
imagine all the physical facts in this world being identical to our world. And yet we can 
imagine an absence of moral metaphysical laws in this world. Of course, there may be some 
ethical naturalists who will insist that moral laws are identical with natural laws such that if 
we imagine a world with all the same natural laws as ours, necessarily, this world will contain 
the same moral laws. The difficulty is this response begs the question against the plausible 
assumption that we can imagine a world in which this metaphysical identity does not hold. It 
does not seem terribly difficult to imagine since many error theorists not only imagine but 
believe we are in such a world.  
 Because such an identity relation is metaphysical, we can imagine a world with 
different metaphysical laws. In this hypothetical world, the physical features of the world the 
naturalist moral realist presumes are identical with the moral features are not identical. 
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However, for all intents and purposes, the physical states of affairs would be the same as they 
are in this world. In such a world, only a normative metaphysical law could instantiate an 
identity between a physical state of affairs and a moral state of affairs. An ordinary 
metaphysical law would fail to instantiate this identity. Hence, only an explicitly moral 
necessity between natural facts and moral claims can allow a moral claim to follow from a 
physical state of affairs. There is no logical entailment between physical facts and moral 
claims.  There is no metaphysical entailment that is not an explicitly moral metaphysical 
entailment. Hence, any explanation of a moral claim that does not either presuppose or 
acknowledge the necessarily moral relationship between the facts that entail the moral claim 
and the correctness of the moral claim undermines that moral claim. This is because the 
relationship between the natural facts that entail a moral claim and the correctness of that 
moral claim must be both necessary and normative.  Any relationship that lacks either this 
necessity or moral status will fail to instantiate an entailment between any set of natural facts 
and any moral claim.  Hence, we can see that claim (E) is a correctness condition of moral 
claims. 
 Claim (F) is a correctness condition of moral claims that states that for any moral 
claim X, an irreducibly moral explanation of X must be a final 2nd order explanation of X. A 
final 2nd order explanation of a moral claim is an explanation that is not open to a higher order 
explanation that significantly re-characterizes the irreducibly moral status of the final 2nd order 
explanation.  Final 2nd order explanations are not only attempts at giving illuminating 
explanations of 1st order phenomena.  Rather, they are necessary conditions that illuminating 
2nd order explanations of 1st order phenomena must satisfy.  If one leaves out such necessary 
FRQGLWLRQVLQRQH¶Vnd order explanation, one is no longer correctly identifying the 1st order 
phenomena one is trying to explain.   
 7RVHHKRZWKLVZRUNVOHW¶VLPDJLQHWKDWWKHFRUUHFWH[SODQDWLRQRIWKHFODLP³,WLV
PRUDOO\SHUPLVVLEOHWRNLOO+LWOHU´LVWKDWWKHIDFWVRIWKHZRUOGLQ5 entailed (in a manner 
WKDWZDVQHFHVVDULO\PRUDOWKDWWKH+LWOHUFODLPLVFRUUHFW1RZOHW¶VDGGDKLJKHURUGHUDQWL-
realist explanation on top of this initial explanation which re-characterizes the initial 
explanation.  The higher order anti-realist explanation will consist of the claim that the moral 
necessity is a conceptual construction borne out of a relation between attitudes that holds 
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when agents try and solve coordination problems.  The problem here is not that the higher 
order explanation says that the moral relation between facts and moral claims is a conceptual 
construction borne out of a relationship between attitudes. The problem is that the explanation 
says that the moral relationship is just a conceptual construction borne out of a relation 
EHWZHHQDWWLWXGHV7KHSUREOHPKHUHLVWKDWLIZHLQWHUSUHW³just a conceptual construction 
borne out of a relation between attitudes´DVDQH[SODQDWLRQRIPRUDOQHFHVVLW\ZHZLQGXS
contradicting conditions of moral necessity that allow it to entail moral states of affairs. Such 
conditions are properties of moral necessity that a conceptual construction borne out of a 
relation between attitudes lacks. A relation between attitudes, we must remember, is a 
contingent state of affairs. Moral necessity is obviously not contingent. Moreover, if the 
relation of attitudes has a moral status it does so in virtue of satisfying some independent 
moral standard. Such is not the case with a construction borne out of the relation of attitudes. 
A relationship of moral necessity, by its very nature, possesses its moral status necessarily.  
 It is also important to note that moral necessity is a metaphysical rather than 
conceptual necessity. Moral necessity is metaphysical because an explanation of moral 
necessity requires the use of a moral explanans that cannot be reduced or summarized to 
something which is non-moral. When this kind of explanation is given, a moral situation is 
being described in a manner that amounts to a moral assertion. This kind of assertion is 
metaphysical precisely because the idea that irreducibly moral explanations can be used to 
describe the world correctly is metaphysical. It is metaphysical because such an explanation 
commit's its proponents to the view that there is a way that the world ought to be. Moreover, 
in this context, the way the world ought to be cannot be reduced to or summarized as 
something that is non-moral. If there is a way the world ought to be that cannot be reduced to 
or summarized as something that is non-moral, the way the world ought to be can only be 
explained as a property of the world.  
If it were a property of humans, one could summarize the way the world ought to be 
as a psychological disposition, evolutionary adaptation, or coordination procedure. Such 
explanations would be reducing or summarizing the way the world ought to be to something 
that is non-moral. On the other hand, if the way the world ought to be was not a property of 
the world, it is doubtful that humans could understand the idea. Even if we imagine the way 
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the world ought to be as a non-physical moral property that somehow causally interacts with 
the world, it looks like the causal interaction is itself a property of the world. If the world 
contains causal interactions with non-physical moral properties, this seems to be a moral 
property of the world. After all, the world, on this scenario, is facilitating moral knowledge 
via causal interaction with non-physical moral properties. This would give the world a 
positive moral status, insofar as it facilitated this causal interaction. Such a positive moral 
status seems incapable of being described as anything other than a moral property of the 
world. Hence, if there is a way the world ought to be, this can only be understood as a moral 
property of the world. Because this moral property is a property of the world, the world 
contains moral properties. If not reduced or summarized to something that is not moral, the 
assertion that the world contains moral properties is a metaphysical assertion.  Because this is 
a commitment of moral necessity, a condition of asserting moral necessity is that one assert 
something which is metaphysical. 
 If we contradict the conditions of asserting moral necessity in an explanation of why 
a moral claim is correct, this means we are undermining that moral necessity. We are 
undermining it because we are subtracting properties from the moral necessity that enable it to 
be what entails a moral claim. Without these properties, explanations of moral necessity will 
cease to describe genuinely moral states of affairs.  Hence, the explanations will cease to be 
irreducibly moral and wind up undermining the correctness of the moral claim being 
advanced.  If we subtract the necessity from moral necessity, we lose the ability of that moral 
normativity to ground the correctness of a moral claim. We have seen that in the argument for 
correctness condition (E). Likewise, if we subtract the moral normativity from moral 
necessity, we lose the ability of the moral necessity to entail moral judgments. And without 
the ability to entail moral judgments, the moral necessity cannot entail correct moral claims 
from facts about the world.  
 This is not just for 2nd order explanations of moral claims which attempt to re-
characterize moral necessity as a relation of attitudes. This is true of any 2nd order explanation 
that attempts to re-characterize moral necessity as something that lacks the properties of moral 
necessity. The same happens if our 2nd order explanation re-characterizes moral necessity to 
what maximizes adaptation value on an evolutionary account. This is because the maximizing 
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of adaptation value is an empirical, contingent state of affairs. Of course, the maximizing of 
adaptation value may exemplify goodness.  However, such maximization is not necessarily 
good.  This is why we can imagine behaviors that maximize adaptation value which are 
grossly unethical. The same situation arises if we try and re-characterize moral necessity as a 
coordination procedure where agents try and satisfy their collective self-interests. Again, 
whether or not agents satisfy their collective self-interests is a contingent state of affairs.  
Moreover, there is nothing about this process that is necessarily moral. We can imagine the 
coordination procedures that satisfy collective self-interests where those self-LQWHUHVWVGRQ¶t 
correspond with morality. Insofar as any coordination procedure, maximization of adaptive 
value, or relation of attitudes exemplifies goodness; it exemplifies goodness in a manner that 
is contingent. This is why to describe moral necessity as being reducible to any of these states 
of affairs undermines the ability of moral necessity to entail moral claims from natural facts. If 
WKHPRUDOQHFHVVLWLHVFDQ¶WHQWDLOPRUDOFODLPVIURPQDWXUDOIDFWVDQWL-realist descriptions of 
the moral necessities are not describing genuinely moral states of affairs.  Hence, anti-realist 
explanations of moral claims are not irreducibly moral and so undermine the correctness of 
the moral claims they explain.   
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 We can now see that a version of moral realism is implied by the correctness 
conditions of moral claims. This means that AME can be refashioned so as to show that moral 
practice presupposes explanatory moral realism. The argument given above is an argument for 
the conclusion that correctness conditions of moral claims imply explanatory moral realism.  
If the above argument is sound, we have been given good evidence for the moral commitment 
to:  
(C): For any meta-ethical theory that is true, that theory must either be an explanatory moral 
realist theory or a theory that is compatible with explanatory moral realism.  
Moreover, all meta-ethical theories that deny (C) warrant moral criticism. As a moral 
commitment, (C) may constitute a presumptive argument for moral realism if one thinks the 
premises I listed entail the conclusion that moral realism is true.  A much better strategy 
would be to provide an additional premise which shows that (D), (E), and (F) constitute 
presumptive evidence in favor of moral realism. As noted earlier, my refashioned version of 
Page 116 of 227 
 
AME does not do this.  Some readers may think it is odd to call it a version of AME if it is not 
designed to show that there is presumptive evidence for moral realism.   
 One reason for referring to it as a rehabilitated version of AME is that it could be 
interpreted as a traditional version of AME.  In other words, there is nothing in the argument, 
as it stands, that prohibits it from being interpreted as a traditional version of AME. One could 
look at the argument and judge that the argument constitutes presumptive evidence that moral 
realism is true.  Although I do not make this judgment, I do not rule out the judgment either. 
Another reason I refer to it as a rehabilitated version of AME is it is an argument constructed 
out of the same basic strategy as the classic version of AME. It uses aspects of moral 
experience (defined as both phenomenology and linguistic practice) to show that we are 
committed (prior to theorizing) to a particular meta-ethics.  Yet another reason is it shows one 
of the things that any sound version of AME must show: namely that we are, in fact, 
committed to moral realism in virtue of our moral experience (defined as both 
phenomenology and linguistic practice).  My final reason for referring to it as a refashioned 
version of AME is it is an argument created out of failed versions of previous versions of 
AME.  
 If my version of AME is sound, the anti-realist will no longer be able to use the 
strategy of giving explanatory arguments to demonstrate that the correctness of moral claims 
need not presuppose moral realism.  This strategy is only a viable option for the anti-realist if 
there is not already evidence in favor of moral practice committing practitioners of moral 
discourse to moral realism. If such evidence does show that moral discourse is committed to 
moral realism, any challenge to the commitment to moral UHDOLVPFDQ¶WVLPSO\FODLPWKDWWKH
commitment constitutes an unattractive explanation.  This is because evidence, by its very 
nature, is not the sort of thing that can be explained away by the attractiveness of denying the 
evidence. Rather, the denial of the evidence must be argued for on grounds other than its 
explanatory attractiveness.  
 %/$&.%851¶62%-(&7,216 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 In this chapter, I will analyse the meta-ethical views of Simon Blackburn, the most 
famous contemporary proponent of the idea that normative ethics does not commit moral 
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agents to particular meta-ethical positions. As noted earlier, the reason I am choosing this 
group of considerations (apart from their notoriety) is that if they are sound, the arguments in 
chapter one and two cease to work. Because quasi-realism depends on the claim that moral 
practice cannot commit us to moral claims, arguments in favor of quasi-realism are arguments 
in favor of the claim that moral practice cannot commit us to moral claims. 
 For Blackburn, the idea that normative ethics does not commit moral agents to 
particular meta-ethical positions is an outcome of his own meta-ethics. Blackburn holds a 
combination of 2nd order anti-realism and 1st order moral objectivism he refers to as quasi-
realism. Quasi-realism is an attempt to account for the practices characteristic of moralizing 
while simultaneously ridding those practices of any moral realist commitments.167 This is why 
the quasi-realist account of morality involves an interpretation of 1st order moral claims that 
interprets them as being metaphysically neutral.  If 1st order moral claims are understood as 
making no metaphysical (and thus no meta-ethical) claims, the quasi-realist can then give an 
anti-realist explanation of the practice of morality that is a variation of Humean projectivism. 
 Humean projectivism is the view that ethical judgments are the product of conative, 
not cognitive psychological processes.168 Such conative psychological processes can be 
described as attitudes or dispositions.  On projectivism, moral reasoning is not a cognitive 
psychological process whereby agents apprehend some mind independent feature of the world 
and then discover something about it through the use or reason.  Rather, agents develop 
attitudes or dispositions towards features of the natural world and then reason about the 
interconnections between those attitudes or dispositions.  These attitudes or dispositions are 
not themselves the products of those features of the world agents have attitudes or dispositions 
in relation to.  Rather, the dispositions are the product of agents projecting their sentiments 
onto the world in a manner that, for the agent, suggests that it is the world rather than the 
projections that explains those sentiments.169 Quasi-UHDOLVPLV6LPRQ%ODFNEXUQ¶VDWWHPSWWR
combine Humean projectivism with an attempt at capturing all the important features of 1st 
                                                        
167
 Blackburn explicitly states this in Blackburn (1992)  pp. 1--22. 
168
 For more elaborate explanations of the relationship between Quasi-Realism and Projectivism, see 
Blackburn (1984).  
169
 This is one respect in which the Humean view seems to have much in common with error theory. 
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order moral discourse.  
 ,QWKLVFKDSWHU,ZLOOFULWLTXH%ODFNEXUQ¶VMXVWLILFDWLRQRITXDVL-realism on the 
grounds that it relies on the plausibility of assumptions that rival theories call into doubt.  
These assumptions include: 
(G) Morality is incapable of giving us any evidence of anything external to morality. 
(H) Morality is compatible with all possible meta-ethical truths a theorist could advocate 
(I) Philosophical Naturalism is true  
and 
(J) Quasi-realism is true.  
(G) is the claim that morality can only give us evidence of the truth or falsity of moral claims.  
If (G) is true, morality cannot give us evidence of the truth of any empirical, metaphysical, 
epistemological, or psychological claims. If (H) is true, morality is not undermined by any 
meta-ethical claims a meta-ethicist could make qua affirming a meta-ethical theory.  Hence, if 
(H) is true, morality is not in any way dependent on such meta-ethical claims.  (I) is the 
assertion that either metaphysical or methodological naturalism is true. (J) is self-explanatory. 
 I will argue that Blackburn must defend each of these assumptions in order to show 
that quasi-realism is a more attractive theory than its rivals. However, I will show that 
Blackburn merely relies on the plausibility of (G) through (J). This is inappropriate if 
%ODFNEXUQ¶VJRDOLVWRVKRZWKDWTXDVL-realism is superior to other meta-ethics theories. This is 
because (G) through (J) are precisely what the other theories deny or can deny. To assert that 
any theory that denies (G) through (J) is implausible is to assert, rather than defend, the 
superiority of quasi-realism to its rivals. 
 In section one of this chapter, I will look at five considerations Blackburn gives in 
defense of quasi-realism. I will first look at his motivation to give an anti-realist theory that 
DYRLGVWKHVWLSXODWLRQWKDWPRUDOLW\LVLQHUURU7KHQ,ZLOOORRNDW%ODFNEXUQ¶VDWWHPSWWR
show that 1st order moral claims are meta-ethically neutral and that mind independence can be 
given an anti-realist account.  I will then look at two arguments Blackburn gives against moral 
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realism: the first will rely on the plausibility of motivational internalism while the second will 
deal with considerations from supervenience.  Finally, I will look at the argument Blackburn 
gives that quasi-realism is an attractive theory because it satisfies the needs of those engaging 
in morality.  I will show that, in all of these considerations Blackburn invokes to defend quasi-
realism, Blackburn is relying on either (G), (H), (I), or (J).  Moreover, I will argue that in 
order for any of these considerations to lend support to quasi-realism, (G), (H), (I), and (J) 
must be explicitly defended.  
 In section 2 of this chapter, I will show that quasi-realism does not support a defense 
of moral objectivism. This is because it is rational to be an agnostic about 1st order morality.  
Moreover, if one is an agnostic about 1st order morality, it is rational to require that 2nd order 
moral claims justify 1st order morality.  This entails it is rational to require that 2nd order moral 
claims justify 1st order morality.  Finally, I will argue that the only meta-ethical theories which 
offer 2nd order moral claims which could potentially justify 1st order morality are moral realist 
theories. This is because moral objectivism is not something that can be justified by observing 
the differences between the 1st order views of different moral agents. Moreover, anti-realist 
WKHRULHVFDQ¶WMXVWLI\PRUDOREMHFWLYLVPRQWKHJURXQGVWKDWREMHFWLYLVPLVLQHYHU\RQH¶V
interests because of the variety of different interests human beings have. Also, anti-realist 
WKHRULHVFDQ¶WMXVWLI\WKHFODLPWKDWKXPDQEHLQJVKDYHXQLYHUVDOPRUDOVHQWLPHQWVZLWKRXW
criticizing the radically different ways in which human beings value their moral sentiments.  
The latter project, I will show, is infeasible, if one does not presuppose moral objectivism.  
4.2. MOTIVATIONS OF QUASI-REALISM 
 6LPRQ%ODFNEXUQ¶VTXDVL-realism attempts a novel synthesis of three elements. On 
the one hand, the theory purports to be an anti-realist theory of ethics that accepts the 
PHWDSK\VLFDOFRQFOXVLRQRI-RKQ0DFNLH¶VTXHHUQHVVDUJXPHQW170 On the other hand, the 
theory attempts to be a theory which is not revisionist.  It wants to account for all the features 
of 1st order moral discourse that constitute the phenomenon of morality that nearly all theorists 
can agree on.  Thirdly, quasi-realism is a variety of noncognitivism.  It posits that moral 
judgments are the expression of non-truth apt attitudes rather than truth apt beliefs. One of the 
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 7KHPHWDSK\VLFDOFRQFOXVLRQRI0DFNLH¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKDWWKHUHDUHQRREMHFWLYHPRUDOSURSHrties. 
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primary features of quasi-realism is it attempts to show, among other things, that 1st order 
moral commitments are meta-ethically neutral.  
 Simon Blackburn gives an interesting defense of the quasi-realist project of 
accounting for moral discourse in a manner that eliminates any possible meta-ethical 
commitments of that discourse.  Blackburn frames his defense of this project as a response to 
-RKQ0DFNLH¶V(UURU7KHRU\171 Here, Blackburn simultaneously supports Mackie¶VTXHHUQHVV
argument while trying, much more so than Mackie, to distance himself from any revisionism 
of 1st order moral discourse. According to Mackie, the ordinary user of moral language is 
committed to the notion that there are objective moral values which presents the user with an 
absolute call to action which is not contingent on any preference or policy choice of human 
agents.172 Mackie believes that ordinary users of moral language are committed to such 
objective values and that they are part of the meaning of moral terms. However, the crux of 
Mackie¶VHUURUWKHRU\LVWKDWWKHUHDUHQRREMHFWLYHYDOXHV+HQFHWKHSUDFWLFHRIPRUDO
discourse is a useful procedure that involves the making of literally false claims.  
 %ODFNEXUQFKDOOHQJHV0DFNLH¶VYLHZE\ILUVWQRWLQJWKDWLIDYRFDEXODU\RIPRUDO
discourse embodies error, it would be more useful to either replace the vocabulary with one 
that avoids the error or use the present vocabulary in a manner in which the error is 
avoided.173 We could then use the vocabulary of moral discourse in a way that meets our 
needs but avoids the prior mistake. Here, Blackburn is claiming that a moral vocabulary that 
makes no metaphysical mistakes is one that could better serve the theoretical needs of the 
meta-ethicist than one with a metaphysical error built into it. It is somewhat ambiguous here 
whether Blackburn is talking about the need to combine the features that constitute quasi-
realism or whether he is talking about the needs of those engaging in morality. Either way, 
what is clear is that Blackburn thinks that a more plausible meta-ethical theory will be one that 
does not assert that ordinary moralisers are in error. 
 The main metaphysical error Blackburn wants to avoid is something like a non-
naturalistic moral realism.  This is the idea that there are mind-independent, non-natural, 
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objectively prescriptive moral properties that motivate some set of agents to perform moral 
acts. I am characterizing non-naturalist moral realism in this way because this kind of non-
QDWXUDOLVPLV%ODFNEXUQ¶s target. Although there have been recent attempts to formulate  non-
naturalism in ways that do not generate the objections  the version I articulated does, it is this 
version which is primarily the variety of non-naturalistic moral realism Blackburn wants to 
avoid. We can assume that there are two primary reasons Blackburn wants to reject such a 
view: the view is at odds with the ontological and epistemological assumptions of naturalism.  
As noted earlier, I take philosophical naturalism to be a conjunction of two views. The first 
view is metaphysical.  It commits the naturalist to the denial of supernatural entities. It also 
commits the naturalist to the denial of entities that cannot be accommodated in descriptions of 
the world that are consistent with the findings and methodological principles of the natural 
sciences. This second view is epistemological.  It states that an explanation is more likely to 
be true if it is consistent with the inference to the best explanation model of explanation.174 
Both of these views are two conditions of naturalistic inquiry that we can assume are the 
standards by which a naturalist judges a theory attractive.   
 The metaphysical component of naturalism is distinct from the epistemological 
component in that the former is merely specifying that non-naturalistic moral realism is at 
odds with a naturalistic metaphysics.  The latter threatens non-naturalistic moral realism 
because the entities that theory postulates purportedly lack simplicity, explanatory power, and 
are incompatible with background assumptions the naturalist finds plausible. These 
epistemological features of a theory, one should note, are the standard criteria within 
naturalism used to adjudicate between rival theories.175 The reason why we can assume that 
naturalism is what motivates Blackburn to reject non-naturalistic moral realism is because he 
explicitly states that he is both a naturalist and that any good meta-ethical theory should also 
be.176   
 The non-naturalistic moral realism I described is at odds with the metaphysical 
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 See Lipton (1991). 
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 7KHVHDUHDSUHVXSSRVLWLRQRI%ODFNEXUQ¶VSURMHFWVLQFHWKHPDMRULW\RIWKHSURMHFWFRQVLVWVRI
explanatory argument Blackburn defends while presupposing the inference to the best explanation 
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176See Blackburn, (1992), 1-11.  
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component of naturalism because it postulates a non-natural set of entities to explain physical 
behavior. Moreover, these non-natural entities are supposed to have a psychological pull on 
human agents; a pull which motivates them to perform moral acts.  This element of the non-
QDWXUDOLVWLFPRUDOUHDOLVP,GHVFULEHGLVDOVRDWRGGVZLWK%ODFNEXUQ¶VLQWHUQDOLVWYLHZVRI
moral motivation.177 $GGLWLRQDOO\LWLVWKLV³SXOO´WKDW0DFNLHGHVFULEHGDVTXHHU178 in his 
defense of error theory. Although there has been some criticism of the claim that all non-
naturalist moral realists must characterize moral properties in this way, there has been little 
defense of the notion thDWWKLVSV\FKRORJLFDO³SXOO´ZLWKLQQRQ-naturalistic versions of moral 
realism is not queer. The closest a contemporary theorist has come to asserting this is Robert 
Audi, who claims that queerness is not an argument for or against the existence of entities.179 
Audi claims that every theory presupposes something and what goes against the fundamental 
presupposition of a particular theory is likely to seem queer to its opponents. Here, Audi 
seems to be saying that the queerness of an explanans is relative to the theoretical starting 
points of a theorist. After all, what is queer to the moral anti-realist may not be queer to the 
non-naturalistic moral realist. AlWKRXJK$XGL¶VFODLPLVWHFKQLFDOO\WUXHWKLVLVDSRRUDWWDFN
on the argument from queerness.  This is because it is possible to have justified theoretical 
starting points that additional claims can conflict with. Insofar as a theorist can recognize his 
own justified starting points, he can be justified in rejecting a theory that does not fit with 
those starting points.  
 The non-naturalistic moral realism I described is deeply at odds with the 
epistemological component of naturalism. This is because the non-naturalistic moral realism I 
described explains moral properties using a moral explanans.  Furthermore, this explanans 
cannot be identified with any natural facts. When one is trying to give an account of any 
phenomena using an explanans that cannot be identified, summarized, or reduced to any 
natural facts, such an account will be difficult to describe in detail. This is because an 
explanans that cannot be identified, summarized, or reduced to any natural facts is difficult to 
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XQGHUVWDQG0RUHRYHULQVRIDUDVVXFKDQH[SODQDQVFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGRQHFDQ¶WGHVFULEHLW
in as much detail as one could physical mechanisms.  Because phenomena that can be 
identified, summarized, or reduced to natural facts are closer to physical mechanisms than 
SKHQRPHQDWKDWFDQ¶WH[SODQDWRU\DFFRXQWVWKDWLQYROYHWKHIRUPHUZLOOEHPRUHGHWDLOHGDQG
comprehensive. Hence, they will have more explanatory power and scope. This is why the 
version of non-naturalistic moral realism that Blackburn wants to reject is a less attractive 
theory than any naturalist theory, according to the epistemological assumptions of naturalism.   
4.3. CRITIQUE OF QUASI-REALIST MOTIVATIONS 
 %ODFNEXUQ¶VGLVFRQWHQWZLWK0DFNLH¶VHUURUWKHRU\LVDVZHVDZSDUWLDOO\PRWLYDWHG
by the idea that it is implausible to assume that those who disagree about the metaphysical 
commitments of ethical discourse are not all engaging in ethical discourse when they make 
moral claims. Blackburn wants to avoid the view that the theorist who correctly affirms the 
metaphysical commitments of morality while making moral claims is the moraliser and the 
theorist who denies those commitments while making moral claims is the schmoraliser.  The 
GLIILFXOW\KHUHLVLWLVUHDVRQDEOHWRILQG0DFNLH¶VYLHZLPSODXVLEOHRQO\LIZHDVVXPH*
(morality is incapable of giving us evidence of anything to external to morality) and (H) 
(morality is compatible with all possible meta-ethical truths a theorist could advocate). If (H) 
were false, then it would not be clear that morality was compatible with all ontologies. If (G) 
were false, it would not be obvious that morality could not give us evidence of some ontology.  
Hence, in order for Blackburn to defend his views about the implausibility of the 
schmoralising meta-ethic, he must first defend (G) and (H). This is quite important because 
error theory asserts that (H) is false and most versions of moral realism assert that (G) is false.  
 Are there any reasons Blackburn could give in defense of (H)? Here, Blackburn 
might assert the fact that we observe plenty of equally ethical agents with fairly divergent 
views on what the metaphysics of ethics is. The fact that they have different notions of what 
the metaphysical commitments of ethics are does not seem in any way to infringe on their 
ability to adequately engage in moral practice.  Moreover, if we assume half of those agents 
are correct in their views about the metaphysics of ethics, there is no discernible ethical 
difference between both groups insofar as they engage in moral practice.  The staunchest non-
naturalistic moral realists seem to be no more or no less ethical than error theorists like 
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Mackie. All meta-ethicists seem, for the most part, like good people.  
 The problem with this reasoning is it ignores two possibilities. The first can be 
described as follows. Jim and Jeff are both meta-ethicists with wildly divergent meta-ethical 
views. Jim is a staunch non-naturalistic moral realist and Jeff is a staunch error theorist.  Jim 
and Jeff are both competent practitioners of moral discourse.  Moreover, they are roughly 
equivalent in their moral status as good human beings. However, each meta-ethicist, because 
they are human, occasioQDOO\GRHVVRPHWKLQJWKDWWKH\VKRXOGQ¶W2QHRIWKHWKLQJVWKDW-HII
does which he morally should not do is deny the metaphysical commitments of moral 
discourse. Jim does something equally bad but unrelated to meta-ethics. Hence, both Jim and 
Jeff are roughly morally equivalent as people and are equally competent at engaging in moral 
discourse. However, we can say that Jeff, unlike Jim, is doing something wrong insofar as Jeff 
denies the metaphysical commitments of moral discourse.  This example shows that the moral 
equivalence of meta-ethicists who disagree about the metaphysics of ethics is not evidence 
that there is nothing wrong with denying the correct metaphysics of ethics.  And if there is 
something morally wrong with denying the correct metaphysics of ethics, this certainly shows 
that ethics commits agents to a metaphysics.  
 The second possibility that Blackburn ignores is that it may not be obvious that the 
affirmation of a meta-HWKLFDOYLHZGDPDJHVRQH¶VPRUDOFKDUDFWHU$IWHUDOOPDQ\PRUDO
claims we now think of as morally abominable were considered perfectly acceptable for years. 
It is conceivable that Jim in the 17th century could have disagreed with slavery while Jeff 
agreed with it. However, Jim might have thought that Jeff was in no way negatively affecting 
his character by endorsing slavery.  His reasoning might have been that, in all other relevant 
respects, Jeff was a perfectly moral, nice human being. This illustrates a difficulty with 
LGHQWLI\LQJZKHQDEHOLHIQHJDWLYHO\HIIHFWVRQH¶VPoral character.  If a belief that negatively 
DIIHFWVRQH¶VFKDUDFWHULVFRQWURYHUVLDORUKLJKO\FRQWHVWHGLQDJLYHQVRFLHW\WKDWEHOLHIPD\
not appear to negatively affect the moral character of those who hold it. This may even be true 
from the perspectiYHRILQGLYLGXDOVZKRGRQ¶WKDYHWKHEHOLHI,QWKHVHFDVHVLWZRXOGEH
difficult to point to some feature of the moral character of someone who holds the belief as 
HYLGHQFHWKDWWKHEHOLHIFRUUXSWHGRQH¶VPRUDOFKDUDFWHU7KLVLVEHFDXVHWKHEHOLHILWVHlf is 
what explains the character defect.  If one cannot see the morally negative nature of the belief, 
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LW¶VGLIILFXOWWRVHHKRZWKDWEHOLHIZRXOGQHJDWLYHO\DIIHFWRWKHUDVSHFWVRIRQH¶VFKDUDFWHU 
 Are there any additional reasons to think morality is compatible with any way a 
theorist could describe the world?  One possible line of argument might be the claim that 
morality, by its nature, does not conflict with the truth of how the world is. Naturalism, one 
might argue, is what most philosophers believe to be true.  Therefore, ethics could not 
possibly commit agents to claims that potentially conflict with naturalism.  The problem with 
this attempted justification is that it assumes the compatibility of truth and morality is a 
necessary compatibility. This seems obviously false. We can imagine worlds in which it is 
true that there are no reasons for action.  We can imagine worlds where it is true that it is 
impossible to increase rather than decrease value.  We can imagine worlds in which it is true 
that agents have none of the components of free will that would facilitate moral responsibility. 
How do we know that we are not in one of these worlds? The fact that naturalism may be true 
in our world is not evidence that we are not in one of the worlds described above.  The fact 
that we appear to live in a world in which agents practice morality does not show that our 
world is incompatible with the possible worlds described above. The fact that agents practice 
morality is not evidence that no version of error theory is true. Moreover, there is nothing 
about error theory worlds that precludes naturalism from being true in them.  
 Here, one could respond that although morality is not necessarily compatible with all 
meta-ethical truths, it is necessarily compatible with all meta-ethical truths which are 
metaphysical. This response fails because we can imagine a possible world that is like ours in 
every way except that moral justification only works if there are non-naturalistic moral 
properties in the universe. In this world, it is not enough to justify refraining from bear baiting 
by talking about the fact that the bear baiting causes pain.  One also has to justify the pain 
having a negative moral status that enables it to be a reason to refrain from bear baiting. The 
only thing that can justify this negative moral status is for the pain to exemplify the non-
QDWXUDOLVWLFPRUDOSURSHUW\RIµPRUDOEDGQHVV¶2IFRXUVHZHFDQDOVRLPDJLQHWKDW
naturalism is true in this world and there are no non-naturalistic moral properties.  The only 
way that we can show this possible world to be incoherent is if non-naturalistic moral 
properties, by their very nature, do nothing in the way of justifying moral claims.   
 Can we think of any reasons to affirm (G)? Is morality incapable of giving us any 
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evidence of anything external to morality? Certainly an invocation of naturalism would not 
supply an adequate defense of (G). This is because (G) presupposes (I) (naturalism is true). 
For the naturalist, the only evidence in favor of (G) is the fact that the naturalist can give a 
good explanation of the world that involves the affirmation of (G). The difficulty here is that 
WKHQDWXUDOLVW¶VQRWLRQRIDJRRGH[SODQDWLRQGRHVQRWVHHPWREHDEOHWREHGHIHQGHGRQ
grounds that are independent of naturalist premises.180 If Blackburn thinks that naturalist 
premises are premises that any reasonable human being would accept, he needs to give an 
argument for this. This is particularly important, since such an argument would be an indirect 
accusation that many moral realists are unreasonable people.  
4.4 ARGUMENTS FOR THE META-ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF THE 1ST ORDER 
 Quasi-realism is a variety of projectivism. The projectivist project itself is a 2nd order 
description of morality where it is assumed that we have sentiments and other reactions 
caused by natural features of things and we then describe the world as though the world 
contained features answering to those sentiments.181 At first glance, projectivism seems 
FRPSDWLEOHZLWK0DFNLH¶VHUURUWKHRU\+RZHYHUDVZHQRWHGDERYH%ODFNEXUQ¶VTXDVL-
realism strongly differentiates itself from error theories by describing moral discourse in a 
way that attempts to rid the discourse of any possible metaphysical FRPPLWPHQWV%ODFNEXUQ¶V
strategy for doing this is to first look at the set of claims made by ordinary users of moral 
discourse that VXJJHVWPRUDOUHDOLVWPHWDSK\VLFV6XFKFODLPVPD\LQFOXGHWKLQJVOLNH³,WLVDQ
REMHFWLYHIDFWWKDWDERUWLRQLVZURQJ´RU³7KHSUDFWLFHRIWRUWXUHLVZURQJLQGHSHQGHQWO\RI
ZKDWDQ\ERG\WKLQNVRQWKHPDWWHU´%ODFNEXUQWKHQUH-interprets these claims as 1st order 
moral claims where the speaker is just expressing a moral judgment that is metaphysically 
neutral. 
 Blackburn wLOOLQWHUSUHWDFODLPOLNH³,WLVDQREMHFWLYHIDFWWKDWDERUWLRQLVZURQJ´
as abortion has some feature which makes it wrong.182 0RUHRYHUWKHWHUP³REMHFWLYHIDFW´
will be interpreted as a mind independence qualification on the claim.  What this means is that 
the sentence specifies that abortion has features which make it wrong and thus the wrongness 
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of abortion is independent of what anybody thinks.  So far, this sounds no different to realist 
interpretations of such claims.  However, the difference lies in two key features of the quasi-
realist interpretation.  The first is that when the person who asserts the sentence uses the 
SKUDVH³REMHFWLYHIDFW´WKHTXDVL-realist is not interpreting the person as referring to any fact 
which is external to 1st order moral practice.  External here refers to something counterfactual. 
To say that something is external to moral practice means that it would exist independently of 
whether or not moral practice had evolved the way it did. The second feature that 
differentiates the quasi-UHDOLVWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHSHUVRQDVVHUWLQJ³,WLVDQREMHFWLYHIDFWWKDW
DERUWLRQLVZURQJ´LVWKHTXDVL-realist interpretation of mind independence.  Again, the quasi-
realist wants to interpret mind independence without referring to anything that is external (in 
the sense specified above) to 1st order moral practice.  
Thus, for the quasi-realist, claims of mind-independence will have both a 1st order 
meaning and a naturalist explanation.  The 1st order meaning will be that mind independence 
UHIHUVWRWKHSURSHUW\RIWKHPRUDOFODLPZKLFKPDNHVLWFRUUHFWLQGHSHQGHQWRIDQ\RQH¶s 
beliefs or desires. The explanation will be that mind independence expresses a higher order 
attitude that regulates lower order attitudes.183  In other words, it is an attitude that commits 
moralisers to the desire to retain the values and semantic rules of moral discourse that allow 
WKHPWRDUULYHDWDFODLPOLNH³LWLVDQREMHFWLYHIDFWWKDWDERUWLRQLVZURQJ´,WLVWKLV
distinction between moral meanings and meta-ethical explanations that I believe is a 
fundamental key to understanding the quasi-realist project.184  For the quasi-realist, moral 
meanings deal with justification, which is internal to the 1st order practice of morality.  Meta-
ethical explanations, on the other hand, are completely distinct from moral meanings. This 
distinction happens because, for the quasi-realist, meta-ethical explanations have no role to 
play in moral justification. Moral justification happens during the 1st order moral practice 
whereby certain situations are identified as having features that make them good or bad, right 
or wrong, and so on.  Meta-ethical explanations have no bearing on whether or not the 
situations specified at the 1st order level have or do not have the features which make them 
good or bad, right or wrong, and so on.  Thus, for the quasi-realist, the meta-ethical 
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explanations are not relevant to moral justification. Moral meanings, on the other hand, are 
relevant to moral justification. This is because moral meanings specify both the features of 
situations that give them their moral value but also dictate the semantic rules for making 
moral identifications of such situations.  
 This explains why the quasi-realist believes he can give anti-realist explanations of 
moral practice without undermining anything that happens at the 1st order level of moral 
practice. This practice of giving anti-realist explanations while purporting to not undermine 
any aspect of 1st order moral practice is relatively new in the history of moral philosophy.185 
Traditionally, it has been thought that meta-ethical explanations are much more intricately tied 
up with moral justification.  This assumption even infected noncognitivism.  In earlier 
versions of noncognitivism, meta-ethical explanations which robbed moral claims of truth 
value or posited that moral judgments were just expressions of desires were thought to 
undermine the 1st order of moral practice.  Hence, early versions of noncognitivism self-
identified as revisionist forms of meta-ethics.186 Quasi-realism is unique in that it attempts 
quite forcefully to distance noncognitivism from its early history of being a revisionary meta-
ethics.  However, the key to understanding this distancing is in understanding the quasi-realist 
distancing of moral justification from meta-ethical explanations. 
 Quasi-Realism gives a meta-ethical explanation of moral claims in terms of their 
ability to function so as to change or preserve certain attitudes. This is at odds with the 
perspective of the moral realist who insists that the most important function of morality is its 
ability to get agents to make decisions in ways that correspond to moral states of affairs in the 
world. For Blackburn, it is only psychological facts about humans and non-moral facts in the 
world which explain why human agents have the moral attitudes they possess. As far as meta-
ethical meanings are concerned, Blackburn wants to interpret all the commitments of moral 
discourse in such a way as to exclude any information about anything other than what features 
of the world make a moral claim correct or incorrect. To give an example, Blackburn would 
say that what makes bear baiting wrong is the pain it causes the bear. He thinks this is a 
sufficient explanation and justification of why bear baiting is wrong.  There is no need, on his 
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view, for any additional information about bear baiting being at odds with the demands of 
mind independent moral facts. If agents talk like this when explaining why they think the 
opposition to bear baiting is justified, Blackburn will simply interpret them as expressing their 
higher order desires.187 For Blackburn, there only need be one level of justification for a moral 
claim.  If bear baiting is wrong, the justification of this claim consists wholly in the fact that it 
causes the bear pain.  If we ask for a justification for the badness of pain, we are simply 
asking more than is required. Blackburn thinks it is just a brute fact that, within the practice of 
morality, pain is bad.  
4.5. CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENTS FOR META-ETHICAL NEUTRALITY OF THE 
1ST ORDER. 
 As noted earlier, the quasi-realist attempt to account for all the features of 1st order 
moral discourse involves a separation between 1st order moral meanings and 2nd order meta-
ethical explanation. This is because, as noted earlier, moral meaning is the arena the quasi-
realist wants to show is the sole area in which moral justification happens. For the quasi-
realist, 2nd order meta-ethical explanation does not in any way undermine 1st order moral 
justification. The quasi-realist tactic for justifying this strategy is to interpret claims that are 
normally understood as moral metaphysical claims as 1st order claims that are metaphysically 
neutral. The main difficulty with this quasi-realist tactic is that if morality commits agents to a 
moral metaphysics, Blackburn would still be right in his contention that one could interpret 
such claims in a metaphysically neutral fashion. Hence, his characterization of 1st order claims 
would not show what it needs to show; that a metaphysically neutral interpretation of a 1st 
order moral claim is evidence that the 1st order moral claim is metaphysically neutral. To 
LOOXVWUDWHOHW¶VWDNHWKHFODLP³%HDUEDLWLQJis wrong independently of what anybody thinks of 
LW´%ODFNEXUQZDQWVWRLQWHUSUHWWKHDJHQWZKRVD\VWKLVDVDQDJHQWZKRLVH[SUHVVLQJKLV
higher order desires.188 For Blackburn, the agent who asserts this claim is just expressing a 
desire that everyone continue to desire to refrain from bear baiting because it harms the bear. 
The trouble is, if morality committed agents to a metaphysics, this would still be part of what 
DJHQWVPHDQZKHQWKH\VDLG³%HDUEDLWLQJLVZURQJLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIZKDWDQ\ERG\WKLQNVof 
                                                        
187
 See Blackburn, (1985), 8-21 
188
 See Blackburn (1992), 1-21.              
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LW´7KH\ZRXOGKRZHYHUDOVRPHDQWKDWWKHZURQJQHVVRIEHDUEDLWLQJLVDPHWDSK\VLFDO
SURSHUW\RIWKHZRUOGWKDWH[LVWVLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIDQ\RQH¶VDWWLWXGHV6RPHUHO\SRLQWLQJRXW
that the meaning of the claim has this higher order desire component does nothing to 
XQGHUPLQHWKHSRVVLEO\PHWDSK\VLFDOFRPSRQHQWRIWKHFODLP¶VPHDQLQJ 
 $VZHKDYHVHHQ%ODFNEXUQ¶VEHOLHIWKDWPRUDOVSHDNHUVGRQRWSUHVXSSRVHWKLV
metaphysical meaning is grounded in his view that the metaphysics of the latter meaning is 
false. Blackburn also thinks that it is possible to interpret speakers without the metaphysical 
meaning and nothing morally relevant would change about their moral practice.  The problem 
with this strategy is that it only works if moral metaphysics are irrelevant to moral 
justification. And simply asserting the falsehood of such metaphysics is not evidence that such 
metaphysics is actually irrelevant to moral justification. In fact, it begs the question against 
error theory. If error theory were true, it could be possible that moral discourse commits moral 
agents to a metaphysics that is false. Moreover, this could be true even though one could 
interpret the discourse in a way that excluded this metaphysics. All that would be required for 
this is that the mind independence meaning of moral claims contained two components: the 
first, dealing with higher order desires and the second component referring to a metaphysics.  
To point out that the mind independence claim contained the higher order desires component 
would not show that the moral metaphysics was not also part of the meaning of the claim. 
 In order to show that moral metaphysics is irrelevant to moral justification, 
%ODFNEXUQFDQ¶WDVQRWHGDERYHVLPSO\REVHUYHWKDWWKRVHZKRDIILUPDQGGHQ\PRUDO
metaphysics seem to have roughly equivalent moral characters. He has to show that without 
the assumption of a moral metaphysics, no moral practice would change in a morally 
VLJQLILFDQWZD\7KHGLIILFXOW\KHUHLVWKDWKHFDQ¶WVLPSO\DVVHVVPRUDOLW\LQDPHWDSK\VLFDOO\
neutral way to see what moral practices would change in a morally significant way.  It is 
possible that the quality of a moral act can be determined by the presence or absence of a 
certain metaphysics. If the pain bear baiting causes a bear is bad because of metaphysical 
moral properties, this means the pain is not bad in a world that lacks such properties. Of 
course, in such a world, there could be philosophers who believe that metaphysical properties 
are irrelevant to justification.  They could believe, like Simon Blackburn, that it is the pain 
bear baiting causes a bear that makes it wrong and nothing more. Of course, in this world they 
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would be mistaken. The important point is one could not evaluate the moral status of their 
claims in a manner which bypassed the metaphysics issue. This is because both the worlds 
with metaphysical moral properties and the error theory worlds without them look and feel the 
VDPH%ODFNEXUQ¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIst order moral claims merely demonstrates that it is 
possible, given how things look and feel, that Blackburn is in a world where quasi-realism is 
true. That possibility does nothing to undermine the contrary possibility that Blackburn is in 
either an error theory world or a world with a moral metaphysics that is relevant to moral 
justification.  Given any of these three possibilities, the world would look and feel the same.  
 ,QWKLVZD\%ODFNEXUQ¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIst order moral claims beg the question 
against both non-naturalistic moral realism and error theory. It may be true that morality has 
no metaphysics, in which case it might be the case that denying moral metaphysics is a 
perfectly acceptable thing to do.  However, if a certain non-naturalistic moral realism is true, it 
may indeed be a morally bad thing to deny the metaphysics that morality commits us to. The 
more intriguing possibility is that the same might be true in an error theory world. On this 
scenario, there might be no moral metaphysics but morality may commit us to a metaphysics 
in a way where denying that moral metaphysics is still morally bad.  What is important about 
the possibility of this error theory is it also casts doubt on (H) (morality is compatible with all 
meta-ethical truths a theorist could advocate). Blackburn may find it implausible to think that 
moral commitments are at odds with the truth, but that just shows he finds error theory 
implausible. Merely finding error theory implausible is not itself an argument against that 
theory. Blackburn must provide an argument that morality can only commit us to things which 
are true in order to show that nothing morally significant changes when agents refrain from 
affirming or presupposing a moral metaphysics.  Blackburn has not provided such an 
argument.  
 This argument, while it would constitute a rebuttal to error theory, would do nothing 
to undermine any form of moral realism. This is because all the above argument would show 
is that morality commits us to things that are true. It does not show that there are no moral 
metaphysics. A second argument for (I) (naturalism is true) would have to be conjoined with 
this first argument in order to show that metaphysics is irrelevant to moral justification and 
morality does not commit agents to a metaphysics. At this point, it might be tempting to think 
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(I) is the one claim Blackburn does not need to defend in the context of this argument. This is 
QRWKRZHYHUWKHFDVH2QHFDQ¶WVLPSO\UHO\RQWKHIDFWWKDWWKHPDMRULW\RIPHWD-ethicists 
are naturalists as a way to avoid having to defend naturalism.  This is because a few 
contemporary meta-ethicists189 self-identify as non-naturalistic moral realists.  To say that one 
offers an account of morality that is superior to non-naturalistic moral realism is to say that 
there are compelling reasons not to be a non-naturalistic moral realist.  In order to present 
such compelling reasons, you first have to address non-naturalistic moral realism without first 
assuming that naturalism is true. This may involve not assuming supplementary views that are 
made plausible because of naturalism.  Such views may include views about supervenience, 
moral motivation, or constraints on the assertions of an ontology.  
 To give an analogy, suppose I am a theist working in analytic philosophy of religion. 
Suppose I obVHUYHWKDWWKHPDMRULW\RIP\FROOHDJXHVDUHDOVRWKHLVWV/HW¶VDOVRVXSSRVH,
ZDQWWRJLYHDWKHLVWLFDFFRXQWRIWKHDSSDUHQWGHVLJQLQWKHXQLYHUVH1RZOHW¶VVXSSRVHWKDW
WKHUHDUHDIHZSURPLQHQWSKLORVRSKHUVRIUHOLJLRQZKRDUHDWKHLVWV/HW¶VDVVXme that they 
argue for an atheistic account of the apparent design in the universe where they explain such 
apparent design away.  If I wish to give a theistic account of apparent design that is superior to 
WKHLUDFFRXQW,FDQ¶WGHIHQGP\DFFRXQWLQDZD\where I assume, without argument, that 
atheism is implausible. The fact that the majority of my colleagues are also theists does not 
absolve me of the need to defend theism. This is because once atheists have stepped into the 
fray giving rival accounts of what I wish to explain, atheism has become a potential defeater 
of theism. In order to show that theism stands strong in the face of even a small number of 
atheist attacks, I have to defend theism. Similarly, Blackburn must defend naturalism if he 
believes his account of morality is superior to even a handful of his non-naturalist colleagues. 
4. 6 THE ARGUMENT FROM MORAL PSYCHOLOGY  
 So far, we have only attacked the considerations Blackburn cites which purportedly 
allow him to show that quasi-realism is superior to both non-naturalistic moral realism and 
error theory. Blackburn,  it is worth noting, also gives substantive arguments in opposition to 
all versions of moral realism. Blackburn gives two arguments against all versions of moral 
realism that rely on the plausibility of Humean accounts of motivation and motivational 
                                                        
189See Shafer-Landau (2006), and Hampton (1998). 
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LQWHUQDOLVP%ODFNEXUQ¶V+XPHDQPRWLYDWLRQDOLQWHUQDOLVPFRPSULVHVWZRPDLQFODLPV190 It 
firstly states that moral motivation is best explained as being the product of the non-cognitive 
states (desires) of agents.  According to this account, our desires are what explain our moral 
motivations. To give an example, if we make a moral decision to give to charity, it will be our 
desires to give to charity that will explain our decision. In this respect, Humean motivational 
internalism is no different to standard motivational internalism. The second claim of Humean 
motivational internalism is that moral beliefs and desires are logically distinct.191 This claim is 
the distinctively Humean element of Humean motivational internalism. What this amounts to 
is a lack of entailment between moral beliefs and desires. According to Blackburn, the 
outcome of these two claims is that moral judgments necessarily motivate.192 
 When moral judgments necessarily motivate, this means that necessarily, if someone 
makes a moral judgment, they will have moral motivation. This view has some interesting 
implications for the characterization of sociopaths. Sociopaths are agents who understand the 
meaning of moral claims but have no accompanying motivation to satisfy the moral demands 
of those claims. If any version of motivational internalism is true, it is the case that the 
concept of a sociopath, as stated above, is conceptually impossible.  This is because, on 
motivational internalism, an agent is failing to understand a correct moral claim if that agent 
fails to be motivated by it.  For the motivational internalist, to understand a correct moral 
claim is to be motivated by it.  
 Many motivational internalists have considered this a problem for the theory. This 
explains why there has been a crop of conceptual qualifications put forward by various 
proponents of motivational internalism. Some motivational internalists, for instance, identify 
themselves as unrestricted motivational internalists.  This means they take the relationship 
between moral judgments and moral motivation to obtain in all agents.193  Restricted 
                                                        
190 See %ODFNEXUQ6³6SUHDGLQJWKH:RUG´2[IRUG8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV1HZ<RUN6HHFKDSWHU 
191
 Ibid.  
192Ibid. 
193For an indepth analysis of the varieties of motivational internalism, see SMITH, Michael. The Moral 
Problem, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1994. Also see MILLER, Christian. Motivational 
Internalism.  Philosophical Studies, 2008, Vol. 39, No. 2, 233-255.  
 
194 See Miller (2009). 
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motivational internalists, by contrast, only commit themselves to this relationship when it 
comes to a specific class of moral agents.194 Such a class is most often characterized as the 
class of moral agents who are normal, practically rational, and virtuous by ordinary standards.  
Moreover, the relationship between understanding a moral claim and being motivated by its 
demands is qualified to a degree that it is not the case with regards unrestricted motivational 
internalists. This qualification is typically cashed out in the postulation that normal moral 
agents, in virtue of understanding a correct moral judgment, have some degree of motivation 
to act in accordance with it.195  However, this does not exclude the possibility of other 
psychological motivations or factors that prevent the moral motivation from being 
efficacious.196 
 Another conceptual qualification within motivational internalism is the distinction 
between weak and strong motivational internalism.197 Weak motivational internalists claim 
that there is a necessary relationship between moral motivation and moral judgments such 
that, at least in some rough way, it is a necessary truth that if a moral agent makes a moral 
judgment then he is motivated to some extent to act in accordance with that judgment. 
Because weak motivational internalism is only committed to this necessary connection, weak 
PRWLYDWLRQDOLQWHUQDOLVPLVFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKHVRXUFHRIDQDJHQW¶VPRUDOPRWLYDWLRQEHLQJ
something other than his moral judgment. Strong motivational internalism, by contrast, claims 
that there is both a necessary connection between moral judgments and moral motivation and 
WKDWWKHRQO\VRXUFHRIDQDJHQW¶VPRUDOMXGJPHQWVLVKLVPRUDOPRWLYDWLRQ 
 %ODFNEXUQ¶VUHOLDQFHRQ+XPHDQPRWLYDWLRQDOLQWHUQDOLVPWRDWWDFNPRUDOUHDOLVP
does not require that Blackburn defend any of the specific versions of motivational 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
195Ibid. 
 
196 Ibid. 
 
197 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 135 of 227 
 
LQWHUQDOLVPVWDWHGDERYH+HQFH%ODFNEXUQ¶VDUJXPHQWLVFRPSDWLEOHZLWKDOOWKHDERYH
versions.  All that Blackburn needs for his arguments against realism is the claim that non-
cognitive states and beliefs are logically distinct and the claim that moral judgments, in some 
ZD\QHFHVVDULO\PRWLYDWHDJHQWV7KLVVHWVWKHVWDJHIRU%ODFNEXUQ¶VWZRDUJXPHQWVDJDLQVW
all forms of moral realism. In the first argument, Blackburn asserts both of these claims and 
maintains that if they are correct, moral judgments must either be non-cognitive states or be 
cognitive states that entail non-cognitive states. Because of the plausibility of motivational 
LQWHUQDOLVP%ODFNEXUQEHOLHYHVFRJQLWLYHVWDWHVVXFKDVPRUDOEHOLHIVFDQ¶WHQWDLOQRQ-
cognitive states.  This implies that moral judgments must be expressions of non-cognitive 
states. All versions of moral realism are at odds with non-cognitivism.  Hence, for Blackburn, 
moral realism is implausible on explanatory grounds.198 
4.7 CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENT FROM MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 ,Q%ODFNEXUQ¶VILUVWDUJXPHQWDJDLQVWPRUDOUHDOLVPIURPPRUDOSV\FKRORJ\
Blackburn relies on the plausibility of motivational internalism. The claim that moral 
judgments necessarily motivate is derived, in part, from the claim that desires are what explain 
moral motivations. The difficulty with relying on motivational internalism to rule out a meta-
ethics is that motivational internalism presupposes (G) (morality is incapable of giving us any 
evidence of anything external to morality). This is because if morality were capable of giving 
us evidence of things external to morality, it would not be in any way obvious that desires are 
what explain moral motivations.  The obvious explanation of moral motivation would be 
whatever morality gave us evidence for.  Morality, if (G) were false, could be a perceptual 
mechanism that allowed agents to see things that explained why they had the moral 
motivations they did.  Desires would, of course, be part of such an account. However, they 
would not be the salient feature that explained moral motivations.  
 Can we construe the claim that desires explain moral motivations in a way where the 
claim becomes evidence for (G)? This seems problematic since a desire can only explain a 
moral motivation if it is the salient feature of a moral motivation. In order to be the salient 
IHDWXUHRIDPRUDOPRWLYDWLRQWKHUHFDQ¶WEHDQ\FRPSHWLQJVDOLHQWIHDWXUHV,IWKHHYLGHQFHRI
the correctness of moral claims were presented to agents by morality, it seems unlikely that 
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 See Blackburn (1984), Chapter 6. 
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we could say that this feature was less salient than the mere fact that agents had desires. After 
all, the desires would simply be desires to do what was in accordance with what morality give 
moral agents evidence of. Is the fact that many people find motivational internalism plausible 
evidence that moral motivation has no competing salient considerations apart from desires? 
 It may initially seem as though we could answer yes to this question if we could first 
establish that the reason people find internalism plausible is because it seems plausible that 
(G) is true. However, the truth of (G) is not the sort of thing that can be established on the 
basis of how plausible contemporary philosophers find it. This is because (G) is a largely 
undebated assumption in arguments that presuppose it is true. The substantive philosophical 
debate over whether (G) is true has largely not happened. Since the plausibility of moral 
realism and quasi-realism both hinge on (G), relying on the plausibility of (G) in an argument 
against either position is inappropriate. Blackburn, in relying on (G), is relying on the very 
assumption his opponents find implausible.  Similarly, if moral realists were to give an 
argument for moral realism on the grounds that (G) was implausible, they would be relying on 
the very assumption Blackburn finds implausible. 
              4.8 THE SUPERVENIENCE ARGUMENT 
Blackburn also offers an argument against all forms of moral realism based on 
supervenience.199 In order to understand this argument, we have to first understand what 
%ODFNEXUQEHOLHYHVWREHWKHSODXVLEOHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWQDWXUDOIDFWVFDQ¶WHQWDLOPRUDORQHV,Q
other words, it may be the case in our world that there is a relationship between torture and 
wrongness.  However, there is no conceptual reason why in some other world, there is a 
relation between torture and wrongness that is distinct from the relationship between torture 
DQGZURQJQHVVWKDWKROGVLQRXUZRUOG$QRWKHUDLGWRXQGHUVWDQGLQJ%ODFNEXUQ¶VDUJXPHQWLV
the observation that moral changes regarding the correctness of a moral claim, necessarily, 
GRQ¶WKDSSHQZLWKRXWVRPHFKDQJHLQWKHIHDWXUHVRIWKHVLWXDWLRQWKDWXQGHUOLHVWKH
correctness of that moral claim.  To illustrate, suppose I claim capital punishment for children 
is wrong while simultaneously claiming that capital punishment for adults is right. Any 
normal moraliser who hears these claims will assume there is some morally relevant 
                                                        
199
 For older and newer modal expressions of this argument, see Blackburn (1984), Chapter 6 and 
BLACKBURN, Simon. Supervenience Revisited. In: Geoffrey SAYRE-McCORD, ed. Essays on Moral 
Realism. New York, USA: Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 59-75.  
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difference between children and adults I am pointing to which explains why I assert that 
capital punishment is right in the case of adults and wrong in the case of children.  
 If I were then to assert that there was no morally relevant difference between children 
and adults which explains why capital punishment is right for the latter and wrong for the 
former, I could be justifiably accused of not understanding how to make moral judgments. 
This illustrates that a feature of moral discourse is that changes regarding the correctness of a 
PRUDOFODLPQHFHVVDULO\GRQ¶WKDSSHQZLWKRXWVRme change in the features of the situation 
that underlies the correctness of that moral claim. This feature of moral discourse Blackburn 
labels the feature of supervenience.200 Blackburn explains supervenience in terms of a 
conceptual impossibility to suppose that if two things are identical in every other respect, one 
is better than the other.201 
 Blackburn believes the quasi-realist can explain supervenience by talking about 
practical constraints on the way agents express value predicates. The practical constraint is 
explained in terms of a counterfactual. Blackburn asserts that if we allowed ourselves a 
system of morality that was like ordinary moral practice but subject to no such supervenience 
constraint, it would allow us to treat naturally identical situations in morally different ways. 
Such a system of morality would be unfit, according to Blackburn, for being a guide to 
practical decision making.202 This constitutes an explanation of why, given the truth of quasi-
realism, our moral practice would have evolved to respect supervenience. If it had not, 
morality would cease to function.  
 Blackburn then contrasts this explanation of supervenience with the moral realist 
H[SODQDWLRQ%ODFNEXUQ¶VFRQWHQWLRQWRSXWLWEOXQWO\LVWKDWPRUDOUHDOLVWVKDYHQR
explanation for supervenience. This is because there is a component of supervenience that 
Blackburn believes moral realism to be an inherently inadequate explanans of. This feature is 
the supervenience claim that if a set of natural facts are significantly similar then moral 
similarities regarding those natural facts must be identical. If we look at competing meta-
ethical explanations of this fact, we can see that the moral realist can offer a view that 
                                                        
200See Blackburn (1984), 181-189 
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postulates a necessary connection between the moral facts and the natural facts.  However, 
this is incompatible with the plausible assumption WKDWQDWXUDOIDFWVGRQ¶WHQWDLOPRUDORQHV,I
WKHUHDOLVWLVWRUHVSHFWWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWQDWXUDOIDFWVGRQ¶WHQWDLOPRUDOIDFWVWKHUHLVQR
way, according to Blackburn, that the realist can give a plausible explanation of 
supervenience.203  This is because the moral realist link between moral facts and natural ones 
is mysterious.204 The quasi-realist, by contrast, can give a detailed explanation of 
supervenience by talking about how, given noncognitivism, language evolved to respect 
supervenience.205  
4.9 CRITIQUE OF SUPERVENIENCE ARGUMENT 
 :LWKUHJDUGV%ODFNEXUQ¶VVXSHUYHQLHQFHDUJXPHQWDJDLQVWPRUDOUHDOLVPZHGRQ¶W
HYHQKDYHWRFKDOOHQJHWKHSUHPLVHVWRVHHKRZLWDVVXPHV,QDWXUDOLVPLVWUXH/HW¶V
assume that Blackburn is right that, on the moral realist view, it is a mystery why there is a 
EDQRQPL[HGZRUOGV/HW¶VDOVRDVVXPHWKDWRQWKHTXDVL-realist view, we can eliminate this 
mystery by talking about how this ban on mixed worlds was a semantic precondition of 
human beings being able to utilize morality in practical decision making. How is this evidence 
DJDLQVWPRUDOUHDOLVP",WLVQ¶WXQOHVVZHDVVXPHWKDW,LVWUXH 
 This is because there is nothing apart from naturalism which suggests that a less 
detailed explanation of a given phenomena is an explanation which is more likely to be false 
WKDQLW¶VPRUHGHWDLOHGULYDOV7RVD\WKDWDQH[SODQDWLRQLVP\VWHULRXVLQWKHZD\WKDW
Blackburn does is just to say that an explanation has less to say than a rival explanation. 
Blackburn believes that the quasi-realist explanation of the ban on worlds has more to say 
(and can say it less mysteriously) because the quasi-realist can talk about the practicality of 
the ban.  The realist, by contrast, has to insist that the ban is just a brute given of the 
metaphysical features of moral discourse.  But why is a brute given explanation less likely to 
be true than an explanation that postulates a brute given further back? It does not seem as 
though there is any way to answer this question apart from giving a comprehensive defense of 
naturalism.  
                                                        
203Ibid. 
204Ibid.  
205This explanation cleverly uses anti-realism to explain the arbitrariness of the ban on mixed worlds. 
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 Yet naturalism is one of the issues up for debate in any confrontation between rival 
meta-ethical theories.  This is partly because one meta-ethical theory that the quasi-realist 
wants to deny is non-naturalist moral realism. The other reason is the assumptions that moral 
realist accounts become more or less plausible depending on whether naturalism is true or 
false. For instance, moral realists sometimes assume the falsity of (G) (morality is incapable 
of giving evidence of things external to morality). However, if naturalism is true, this 
assumption loses much of its plausibility. This is because naturalistic ontology is descriptive 
rather than normative.  Moreover, naturalistic explanatory methodology, even if normative, is 
not moral. There are simply no non-moral phenomena for morality to give us evidence of if 
naturalism is true.  Moreover, if naturalism is true, there are no epistemological mechanisms 
that morality has for doing this in the first place.  
4.10. THE PRACTICAL NEEDS ARGUMENT 
An additional argument Blackburn gives for quasi-realism is the claim that quasi-
realism satisfies the practical needs of morality for a meta-ethics in two different ways.206 The 
practical needs of morality for a meta-ethics include: 
(N) That the theory describes how morality functions correctly. 
and 
(O) That the theory is consistent with truth tracking methods from the natural sciences and 
analytic philosophy.  
(N) basically states that a practical need of morality is that any meta-ethics which describes it 
must describe it in a way where the description does not show morality to be faulty in some 
way.  (O) states that a practical need of morality is that the meta-ethical theory which 
describes it must be consistent with what the methods of truth tracking in the natural sciences 
and analytic philosophy tell us. (O) is a practical need because it would cause various troubles 
for philosophers and scientists if morality were to contest their claims.  
 Blackburn thinks quasi-realism satisfies (O) because it is attractive on a naturalistic 
world view.207 Blackburn believes quasi-realism satisfies (N) because it includes a description 
of a 1st order a moral vocabulary that retains all the rules and self-regulations of the practice of 
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morality.208 Presumably Blackburn thinks that (N) and (O) constitute genuine practical needs 
of morality for meta-ethical theories because he thinks meta-ethics must vindicate morality.  
Meta-ethics, in order to vindicate morality, must describe morality in a way where the meta-
ethical description of morality does not undermine morality in any way.  This means the 
description must describe morality as functioning consistently, coherently, and such that 
human agents have good reason to engage in moral practice. Also, Blackburn must 
presumably think that morality, in order to be vindicated, must not be guilty of any 
metaphysical error.  If a meta-ethical theory describes morality as being guilty of such an 
error, it seems as though for Blackburn, the theory is not satisfying the practical needs of 
morality.  
4.11 CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENT FROM PRACTICAL NEEDS 
 The difficulty for this argument is it is implausible that the practical needs of 
morality for a meta-ethics include (N) (that the theory describes how morality functions 
correctly) and (O) (that the theory is consistent with truth tracking methods from the natural 
VFLHQFHVDQGDQDO\WLFSKLORVRSK\$IWHUDOORQHFDQ¶WGRDQDVVHVVPHQWRIZKDWWKHPRUDO
needs of a meta-ethical theory are prior to creating the meta-ethical theory.  This is because 
the way the meta-ethical theory characterizes morality will, in part, determine what the 
practical needs of a meta-ethical theory are. 
 If moral realism is true, for instance, it is not clear that one can separate meta-ethical 
explanations from moral meanings.  If the two have a more intimate relationship with each 
other than the quasi-realist describes, this has the potential to radically change what the 
practical needs of morality are. Because moral realism is itself an explanation of moral claims 
and moral realism sees itself as an explanation that vindicates morality, moral realism already 
has a characterization of the practical needs of a meta-ethical theory which is different from 
quasi-realism. What this difference amounts to is the moral realist is not committed to (O). 
This is because it is an open question as to whether or not (O) will vindicate moral realism.  If 
it does not, on the realist view, it is an open question as to whether or not (O) is consistent 
with (N). For moral realism, realism is the only correct explanation of how morality functions 
correctly.  If (O) does not blatantly support moral realism, (O) is not satisfying (N). In this 
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scenario, the moral realist would have no reason to consider (O) a moral need.  
 Also, rival meta-ethical theories have different interpretations of what (N) amounts 
WR:HFDQVHHWKLVTXLWHVDOLHQWO\LQREVHUYLQJWKHUHDVRQVZK\%ODFNEXUQUHMHFW¶V0DFNLH¶V
error theory. Blackburn claims209 that if moral discourse is in error, MDFNLH¶VRZQH[SRVXUHRI
the error changes the category of his own moral claims.  If Mackie is right, then Mackie, in 
promoting his error theory, is promoting the rejection of a commitment to moral discourse.  
Since such commitments are a requirement for spHDNHUVZKHQWKH\PRUDOLVH0DFNLH¶VRZQ
moral claims can no longer be examples of moralising. According to Blackburn, they are 
examples of schmoralising.210 Schmoralising resembles moralizing in most ways apart from 
its rejection of the metaphysical commitments which moral speakers are committed to.  
Blackburn thinks that if Mackie is right about moral discourse being dependent on dubious 
metaphysical commitments, then one cannot simultaneously engage in moral discourse and 
satisfy the demands of (O). Since Mackie, as a philosopher, is satisfying the latter need, he 
must be engaging in some discourse that is not moral discourse when he makes moral claims.  
 This illustrates the way in which Mackie and Blackburn have different interpretations 
of (N) which are the outcomes of their respective theories.  For Mackie, to describe how 
morality functions correctly is simply to describe how morality actually is.  For Blackburn, to 
describe how morality functions correctly is, in some sense, to vindicate the commitments of 
PRUDOLW\0DFNLH¶VYLHZFRPHVRXWRIKLVHUURUWKHRU\SUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHRQWKDWWKHRU\LWLV
morally permissible to be an error theorist.211 Blackburn, on the other hand, seems to think 
there is at least a moral problem with denying the commitments of morality. Why else would 
he try to vindicate what he takes to be the salient commitments of morality? If this aim were 
purely descriptive, there would be no reason to justify the claim that quasi-realism satisfies the 
moral needs of a meta-ethical theory. Blackburn simultaneously wants to say that an error 
theorist is not engaging in something other than morality when the error theorist moralises. 
This is presumably because Blackburn does not want to say that a theorist is no longer 
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moralising just because they have advocated a false meta-ethical theory.  How does Blackburn 
harmonize these tensions? 
 +HLQWHUSUHWV0DFNLH¶VWKHRU\DVDIILUPLQJWKDWGHQ\LQJWKHFRPPLWPHQWVRIPRUDOLW\
amounts to engaging in a practice that is not moralising.212 Although Blackburn sees this as an 
LPSOLFDWLRQRI0DFNLH¶VHUURUWKHRU\KHIUDPHVLWDVDreductio of Mackie¶VYLHZ%ODFNEXUQ
finds it incredibly implausible that we should call a moralising error theorist a schmoralist 
rather than a moralist.213 Blackburn finds it much more intuitive to suppose that both error 
theorists and ordinary speakers are engaged in the same activity when they moralise.  
Blackburn would also prefer to say that both ordinary speakers and error theorists are engaged 
in the same moral practice despite the different interpretations they may have of what that 
practice is.214 We can assume that part of what makes Blackburn think that the error theorist 
and the ordinary moral speaker are engaging in the same practice is the fact that this 
interpretation of the situation allows morality to satisfy quasi-realist practical needs. After all, 
LIPRUDOLW\H[FOXGHG0DFNLHIURPWKHFDWHJRU\RIµPRUDOLVHU¶WKLVZRXOGLPSO\DWHQVLRQ
between (O) (which assumes compatibility of morality and the truth tracking procedures of 
the natural sciences and analytic philosophy) and the commitments of morality.  Such a 
tension would leave morality in a position of not fulfilling the quasi-realist practical needs. 
This lack of fulfillment would presumably uQGHUPLQHWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUPRUDOLW\¶V
GRPLQDQFHLQKXPDQDIIDLUV6LQFH%ODFNEXUQEHOLHYHVWKDWPRUDOLW\¶VGRPLQDQFHLVMXVWLILHG
and he believes (O) is a practical need for a meta-ethical theory, Blackburn thinks a plausible 
account of morality will be one that allows morality to satisfy (N) and (O).  Hence, his 
argument from practical needs assumes the truth of quasi-realism in order to show that quasi-
realism satisfies the moral needs of a meta-ethical theory. After all, if quasi-realism is true, not 
only are (N) and (O) practical needs of a meta-ethical theory, but quasi-realism, can also 
satisfy (N) and (O). As we have seen, it is not clear that this would be the case if quasi-realism 
were false.  
 %ODFNEXUQ¶VUHOLDQFHRQ2LVDOVRLQGLUHFWO\Dreliance on (H) and (I).  (H), as we 
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recall, asserts that morality is compatible with any possible meta-ethical truths a theorist could 
advocate and (I) is an assertion of philosophical naturalism.  This is partially because (O) 
presupposes (I).  It presupposes (I) because if (I) were false, (O) would simply not be a moral 
need of a meta-ethical theory.  This is because the incompatibility of morality with a possible 
outcome of naturalism would be a counter-example to the claim that the truth tracking 
methods of the natural sciences and analytic philosophy are consistent with morality.  If they 
DUHQRWFRQVLVWHQWZLWKPRUDOLW\PRUDOLW\¶VFRQVLVWHQF\ZLWKWKHPLVQRORQJHUDKXPDQQHHG
The human need becomes the consistency of the truth tracking mechanisms with morality, not 
the other way around.  Also, if (H) were false, the truth tracking mechanisms of analytic 
philosophy and the natural sciences would no longer be mechanisms that it was one of our 
moral needs that morality be consistent with.  Rather, it would be the case that it was one of 
our needs that such truth tracking mechanisms be consistent with morality. There would be no 
need to try and make morality consistent with naturalism or any practice that presupposed 
naturalism. 
               4.12 QUASI-5($/,60¶6)$,/85(72 SUPPORT MORAL OBJECTIVISM 
 As has been noted, the quasi-realist project (in both its motivations and the main 
DUJXPHQWVLQLWµVIDYRUSUHVXSSRVHV*PRUDOLW\LVLQFDSDEOHRIJLYLQJXVDQ\HYLGHQFHRI
anything external to morality,I*LVWUXHPRUDOLW\FDQ¶WJLYHDJHQWVHYLGHQFHRIDQ\WKLQJ
metaphysical. The difficulty with (G) is it is an epistemological claim that, if true, undermines 
other elements of quasi-realism Blackburn wishes to retain.  For instance, Blackburn wants to 
EHDEOHWRVD\³EHDUEHDWLQJLVZURQJEHFDXVHLWFDXVHVWKHEHDUSDLQ´0RUHRYHUKHZDQWVWR
say the above claim is correct in a way that cannot be changed by a sudden change in 
collective opinion. This is because Blackburn wants to avoid a relativist 1st order view.215 As 
noted earlier, he wants to remain a 2nd order anti-realist and 1st order objectivist 
simultaneously.  
 The quasi-realist separation of 2nd order meta-ethical explanation and 1st order moral 
meaning is what allows the 2nd order anti-realism to leave 1st order discourse unaffected.  If 
the 2nd order meta-ethical explanations are completely separate from the 1st order account, no 
amount of 2nd order anti-realism within the quasi-realist meta-ethics can change the 
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objectivism of the 1st order. However, moral objectivism is at odds with (G). If we assume (G) 
is true, it seems implausible to think morality can somehow give us evidence that particular 
PRUDOFODLPVDUHWUXHLQDQREMHFWLYLVWVHQVH$V0DFNLH¶VDUJXPHQWIURPUHODWLYLW\VKRZVLW
is difficult to explain how the diversity of intractable ethical opinion can be adequately 
accounted for by the hypothesis that certain agents just have got things wrong.216 This is 
especially true if one takes the line that morality gives us no evidence for any metaphysics or 
mind independent relationship between natural properties and moral facts. What kind of 
evidence could morality possibly give agents that the pain that bear baiting causes a bear 
PDNHVEHDUEDLWLQJZURQJ",WFDQ¶WVLPSO\EHDQLQWHUQDOL]ed aversion to causing a bear pain 
since there are agents with an internalized desire for causing a bear pain.  How can morality 
give us evidence that the agent with an aversion to giving pain has gotten things right?  
 %ODFNEXUQFDQ¶WVLPSO\VD\WKDWLWLs just obvious to anyone with good moral 
VHQVLELOLWLHVWKDWFDXVLQJSDLQWRDQRWKHUOLYLQJFUHDWXUHIRURQH¶VRZQDPXVHPHQWLVZURQJ
This is because Blackburn has not yet shown that morality gives us evidence for such a thing 
DV³JRRGVHQVLELOLWLHV´LQDQ objectivist sense. Moreover, many moral claims were considered 
obviously correct in other centuries that we now find morally abhorrent.  One of the appeals 
of moral realism is that it purports to supply morality with something that could potentially 
justify the separating of moral claims into correct and incorrect categories. In the case of non-
naturalistic moral realism, it is the non-naturalistic metaphysical properties that justify the 
differentiation.  In the case of naturalistic moral realism, it is the mind independent identity 
EHWZHHQQDWXUDOSURSHUWLHVDQGPRUDOIDFWV%XWZLWK%ODFNEXUQ¶VTXDVL-realism, there does not 
seem to be anything like this that can give agents evidence for the correctness or incorrectness 
of moral claims.  Moral Realism tries to vindicate moral practice by showing that morality 
gives us evidence that the practice of objectivist morality is justified.  It does this by 
attempting to show that there are 2nd order meta-ethical justifications of 1st order moral claims.  
Quasi-realism does not seem to be able to do this because there is no place for morality to give 
us any evidence of a meta-ethical claim which could justify any 1st order moral claims.  On 
the quasi-realist view, meta-ethical explanations and moral justification are completely 
separate. Moreover, 1st RUGHUPRUDOLW\FDQ¶WRQWKLVYLHZJLYHXVDQ\HYLGHQFHWKDWD
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particular meta-ethics is true either.  
 The importance of a 2nd order meta-ethical justification of moral objectivism should 
not be understated.  After all, the reason most sceptics of moral objectivism are sceptics is not 
because a number of their 1st order moral beliefs have come into doubt. It is not as if there are 
sceptics of objectivism because people have stopped believing that bear baiting is wrong.  
Rather, sceptics get created when people start to question how it can be true that causing pain 
has a negative value and thus is an objectively bad thing to do. This scepticism is not created 
because of any doubts about features of the world that make a moral claim correct.  It is 
created because of doubts about the moral justification of this relationship between natural 
states of affairs and objective reasons for action. The moral sceptic may have an aversion to 
bear baiting because they dislike the act of causing pain. However, the 1st order claim that this 
aversion is a morally appropriate reaction to an objective moral reason not to cause pain is one 
WKH\TXHVWLRQWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQRI7KH\GRQµWVHHst order morality as something that gives 
them evidence of the correctness of any particular 1st order claim.  They almost always require 
something outside of morality to justify morality.  They are sceptics because they believe the 
universe is bereft of the external justifier of 1st order morality that they seek. If such a thing 
were to exist and it could justify 1st order moral claims, it would obviously be a 2nd order 
meta-ethical justification.  
 At this point, it might be objected that moral sceptics just have gotten things wrong.  
By assuming that morality needs a 2nd order meta-ethical justification, they have made the 
mistake of assuming that the features which make a thing wrong depend on some 2nd order 
meta-ethical justification in order to entail the wrongness in question. It just seems obvious 
that what makes sadistic torture, for instance, wrong is the psychological and physical pain it 
causes.  To ask for anything more than that is itself to make both a meta-ethical and 1st order 
moral mistake. According to this objection, the natural features that make sadistic torture 
wrong at the 1st order are all that is needed to justify the moral wrongness of sadistic torture. 
The difficulty with this objection is it ignores the fact that the sceptic agrees that if 1st order 
morality were vindicated, the features that make sadistic torture wrong at the 1st order would 
be all that was needed to show that torture is wrong. However, the sceptic is a sceptic about 
morality precisely because the sceptic became an agnostic about the moral relationship 
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EHWZHHQWKRVHIHDWXUHVDQGµZURQJQHVV¶GHVFULEHGDWWKHst order. Because of this 
agnosticism, a 2nd order meta-ethical justification is what the sceptic sought and failed to find.  
This is how he became a sceptic. There are two important issues here for Blackburn. The first 
is whether or not it was rational for the sceptic to go into the position of agnosticism regarding 
1st order moral discourse.  The second is whether the sceptic, once in the position of 
agnosticism, was rational in thinking the vindication of morality could only be saved by a 2nd 
order meta-ethical justification.  
 :LWKUHJDUGVWRWKHILUVWLVVXHLWVHHPVWKHUHLVQRWKLQJLUUDWLRQDOLQWKHVFHSWLF¶V
agnosticism about 1st order morality. Of course, it would be easier to make the claim that there 
ZDVVRPHWKLQJLPPRUDODERXWWKHVFHSWLF¶VUHWUHDWLQWRPRUDODJQRVWLFLVP+RZHYHUZH¶GEH
hard pressed to find anything irrational about moving into such a position. It does not seem to 
be at odds with the moral interests of the sceptic to be an agnostic about morality. This 
agnosticism, in most respects, not need affect his moral behavior or sentiments in any 
substantive way.  He could even moralize about various issues in much the same way that 
Mackie did.217 Moreover, moral scepticism does not seem to be inconsistent with any 
uncontroversial natural facts about the world.  Nor is it inconsistent with any of the methods 
of the natural sciences or analytic philosophy. Such scepticism might be morally wrong (and 
,¶PKHUHOHDYLQJopen whether or not it is) but the only perspective from which moral 
scepticism seems outrageous is the 1st order moral perspective.  This is because it is a 
challenge to the commitments of that 1st order perspective. It is not necessarily a challenge to 
the behaviour or sentiments that one who endorses the 1st order perspective might exhibit.  
 With regards to the second issue, it seems perfectly rational, if one is a sceptic about 
morality, to think that 1st order moral discourse could be vindicated by a 2nd order meta-ethical 
claim.  This is because, once in the agnostic position, it really is the only option on the table. 
If any metaphysical or epistemological claim could vindicate 1st order moral discourse, that 
claim would itself become a 2nd order meta-ethical claim.  There does not seem to be any way 
that an empirical claim could vindicate 1st order moral discourse.  If one were to try and 
vindicate 1st order moral discourse using an empirical claim, one might point towards the 
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uniformity of moral practices or intuitions in humans. However, this purported uniformity 
could be compatible with lots of error theories that undermine the vindication of 1st order 
morality.  The only claims that would be incompatible with such error theories are moral 
realist metaphysical or epistemological claims.  Being such that they are moral realist, they 
would be 2nd order meta-ethical claims.  
 Since it seems perfectly rational to be both a sceptic about morality and to think 1st 
order discourse could only be vindicated by 2nd order meta-ethical claims, this shows that it is 
not irrational to think 1st order morality requires 2nd order meta-ethical justification in order to 
be vindicated.  Since it is not irrational, we can ask, what other reasons might there be for 
thinking that 1st order morality does not require 2nd order meta-ethical justification? The only 
answers left come in two varieties.  The first variety is the 1st order moral answer.  This goes 
something along the OLQHVRI³&RUUHFWst order moral claims do not morally require 2nd order 
meta-HWKLFDOMXVWLILFDWLRQVLQRUGHUWREHFRUUHFW´7KHVHFRQGYDULHW\RIDQVZHUFRPHVLQWKH
IRUPRIDQH[SODQDWLRQ7KLVH[SODQDWLRQJRHVVRPHWKLQJDORQJWKHOLQHVRI³,WLVDfact about 
competent moral practice such that a competent practitioner internalizes sentiments which 
stop him from requiring 2nd order justifications for 1st RUGHUPRUDOFODLPV´ 
 The 1st order moral answer blatantly begs the question. This is because one FDQ¶WXVH
1st order discourse to legitimize 1st order discourse if one is trying to persuade someone who 
does not already accept the legitimacy of 1st order discourse.  The second explanatory answer 
does not beg the question, but if given by a quasi-realist, is entirely unpersuasive.  Just what 
reasons are there, apart from moral reasons, to believe this explanation? It does not seem like 
there are any. Moreover, the moral reason is itself at odds with many aspects of moral 
practice. Human beings, since the dawn of human civilization, have routinely flirted with 
moral scepticism. One could argue that meta-ethics and philosophy itself are products of the 
attempt to deal with this scepticism. Most moral sceptics are not sociopaths. They retain most 
of their moral sentiments prior to the scepticism and behave in a manner that reflects the same 
moral character they had prior to the scepticism. If 1st order moral practice were not in need of 
2nd order justification, how could this scepticism, in mostly normal moral agents, be possible? 
 If it really were the case that 1st order moral discourse was in no need of any 2nd order 
justification, it seems unlikely that moral scepticism would have struck normal moral agents. 
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Moreover, if it did strike them, it would likely have done so without being so widespread and 
with a much smaller impact on moral philosophy. Moreover, moral scepticism would have 
most likely been interpreted as a moral failure rather than the form of intellectual questioning 
it has been characterized as throughout the years. Additionally, the fact that quasi-realism is 
such a recent position on the philosophical scene suggests the view that 1st order moral 
discourse needs no 2nd order justification is not the most plausible position for most moral 
agents. For two thousand years, moral philosophers generally assumed that ethics was not a 
practice whereby accounts of 1st order morality and 2nd order explanations of it could 
completely come apart. This is why noncognitivism started out as a revisionist meta-ethics 
and its non-revisionist versions came on the scene relatively late.218  
Perhaps at this point, Blackburn might respond that 2nd order moral claims, by their 
very nature, are not the sort of thing that gives us evidence for 1st order moral claims. Rather, 
1st order morality is just a practice that, by its very nature, assumes certain things as a given.  
2QHRIWKHWKLQJVLWDVVXPHVLVFDXVLQJDQRWKHUOLYLQJWKLQJSDLQIRURQH¶VRZQDPXVHPHQWLV
just incompatible with the requirements of morality. One can draw an analogy here between 
the practice of 1st order morality and the practice of playing chess. It is not the case that chess 
gives us evidence that a bishop ought to move along the diagonal spaces of the board.  Rather, 
chess is just the sort of game that, if one wishes to play it, one must move the bishop along 
diagonal spaces on the board. Blackburn could say the same about morality. Insofar as one 
engages in the practice of morality, one must take for granted that causing another living 
FUHDWXUHSDLQIRURQH¶VRZQDPXVHPHQWLVMXVWEDG+HQFHLQVRIDUDVRQHHQJDJHVLQWKH
practice of morality, one must assume the 1st order is vindicated.  
 The problem with this rejoinder is that it ignores the fact that internal to the practice 
of morality, there is a glaring disanalogy between morality and chess. This disanalogy consists 
in the fact that morality is categorical.  It is not the case that one ought to accept that causing 
DQRWKHUOLYLQJWKLQJSDLQIRURQH¶VRZQDPXVHPHQWLVEDd if one wishes to practice morality. 
Rather, one ought to accept this whether or not one wishes to practice morality. Moreover, one 
should practice morality regardless of whether one wishes to. Unlike chess, morality 
prescribes that one ought to both follow every rule of morality and choose to engage in the 
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practice unconditionally. This raises the following problem: How can this categorical 
prescriptivity be a reason for us to heed the demands of morality if moral objectivism is given 
no 2nd order defense?  
 If the answer is just that it is in the long-term interests of all humans to do so, this 
DQVZHUFDQRQO\JDLQSODXVLELOLW\RQFHDVSHFLILFPRUDOLW\LVGHIHQGHGDV³7+(025$/,7<´
WKDWLVLQHYHU\RQH¶VLQWHUHVWV´ The difficulty is that with all the varieties of moral systems to 
choose from, there does not seem to be any criteria with which we can identify the long-term 
interests of absolutely everyone. If we crafted a moral system for everyone based on cultural 
norms every human society could agree with, we wind up with a morality that looks too thin. 
After all, slavery, forced marriages, incest, and authoritarian politics are practiced all 
throughout the world.  We would have to come up with a morality that does not exclude such 
practices from moral acceptability.  But this is hardly what an anti-realist moral objectivist has 
in mind when defending the idea that there is a single morality that is in the long-term 
interests of everyone. 
 Anti-realists objectivists usually mean something subtler than this. What they mean 
is that there are basic moral sentiments in all cultures that are inconsistent with practices such 
as slavery or authoritarian politics.  According to this line of thought, the existence of such 
practices as slavery or authoritarian politics in certain societies just shows that these societies 
are being inconsistent with their own moral sentiments.  If such societies could see the 
implications of their moral sentiments, they would realize that practices such as slavery or 
authoritarian politics are at odds with those sentiments. The problem with this line of thought 
is it assumes that the society would identify their moral sentiments with their interests rather 
than their traditions and current political practices.  There is always a chance particular 
societies may modify their moral sentiments to coincide with their traditions and practices 
rather than the other way around. Such societies could claim that their traditions and practices 
represent their interests more than the moral sentiments they may possess which clash with 
those traditions and practices.   
 This is the difficulty with justifying moral objectivism on the basis of the self-interest 
of all humans.  Self-interest, unlike moral objectivism, has a degree of flexibility that moral 
claims on an objectivist framework do not.  John and Mary can both have an internalized 
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moral sentiment that makes them predisposed towards liberal democratic societies. However, 
OHW¶VVD\ERWKRIWKHPILQGWKHPVHOYHVLQDOLEHUDOGHPRFUDWLFVRFLHW\WKDWEHcomes an 
authoritarian one.  Mary finds the political situation intolerable because of the social and 
political freedoms that the new government restricts. John initially agrees with her but then 
begins to change his opinion after observing the remarkable drop in crime levels. The 
defender of universal self-interest, here, would like to say that John is simply ignoring his own 
moral sentiments (which are in his interests) and supporting a position that is at odds with 
those sentiments (which is not in his interests). The difficulty is that John, upon recognizing 
the inconsistency, can simply stop valuing his anti-authoritarian moral sentiments because he 
comes to realize the benefits of living in an authoritarian society.  
 On what basis can the anti-realist REMHFWLYLVWVD\WKDWLWLVLQ-RKQ¶VORQJ-term interest 
not to do this? Here the anti-realist objectivist might say that John should be appalled at an 
authoritarian government because that very government could some day punish him for 
violating one of its unjust laws. John could respond that the crime decrease in his society 
MXVWLILHVWKHUHJLPH¶VDXWKRULWDULDQODZVDQGWKDWLIKHZHUHWREHIRXQGJXLOW\IRUYLRODWLQJ
them, he would gladly be punished by his government. On what basis could the objectivist 
respond that John is still failing to satisfy his own interests? It does not seem that there is 
much the objectivist could say here apart from the fact that John is just badly mistaken in his 
valuations of freedom vs. lower crime rates. But to say that John is wrong in his valuations is 
just to assert moral objectivism, not defend it. 
 The problem here is that for any moral sentiments John has, John can always modify 
them in light of his new experiences.  He may initially be a democrat but after being 
dissatisfied with the levels of crime in his society, switch his allegiances to an authoritarian 
IRUPRIJRYHUQPHQW+HFDQVD\³,XQGHUVWDQGZK\SHRSOHYDOXHIUHHVRFLHWLHVDQGRSSRVH
authoritarian ones.  But people value freedom so highly that they will tolerate unacceptable 
levels of social decay in order to preserve it. Experiencing the crime of a liberal society has 
made me see that no amount of freedom can compensate for living in a society with crime 
levels like those in a liberal democratic society.  Therefore, I am willing to accept whatever 
drawbacks that come from living in a low-FULPHDXWKRULWDULDQVRFLHW\´:HFDQ¶WVD\WKDW
-RKQ¶VH[WUHPHO\KLJKYDOXLQJRIORZFULPHLVDWRGGVZLWKKLVLQWHUHVWV+HLVLQWHUHVWHGLQ
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living in a low crime society and will accept authoritarian measures to get that. What we can 
say is that his experiences have caused his interests to change.  Whether or not this change 
was a mistake is not something interest talk alone can settle.  
 The non-naturalistic moral realist in this situation can make recourse to the fact that 
there are non-natural moral facts that John is not sufficiently tracking. The naturalistic moral 
realist can talk about how John fails to track the natural facts in the world that constitute the 
relevant moral facts. The anti-realist objectivist can say neither of these things. As we have 
seen, appeals to universal self-LQWHUHVWZRQ¶WKHOSHLWKHU$OOWKHDQWL-realist can say, at this 
point, is that morality just is the practice whereby agents value the freedoms of a liberal 
society more than low crime.  We know when the anti-realist asserts this that he affirms a 
morality whereby the freedoms of a liberal society are more valuable than low crime rates.  
Yet there are plenty of moral agents living in the wRUOGZKRGRQ¶W7KHUHGRHVQRWVHHPWREH
any 2nd order basis on which the anti-UHDOLVWFDQVD\WKDWKLVPRUDOVFRLQFLGHZLWK³7+(
025$/,7<´WKDWLVLQHYHU\RQH¶VLQWHUHVWV 
 The anti-realist might say here that it is only agents with sufficiently working, 
SURSHUO\LQWHUQDOL]HGPRUDOVHQWLPHQWVWKDW³7+(025$/,7<´LVLQWKHLQWHUHVWVRI%XWWKLV
begs the question against moral relativists. It assumes that objectivists rather than relativists 
are agents with sufficiently working, properly internalized moral sentiments. This of course, 
may be true.  Yet in order to be taken seriously, there must be evidence given in favor of this 
claim.  If one is an anti-UHDOLVWWKLVHYLGHQFHFDQ¶WFRPHIURPLQVLGHWKHSUDFWLFHRIPRUDOLW\
because the objectivist and relativist will have a different 1st order moral point of view.  On 
WKHRWKHUKDQGWKHHYLGHQFHFDQ¶WFRPHIURPDnd order moral metaphysics because on an 
anti-UHDOLVWYLHZWKHUHLVQRVXFKPHWDSK\VLFV,WDOVRFDQ¶WFRPHIURPDnd order view about 
the identity relation between natural properties and moral facts. The only possible source of 
evidence, which could favor objectivism for an anti-realist, is empirical evidence.  
 (PSLULFDOHYLGHQFHDORQHZRQ¶WGRDQ\JRRGEHFDXVHDFXUVRU\H[DPLQDWLRQRIWKH
empirical evidence regarding the practice of morality will bear out a multiplicity of different 
moral practices.  It might be that these different practices are just variations on the same 
practice.  However, in order to justify that such variations are all variations on objectivism, we 
would have to isolate some feature, which is common to all moral practices, that seems to 
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imply objectivism.  This would raise a further difficulty.  On what basis could we take this 
feature as central to morality rather than just the actual 1st order views people hold? To give 
an example, suppose that a correctness condition of the consistency of all moral claims is that 
moral objectivism is true.  Now suppose that all liberal Europeans are avowed non-
objectivists. Suppose that they admit that there is a correctness condition of the consistency of 
PRUDOFODLPVWKDWLPSOLHVPRUDOREMHFWLYLVP%XWOHW¶VLPDJLQHWKH\VD\WKDWWKHLUQRQ-
objectivism is more central to morality than the correctness conditions that their moral claims 
UHTXLUHLQRUGHUWREHFRQVLVWHQW/HW¶VDOVRVXSSRVHWKDWWKH\KDYHSURYLGHGDFRPSHOOLQJFDVH
to many non-Europeans and European conservatives who are becoming increasingly 
sympathetic with non-REMHFWLYLVP/HW¶VLPDJLQHWKDWWKHUHLVDUHDOSRVVLELOLW\WKDWLQWKHQH[W
30 years or so, the persuasive case made by the liberal Europeans could result in the majority 
of the world affirming non-objectivism. 
 /HW¶VVWLSXODWHWKDWLQWKLVVLWXDWLRQWKHPDMRULW\RI$IULFDQFRQVHUYDWLYHVDUH
objectivists. They believe that the objectivism implied by the correctness conditions of moral 
claims is central WRPRUDOLW\/HW¶VDVVXPHWKDWOLNHWKHOLEHUDO(XURSHDQVthey are providing 
a compelling case to the world for moral objectivism.  Many members of different nations and 
political affiliations are becoming sympathetic with moral objectivism.  It is a real possibility 
that in the next 30 years or so, the persuasive case made by the African conservatives could 
result in the majority of the world affirming moral objectivism.  How do we decide who is 
FRUUHFWKHUH"7KHSUREOHPIRU%ODFNEXUQLVKRZHYHUZHPDNHWKHGHFLVLRQFDQ¶WEH
determined by empirical evidence aloQH7KLVLVEHFDXVHWKHFODLP³PRUDOREMHFWLYLVPLV
central WRPRUDOLW\´LVDFODLPWKDWFDQ¶WEHGHWHUPLQHGE\HPSLULFDOHYLGHQFH,IZHDVVXPH
the claim is true, there is no way of guaranteeing that the majority of humans will practice 
morality as though the claim is true.  Hence, the truth or falsity of the claim is something that 
can only be demonstrated on moral grounds alone.  
 As we can see, quasi-realism does not support moral objectivism against sceptical 
challenges because quasi-realism is a form of anti-realism. Anti-realist meta-ethics have no 
basis on which to assert moral objectivism except on 1st order explanatory grounds.  Such 
JURXQGVFDQ¶WEHMXVWLILHGIURPDSHUVSHFWLYHWKDWLVQRWDOUHDG\DIILUPDWLYHDERXWWKHYDOLGLW\
of 1st order moral discourse. As we have seen, it is not irrational to be a moral sceptic. 
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Moreover, talk of self-LQWHUHVWRUHPSLULFDOREVHUYDWLRQVRIPRUDODJUHHPHQWDOVRFDQ¶WMXVWLI\
moral objectivism if one is an anti-realist.  If a moral sceptic is doubting 1st order moral 
claims, all that is left to persuade is 2nd order moral claims. Such claims are, by definition, 
meta-ethical claims.  
4.13 CONCLUSION  
As we have seen, the main considerations Blackburn gives in favor of quasi-realism 
assume either (G), (H), (I) or (-)RU%ODFNEXUQ¶VDUJXPHQWVWRKDYHDQ\IRUFHLQVXSSRUWLQJ
quasi-realism, he must offer supplementary arguments in favor of (G), (H), (I), or (J).  As we 
have also seen, quasi-realism does not support moral objectivism because it is a variety of 
moral anti-UHDOLVP*LYHQWKHVHH[WUDYDJDQWSUREOHPVZLWK%ODFNEXUQ¶VTXDVL-realism, it 
seems initially bizarre that such a theory could even be taken seriously by a good number of 
meta-ethicists.  However, it is not so difficult to understand once we see that the theory begs 
the question by relying on some of the dominant assumptions of 20th century analytic 
philosophy.  (G), (H), (I), and (J) have become so prevalent in philosophy that some aspects of 
them seem to have filtered down into popular culture.  Many people, for instance, hold that 
(G), (H), and (I) are what is now considered part of the collective common sense of educated, 
non-religious persons in the West. As we have seen, the difficulty with simply relying on 
these assumptions to justify a meta-ethics theory is that many contemporary meta-ethics 
WKHRULHVLPSO\WKHGHQLDORIWKHVHDVVXPSWLRQV7RUHO\RQWKHPWRMXVWLI\RQH¶VPHWD-ethics 
(rather than defend them) is analogous to a philosopher of religion who relies on the 
plausibility of theism to argue against an atheist account of apparent design in the universe.  
 At this point, the reader may still think that there is something slightly funny about 
the inability of contemporary meta-ethicists to see that quasi-realism defends itself by relying 
on assumptions that are called into question by the variety of meta-ethics positions taken 
seriously. Here, another observation about the nature of analytic philosophy may be of some 
help. Analytic philosophers, as is well known, typically think of themselves as engaging in a 
form of knowledge inquiry that aligns itself more with the natural sciences than the 
humanities. One of the hallmarks of the natural sciences is an attempt at rigorously generating 
knowledge about a given phenomena in a way which is free from personal bias. Within the 
QDWXUDOVFLHQFHVSHUVRQDOELDVLVQRUPDOO\WKRXJKWWRLQFOXGHRQH¶VPRUDORUSROLWLFDO
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commitments. The underlying assumption here seems to be that the world in it itself is neutral 
with regards the ethical and political commitments of the human beings who study it. This is 
why even those natural sciences that study morality (i.e evolutionary psychology) never use 
the truth of moral claims as an explanans.219  
 Yet positions in meta-ethics such as moral realism are, when understood properly, a 
challenge to constraints on explanations within the natural sciences. Since this is the case, one 
would think analytic meta-ethicists would do one of two things: They would either admit that 
plausible ethics theories call into question the dominant assumptions of the natural sciences or 
stop taking moral realist theories seriously because they call into question the dominant 
assumptions of the natural sciences.  To take the first option is to allow analytic philosophy a 
critical distance from the natural sciences that enables analytic philosophy to occasionally 
challenge the claims of the natural sciences.  If we employ this strategy, it seems we have to 
question the popular dogma that the success of the natural sciences either verifies or makes 
reasonable the assertion that all of the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences are 
correct.  If we take the second option we must assume that analytic philosophy is a discipline 
that presupposes, rather than engages with claims made by the natural sciences. Moreover, 
there will be no need to defend moral anti-realism since anti-realism will just become a 
presupposition of all meta-ethics. Insofar as anti-realist accounts will be discussed in meta-
ethics debates at all, the discussions will centre on which versions of anti-realism are the most 
plausible.   
 What has happened in reality is an awkward attempt at having things both ways: 
Moral anti-realism is defended as a more attractive rival account of ethics than both 
naturalistic and non-naturalistic moral realism. Meta-ethicists try to refrain from embracing 
any theory that challenges the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences. On the 
other hand, versions of moral realism are taken seriously in debates about what constitutes the 
most plausible meta-ethical theory. The combination of these two practices creates a strange 
situation: One the one hand, moral realism is seen as a plausible contender for an adequate 
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account of morality.  On the other hand, moral realism is seen as more theoretically attractive 
insofar as the account says nothing that could conflict with the methodological assumptions of 
the natural sciences. This creates a bias in favor of dismissing the aspects of moral realism 
that conflict with the assumptions of the natural sciences. On the other hand, moral realism is 
motivated by the attempt to create a theory that most comprehensively matches our moral 
commitments.  It is these very commitments that are overt threats to the methodological 
assumptions of the natural sciences.  
              5. DWORKIN, DREIER, EHRENBERG, AND ARCHIMEDEANISM 
              5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 ,QFKDSWHUIRXU,ZLOOH[DPLQH5RQDOG'ZRUNLQ¶VREMHFWLRQWRWKHFODLPWKDWPRUDO
practice can commit us to meta-ethical claims that imply moral realism or moral anti-realism.  
According to Dworkin, there are no 2nd order moral claims which can validate or undermine 
1st order moral claims. This is because, for Dworkin, most of the purportedly 2nd order moral 
claims are actually a set of 1st order moral claims.220 The remaining 2nd order moral claims 
which can validate or undermine 1st order moral claims are implausible.221 2Q'ZRUNLQ¶V
view, there are no moral commitments to meta-ethical claims that could validate or undermine 
moral realism or anti-realism. This is because there simply are no 2nd order moral claims 
which could validate or undermine 1st order moral claims. If there are no such 2nd order moral 
claims, a debate between moral realists and anti-realists is, most of the time, a debate 
happening at the 1st order level of moral discourse. The only exceptions to this are when the 
participants of such a debate trade in implausible 2nd order claims.  
 'ZRUNLQXVHVWKHWHUP³DUFKLPHGHDQ´WRGHQRWHWKHVHWRInd order moral claims that 
can be used to validate or undermine moral realist or moral anti-realist views.  He believes 
such claims are either 1st order moral claims that are mistaken for 2nd order moral claims or 
they are implausible 2nd order claims. By implausible moral claims, Dworkin means claims it 
is implausible to make or attribute to ordinary moralisers.222 Dworkin then criticizes three 
theories he takes to be archimedean. They are secondary quality theory, expressivism, and 
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quasi-realism. He criticizes each theory for making 1st order moral claims the theory 
mistakenly identifies as 2nd order moral claims. Dworkin criticizes secondary quality theory 
for implying counterfactual claims that are morally non-neutral 1st order moral claims.223 He 
next criticizes expressivism for denying plausible 1st order moral claims in the name of 
revising our explanations of 2nd order claims in order to make such claims more plausible.224 
He finally criticizes quasi-realism for denying 1st order moral claims that the quasi-realist 
mistakes for 2nd order moral claims.225  
 'ZRUNLQ¶VDLPLVWRVKRZWKDWDOOJRRGPHWD-ethical theories are non-archimedean 
theories.226 This leaves the meta-ethicist with no room to discuss moral realism or moral anti-
realism. Without archimedean claims, meta-ethics cannot make judgments that are external to 
1st order moral practice which validate or undermine 1st order moral claims. All validating or 
undermining of 1st order claims must be done from the 1st order perspective.  Hence, if 
'ZRUNLQ¶VYLHZLVFRUUHFWWKHUHFDQEHQRnd order claim that validates or undermines any 
particular moral claim.  All a 2nd order claim could do is articulate meta-ethical issues relating 
WRWKHFODLP³0XUGHULVZURQJ´WKDWKDYHQREHDULQJRQZKHWKHUWKHFODLPLVYDOLGDWHGRU
undermined.   
  In section one, ,ZLOOSUHVHQW'ZRUNLQ¶VDUJXPHQWV,QVHFWLRQWZR,ZLOOFULWLFL]HKLV
arguments on the basis that they are inconsistent. Dworkin relies on 2nd order moral claims 
that are used to validate or undermine moral realist and anti-realist theories. This is the very 
set of claims his arguments purport to show do not exist. In section 3, I will analyze objections 
WR'ZRUNLQ¶VDUJXPHQWVJLYHQE\-DPLH'UHLHU,QVHFWLRQIRXU,ZLOOVXPPDUL]H'UHLHU¶V
REMHFWLRQVWR'ZRUNLQ¶VDUJXPHQWV'UHLHUREMHFWV WR'ZRUNLQ¶VGHIHQVHRIDQWL-
archimedeanism by attempting to show that some 2nd order moral claims can be morally non-
committing.  Dreier attempts to show that some 2nd order moral claims that are morally non-
committing are non-preposterous 2nd order moral claims. Moreover, Dreier thinks these 2nd 
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order moral claims could be used to validate or undermine moral realist or anti-realist 
positions. Dreier believes that if any 2nd order moral claims are morally non-committing, there 
is no reason to interpret them as 1st order claims. This is true, according to Dreier, even if 
those 2nd order moral claims have moral implications.   
 Kenneth Ehrenberg, by contrast, throws a very different set of criticisms at Dworkin.  
In section four, I will summarize these criticisms. Ehrenberg maintains that Dworkin has 
failed to discredit the 2nd order perspective from which the meta-ethicist discussing the merits 
of moral realism or anti-realism makes his claims. Ehrenberg accuses Dworkin of failing to 
give persuasive reasons for the interpretation of a set of 2nd order moral claims as a set of 1st 
RUGHUPRUDOFODLPV(KUHQEHUJOLNH'UHLHUWDNHVLVVXHZLWK'ZRUNLQ¶VDWWHPSWVWRVKRZWKDW
non-preposterous 2nd order moral claims used to justify moral realism or anti-realism are 
actually 1st order moral claims. This is because Dworkin, according to Ehrenberg, has failed to 
give good reasons for showing that such claims are morally non-neutral. Ehrenberg also 
FULWLFL]HV'ZRUNLQ¶VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWQRQ-preposterous debates regarding moral realism and 
anti-realism do not deal with issues which are above and beyond those issues dealt with in 1st 
order moral discourse. Ehrenberg gives counter-examples that he believes demonstrate that 
there are metaphysical issues dealt with during non-preposterous debates over whether 
particular versions of moral realism or moral anti-realism are true. These issues, he contends, 
are distinct from anything discussed at the 1st order.  
 ,QVHFWLRQILYH,ZLOOVKRZWKDWERWK'UHLHUDQG(KUHQEHUJ¶VDWWacks on Dworkin fail 
to hit their targets.  This is because both Dreier and Ehrenberg assume some component of 
moral archimedeanism.  These components are related to the traditional characterization of the 
1st and 2nd order distinction assumed by moral archimedeans. Dreier assumes that meta-ethical 
standards about how one ought to evaluate moral standards are not themselves moral 
standards.  He also fails to see that one of his own versions of morally non-committing 
secondary quality theory is actually a theory there are moral reasons not to hold. Moreover, 
these moral reasons are simultaneously 2nd order meta-HWKLFDOFODLPV(KUHQEHUJ¶VFULWLFLVPV
of Dworkin all uniformly fail because Ehrenberg assumes the falsity of the claim that there 
can be 2nd order moral commitments.  At the end of chapter four, I will explain how Dworkin, 
Dreier, and Ehrenberg either fail to attack archimedeanism or fail to defend it because they 
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presuppose components of it.  I will then suggest what might perhaps motivate them to accept 
these components in such a strong way.  
 An important preliminary issue to clarify is the way the 1st order moral claim and 2nd 
order claim definitions will be handled. When I discuss the 1st and 2nd order moral claim 
distinction, I will not be referring to the distinction between moral and non-moral claims.  
6LQFHWKDWGLVWLQFWLRQLVSDUWO\WKHWDUJHWRI'ZRUNLQ¶VDUJXPHQWV,ZLOOEHGLVWLQJXLVKLQJst 
and 2nd order moral claims throughout this chapter in a different way. 1st order moral claims I 
will presuppose are moral claims that are internal to the practice of morality. 2nd order moral 
claims I will presuppose are meta-ethical claims about 1st order moral claims. To say that a 
claim is a meta-ethical claim about 1st order claims is to say that the claim illuminates either 
implications or presuppositions of the 1st order claim.  These implications or presuppositions 
have a non-moral component.  
 An example of such a 2nd RUGHUPRUDOFODLPPLJKWEH³7KHst RUGHUFODLPµ,WLV
wrong to torture childrHQ¶SUHVXSSRVHVWKHH[LVWHQFHRIPLQGLQGHSHQGHQWQRQ-natural moral 
SURSHUWLHV´7KLVFODLPLVDQH[DPSOHRIDnd order moral claim because it is a claim about the 
1st RUGHUPRUDOFODLP³,WLVZURQJWRWRUWXUHFKLOGUHQ´0RUHRYHULWLVDOVRDFODLPWKDW 
LPSOLHVWKDWDSUHVXSSRVLWLRQRIWKHFODLP³,WLVZURQJWRWRUWXUHFKLOGUHQ´KDVDQRQ-moral 
component.  The non-moral component would be the fact that the 1st order claim presupposes 
the existence of mind-independent non-natural properties. The moral component would be the 
moral nature of the mind independent non-natural properties.   
 As a matter of definitions, I will remain agnostic about whether 2nd order claims are 
also moral, since that is one of the topics at issue in this discussion. Also, when I refer to 
moral commitments, it should be reminded that I am referring to any claims we must affirm or 
presuppose in virtue of engaging adequately in moral practice. I am leaving it open in my 
definition of moral commitments whether moral commitments must be 1st order moral claims 
or whether they can be both 1st order and 2nd order moral claims.  
':25.,1¶6$17,-ARCHIMEDEANISM 
͒ Ronald Dworkin attacks a position he describes as moral archimedeanism. According 
to Dworkin, archimedeanism is a class of theories that purport to stand outside a whole body 
of belief and judge it as a whole from premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it. Moral 
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archimedeanism refers to the class of views that purport to stand outside a body of moral 
beliefs and judge it as a whole from premises or attitudes that owe nothing to it. Dworkin 
develops a lengthy attack on moral archimedeanism on the grounds that any successful, 
intelligible argument that moral propositions are either true or false must be internal to the 
moral domain rather than archimedean about it.227 This means, for instance, that an 
archimedean theory that makes the claim that there is no right or wrong answer to the question 
of whether abortion is wrong is making a moral claim. Furthermore, such a claim is a claim 
that should be judged and evaluated no differently than any other moral claim.  
 ,WLVSODLQWRVHHWKDW'ZRUNLQXVHVWKHWHUPµDUFKLPHGHDQLVP¶WRUHIHU to meta-ethical 
theories that are either moral realist or moral anti-realist.  This is because these are the only 
meta-ethical theories that purport to stand outside a body of moral beliefs while 
simultaneously judging those beliefs as true or false. Even those meta-ethical theories that 
conclude that moral judgments are neither true nor false normally start from a perspective that 
purports to judge moral beliefs from a theoretical perspective that is external to 1st order moral 
practice.228 In his arguments against archimedeanism, Dworkin directly attacks archimedean 
theories that he believes are sceptical about 1st order morality. He contends that any sceptical 
theory of morality can only be sceptical from within the practice of 1st order morality. This is 
because Dworkin believes it is not philosophically tenable to make claims from outside of 1st 
order moral practice that either validate or undermine 1st order moral claims.  
This is a criticism of archimedean scepticism that applies just as much to moral 
realist archimedean theories as it does to moral anti-UHDOLVWWKHRULHV$IWHUDOOLI'ZRUNLQ¶V
thesis is correct, it is just as untenable to validate 1st order moral claims from a perspective 
outside of morality as it is to undermine them. Hence, it is best to interpret Dworkin as 
offering a critique of all forms of archimedeanism, rather than just a critique of sceptical 
varieties of archimedeanism. Dworkin begins his attack by challenging the traditional 
distinction between 1st and 2nd order moral claims. This challenge begins with a criticism of 
what Dworkin calls internal morally sceptical and external morally sceptical positions. For 
                                                        
227
 Ibid., 87-139 
228
 Moral Realism, as well as anti-realism, are both attempts to potentially validate or potentially 
undermine (in the case of some anti-realist theories) moral commitments.  
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Dworkin, an internally sceptical position denies some group of familiar positive moral claims 
and justifies that denial by endorsing a different positive moral claim. Dworkin gives as an 
example of an internally sceptical position, the view that many liberals have about 
conventional sexual morality. Such liberals believe that sexual acts are not inherently good or 
bad or right or wrong. However, they believe this because they are presupposing that suffering 
is the only thing that is inherently bad, and they doubt that either heterosexual or homosexual 
acts promote suffering.229 This is an example of an internal morally sceptical view that rests 
on a counterfactual moral claim. It is a counterfactual claim because it claims that certain 
conditions, which it presupposes would support positive moral ascriptions if they did hold, do 
not hold. Additionally, Dworkin claims that internal morally sceptical views have direct 
implications for action. Dworkin believes that this is normally how internal morally sceptical 
views are differentiated from external morally sceptical views.230 External morally sceptical 
views are typically portrayed as morally neutral insofar as they, unlike internal morally 
sceptical views, do not take sides in moral controversies. Additionally, external morally 
sceptical views are supposedly austere, in the sense that they do not rely on other moral 
claims. External morally sceptical views are a subset of archimedean views since they are 
used in the defence of various forms of moral anti-UHDOLVP'ZRUNLQ¶VVWUDWHJ\KHUHLVWRGHQ\
external morally sceptical views by denying an archimedean characterisation of a meta-ethical 
distinction external morally sceptical views rely on. ͒ 
This distinction is what Dworkin refers to as the distinction between I and E 
propositions.231 Dworkin claims that archimedeans distinguish E propositions from I 
propositions by claiming that I propositions are 1st order moral propositions internal to the 
practice of moralising and E propositions are 2nd order metaphysical statements about I 
propositions. This distinction should not be mistaken for one that corresponds roughly to the 
traditional distinction between meta-ethical propositions (E propositions) and normative ethics 
propositions (I propositions). Archimedean claims are not identical to meta-ethical claims 
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because not all meta-ethical claims deal with the possible metaphysical commitments of moral 
claims.232 Some meta-ethical claims deal with issues of meaning, psychology or epistemology.  
Archimedean claims do not deal with these non-metaphysical issues that meta-ethical claims 
often do. I am taking it for granted here that E propositions consist entirely of 2nd order 
metaphysical statements about normative ethics propositions (I propositions).   
 Dworkin believes archimedeans mistakenly characterize the distinction between E 
and I propositions in a way that allows them to claim that E propositions are morally neutral 
and austere. According to Dworkin, archimedeans believe that insofar as they are asserting E 
propositions, they can claim moral neutrality. They claim austerity because they purport to 
rely on non-moral premises to support their views. Dworkin illustrates what he believes is the 
PLVWDNHQFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRIWKLVGLVWLQFWLRQE\ORRNLQJDW5LFKDUG5RUW\¶VGHVFULSWLRQRI
PRUDODUFKLPHGHDQVDVEHLQJLQDVWDWHRIµLURQ\¶233 By µLURQ\¶5RUW\PHDQVWKDW
archimedeans believe that they have the capacity to have their moral convictions in one sense 
and lose them in another sense. Specifically, he means that archimedeans believe they have 
the capacity to have their moral convictions in a 1st order sense but not in a 2nd order sense. 
This belief is what Dworkin wants to attack. He wants to show that if we were to adequately 
characterize the distinction between I and E propositions, archimedeans could not claim moral 
neutrality.  Most of the time, they could not claim austerity either. In order to show this, 
Dworkin devises an interesting strategy.  
 He believes he can show 1. All plausible E propositions can be plausibly interpreted 
as I propositions and 2. There can be no interpretations or translations of any plausible claims 
such that those claims wind up being best interpreted or translated as E propositions.234 In 
order to show 1, Dworkin contends that it is possible to interpret plausible  E propositions as 
either clarifying, emphasizing, elaborating or metaphorically restating I propositions.235 In 
order to show 2, Dworkin contends that the range of meta-ethical statements typically thought 
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to be E propositions, are philosophically problematic in some way unless interpreted as I 
propositions. Dworkin believes that the truth of 1 and 2 show that archimedean moral theories 
are philosophically bankrupt.236 Moreover, any moral theory that asserts E propositions will 
be philosophically bankrupt until such E propositions are either eliminated or understood as I 
propositions. ͒It is here that it should be noted that Dworkin is advocating a thesis that is not a 
meta-ethical minimalism about moral truths. Crispin Wright, perhaps the most famous 
proponent of minimalism about truth, has argued that the concept of truth is that which is 
IL[HGE\WKHGLVTXRWDWLRQDOVFKHPD³3LVWUXHLIDQGRQO\LI3´237 This is minimalism precisely 
because the disquotational schema exhausts all that can be said about what it is for a 
proposition to be true.238 This concept is what Wright refers to as minimal truth. It looks 
superficially as though Dworkin is advocating the claim that a moral claim X is true if and 
only if X.239 After all, Dworkin seems to be denying many of the meta-ethical explanations 
philosophers traditionally use to elucidate what it means for a moral claim to be true. His anti-
archimedeanism has no place in it for affirmations or denials of moral realism or moral anti-
realism. There is also no room for a 2nd order moral claim to validate or undermine any 1st 
order moral claim.  Like a minimalist meta-HWKLFV'ZRUNLQ¶VYLHZVEORFNPDQ\RIWKH
traditional questions about the ontology of a moral claim.240 
 +RZHYHU'ZRUNLQ¶VYLHZVDUHQRWPLQLPDOLVWEHFDXVHWKHUHLVURRPRQ'ZRUNLQ¶V
views for meta-ethical GLVFXVVLRQV7KLVLVEHFDXVHWKHUHLVURRPRQ'ZRUNLQ¶VYLHZVIRUnd 
order meta-ethical claims.  These meta-ethical claims, however, cannot be archimedean 
claims.  In other words, they cannot be claims which are made from a 2nd order perspective 
which validate or undermine 1st order moral claims. However, we can assume there are plenty 
of semantic, psychological, and epistemological meta-ethical claims which do not validate or 
undermine 1st order moral claims. Moreover, there are plenty of meta-ethical claims that GRQ¶W
justify or deny particular moral realist or moral anti-UHDOLVWWKHRULHV:KDW'ZRUNLQ¶VYLHZV
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are consistent with is a meta-ethics where there is no place for discussions of what moral 
realist or moral anti-realist theories are true. This is because, for Dworkin, all the plausible 
moral claims that have the capacity to validate or undermine other 1st order moral claims are 
themselves, 1st order claims.  
 As we saw earlier, all plausible moral claims, whether affirmed at the 1st or 2nd 
order, wind up being I propositions for Dworkin. Hence, all philosophically plausible moral 
claims, for Dworkin, are morally non-neutral. In his defense of 1, Dworkin considers 
supposed E propositions made in a conversation where a proponent of the view that abortion 
is wrong makes his case by asserting these supposed E propositions. At one point in the 
FRQYHUVDWLRQWKHSURSRQHQWVD\V³,WLVMXVWWUXHWKDWDERUWLRQLVZURQJ´$FFRUGLQJWR
Dworkin, this can be interpreted as an impatient restatement of his substantive moral position, 
not an E proposition.241 'ZRUNLQWKHQLPDJLQHVWKLVVSHDNHUJRLQJRQWRVD\³,WLVREMHFWLYHO\
the case that abortion is wrong´DQG³$ERUWLRQreally LVZURQJ´'ZRUNLQWKLQNVWKHVHWZR
claims can also be interpreted as attempts to clarify the 1st order view that abortion is wrong 
by distinguishing it from other opinions that are subjective matters of taste. This is because the 
SURSRQHQWRIWKHFODLPWKDWDERUWLRQLVZURQJFRXOGPDNHWKHFODLPWKDW³6RFFHULVDZRUWKOHVV
JDPH´ZKLOHLQWending the claim to be an assertion of his subjective tastes. In other words, he 
FRXOGDVVHUW³6RFFHULVDZRUWKOHVVJDPH´ZLWKRXWFRPPLWWLQJKLPVHOIWRWKHFODLPWKDWVRFFHU
is in some objective sense more worthless than games he prefers to watch.242 He might say 
that he has a reason for not watching soccer but it is also the case that no one whose soccer 
tastes are different has the same reason. Such is not the case with his views on abortion.͒  
 Dworkin then imagines our proponent of the claim that abortion is wrong going on to 
VD\WKDW³WKHZURQJQHVVRIDERUWLRQLVDPRUDODEVROXWH´+HUH'ZRUNLQFRQWHQGVWKDWWKLV
claim can be interpreted as the claim that abortion is always wrong in principle and that its 
wrongness is never overridden by competing considerations.243 Dworkin then imagines our 
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SURSRQHQWPDNLQJWKHHYHQPRUHEDURTXHFODLPWKDW³7KHZURQJQHVVRIDERUWLRQLVDPRUDO
IDFWWKDWH[LVWVLQDQLQGHSHQGHQWUHDOP´%HIRUH'ZRUNLQWUDQVODtes this claim into an I 
proposition, he asserts that such a claim is not something that ordinary people (i.e. non-
philosophers) actually say.244 However, Dworkin claims that we can make sufficient sense of 
this kind of claim as something people might say, by understanding it as an inflated, 
metaphorical way of repeating what other 1st order claims say more directly.245 For instance, 
WKHFODLP³WKHZURQJQHVVRIDERUWLRQLVDPRUDOIDFWWKDWH[LVWVLQDQLQGHSHQGHQWUHDOP´FDQ
EHXQGHUVWRRGDVDQLQIODWHGPHWDSKRULFDOZD\RIVD\LQJ³7KHZURQJQHVVRIDERUWLRQGRHVQRW
depend RQDQ\RQH¶VWKLQNLQJLWZURQJ´͒ 
 In defense of 2 (there can be no interpretations or translations of any plausible claims 
such that those claims wind up being best interpreted or translated as E propositions), 
Dworkin critiques the traditional practice of archimedeans to read E propositions as meta-
ethical claims about value judgments.246 Dworkin asserts that these E propositions are read as 
such by archimedeans because archimedeans look to E propositions to take positions on 
metaphysical questions. These questions include the question of whether or not there are 
moral properties in the universe and if so, what kind of properties these are.247 Dworkin thinks 
archimedeans see themselves as being capable of answering ³QR´WRWKLVTXHVWLRQ+RZHYHU
they do not sHHWKHDFWRIDQVZHULQJ³QR´DVDVVHUWLQJDQ\PRUDOFODLP7KH\VHHERWKD³\HV´
RU³QR´DQVZHUDVOHDYLQJPRUDOLW\DVLWVWDQGV 
 'ZRUNLQFRQWHQGVWKDWWKHTXHVWLRQ³$UHWKHUHPRUDOSURSHUWLHVLQWKHXQLYHUVH"´LV
a question that can only plausibly be understood as a weak I proposition. Even if we 
understand it as a question about what natural properties moral properties consist of, Dworkin 
believes it is best interpreted as an  I proposition. This is because Dworkin believes the 
identity of a natural and moral property is a synthetic (rather than semantic) identity and is 
discovered through empirical investigation.248 According to Dworkin, there is nothing 
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metaphysical that is being postulated when someone asserts that there is an empirically 
discovered, synthetic identity between moral properties and natural properties. To illustrate 
this point further, Dworkin imagines two utilitarians having a dispute. In this dispute, one 
utilitarian thinks the only thing that can make an act right is its pleasure maximizing power 
and the other utilitarian thinks that the property of rightness and the property of pleasure 
maximizing power are the same property.249 According to Dworkin, the second utilitarian is 
not saying anything that adds anything to what the first utilitarian is saying. Rather, the second 
utilitarian is merely using the jargon of metaphysics. For Dworkin, the second idea appears to 
have the characteristics of an E proposition but is in fact, an I proposition. For him, a claim 
needs more than the language of metaphysics to be genuinely metaphysical. It needs to say 
something over and above a claim that could be re-expressed as an I proposition without 
metaphysical language. Dworkin does consider a range of 2nd order claims about morality 
that DUHPHWDSK\VLFDOLQVRIDUDVWKH\FDQ¶WEHUH-expressed as I propositions without their 
metaphysical language. However, he also claims that these are both difficult to make sense of 
and claims no normal moraliser would make. These 2nd order claims posit a causal 
relationship between moral properties and moral beliefs where the moral properties cannot be 
reduced to natural properties. Moreover, on this causal relationship account, the moral 
properties cause the moral beliefs.250 These claims constitute what Dworkin calls a Platonist 
³PRUDOILHOGWKHVLV´2QWKHPRUDOILHOGWKHVLVWKHUHDUHQRQ-natural moral properties that exist 
in the universe. They exist alongside protons and neutrons (Dworkin calls them µPRURQV¶
having a causal impact on human receptors. 
 ͒ For Dworkin, archimedeans have one of three ways of interpreting the moral field 
thesis. They can interpret it as a metaphysical claim, in which case there is not much that can 
be said about it on account of it being so difficult to make sense of. If they interpret the moral 
field thesis as a physics thesis, it simply becomes a bad piece of physics worthy of rejecting 
on scientific grounds. If they interpret it as a moral claim, it seems more metaphor than a 
statement that refers to anything literal. This is why the moral field thesis is one of the few 
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claims Dworkin believes an archimedean could deny while maintaining both austerity and 
moral neutrality.251 The rub, as we just saw, is that the moral field thesis is a claim no ordinary 
moraliser would actually make. For Dworkin, it is an implausible creation of philosophers and 
as such, should be denied insofar as one can make sense of it.252 However, this is not the case 
with the majority of supposed E propositions. Such propositions, according to Dworkin, are 
plausibly interpreted only as I propositions. Thus, for the archimedean to deny them is for the 
archimedean to give up his moral neutrality.  
 DZRUNLQ¶VYLHZVLPSO\WKDWDUFKLPHGHDQVJHQHUDOO\WUDGHLQ,SURSRVLWLRQVH[FHSWLQ
cases when they are trading in implausible E propositions. This implies there is no such thing 
as an archimedean philosophical debate where philosophers are trading in plausible E 
propositions. Meta-ethical theories, which appear to be putting forward an archimedean 
hypothesis, are either unwittingly asserting I propositions or asserting implausible E 
propositions. This means that for Dworkin, all the plausible discussions of morality happen at 
the 1st RUGHU7KLVLOOXVWUDWHVKRZ'ZRUNLQ¶VYLHZVDUHVLPLODUWRPHWD-ethical minimalism.  
Dworkin seems to be advocating the claim that a moral claim X is true if and only if X. 
However, he is qualifying this claim with the subsequent claim that to affirm X is to affirm X 
at the 1st order. This qualification is what demonstrates how the traditional meta-ethical 
questions about the ontology of X get blocked before they even get off the ground.   
 If Dworkin is right, the meta-ethicist has three types of propositions to choose from 
when giving an account of morality.  He can choose from 1st order moral claims (I 
propositions), 2nd order archimedean moral claims (E propositions), or 2nd order moral claims 
that are not archimedean.  Such 2nd order claims could include claims about the meaning of 
moral terms or the logical relations embedded in moral propositions.  Since the 2nd order 
archimedean moral claims are excluded on the grounds of implausibility, all the meta-ethicist 
has left is 1st order moral claims and 2nd order moral claims that are not archimedean.  This 
means a decent meta-HWKLFDOWKHRU\RQ'ZRUNLQ¶VYLHZFDQRQO\PDNHPRUDOFODLPVRUPDNH
meta-ethical claims that are irrelevant to the project of assessing whether or not moral realism 
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is true.  
 Dworkin then goes on to claim that various meta-ethical theories thought to be 
DUFKLPHGHDQDFWXDOO\WUDGHLQ,SURSRVLWLRQVZKLFKWDNHVWDQGVLQPRUDOGLVSXWHV'ZRUNLQ¶V
two main targets for this attack are secondary quality meta-ethical theories and expressivist 
meta-ethical theories. Dworkin claims that proponents of secondary quality theory are taking 
stands in moral disputes because they are committed to counterfactual claims about which 
moral propositions would be true in certain situations.253 Although Dworkin admits the 
potential diversity of secondary quality theories, he insists that all secondary quality theories 
will commit proponents to affirming that the extension of moral properties is fixed to some 
extent by our natural history.254 Dworkin claims that the most natural form of secondary 
quality theory states that what makes an act morally wrong is that contemplating the act in fact 
produces a particular kind of reaction in most people or most members of a particular 
community.255 According to Dworkin, it follows from this formulation that if one day people 
in general, or in the stipulated community, ceased to react in that way to genocide, genocide 
would cease to be wicked. Dworkin believes that this thesis is a controversial moral claim.256 
Secondary quality theories, for Dworkin, are not morally neutral theories that only trade in E 
propositions.͒  
 Dworkin considers a more sophisticated variation of secondary quality theory.  He 
considers a secondary quality theory that posits that what makes genocide wrong is the 
UHDFWLRQQRWRIZKLFKHYHUNLQGRISHRSOHKDSSHQWRH[LVWIURPWLPHWRWLPHEXWRI³XV´
'ZRUNLQGHILQHV³XV´DVSHRSOHZLWKWKHSK\VLRORJLFDOVWUXFWXUHEDVLFLQWHUHVWVDQGJHQHUDO
mental dispositions that people actually have now.257 On this secondary quality theory, it 
would no longer follow that genocide would cease being wicked if human beings developed 
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very different general interests or different neural wiring.258 However, Dworkin insists that 
such a secondary quality theory would cease to be philosophically illuminating precisely 
because it would lack counterfactual claims about the circumstances in which genocide would 
not be wicked.259 Nonetheless, controversial claims would still follow. For instance, this 
theory would entail the claim that genocide would not have been wicked if economic or other 
circumstances had been different as human reactions evolved, so that creatures with our 
general interests and attitudes had not been revolted by genocide.260 
 Here, Dworkin is not including the latter sort of claim within the class of moral 
counterfactual claims that are controversial. Presumably, this is because the claim about what 
would be the case if human beings had developed differently (in the past) would not be 
morally relevant to contemporary human beings if it were true. Counterfactual claims about 
the future given by secondary quality theories would be morally relevant. This is because such 
counterfactuals tell us possible circumstances we could find ourselves in where genocide may 
not be wrong. Counterfactuals about the past do not do this.  Dworkin is careful to qualify 
that he is not meaning to suggest that moral properties are primary in giving this critique of 
secondary quality theories. Rather, he thinks that the question of whether or not moral 
properties are primary is a moral question. This is because Dworkin believes the question of 
what kinds of moral properties exist in the world is also a question about the circumstances in 
which institutions are just or unjust or people are good or bad and why.261 For Dworkin, there 
is no philosophically substantive metaphysical way of talking about moral properties. Hence, 
Dworkin believes that any philosophically illuminating account of moral properties will be 
one that is both morally non-neutral and an account that trades in I propositions. Dworkin also 
believes the only kind of illuminating discourse one can have about moral properties is 1st 
order discourse.262 He assumes that all 1st order discourse is by definition, morally non-
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neutral. Talk of moral properties for Dworkin amounts to 1st order talk about the moral 
circumstances in which moral properties obtain. 
 Dworkin here goes on to criticize expressivism on the grounds that it unwittingly 
trades in contentious, morally non-neutral I propositions. Dworkin maintains that 
expressivism winds up denying plausible morally non-neutral I propositions in the name of 
revising our explanations of such I propositions. According to Dworkin, expressivists 
maintain that positive moral judgments that make up the I propositions of morality are not 
actually propositions. They belong to a different semantic category. They are rather I 
expressions of approval or disapproval or recommendations of rules of conduct.263 Dworkin 
states that expressivism is committed to the view that the moraliser who asserts that torture is 
wicked is not describing anything.  Rather, on the expressivist account, he is only expressing a 
negative attitude towards torture and perhaps endorsing a standard of conduct that would 
FRQGHPQWRUWXUH'ZRUNLQEHOLHYHVVXFKWKHRULHVDUHµGUDPDWLFDOO\¶UHYLVLRQLVWEHFDXVHWKH\
contradict what people actually mean when they assert I propositions.264 For Dworkin, people 
who say that torture is wicked do not think they are just expressing an attitude or accepting a 
rule or standard as a kind of personal commitment. Dworkin accuses the expressivist of 
forcing the ordinary moraliser to change his understanding of his asserted I propositions by 
claiming that if the ordinary moraliser does not, he will mean nothing at all. However, 
Dworkin believes there is a specific reason why expressivism is so strident in the manner it 
tries to revise moral discourse. This reason is where Dworkin pushes the bulk of his criticism 
of expressivism. ͒  
 Dworkin cites Alan Gibbard in claiming that the expressivist is a revisionist about 
moral discourse because he is motivated by the worry that if one treats normative judgments 
as descriptive reports, one will have to embrace Platonism.265 Platonism, according to 
Gibbard, is the idea that truths about what is rational or just or good are among the facts of the 
world. For Gibbard, such an idea is fantastic to an ordinary sensibility and if anyone believed 
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it, such a belief should be debunked.266 Expressivism becomes an attempt to rescue morality 
from platonism by proposing that morality is not a descriptive project but instead an 
expressive enterprise. Dworkin contends that the motivation behind expressivism begs the 
question against his anti-archimedeanism by assuming that the platonist E propositions of 
morality are not themselves I propositions. Moreover, Dworkin claims that if platonism, as 
Gibbard defines it, is something that should be debunked, this means morality must be 
debunked along with it.267 Hence the expressivist, in order to find a plausible reading of any 
moral claim, must create a reading of the claim that takes away what the claim is traditionally 
thought to assert.268͒ 
 Unlike his views on expressivism, Dworkin concedes that there are some 
sophisticated versions of non-cognitivism that try and countenance the face value of moral 
discourse by interpreting it as non-cognitive. Here, Dworkin is referring to Blackburn¶VTXDVL-
realism. According to Dworkin, quasi-realism attempts to countenance counterfactual claims 
about morality that sound like E propositions within the domain of the non-cognitive. The 
quasi-realist, for instance, will agree with the ordinary moraliser that slavery would be wrong 
even if evolution and history had proceeded in a way where almost no one thought it was.269 
However, this claim, within the quasi-realist re-interpretation, will simply express a somewhat 
PRUHUHILQHGDWWLWXGHWKDQWKHDWWLWXGHH[SUHVVHGLQWKHFODLP³6ODYHU\LV:URQJ´270 By 
³PRUHUHILQHGDWWLWXGH´ we mean that it is a higher order attitude of the 1st order which 
regulates other lower attitudes of the 1st order.271 The purpose of this attitude regulation is to 
allow agents to develop moral sentiments that in turn allow them to engage in the practice of 
mutual attitude coordination the quasi-realist identifies with morality.272 This expression of a 
higher order 1st order attitude, on the quasi-realist framework, is a non-cognitive I proposition 
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rather than a platonic and false E proposition.  
 For the quasi-realist, there can be higher order attitudes which are non-cognitive I 
propositions rather than cognitive E propositions. Thus, a higher order moral attitude need not 
be a metaphysical, 2nd order claim for the quasi-UHDOLVW%ODFNEXUQ¶VVWUDWHJ\IRUthis 
maneuver is to distinguish between oblique contexts in which we can affirm higher order 
attitudes as I propositions and other oblique contexts in which we can affirm them as non-
cognitive E propositions.273 Oblique contexts are 1st and 2nd order contexts in which a given 
proposition can have different truth values. For Blackburn, there is an oblique context internal 
to the practice of moral discourse in which we can say the wrongness of slavery is not 
GHSHQGHQWRQDQ\RQH¶VDWWLWXGHV<HWWKHUHLVDQRWKHU oblique context external to the practice 
of moral discourse in which we can talk about causal relations between people. It is in this 
FRQWH[WWKDWZHFDQGHQ\WKHFODLPWKDWWKHZURQJQHVVRIVODYHU\LVQRWGHSHQGHQWRQDQ\RQH¶V
attitudes. It is also in this oblique context that we can say that philosophical naturalism is true 
because there are no moral properties. There are only attitudes of people.274 
 For Blackburn, the denial of the claim that there are moral properties is no threat to 
WKHFODLPWKDW³6ODYHU\LV:URQJ´ 7KLVLVEHFDXVHZKDWPDNHVVODYHU\ZURQJLVQRWVODYHU\¶V
instantiation of moral properties but rather the features of slavery that make it morally 
objectionable. These features include the fact that it causes pain, denies autonomy to human 
agents, is unjust, and so on. For Blackburn, none of these features depends on the existence of 
moral properties in order to make it the case that slavery is morally objectionable.275 For 
Dworkin, if we interpret Blackburn as simply denying moral properties, this is not strong 
enough for quasi-realism to be inconsistent with the sort of platonism that Gibbard 
describes.276 Under that platonism, there are moral properties that exist in the universe and are 
independent of human will or attitude. Moreover, on that platonism, moral claims are correct 
insofar as they correspond to or represent these properties. If Blackburn wants to defend 
quasi-realism as something stronger than the denial of platonistic moral properties, Dworkin 
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thinks he must abandon the claim thDWWKHZURQJQHVVRIVODYHU\LVLQGHSHQGHQWRIDQ\RQH¶V
attitudes.277 
 Dworkin thinks the wrongness of slavery must depend on attitudes if attitudes are all 
it can depend on and this is true regardless of context.278 Here, Dworkin is accusing Blackburn 
of an incoherence. On the one hand, Blackburn wants to assent to the claim that ³7KHUHDUHQR
PRUDOSURSHUWLHVRQO\DWWLWXGHV´2QWKHRWKHUKDQG%ODFNEXUQZDQWVWRDVVHQWWRWKHFODLP
WKDW³7KHZURQJQHVVRIVODYHU\GRHVQRWGHSHQGRQDWWLWXGHV´'ZRUNLQVHHVWKe former claim 
as entailing the denial of the latter claim. ͒7KLVLVEHFDXVH³WKHZURQJQHVVRIVODYHU\GRHVQRW
GHSHQGRQDWWLWXGHV´LVDFODLPWKDWLVFRUUHFWIURPZLWKLQWKHSUDFWLFHRIPRUDOLW\$VVXFK
Dworkin believes it cannot be the case that this claim is, in another context, a false E 
SURSRVLWLRQ7KLVLVSDUWO\DQRXWFRPHRI'ZRUNLQ¶VUHMHFWLRQRIDUFKLPHGHDQLVP)RU
Dworkin, there simply is no philosophically plausible way of interpreting any context other 
than the 1st order moral context in whiFK³WKHZURQJQHVVRIVODYHU\GRHVQRWGHSHQGRQ
DWWLWXGHV´7KHUHLVQRFRQWH[WLQZKLFKVXFKDFODLPFRXOGEHLQWHOOLJLEOHZLWKRXWFRPPLWWLQJ
ordinary moralisers to a wildly implausible hypothesis. For Dworkin, Blackburn has given us 
no reason to think that a correct I proposition can simultaneously be an incorrect E 
SURSRVLWLRQ$IWHUDOORQ'ZRUNLQ¶VYLHZWKHUHLVQRSKLORVRSKLFDOO\SODXVLEOHDFFRXQWRI
moral E propositions in the first place. 
 ,QVXPPDU\ZHFDQVHHWKDW'ZRUNLQ¶VDQWL-archimedeanism implies that there can 
EHQRPRUDOFRPPLWPHQWVWRDUFKLPHGHDQFODLPV$UFKLPHGHDQFODLPVRQ'ZRUNLQ¶VYLHZ
are E propositions and all E propositions are implausible 2nd order moral claims. The 
constraint on the attractiveness of meta-ethical theories argued for in chapter 2, we should 
remember, was an archimedean claim.  It was an assertion of explanatory moral realism, the 
YHU\VRUWRIDVVHUWLRQ'ZRUNLQZRXOGGHVFULEHDVDQLPSODXVLEOH(SURSRVLWLRQ,I'ZRUNLQ¶V
views are correct, this would imply the negation of the constraint defended in chapter 2 of this 
thesis.             
             5.3 CRITIQUE OF DWORKIN 
 'ZRUNLQ¶VDUJXPHQWLVLQFRQVLVWHQW'ZRUNLQUHOLHVRQWKHYHU\nd order 
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archimedean propositions that his argument attacks. Dworkin says that 2nd order archimedean 
propositions are implausible unless interpreted as I propositions.  On what basis does Dworkin 
think such propositions are implausible? As we saw, it is because they attribute extravagant 
claims to ordinary moralisers that such moralisers would never make.  These are claims such 
as the moral field thesis that, to the extent that they can be made sense of, seem to be bad 
physics. Dworkin asserts that the moral field thesis is a 2nd order claim there is good reason to 
cast doubt on. TKLVPHDQV'ZRUNLQ¶VFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIWKHPRUDOILHOGWKHVLVLVLWVHOIDnd 
order claim. I will show that this 2nd order claim is an archimedean 2nd order moral claim. This 
is for the reason that the act of casting doubt on an archimedean claim requires the assertion of 
DFODLPWKDWLVDPRQJRWKHUWKLQJVDQDUFKLPHGHDQFODLP+HQFH'ZRUNLQ¶VDUJXPHQW
against the moral field thesis inadvertently relies on an archimedean claim his views entail is 
an implausible claim.  
 To see clearly why this is the case, we need to consider the options for someone 
wishing to cast doubt on an archimedean claim. It looks like there are three. One can use a 1st 
order moral claim to cast doubt on the archimedean claim. One could, for instance, assert the 
1st RUGHUPRUDOFODLP³PRUDOVHQWLPHQWVDUHPRUHYDOXDEOHWKDQPRUDOSULQFLSOHV´LQRUGHUWR
cast doubt on any meta-ethical theory which is inconsistent with that 1st order moral claim.279 
The second option is to employ a different archimedean claim to cast doubt on the initial 
archimedean claim. One could, for instance, employ the archimedean claim, ³4XDVL-Realism 
LVWKHPRVWDWWUDFWLYHWKHRU\´WRFDVWGRXEWRQWKHDUFKLPHGHDQFODLP³(UURUWKHRU\LVWUXH´
The third option is to employ a claim which is not moral to cast doubt on the archimedean 
claim. Here, one could employ the non-PRUDOFODLP³7KHUHLVHYLGHQFHDJDLQVWWKHH[LVWHQFH
of non-QDWXUDOSURSHUWLHV´WRFDVWGRXEWRQWKHDUFKLPHGHDQFODLP³7KHUHDUHQRQ-natural 
PRUDOSURSHUWLHV´ 
 Dworkin is definitely not using 1st order moral claims to cast doubt on the moral field 
thesis. If Dworkin were to employ this tactic, he would have one of two strategies. Both 
strategies could not be viable options for him.  The first strategy would be that he try and 
show that there are 1st order moral reasons to doubt the moral field thesis despite the fact that 
the moral field thesis is also a 1st order moral commitment.  The second strategy would be to 
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try and show that the moral field thesis was not a moral commitment.  The first strategy would 
not work because whatever 1st order moral reasons he could assert that cast doubt on the moral 
field thesis would be inconsistent with other 1st order moral commitments to the moral field 
thesis.  Thus, there would be no way he could consistently assert 1st order moral reasons to 
doubt the moral field thesis.  
 The second strategy would not work because he would have to assert an archimedean 
claim if he chose the second strategy.  This is because the second strategy would involve 
defending four claims. The first claim would be a 1st order moral reason to the effect that we 
ought to believe what is true.  The second claim would be a non-moral claim to the effect that 
physics is an authority on what is true.  The third claim would be an additional non-moral 
claim to the effect that physics casts doubt on the moral field thesis. The fourth claim would 
be an archimedean claim to the effect that physics is more of an authority than 1st order moral 
commitments when it comes to affirming the set of descriptive truths that morality takes for 
granted. The reason why this fourth claim is essential is the first three claims only show that 
we ought to doubt the moral field thesis if the moral field thesis were not a 1st order moral 
commitment.  It does not show what Dworkin would be intending to show: namely, that there 
is no 1st order moral commitment to the moral field thesis. The fourth claim is essential for 
showing that in the event of a clash between 1st order moral commitments and physics 
commitments, physics would win out. It is only in such a scenario that we could guarantee 
that the moral field thesis is not a 1st order moral commitment merely because physics casts 
doubt on it.  
 The fourth claim that physics is more of an authority than 1st order moral 
commitments when it comes to affirming the set of descriptive truths that morality takes for 
granted is an archimedean claim.  It is archimedean because it is a claim made outside of the 
perspective of 1st order moral practice.  We can see this by observing the fact that it is, in part, 
an epistemological claim about the comparative evidential capacities of physics and moral 
commitments. It is also archimedean because it is a claim made from outside 1st order moral 
practice which attempts to validate or undermine 1st order moral claims.  Specifically, it is a 
2nd order claim which is both descriptive and attempts to show that 1st order moral 
commitments can be undermined by physics commitments. In sum, it is exactly the kind of 
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claim Dworkin prohibits himself from being able to invoke.   
The only option left for Dworkin is an attempt to use a non-moral claim to undermine 
the moral field thesis. However, the difficulty with this third option is there is no real 
distinction between a non-moral claim and an archimedean claim if the non-moral claim casts 
GRXEWRQDQDUFKLPHGHDQFODLP7RLOOXVWUDWHWKLVOHW¶VH[DPLQHDVWDQGDUGDUFKLPHGHDQFODLP
OLNH³(UURUWKHRU\LVWUXH´,WLVDFODLPWKDWLVPDGHIURPDSHUVSHFWLYHWKDWLVQRWLQWHUQDOWR
1st order moral practice.  It is a claim that affirms that the set of all moral claims is false. In all 
these respects, it satisfies the criteria for being an archimedean claim. However, it 
simultaneously satisfies the criteria for being a non-moral claim.  It is, after all, a claim made 
from outside of 1st order moral discourse.  It is a claim made on the basis of non-moral 
considerations. It is a claim that seems to be capable of being interpreted as a descriptive 
claim. After all, the claim that error theory is true entails that all moral claims are false.  One 
need not interpret this claim as entailing that all moral claims ought to be false. Moreover, one 
need not interpret the claim as entailing that the falsehood of moral claims has any effect on 
what one should believe the demands of morality are. Because of these considerations, there 
does not seem to be any way that this claim could be said to be more of a non-moral claim 
than an archimedean claim. It seems to be both. 
 Similarly, the claim that contemporary physics implies the denial of the moral field 
thesis is both a non-moral claim and an archimedean claim. It is a non-moral claim because it 
is a descriptive claim made from within a natural science.  On the other hand, it satisfies the 
criteria for being an archimedean claim.  It is a claim made from outside 1st order moral 
GLVFRXUVH,WLVDFODLPZKLFKSRWHQWLDOO\YDOLGDWHVWKHVWRUGHUPRUDOFODLP³2QHRXJKWQRW
EHOLHYHWKHPRUDOILHOGWKHVLV´DQGSRWHQWLDOO\XQGHUPLQHVWKHst order moral cODLP³2QH
RXJKWWREHOLHYHWKHPRUDOILHOGWKHVLV´7KHFODLPWKDWFRQWHPSRUDU\SK\VLFVLPSOLHVWKH
denial of the moral field thesis one can certainly interpret as a physics claim.  However, one 
could also interpret it as a meta-ethical claim.  After all, it is a claim made from outside of 1st 
order moral practice that denies a set of possible meta-ethical theories. It does this on the basis 
of descriptive considerations, but this makes it no different than error theory.   
 Perhaps one might object that the fundamental difference between the physics claim 
about the moral field thesis and error theory is that the physics claim gives us information 
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about physics whereas error theory only gives us information about morality.  According to 
this reasoning, this is why we can call error theory an archimedean meta-ethical claim but we 
only call the physics claim a non-moral claim.  The problem with this objection is that error 
WKHRU\GRHVQRWRQO\JLYHXVLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWPRUDOLW\%HFDXVHRI0DFNLH¶VTXHHUQHVV
argument, error theory is involved in making metaphysical assertions.280 There seems to be no 
reason to think that a theory that makes metaphysical assertions is archimedean and yet a 
theory which only makes physical assertions is not. There is certainly nothiQJLQ'ZRUNLQ¶V
characterisation of what an archimedean claim is which suggests this distinction. 
 7KLVLVZK\'ZRUNLQ¶VGHIHQVHRIDQWL-archimedeanism is inconsistent. He wants to 
defend the assertion that archimedean claims consist either of 1st order moral claims that are 
mistakenly identified as 2nd order claims or implausible 2nd order claims. Yet his defense of 
this dilemma must rest on a 2nd RUGHUDUFKLPHGHDQFODLP$VZHKDYHVHHQLWFDQ¶WUHVWRQD
1st order moral claim because Dworkin would have to first show that the moral field thesis is 
not a moral commitment.  He would have to defend an archimedean claim in order to do this.  
+LVGHIHQVHRIWKHGLOHPPDFDQ¶WUHVWRQDnd order archimedean claim because Dworkin 
believes 2nd order archimedean cODLPVDUHLPSODXVLEOH)LQDOO\WKHGLOHPPDFDQ¶WUHVWRQD
non-moral claim because there is no difference between such non-moral claims and an 
archimedean claim when the non-moral claim is used to deny an archimedean theory. In this 
context, the non-moral claim is, for all intents and purposes, also an archimedean claim.  
 This means that Dworkin, in his defense of anti-archimedeanism, is using 2nd order 
archimedean claims to try and show that 2nd order archimedean claims are implausible.  His 
anti-archimedeanism can only be adequately defended if he shows that discussions of the 
validating or undermining of 1st order moral claims can justifiably happen only at the 1st order.  
Yet his reasons for showing that discussions at the 2nd RUGHUFDQ¶WMXVWLILDEO\Yalidate or 
undermine 1st order moral claims are ultimately archimedean. In other words, Dworkin is 
inconsistent in his defense of his version of anti-archimedeanism because he relies on the very 
claims he wants to show are implausible.  
              5.4 J$0,('5(,(5¶6&5,7,48(2)':25.,1 
                                                        
280This is the outcome that the queerness argument is an argument about which metaphysical properties 
are likely and unlikely to exist. 
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 ,QKLVSDSHU³0HWD-(WKLFVDQG1RUPDWLYH&RPPLWPHQW´-DPLH'UHLHUSUHVHQWVD
QRYHOFULWLTXHRI'ZRUNLQ¶VDWWDFNRQDUFKLPHGHDQWKHRULHV'ULHUXVHVSRVVLEOHZRUOG
matrixes to show that the normative commitments of a theory are distinct from its normative 
implications.281 For Dreier, this is a strategy for showing that some meta-ethical theories are 
morally non-committal, despite the fact that they have moral implications. The purpose of this 
strategy is to demonstrate that some of the meta-ethical theories that are morally non-
committal are also theories that are situated in the moral realist/moral anti-realist debate. 
Hence, Dreier wants to show that even if Dworkin is right about the moral non-neutrality of 
plausible meta-ethical theories, it does not follow that those theories are conjunctions of 1st 
RUGHUPRUDOFODLPV7KLVFRQVWLWXWHVDQDWWDFNRQ'ZRUNLQ¶VDQWL-archimedeanism because if 
'UHLHULVULJKWVRPHSODXVLEOHDUFKLPHGHDQWKHRULHVFDQ¶WEHUHGXFHGWRst order claims. This 
entails that it is not only implausible archimedean theories (like the moral field thesis) that 
cannot be reduced to 1st order moral claims. If some archimedean theories are plausible at the 
2nd order, this constitutes a refutation of DworkLQ¶VYLHZV 
 Dreier claims that a statement is morally committing if and only if it is true according 
to some moral standards and false at others at any world in which it is affirmed. This means 
that if you listen to someone make a moral statement that is morally committing, you will be 
able to narrow down the class of moral standards that would make their statement true. This is 
important for Dreier because he aims to show that there are archimedean theories that consist 
of 2nd order claims that do not let one who affirms them narrow down the class of moral 
standards that they hold. Dreier believes that a version of secondary quality theory is an 
example of such a morally neutral archimedean theory. Moreover, Dreier believes that 
Dworkin has misunderstood secondary quality in failing to consider plausible versions of 
secondary quality theory that are morally non-committal. ͒ 
 Dreier begins his critique of Dworkin by trying to get a grip on what a normative 
FRPPLWPHQWLV+HLQLWLDOO\FRQVLGHUV+XPH¶V/DZZKich states: HL: There is no logically 
valid argument with only non-moral premises and a normative conclusion. ͒However, Dreier 
rejects HL because of a refutation given by A.N. Prior in 1960.231 According to Prior, we can 
imagine a disjunction D v M where D stands for a descriptive claim and M stands for a moral 
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FODLP,IWKHGLVMXQFWLRQLVLWVHOIDPRUDOFODLPLWLVORJLFDOO\HQWDLOHGE\'VR+XPH¶V/DZLV
false. On the other hand, if it is not moral, ¬D conjoined with D v M entails M. Again, 
+XPH¶V/DZLV IDOVH$WWKLVSRLQW'ULHUFRQVLGHUVDUHKDELOLWDWHGYDULDWLRQRI+XPH¶V/DZ
JLYHQUHFHQWO\E\7RRPDV.DUPR.DUPR¶V/DZVWDWHV./7KHUHLVQRVRXQGDUJXPHQWZLWK
only non-moral premises and a moral conclusion. According to Karmo, we classify a sentence 
as moral at a possible world, w, if and only if, it is true at w according to one moral standard 
and false at another. For the notion of a moral standard, we take the class of uncontroversial 
moral sentences. To illustrate this idea, Karmo considers the disjunction:B: Benito is Evil or 
New Zealand is a Communist Republic. In our world, this sentence is moral because it is true 
DFFRUGLQJWRDQ\PRUDOVWDQGDUGWKDWDVVLJQVWKHYDOXHWUXHWR³%HQLWRLV(YLO´DQGIDOVH
according to any other moral standard. AFFRUGLQJWR.DUPR¶VUHDVRQLQJDSURSRVLWLRQLVQRQ-
moral at a world w if you can tell whether it is true at that world without any moral 
investigation.282 ͒)RU'UHLHUDFRXQWHULQWXLWLYHIHDWXUHRI.DUPR¶V taxonomy is it fails to 
close the class of non-moral sentences under entailment.283 In other words, a sentence may be 
moral while still being entailed by a sentence that is not moral. To illustrate, the B disjunction 
is moral in our world and is entailed by ³1HZ=HDODQGLVD&RPPXQLVW5HSXEOLF´ZKLFKLV
QRWPRUDO+RZHYHUWKLVFRXQWHULQWXLWLYHIHDWXUHGRHVQRWFRXQWDJDLQVW.DUPR¶VWKHRU\IRU
'UHLHUEHFDXVHLWVLPSO\DPRXQWVWRDGHQLDORI+XPH¶V/DZ284 None the less, Karmo¶V/DZ
together with his classifiFDWLRQRIVWDWHPHQWVDYRLGV3ULRU¶VUHIXWDWLRQE\LQVLVWLQJWKDWDWOHDVW
one true premise in any argument which goes from a descriptive premise to a normative 
conclusion will be false.285 )RUH[DPSOHWKHYDOLGDUJXPHQWIURP³1HZ=HDODQGLVD
Communist RepXEOLF´WR%KDVDIDOVHSUHPLVHLQWKLVZRUOG,IZHFRQVLGHUWKHDUJXPHQWLQD
world where New Zealand is a Communist Republic and the argument becomes sound, the 
conclusion gets classified as non-moral relative to that world. Let us instead consider the 
disjunctive syllogism: 
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͒1 .B ͒ 
  or 
͒³1HZ=HDODQGLVQRWD&RPPXQLVW5HSXEOLF´͒ 
  Therefore Benito is evil. 
 We find that in our world it may be sound. It is sound if Benito is evil and because B 
is one of its premises, it counts as a moral statement. If we take this disjunctive syllogism to a 
world where New Zealand is a Communist Republic, then the premises will all be non-moral. 
However, the argument will no longer be sound. ͒However, this salvage does not make 
.DUPR¶V/DZOHJLWLPDWHIRU'UHLHU¶VSXUSRVHV\HW$WWKLVSRLQW.DUPR¶VFODVVLILFDWLRQVWLOO
counts Newtonian mechanics as having moral consequences because Newtonian mechanics is 
false.286 In fact, as the law stood, all false statements will have Karmo-moral consequences. 
Dreier illustrates this by imagining the following material conditional, which is a logical 
consequence of Newtonian mechanics: 
(P): If Newtonian mechanics is false, then eating yams is morally wrong. ͒ 
(P) is a Karmo-moral implication of Newtonian mechanics. This is not what Drier wants from 
such a law. Rather, Dreier wants a conception of ³FDUU\LQJPRUDOFRPPLWPHQW´LQZKLFK
meta-ethical theories do and Newtonian mechanics theories do not carry moral commitment. 
'UHLHUFDQ¶WJHWVXFKDFRQFHSWLRQE\OHWWLQJPRUDOFRPPLWPHQWVEH.DUPR-moral 
implications. Moreover, there is an additional way in which an intuitive conception of 
³FDUU\LQJPRUDOFRPPLWPHQW´LVDWRGGVZLWK.DUPR¶V/DZ7KHLGHDRIDQDVVHUWLRQ
committing someone to something is, according to Dreier, not the same as the idea of a 
SURSRVLWLRQ¶VKDYLQJVRPHWKLQJDVDQLPSOLFDWLRQ287͒To illustrate this idea, Dreier considers a 
UHODWLYHRI0RRUH¶VSDUDGR[͒ 
4,WLVUDLQLQJEXW,GRQ¶WEHOLHYHLWLVUDLQLQJ͒ 
(Q) is not a contradiction even though in some sense it feels like one. This is because the claim 
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commits whoever asserts it to the belief that it is raining even though the sentence does not 
logically imply this.288 For Drier, (Q) is over committing. So instead, he considers͒ 
5(LWKHULWLVUDLQLQJRU,GRQ¶WEHOLHYHLWLVUDLQLQJ͒ 
(R) is under committing for Dreier because anyone could assert it regardless of what their 
actual beliefs are. Dreier takes it for granted that a conversation has the primary function of 
informing the various interlocutors about the beliefs of others.289 On this criterion, (R) fails to 
inform.͒  
  Dreier then considers what he takes to be a plDXVLEOHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIDQDJHQW¶V
EHOLHIV+HUHSUHVHQWVDQDJHQW¶VEHOLHIVDVWKHELJVHWRIDOOWKHSRVVLEOHZRUOGVWKDW
correspond to the beliefs the agent might have. He makes it a point at the start not to eliminate 
possibilities. This way he can use the sincere assertions of the agent to whittle down the set of 
SRVVLEOHZRUOGVWKDWPLJKWEHWKHDJHQW¶VEHOLHIVHW)RULQVWDQFHLIWKHDJHQWVLQFHUHO\DVVHUWV
it is raining, Dreier rules out all those worlds in which it is not raining. But if the agent asserts 
(R), Dreier claims it is not clear whether or not we can rule anything out.  
  He starts by considering the proposition: ͒ 
6-DPLH¶VILUVWJUDGHWHDFKHULVLGHQWLFDOWR-DPLH¶VDFWXDOILUVWJUDGHWHDFKHU 
Dreier observes that (S) is not a necessary proposition. This is because (S) is not true in a 
ZRUOGZKHUH-DPLH¶VILUVWJUDGHWHDFKHULV$UQROG6FKZDU]HQHJJHU,IZHDVVXPHWKDW6
expresses a proposition and we can assume that we can use sets of possible worlds to 
represent propositions, then (S) expresses a set containing all those worlds which are like the 
actual one in respect to who teaches Jamie in first grade. (S) implies, in the sense of strict 
LPSOLFDWLRQWKDW-DPLH¶VILUVWJUDGHWHDFKHULVDZRPan. None the less, Dreier asserts that 
there is a fairly ordinary sense of an assertion committing one to something in which asserting 
6GRHVQRWDWDOOFRPPLWDQ\RQHWRWKHSURSRVLWLRQWKDW-DPLH¶VILUVWJUDGHWHDFKHULVD
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woman. In this ordinary sense, Dreier asserts that (S) is non-committal.290 In order to further 
explain this idea, Dreier appeals to an apparatus developed by theorists at the intersection of 
semantics and pragmatics.291 If we pretend that we have a standard enumeration of possible 
worlds, we can think of a proposition as a row of cells, each containing a T or F. Whether or 
QRWWKH\FRQWDLQ7¶VRU)¶VGHSHQGVRQZKHWKHUWKHSURSRVLWLRQLVWUXHRUIDOVHDWWKHZRUOG
corresponding to that cell. Dreier then suggests we compare:  
7-DPLH¶VIirst grade teacher is a woman.͒ 
and͒ 
8-DPLH¶VDFWXDOILUVWJUDGHWHDFKHULVDZRPDQ͒ 
(T) can be represented by the set of all worlds in which Jamie has a woman for a first grade 
teacher. (U) cannot because the proposition expressed by it is the set of all worlds in which 
Mrs. Proctor exists. Dreier suggests we represent sentences containing indexicals like 
µDFWXDOO\¶E\WZRGLPHQVLRQDOPDWULFHV(DFKURZRIWKHPDWUL[LVDSURSRVLWLRQVRWKDWHDFK
cROXPQJHWVODEHOHGE\DZRUOG$JLYHQURZLVILOOHGLQZLWK7¶VDQG)¶VWKDWGHSHQGRQ
whether the proposition of the row is true or false at the world labeling the column. The rows 
are labeled by contexts of utterance and a sentence expresses a proposition at one context and 
maybe another at a different context. For Dreier, the contexts are the possible worlds. Dreier 
VXJJHVWVWRWKHUHDGHUWKDWZHFRQVLGHUWKUHHZRUOGV$WZRUOG-DPLH¶VILUVWJUDGHWHDFKHULV
0UV3URFWRU$WZRUOG-DPLH¶VILUVWJUade teacher is Arnold Schwarzenegger. And at world 
-DPLH¶VILUVWJUDGHWHDFKHULV'DYLG.DSODQ'ULHUWKHQJLYHVXVWKHPDWUL[UHSUHVHQWLQJ8 
 
World 1        World 2        World 3  
(U) T  F  F 
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(S) F  T  F 
(T) F  F  T 
 
 Citing Bob Stalnaker, Dreier remarks that the diagonal of (U) is a necessary 
proposition.292 (U) is noncommittal because of the necessity of this diagonal. According to 
this line of reasoning, one is expressing something knowable apriori when a sentence has 
necessary diagonal propositioQV7KLVLVILQDOO\WKHFRQFHSWLRQRIVRPHWKLQJ¶V³FDUU\LQJ
FRPPLWPHQW´WKDW'ULHULVDIWHU͒Drier claims that asserting a proposition is committing 
RQHVHOIPRUDOO\ZKHQHYHUWKHSURSRVLWLRQFRXQWVDVPRUDOLQ.DUPR¶V sense of when a 
proposition counts as moral) relative to the world the speaker believes he is in. In other words, 
we classify a sentence as moral at a possible world, w, if and only if, it is what the speaker 
believes is true at w according to one moral standard and false according to another moral 
standard. Dreier concedes that a speaker does not generally believe that he is in a particular 
world. This is because to believe that one is in some particular world is to have unimaginably 
detailed beliefs.293 Rather, Dreier claims that the beliefs of speakers are best represented by a 
set of worlds. Drier also admits that he is idealizing to some extent the epistemic states of 
agents by representing their total system of beliefs as sets of possible worlds.294 Dreier 
concedes that the actual moral beliefs of moral agents are far less systematic than is depicted 
in his matrix. To measure moral commitment, Drier wants something like the diagonal of the 
matrixes used above. However, the matrixes cannot be the kind used to represent the semantic 
values of ordinary, non-moral sentences that contain no moral vocabulary. ͒ 
 'UHLHU¶VPDWUL[HVDUHHYHQWXDOO\XVHGWRUHSUHVHQWKLVRZQYDULDWLRQRQ.DUPR¶V
Law:  
(VKL): A statement is morally committing if and only if it is true according to some moral 
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standards and false according to others (at that world). ͒ 
The idea is that if one listens to an agent make a statement that is morally committing, one will 
be able to narrow down the class of moral standards that would make their statement true. 
Dreier here deliberately ignores the plurality of possible worlds and instead uses the speaker 
to stand for the context of assertion. This is because the same sentence might express different 
propositions depending on the speaker. Combining these two features, (moral standards 
delivering truth values from moral propositions and contexts delivering propositions from 
indexical sentences), Dreier constructs his new matrix to express the semantic value of a 
moral sentence. He chooses the following sentence: 
M1: Abortion is wrong only if it is wrong according to my moral standard.͒  
'UHLHULQWKLVH[DPSOHVSHFLILHVWKDW$DQG$¶VPRUDOVWDQGDUGVSHUPLWDERUWLRQZKLOH$¶V
do not. Thus, the matrix we get for M1 is:  
      M1   M2   M3͒ 
A1   T     T      F  
A2   T     T      F  
A3    F     F     T  
7KHILUVWURZLVWKHPRUDOSURSRVLWLRQ³$ERUWLRQLVZURQJLIDQGRQO\LILWLVFRXQWHGZURQJE\
$¶VPRUDOVWDQGDUG´7KLVDFFRUGLQJWR'UHLHULVFRXQWHGWUXHEHFDXVHWKHULJKWVLGHLVIDOVH
and the left side is false by both M1 and M2) and counted false (because the right side remains 
false while the left side is counted true by M3). The same holds for the other two rows. Again, 
ZKDWLVRILPSRUWDQFHLVWKDWWKHGLDJRQDORIWKHPDWUL[LVDOO7¶V7KLVmeans the assertion 
³$ERUWLRQLVZURQJRQO\LILWLVZURQJDFFRUGLQJWRP\PRUDOVWDQGDUG´LVIRU'UHLHUPRUDOO\
non-FRPPLWWDO2QHFDQDVVHUWLWLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIZKDWRQH¶VPRUDOVWDQGDUGVDFWXDOO\DUH
Drier then claims that we can make assertions that constitute a secondary quality theory which 
are not morally committing. One such assertion is what Dreier calls (ASQ):͒ 
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(ASQ): For every X, necessarily, X is wrong if and only if X is wrong according to my actual 
moral standards. ͒ 
(ASQ) is morally non-committal because even when we evaluate instantiations of this formula 
at other worlds, the standards we use are the ones to which the agent who asserts it actually 
subscribe, not the ones to which he subscribes at the world of evaluation. Dreier claims that if 
we were to express this claim within his matrix, it would be true at every point on the 
diagonal. This is because for each choice of X and each world, the two sides of the 
biconditional will say the same thing. Thus, the biconditional will be true everywhere, 
satisfied by every object.295 Drier concedes that Dworkin is correct that some versions of 
secondary quality are morally committing but (ASQ) is designed to show that this is not true 
for every version. The version that Dworkin himself refers to, Dreier claims, is not such a 
version. In that version, what makes genocide wrong is that people with our physiological 
structure, basic interests, and general mental dispositions have a certain reaction to 
genocide.296 Dworkin, as noted above, believes that substantive and controversial claims 
follow from this version. Such a claim is that genocide would not have been wicked if 
economic or other circumstances had been different as human reactions evolved so that 
creatures with our general interests and attitudes had not been revolted by genocide.297  Dreier 
WKLQNV'ZRUNLQ¶Vexplication of this version of secondary quality involves an incoherence. For 
Dreier, in any world where creatures are as we are, genocide would cause in them a feeling of 
moral revulsion. It makes no sense to imagine a world where we have the general interests and 
attitudes we have now but are not revolted by genocide. For Drier, any world where 
circumstances evolved so that creatures with our general interests and attitudes had not been 
revolted by genocide would be a world that does not contain creatures with our general 
LQWHUHVWVDQGDWWLWXGHV)RU'UHLHU'ZRUNLQ¶VQRWLRQRIZKDWZHDUHLVQRWFRQVWUDLQHGHQRXJK
by our actual moral standards and the contingent circumstances that allowed them to evolve. 
If a secondary quality theory such as the one Dworkin imagines is so constrained, Dreier 
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believes it will not have any of the substantive and controversial claims that Dworkin believes 
follow from it.  
5.5 CRITIQUE OF DREIER  
The difficulty wiWK'UHLHU¶VXVDJHRIKLVYDULDWLRQRQ.DUPR¶V/DZ9./LVQRWWKDW
(VKL) is false. Rather, the difficulty is that Dreier has an unduly narrow interpretation of 
ZKDWDµPRUDOVWDQGDUG¶LV0RUHRYHUKHRIIHUVQRMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUWKLVQDUURZLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ. 
)RU'UHLHUDPRUDOVWDQGDUGFDQ¶WLQFOXGHDFODLPDERXWKRZWRPRUDOO\HYDOXDWHRWKHUPRUDO
standards. We can see this because if Drier were to allow that moral standards could include 
claims about how to morally evaluate other moral standards, his examples could be examples 
of such moral standards. If this were the case, it would mean that Dreier had failed to show 
WKDWDUFKLPHGHDQSURSRVLWLRQVFDQEHPRUDOO\QHXWUDO7KXVLQRUGHUIRU'UHLHU¶VDUJXPHQWLQ
favour of the possible neutrality of archimedean claims to be successful, he must offer 
additional arguments for the moral non-QHXWUDOLW\RIKLVH[DPSOHV7RLOOXVWUDWHOHW¶VWDNHRQH
RIWKHFODLPVWKDWFRPHVRXWZLWKDGLDJRQDORI7¶VLQ'UHLHU¶VPDWUL[$ERUWLRQLVZURQJLI
and only if it is wrong according to my moral standard. Drier is correct that this claim does 
not commit us to a range of 1st order moral claims dealing directly with the moral status of 
abortion. However, Dreier has not shown that this claim does not commit us to 2nd order 
moral claims about how to morally evaluate moral standards relating to abortion. In other 
words, Dreier has not shown that this claim does not commit us to a claim that is 2nd order 
DQGVLPXOWDQHRXVO\PRUDO7RVHHWKLVOHW¶VREVHUYHWKHFODLP³$ERUWLRQLVZURng if and only 
LILWLVZURQJDFFRUGLQJWRP\PRUDOVWDQGDUG´7KLVFODLPLPSOLHVWKHGHQLDORI 
(V) Abortion is wrong independently of whether it is wrong according to my actual moral 
standards  
and  
:,WLVLQFRUUHFWWKDW³DERUWLRQLVZURQJRQO\LILWis wrong according to my actual moral 
VWDQGDUGV´͒ 
(V) and (W) seem, on the face of it, like 2nd order claims. On the other hand, they also seem 
to be capable of being read as moral claims. (V) says if one chooses to evaluate my actual 
moral standards, one should not assume that my moral standards determine whether or not 
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abortion is wrong. (W) says that if one were to assert that abortion was wrong  iff it were 
wrong according to my actual moral standards, they would be mistaken. Of course, it is true 
that one could give a purely descriptive reading of (V) and (W). The point is the moral reading 
KDVWREHH[FOXGHGIRU'UHLHU¶VXVHRI9./WRDGHTXDWHO\GHPRQVWUDWHWKDWDUFKLPHGHDQ
theories can be morally neutral. Moreover, merely claiming that (V) and (W) are 2nd order 
ZRXOGQRWEHVXIILFLHQWWRGRWKLV7KLVLVIRUWZRUHDVRQV7KHILUVWUHDVRQLVWKDWWKDW'UHLHU¶V
claim about abortion appears to be both 2nd order and morally non-neutral. The second is that 
'ZRUNLQ¶VZKROHSRLQWLVWKDWSODXVLEOHPRUDOFOaims that appear to be 2nd order claims can 
be interpreted as 1st order claims. Dreier needs to exclude the moral reading of his abortion 
claim in order to show that the 1st order interpretation does not work. ͒  
I will leave it an open question for now whether or not (V) and (W) actually are 1st 
or 2nd order. Quasi-Realists like Simon Blackburn would probably want to classify them as 
1st order moral claims that express higher-order attitudes. Other theorists like Mackie would 
probably want to classify them as 2nd order claims which happen to be false. Regardless of 
which order one chooses to interpret them as being, Dreier must show how a moral 
interpretation of them is either impossible or implausible. One cannot simply point out that the 
claim tells us little about additional moral standards the agent who affirms it may or may not 
hold if one is attempting to demonstrate the moral neutrality of the claim. One must show that 
it is not a moral claim about how to evaluate other moral claims. This is because a claim about 
how to evaluate abortion claims may be moral on the one hand and on the other hand silent 
about the specific views the agent who affirms it holds about abortion. ͒  
,IZHGRQµWUXOHRXWWKLVSRVVLELOLW\ZHFDQFHUWDLQO\VD\WKDWVXFKFODLPVFommit 
whoever affirms them to a range of moral claims in that world. They may not be claims about 
whether or not one should take a pro or anti-abortion stance. However, they could be claims 
about how it is appropriate to evaluate moral claims that take pro or anti-abortion stances. 
Moreover, in the absence of an argument that (V) and (W) must be read as descriptive, we 
could say that if we heard a speaker affirm or deny (V) or (W) in any world, we would be able 
to narrow down the set of moral claims they beOLHYHLQ,IDVSHDNHUDIILUPHG³$ERUWLRQLV
ZURQJLIDQGRQO\LILWLVZURQJDFFRUGLQJWRP\PRUDOVWDQGDUG´ZHZRXOGNQRZKHGHQLHV
9DQG:,IKHDIILUPHG9RU:WKHQZHZRXOGNQRZKHGHQLHV³$ERUWLRQLVZURQJLI
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and only if it is wrong accordLQJWRP\PRUDOVWDQGDUG´,IWKHUHDUHQRDUJXPHQWVWRVKRZ
WKDW9DQG:DUHGHVFULSWLYHLWVHHPVWKDW'UHLHU¶VDERUWLRQFODLPLQYROYHVPRUDO
commitments after all. They are just not substantive pro-abortion or anti-abortion 
commitments.  Here, Dreier might reply that the kinds of moral commitments we are 
highlighting are irrelevant to his project. He might protest that his aim was simply to show 
that there is a criterion for deciding when a moral claim is morally neutral in the sense of not 
committing its proponents to 1st order moral claims. Such claims, he may insist, are not also 
claims about how to morally evaluate moral standards. Perhaps this is what Dreier meant by 
the set of all uncontroversial moral sentences. If Dreier were to give this rejoinder, he would 
EHEHJJLQJWKHTXHVWLRQDJDLQVW'ZRUNLQ2QHRIWKHNH\FODLPVRI'ZRUNLQ¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKH
assertion that many claims that sound like 2nd order archimedean claims are, in fact, 1st order 
moral claims. If archimedean theories commit those who assert them to these moral claims 
that sound as though they are 2nd order, those archimedean theories are not morally neutral. 
Dreier needs to show that no archimedean theories commit their proponents to 2nd order 
moral claims about how to evaluate moral standards. In order to defeat Dworkin, he also has 
to show no archimedean theories commit their proponents to any moral claims whatsoever. ͒ 
$VZHUHFDOOSDUWRI'ZRUNLQ¶VVWUDWHJ\LVWRGRWZRWKLQJV+HZDQWVWRVD\WKDWDQ\
2nd order claims that validate or undermine 1st order claims can be reduced to 1st order moral 
claims. On the other hand, he wants to say that those 2nd order claims which validate or 
undermine 1st order moral claims and cannot be reduced to 1st order moral claims are 
implausible claims to assert.  These latter 2nd order moral claims are the archimedean claims 
Dworkin opposes. If Dreier can show that all these archimedean claims are morally neutral, he 
will have shown that there are no 2nd order claims which can validate or undermine 1st order 
PRUDOFODLPV%HFDXVH'UHLHUIDLOVWRPDNHWKHDERYHDWWDFNKLVUHSO\WR'ZRUNLQ¶VYLHZVRQ
secondary qualities is particularly problematic. As we recall, Dreier tries to generate a version 
of secondary quality theory thDWLVDEOHWRJHWGLDJRQDO7¶VLQKLVPDWUL[+LVDLPDVQRWHG
earlier, is to show that Dworkin is mistaken in thinking that there is something inherent in 
secondary quality theories that makes moral claims. Therefore, he constructs a version of 
secondary quality (which he labels (ASQ)) which is expressed by a proposition he believes is 
morally neutral regarding abortion:͒ 
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(ASQ): For every X, necessarily, X is wrong if and only if x is wrong according to my actual 
moral standards.  
While Dreier is correcWWKDW$64FDQJHWGLDJRQDO7¶VLQKLVPDWUL[WKLVDJDLQIDLOVWR
show that (ASQ) is morally neutral. This is because, like the above claim about abortion, 
(ASQ) can be read as a moral claim about how it is morally appropriate to evaluate moral 
standaUGV/LNH'UHLHU¶VDERUWLRQFODLP$64LPSOLHVWKHGHQLDORIWZRFODLPV 
(Y) X can be wrong if X is wrong according to my actual moral standards. ͒   
and͒ 
=,WLVLQFRUUHFWWKDW³)RUHYHU\;QHFHVVDULO\;LVZURQJLIDQGRQO\LI[LVZURQJ
according WRP\DFWXDOPRUDOVWDQGDUGV´͒ 
 Like (V) and (W), it looks on the face of it that (Y) and (Z) are capable of being read 
as moral claims. (Y) says if one chooses to evaluate my moral standards, one should not 
assume that my moral standards determine whether or not X is wrong. (Z) says that if one 
were to assert that X was wrong if and only if it were wrong according to my moral standard, 
they would be mistaken. Like (V) and (W), it is true that one could give a purely descriptive 
reading of (Y) and (Z). Again, the moral reading must be excluded for Dreier to use (VKL) to 
adequately demonstrate that (ASQ) is morally neutral. As we can see, Dreier has failed to 
exclude this moral reading.  Hence, (ASQ) fails to show that a version of secondary quality is 
morally non-committal.  
               .(11(7+(+5(1%(5*¶6$77$&.21':25.,1 
.HQQHWK(KUHQEHUJPRXQWVDGLIIHUHQWDWWDFNRQ'ZRUNLQ¶VFODLPV)RU(KUHQEHUJ
Dworkin fails to discredit the theoretical stance from which the archimedean makes his 
claims. +HUH,DPXVLQJ³WKHRUHWLFDOVWDQFH´WRPHDQWKHWKHRUHWLFDODVVXPSWLRQVWKDWWKH
archimedean makes while attempting to assert his archimedean claims.298 Ehrenberg throws a 
barrage of criticisms at Dworkin.  All of them, in different ways, attempt to demonstrate this 
IDLOXUHRQ'ZRUNLQ¶VSDUWWRGLVFUHGLWWKHWKHRUHWLFDOVWDQFHRIWKHDUFKLPHGHDQ7KHILUVWRI
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these criticisms is that Dworkin fails to show that one can reduce all plausible E propositions 
to I propositions. One of the theoretical assumptions of the archimedean, we should 
remember, is that he can assert E propositions he believes are plausible and incapable of being 
reduced to I propositions. That means the archimedean believes he can assert 2nd order moral 
claims about the metaphysics of I propositions which can potentially undermine or validate 2nd 
order moral claims. If Ehrenberg is right in this criticism of Dworkin, he has shown that 
Dworkin has failed to demonstrate that the archimedean holds any false assumptions 
regarding E propositions.  
 /LNH'UHLHU(KUHQEHUJWDNHVLVVXHZLWK'ZRUNLQ¶VFODLPVWKDWDUFKLPHGHDQWKHRULHV
that purport to be morally neutral are making moral claims.  If Ehrenberg is right in this 
criticism, archimedeans justifiably assume that they are morally neutral insofar as they make 
DUFKLPHGHDQFODLPV(KUHQEHUJDOVRGLVSXWHV'ZRUNLQ¶VFODLPWKDWVHFRQGDU\TXDOLW\WKHRU\LV
morally non-neutral because the theory takes positions on counterfactual conditionals about 
morality. If Ehrenberg is right in this criticism, he has shown that Dworkin has failed to 
demonstrate archimedeans are mistaken in assuming that at least some archimedean theories 
DUHPRUDOO\QHXWUDO(KUHQEHUJDOVRDWWDFNV'ZRUNLQ¶VFODLPWKDWTXDVL-realism is not morally 
neutral. Dworkin claims this moral non-neutrality stems from the impossibility of quasi-
realism to maintain the distinctions between the 1st and 2nd order moral perspectives from 
which the quasi-realist makes his multiple claims. Ehrenberg claims that these distinctions are 
possible and attempts to explain how.  If Ehrenberg is right, quasi-realists are archimedeans 
who make no false assumptions about the meta-ethical distinctions they rely on to make their 
claims.  
 (KUHQEHUJDOVRDWWDFNV'ZRUNLQ¶VYDULRXVDWWHPSWVWRVKRZWKDWDUFKLPHGHDQVDre not 
dealing with philosophical issues that are above and beyond the issues dealt with in 1st order 
moral discourse. These issues include whether one or not one can adequately cash out the 
notion of moral objectivity in terms of causal relations. Ehrenberg maintains that this issue is 
not one that is happening at the 1st order. If Ehrenberg is correct in this criticism, he has 
shown that Dworkin has failed to demonstrate that archimedeans make false assumptions 
when archimedeans believe themselves to be having 2nd order philosophical discussions. This 
is the first tactic Ehrenberg utilizes in his critique of Dworkin. He begins with this tactic, I 
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believe, as a way of making his other criticisms increasingly persuasive.  After all, if one 
starts out believing the claim that archimedean philosophical issues are distinct from 
discussions of 1st order moral claims, the other criticisms Ehrenberg aims at Dworkin increase 
in plausibility.299 
 (KUHQEHUJEHJLQVKLVFULWLTXHRI'ZRUNLQE\H[DPLQLQJ'ZRUNLQ¶VFODLPWKDt 
discussions about moral properties are not best understood as examples of metaphysical, 2nd 
order discussions. As noted earlier, Dworkin posits that moral properties are not to be 
understood metaphysically but as part of the 1st order moral claims internal to moral practice. 
He claims, for instance, that to make the apparently metaphysical claim that being right is just 
the property of maximizing happiness is analogous to making the claim that being water is the 
same as being H20. In both cases, the reductions are synthetic and not semantic reductions of 
identity claims. Moreover, such reductions work because of scientific discovery. For 
Dworkin, the claim about rightness being the maximization of happiness is best understood as 
the result of a substantive moral thesis (utilitarianism) and is just a part of that 1st order moral 
theory.300  
To further defend this claim, Dworkin, as noted earlier, claims that there is no 
difference in what two people think if one utilitarian thinks that the only thing that can make 
an act right is maximizing power and the second utilitarian thinks that the property of 
rightness and the property of maximizing power are the same property.301 For Dworkin, the 
RQO\GLIIHUHQFHLVWKDWWKHVHFRQGXWLOLWDULDQ¶VYLHZXVHVWKHMDUJRQRIPHtaphysics. However, 
it does nothing to add any substantive idea to the view of the first utilitarian¶VYLHZ(KUHQEHUJ
criticizes Dworkin for choosing an example which does not adequately showcase possible 2nd 
order differences between two utilitarians who agree that what makes an act right is its 
maximizing power. Ehrenberg invites us to imagine a different example with a new pair of 
utilitarians. The first utilitarian says that there is a fact of the matter about which actions are 
good because goodness is the same property as the maximization of happiness and there is 
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some empirical truth about which actions maximize happiness. The second utilitarian believes 
there is a fact of the matter about which actions are good and also believes the 1st order claim 
that goodness is the maximization of happiness. Where the second utilitarian disagrees with 
the first is that the second believes that goodness is the maximization of happiness because 
moral sensibility is the result of an evolutionary process that functionally favours valuing 
certain actions over others as happiness maximizing.302 Ehrenberg states that while the two 
utilitarians agree on first order questions about which actions are good, they disagree on the 
second order question of why happiness maximization determines which actions are good. 
Ehrenberg then states it is implausible to interpret each utilitarian as holding a different 
version of 1st order utilitarianism. Rather, he thinks the best explanation of the situation is that 
both utilitarians hold the same first order doctrine. However, they disagree on the second 
order meta-ethical theory that best accounts for the 1st order utilitarianism they both hold.303 
 Ehrenberg thinks this is the case because both utilitarians agree on every 1st order 
claim that could be called part of a utilitarian theory. Ehrenberg finds it implausible to claim 
that both utilitarians are holding distinct forms of utilitarianism because of the widespread 
agreement at the 1st order level. Moreover, Ehrenberg finds the 2nd order disagreement 
EHWZHHQERWKWKHRULVWVDGLVDJUHHPHQWWKDWLVPRUDOO\QHXWUDO+HQFH'ZRUNLQFDQ¶WFODLP
that each version of utilitarianism is 1st order. Ehrenberg thinks the reasoning that motivates 
WKHILUVWXWLOLWDULDQWRUHMHFWWKHVHFRQG¶V'DUZLQLDQ reasoning is not moral reasoning. To 
illustrate, Ehrenberg considers the possibility that the evolutionary utilitarian might be 
claiming that happiness maximization is morally best because we are evolutionarily disposed 
to believe that. In this hypothetical scenario, the evolutionary utilitarian would be making a 
moral claim. But in the scenario that Ehrenberg has just had us consider, this is not the case. 
According to Ehrenberg, the evolutionary utilitarian is only explaining why we consider it to 
be morally best. The evolutionary utilitarian is not making any moral endorsements and thus 
one can evaluate his claims about evolution in a way that is entirely distinct from his 1st order 
evaluative endorsements. Hence, Ehrenberg believes he has shown that Dworkin has failed to 
establish that the 2nd order questions involving explanations of why we hold the moral beliefs 
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we do are actually 1st order moral discussions. 
 Ehrenberg also attacks Dworkin on the grounds that Dworkin has not sufficiently 
shown that particular 2nd order meta-ethical theories are committed to making moral claims. 
$FFRUGLQJWR(KUHQEHUJWKLVLVSDUWLFXODUO\WUXHUHJDUGLQJ'ZRUNLQ¶VDQDO\VLVRIERWK
secondary quality theory and quasi-realism. With regards to secondary quality theory, 
Dworkin states that the distinction between primary and secondary properties is that the 
former are properties that things have in themselves while the latter are just capacities to 
provoke defined sensations or reactions in sentient creatures.304 This, as we saw above, is what 
Dworkin believes commits secondary quality theories to substantively moral counterfactual 
claims. Among these are the claim that if humans had developed along different historical 
lines, reactions to things like genocide could be very different from the reactions humans 
currently possess. In such hypothetical situations, genocide would cease to have the same 
moral status it has now. As we saw earlier, Dworkin takes this to be a substantive moral claim.  
Ehrenberg claims that Dworkin has given no persuasive reason to think that the counterfactual 
claims he believes secondary quality theories are committed to are moral. He has merely 
shown that such claims could be interpreted in a way that is moral. However, according to 
Ehrenberg, the burden of proof is on Dworkin to show that it is somehow impossible or 
implausible to interpret such counterfactuals as purely descriptive. Ehrenberg also claims that 
Dworkin has unfairly assumed that secondary quality would commit its proponents to such 
counterfactual moral claims in the first place. This is because Dworkin assumes that there is 
no difference between saying something has the capacity to provoke a reaction and saying it 
would not have that capacity if it did not produce the reaction in situations where the reaction 
currently occurs.305͒  
Referencing secondary quality proponent John McDowell, Ehrenberg notes that there 
is a mind independence element of secondary quality descriptions that Dworkin ignores.306 
According to McDowell, a situation¶VEHLQJZUong is independent of its seeming wrong to 
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anyone on any particular occasion. For McDowell, to experience something as being wrong 
can count as a case of being presented with a property that is there independently of the 
experience.307 This means, for Ehrenberg, that a secondary property is just the ability of an 
object to give rise to a reaction. However, this reaction may not ever take place.308 Ehrenberg 
LOOXVWUDWHVWKLVFODLPE\LQYLWLQJXVWRLPDJLQHDQHZO\GLVFRYHUHGPLQHUDOFDOOHG³QDXVHXP´
309
 Nauseum has the property of making the viewer of nauseum feel nauseated when light is 
refracted off its surface at a specific angle and enters the eye. For Ehrenberg, this is clearly a 
secondary property in both Dworkin and McDowell¶VVHQVH+RZHYHUQDXVHXPKDVthis 
property prior to and independently of anyone ever experiencing nausea elicited by nauseum. 
We can even imagine situations in which everyone is warned beforehand of the nausea that 
nausium elicits and everyone takes precautions such that no one ever experiences nausea 
caused by nauseum. Even in these circumstances, Ehrenberg maintains that naseum still has 
the secondary property of having the capacity to make a viewer of nauseum feel nauseated. 
Hence, secondary quality does not commit its proponents to counterfactual claims that a 
particular secondary quality would not exist under different conditions.310   
(KUHQEHUJDOVRFULWLTXHV'ZRUNLQ¶VDVVHVVPHQWRITXDVL-realism on similar grounds. 
As noted earlier, Dworkin thinks there is an inherent tension between the act of making quasi-
realist 2nd order claims while simultaneously trying to accommodate the face value of 1st 
RUGHUPRUDOGLVFRXUVH7KLVWHQVLRQDULVHVEHFDXVHVWRUGHUFODLPVVXFKDV³*HQRFLGHZRXOG
EHZURQJHYHQLIQRRQHWKRXJKWLWVXFK´Gepend on mind independent facts. This is because, 
in the absence of mind independent facts, Dworkin believes there would be no justification for 
EHOLHYLQJWKDWJHQRFLGHZRXOGFHDVHWREHZLFNHGLISHRSOH¶VDWWLWXGHVZHUHGLIIHUHQW
Ehrenberg here accuses Dworkin of having a falsely dichotomous thinking when it comes to 
the perspectives available from which to analyze value concepts.311 He accuses Dworkin of 
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believing you are either in or out of a practice312 with regard to the subject of your analysis. 
Moreover, Ehrenberg claims that practices have a wide variety of µQHVWHGOHYHOV¶LQZKLFKRQH
can participate or remain outside.313 Ehrenberg illustrates his contentions by claiming that one 
FDQVD\³*HQRFLGHLVPRUDOO\UHSUHKHQVLEOH´³8WLOLWDULDQLVPLVWKHEHVWWKeory of moral 
MXGJPHQWV´DQG³0RUDOVWDWHPHQWVKDYHQRWUXWKYDOXH´)RUDOOWKUHHFODLPV(KUHQEHUJ
claims there is no precise way of differentiating which claims are 1st order and which claims 
are archimedean. This is because each claim, according to Ehrenberg, appears archimedean 
from a claim pitched at a perspective that is closer to 1st order moral discourse. Ehrenberg 
even accepts that there may be tensions among our beliefs at different levels of perspective. 
However, Ehrenberg states that these tensions are not contradictions. Rather, he posits that the 
criteria by which we assess the validity of descriptions shift, depending on the level of 
abstraction from which one approaches a description.314͒  
Dworkin, as noted above, attempted to show that claimVOLNH³6ODYHU\LVREMHFWLYHO\
ZURQJ´GRQ¶WVD\DQ\WKLQJRIPHWDSK\VLFDOVXEVWDQFHZKLFKLVRYHUDQGDERYH³6ODYHU\LV
ZURQJLQWHUGHSHQGHQWO\RIZKDWDQ\ERG\WKLQNV´'ZRUNLQFULWLFL]HVWKHDUFKLPHGHDQIRU
assuming this claim is metaphysical so that the archimedean can deny it in the name of 
wanting to craft an attractive ontology.315 However, as we saw earlier, Dworkin believes that 
not only are such claims not metaphysical but that denying them amounts to denying the claim 
³6ODYHU\LVZURQJLQGHSHQGHQWO\RI ZKDWDQ\ERG\WKLQNV´'ZRUNLQLVQRWMXVWFULWLFL]LQJ
archimedeans but moral realists as well. For Dworkin, both positions attempt to occupy a 2nd 
order theoretical space outside of moral practice from which both positions attempt to validate 
or undermine moral claims.  For Dworkin, all 2nd order moral claims which attempt to validate 
or undermine 1st order claims are implausible. Dworkin criticizes attempts by meta-ethicists to 
FDVKRXW³PRUDOREMHFWLYLW\´LQWHUPVRIFDXVDOUHODWLRQVZKHUHWKHUHLVDFRUrespondence 
between moral beliefs and the properties of moral states of affairs. If this causal relation 
amounts to the claim that the practice of slavery causes one to judge it wrong, there is no way 
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to interpret this at the 2nd order level which leaves the claim with any plausibility. If one 
LQWHUSUHWVWKHFODLPDVDFODLPDERXWWKHFDXVDOUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQRQH¶VPRUDOEHOLHIVDQG
PRUDOVWDWHVRIDIIDLUVWKHFODLPDPRXQWVWR³,EHOLHYHFHUWDLQPRUDOVWDWHVRIDIIDLUVDUHEDG
because my observations of those states of affairs causes me to think that the states of affairs 
DUHEDG´,IWKHDUFKLPHGHDQZHUHWRGHQ\WKLVFODLPWKLVZRXOGDPRXQWWRDQDGPLVVLRQRI
non-neutrality regarding moral claims. On the other hand, if one interprets the causal relation 
as one between moral agents and moral situations that are surrounded by a non-naturalistic 
³PRUDOILHOG´WKDWFDXVHVPRUDODJHQWVWRKDYHPRUDOEHOLHIVRQHKDVPDGHDSUHSRVWHURXV
moral claim. ͒  
Ehrenberg agrees here with the preposterousness of the moral field thesis. However, 
KHFKDOOHQJHV'ZRUNLQ¶VDVVXPSWLRQWKDWLWLVDPRUDOFODLP+HLQYLWHVXVWRLPDJLQHDQRWKHU
set of disagreeing utilitarians. Both of them say that what makes an action right is that it tends 
to maximize happiness. Ehrenberg now suggests we imagine that each has a different answer 
to the question of how they know that what makes an action right is its tendency to maximize 
happiness. The first utilitarian claims that her views of rightness are the result of utilitarianism 
getting the closest balance between her considered moral judgments and theoretical 
constructions about those judgments. The second utilitarian says his views on rightness are 
grounded in the fact that there is a moral field surrounding situations in which happiness has 
been increased or around actions that have increased happiness. If we ask this second 
utilitarian what his response would be to an action that increases happiness that is not 
surrounded by the moral field, he can give two answers. He could say that the moral field 
trumps since that is the way in which he knows what is moral or he could say the increasing 
happiness trumps since that is a good theory which should not be discarded on the basis of a 
few counter examples.316Ehrenberg claims that the former answer indicates the person is no 
longer a utilitarian and the latter answer indicates the person is engaging in theory 
construction using meta-theoretical considerations.317 The former answer would mean that the 
moral field thesis was a moral thesis for the second utilitarian. However, the latter answer 
would not and this answer still represents an open possible interpretation of the 
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situation.318Again, Ehrenberg believes this shows that Dworkin has failed to provide a good 
case that objectivity claims must be interpreted in a first order manner. All Dworkin has 
shown is that such a first order interpretation is possible. However, Ehrenberg claims he has 
not shown that a completely descriptive, 2nd order interpretation is impossible or 
implausible.319 
 Ehrenberg then goes on to suggest that what differentiates 1st order from 2nd order 
moral questions are levels of justification. For Ehrenberg, the 2nd order moral claim justifies 
the 1st order moral claim in a manner that another 1st order moral claim cannot do. When a 
utilitarian is asked why he believes that right actions are happiness maximizing actions, he 
will typically give answers that consist of 1st order claims. However, when asked to justify 
such answers by answering the question of whether or not the utilitarian knows that 
utilitarianism is an objective matter of fact or expression of his subjective opinion, the 
answers given will typically be 2nd order. They will be archimedean in the sense that they 
will be judgments made from a 2nd order perspective which is outside the 1st order perspective 
of moral practice. Moreover, they will be 2nd order answers that Ehrenberg claims are not 
dependent on any of the 1st order justifications that the utilitarian may give. Ehrenberg leaves 
open whether or not these 2nd order debates are relevant for moral decision making. However, 
he makes a point to claim that such debates are intelligible debates that cannot be reduced to 
1st order debates. ͒  
&5,7,48(2)(+5(1%(5*¶6&5,7,48(2)':25.,1 
Ehrenberg challenges 'ZRUNLQ¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDWGLVFXVVLRQVRIWKHLGHQWLWLHVRI
metaphysical properties are happening at the 1st order.  As we saw above, Ehrenberg delivers 
this challenge with an example of two utilitarians who hold the same 1st order moral views.  
However, the first utilitarian believes that goodness is the same property as the maximizing of 
happiness. The second utilitarian thinks goodness is the same property as maximizing 
happiness but this is because moral sensibility is a result of an evolutionary process that 
functionally favours valuing certain actions over others. The first utilitarian does not hold the 
view that the second utilitarian does about why utilitarianism is true.  Ehrenberg assumes that 
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this disagreement is a 2nd order disagreement that leaves all the 1st order moral views of both 
utilitarians unchanged.  Hence, it is an archimedean disagreement that is morally neutral.  
 The difficulty with this argument is it does not establish what it is supposed to 
establish.  This is because the example Ehrenberg uses does seem like a 2nd order discussion, 
on the one hand.  On the other hand, it seems like it could be read as a morally non-neutral 
GLVDJUHHPHQWDVZHOO7KLVLVEHFDXVHWKHVHFRQGXWLOLWDULDQ¶VYLHZFDQEHUHDGDVDPRUDO
claim.  To say that utilitarianism is true because moral sensibility is a result of an evolutionary 
process that favors valuing certain actions over others is to say that an evolutionary process 
can determine what is moral. If an evolutionary process can determine what is moral, this 
suggests that the evolutionary process is capable of justifying moral claims.  If this is the case, 
claims that explain moral truths in terms of an evolutionary process, seem to be explaining 
those moral truths as being morally justified because of the evolutionary process. Of course, 
there is the alternative reading of the claim of the second utilitarian that is completely non-
PRUDO$OWKRXJK(KUHQEHUJILQGVWKHDOWHUQDWLYHUHDGLQJPRUHSODXVLEOHKHGRHVQ¶W
demonstrate to the reader that the first reading is implausible. 
 7KLVVHHPVWREHHLWKHUDSURGXFWRI(KUHQEHUJ¶VIDLOXUHWRQRWLFHWKHPRUDO
interpretation of the beliefs of the 2nd XWLOLWDULDQRU(KUHQEHUJ¶VUHMHFWLRQRIWKHPRUDO
interpretation.  If Ehrenberg has failed to notice the moral interpretation, he needs to 
reconstruct this particular argument against Dworkin to deal with it.  If Ehrenberg rejects the 
moral interpretation because he finds it implausible, he needs to explain why.  Ehrenberg does 
neither. Also, there is a difficulty with a non-moral interpretation of the views of the second 
utilitarian that Ehrenberg has not addressed.  This difficulty is the views of the second 
utilitarian involve explaining why a 1st order normative ethical theory is true by making 
reference to evolutionary processes. If Ehrenberg interprets the evolutionary processes as not 
being a moral justification of utilitarianism, then he is interpreting the evolutionary processes 
as just being a non-moral explanation of the truth of utilitarianism. To the extent that the 
evolutionary process does any justification of the truth of utilitarianism, it will somehow be 
non-moral justification. 
 The problem with this view is it presupposes the normal characterisation of the 1st 
and 2nd order distinction.  It presupposes that one can validate a set of 1st order moral claims 
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from 2nd order moral claims that are morally neutral.  This is the very possibility that 
'ZRUNLQ¶VYLHZVDUHFKDOOHQJLQJ'ZRUNLQ¶VZKROHSRLQWLVWKDWnd order moral claims which 
can validate or undermine 1st order moral claims are implausible 2nd RUGHUFODLPV(KUHQEHUJ¶V
example only shows that one may interpret a utilitarian as making a 2nd order claim that 
validates a set of 1st order moral claims.  It does not show that this assertion by the utilitarian 
is plausible.  This is what Ehrenberg would have to show in order to use this argument as a 
challenge to Dworkin. All Ehrenberg does is invoke a hypothetical example of two 
disagreeing utilitarians which presupposes the normal characterisation of the 1st and 2nd order 
GLVWLQFWLRQ7KLVEHJVWKHTXHVWLRQDJDLQVW'ZRUNLQEHFDXVH'ZRUNLQ¶VYLHZVFRQFHUQLQJ
what constitute an implausible 2nd order claim attempt to challenge the normal 
characterization of the 1st and 2nd order distinction. Namely, they attempt to challenge the 
aspect of that normal characterization which implies that plausible 2nd order claims can 
validate or undermine a set of 1st order moral claims.  
 (KUHQEHUJPDNHVDGLIIHUHQWVHWRIPLVWDNHVLQKLVDWWHPSWWRGHIHQG0F'RZHOO¶V 
VHFRQGDU\TXDOLW\WKHRULHVIURP'ZRUNLQ¶VDWWDFN(KUHQEHUJFODLPVWKDWRQVHFRQGDU\TXDOLW\
theory, the claim that to experience something as being wrong can count as a case of being 
presented with a property that is there independently of the experience.320 For Ehrenberg, a 
secondary property is just the ability of an object to give rise to a reaction that may never take 
place. Hence, for Ehrenberg, a secondary quality theory need not involve counterfactual 
claims. Are these sufficient conditions of a morally neutral secondary quality theory? It seems 
not. This is because any meta-ethical theory that attempts to give an identity between the 
experience of something being wrong and being presented with a property that is there 
independently of the experience of the property is morally non-neutral. It is morally non-
neutral because it implies moral claims.  Namely, it implies that any meta-ethical theory that 
is incompatible with the secondary quality theory is giving an incorrect characterization of 
wrongness. The claim that a theory is giving an incorrect characterization of wrongness is a 
moral claim because it is implicitly giving necessary conditions of a correct characterization 
of wrongness.  In other words, the claim is asserting that in order to be a genuine instance of 
wrongness, the experience of wrongness has to coincide with being presented with a property 
                                                        
320Ehrenberg (2008), 515-520 
Page 199 of 227 
 
that is there independently of the experience of the property. Any experience of wrongness 
that does not coincide with being presented with a property that is there independently of the 
experience of the property is not a genuine instance of wrongness.  The act of giving 
necessary conditions of a correct characterization of wrongness is a moral act because it 
implies that a set of purportedly wrong claims that fail to satisfy the necessary conditions are 
not actually wrong. If Ehrenberg wants to show that despite these entailments, his version of 
secondary quality is somehow morally neutral, the burden of proof is on him to provide 
supplementary arguments.  He fails to do this.  
 Ehrenberg makes a similar blunder in his attempt to show that Dworkin has failed to 
demonstrate that a debate about the causal explanation of moral beliefs can be a morally 
neutral one. As we recall, Dworkin claims that causal explanations of moral claims must 
either be understood as 1st order moral claims or as absurd 2nd order moral claims. For 
Dworkin, this counts against them being understood as 2nd order moral claims. Ehrenberg 
WULHVWRVKRZKHUHWKDWZHFDQLQWHUSUHWDXWLOLWDULDQDVKROGLQJRQHRI'ZRUNLQ¶VDEVXUGQG
RUGHUFODLPVWKHµPRUDOILHOGWKHVLV¶IRUUHDVRQVWKDWDUHWKHRUHWLFDOUDWKHUWKDQPRUDO
Ehrenberg believes that the burden of proof is on Dworkin here to show that the above 
VFHQDULRLVLPSRVVLEOH<HW(KUHQEHUJ¶VRZQH[DPSOHIDLOVWRVKRZZKDWLWLVVXSSRVHGWR
show: that the agent who holds the moral field thesis for theoretical reasons is not engaged in 
a moral act. Ehrenberg makes no attempt to deal with the issue of whether the moral field 
thesis gives necessary conditions of morality that wind up implying moral claims.  Nor does 
he deal with the issue that the moral field thesis may be a 2nd order view about how to morally 
evaluate moral claims. 
 (KUHQEHUJIDLOVWRDGHTXDWHO\GHIHQGKLVDWWDFNVRQ'ZRUNLQ¶VWUHDWPHQWRITXDVL-
realism. As we recall, Dworkin criticizes quasi-realists like Blackburn who attempt to make 
PLQGLQGHSHQGHQFHFODLPVVXFKDV³*HQRFLGHZRXOGEHZURQJHYHQLIQRRQHWKRXJKWVR´
because they simultaneously deny the existence of mind independent moral facts. Ehrenberg 
defends the quasi-realists here by insisting that the denial of mind independent moral facts is 
KDSSHQLQJDWWKHQGRUGHUOHYHORIWKHRU\ZKHUHDVWKH³*HQRFLGH is wrong even if no one 
HYHUWKRXJKWVR´FODLPLVKDSSHQLQJDWWKHVWRUGHUOHYHORIWKHRU\7KLVGHIHQFHEHJVWKH
question against Dworkin because it assumes the quasi-realist understanding of the 1st and 2nd 
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order distinction.321 Yet it is this very understanding that Dworkin is calling into question.  
Although Dworkin is not a moral realist, he clearly thinks moral claims about mind 
independence have to (in some sense) be taken at face value. Dworkin expects the moral 
theorist to be something like a moral realist at the 1st order level. This means that, for 
Dworkin, the kinds of views moral realists typically hold as 2nd order justifications of their 
1st order moral views Dworkin wants to hold at the 1st order level. Dworkin does not think 
³;LVZURQJLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIZKDWDQ\ERG\WKLQNV´FDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVDQDWWLWXGHWKDW
regulates other attitudes. Rather, Dworkin thinks the only appropriate interpretation of such a 
mind independence moral claim is that it be interpreted as a claim about mind independent 
PRUDOIDFWV6SHFLILFDOO\'ZRUNLQZDQWVWRFODLPWKDW³;LVZURQJLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIZKDW
DQ\ERG\WKLQNV´LVDPRUDOFODLPWKDWFDQQRWEHDQDO\]HGRUVXPPDUL]HGDVDQ\WKLQJRWKHU
than a 1st order moral claim. As soon as a quasi-realist starts to give an account of mind 
independence that offers a summary of mind independence in terms of the attitude-
coordinating role it plays in moral practice, Dworkin believes the quasi-realist has 
misinterpreted mind independence. For Dworkin, the mind independence of moral claims is 
simply the mind independence of moral claims. Nothing more that is not moral can be said 
about it without a fundamental misinterpretation going on. Although Dworkin is offering a 
meta-ethics that is similar to minimalism, it is also like realism in these crucial respects. He 
wants moral claims to be taken at face value without additional analysis or summaries which 
are not themselves also just 1st order moral claims.͒  
Although Dworkin disavows the typical metaphysics of moral realism, he wants to 
hold the claims that moral realists typically hold. Moreover, he sees most of them as moral 
claims, since he believes the denial of most moral realist claims amounts to a denial of moral 
claims. For Dworkin, the affirmation of an account of mind independence, which is not moral 
UHDOLVWLVWDQWDPRXQWWRWKHGHQLDORIWKHFODLPWKDW³*HQRFLGHLVZURQJLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIZKDW
DQ\ERG\WKLQNV´%HFDXVH'ZRUNLQWKLQNVDFODLPDERXWPLQGLQGHSHQGHQWPRUDOIDFWVLVD
moral claim, he assumes that it must be a 1st order claim. Regardless of which order Dworkin 
believes the claim to be, Dworkin does not allow for a legitimate interpretation of mind 
LQGHSHQGHQFHWKDWLVQRWPRUDOUHDOLVW,QRUGHUIRU(KUHQEHUJ¶VDWWDFNRQ'ZRUNLQWREH
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successful, Ehrenberg needs to show that there are legitimate non-realist interpretations of 
mind independence claims. Rather than show this, Ehrenberg merely points out that theorists 
theorize as though there are legitimate non-realist interpretations of such claims. Instead, 
Ehrenberg needs to actually justify what these theorists are doing. ͒  
Ehrenberg is keen to note that there may be tensions that exist between 1st and 2nd 
order levels of moral discourse. However, he maintains the tensions are not contradictions 
because the validity of the description shifts, depending on which level one is making moral 
claims. This response again begs the question because it assumes that because theorists 
theorize as though there can be tensions between claims made at the 1st and 2nd order, this is 
a justification for the claim that the tensions are not contradictions. If Dworkin challenges a 
commonly accepted practice among meta-ethicists, Ehrenberg cannot simply repeat that the 
theorists theorize as though the practice is legitimate. He must show that the practice is 
OHJLWLPDWHE\VKRZLQJWKDWVWRUGHUPRUDOFODLPVGRQ¶WFRPPLWPRUDOLVHUVWRUHDOLVW
interpretations of those claims. The fact that quasi-realists assume that this is not the case is no 
argument for the claim that 1st order moral clDLPVGRQ¶WFRPPLWPRUDOLVHUVWRUHDOLVW
interpretations of those claims.  
5.8 EHRENBERG¶6 ASSUMPTION OF THE FALSITY OF (Z*) 
 2QHRIWKHLQWHUHVWLQJWKLQJVDERXW(KUHQEHUJ¶VIDLOXUHVWRRIIHUDSHUVXDVLYHFRXQWHU-
attack on Dworkin is that all the failures can be explained by an assumption Ehrenberg is 
making throughout his arguments. This assumption is that (Z*) (2nd order moral claims can 
be morally non-QHXWUDOLVIDOVH7KLVLVWUXHZKHWKHULW¶V(KUHQEHUJ¶VDUJXPHQWVFRQFHUQLQJ
his utilitarian examples, his arguments defending archimedean secondary quality and quasi-
realist theories, or his arguments attempting to show that meta-ethical discussions of causal 
explanations of moral beliefs are morally neutral.  This is even true in his arguments that 
attempt to show that there are 1st and 2nd order levels of moral justification.  One would think 
that in these latter arguments about levels of justification that Ehrenberg would provide a 
defence of his denial of (Z*).  He does not.  
 In his hypothetical example of the disagreeing utilitarians, Ehrenberg fails to show 
that the utilitarian who believes utilitarianism is true because of evolutionary processes is 
affirming a morally neutral 2nd order moral claim. His failure is the result of his assumption 
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that (Z*) is false.  He presupposes (Z*) is false because his defence of the claim that the 
second utilitarian holds a non-moral view is partly the claim that the 2nd utilitarian is affirming 
a 2nd order view. If (Z*) were true, this would not be evidence that the second utilitarian was 
affirming a morally neutral view. If (Z*) were true, 2nd order views could be morally non-
QHXWUDOYLHZV7KHRWKHUSDUWRI(KUHQEHUJ¶VGHIHQFHRIWKHVHFRQGXWLOLWDULDQKROGLQJDQRQ-
PRUDOYLHZLV(KUHQEHUJ¶VDELOLW\WRLQWHUSUHWWKe second utilitarian as holding a non-moral 
view.  If (Z*) were true, this interpretation would not be evidence that the second utilitarian 
was holding a non-moral view. Ehrenberg makes the same mistake when he claims that an 
agent can affirm the moral field thesis without affirming a moral claim.  
 When Ehrenberg claims that a 2nd order view like the moral field thesis is non-moral, 
he is again assuming (Z*) is false.  He claims that the moral field thesis is non-moral because 
it is a 2nd order view that is held for reasons which are themselves theoretical rather than 
moral. If (Z*) were true, the fact that a 2nd order claim was affirmed for theoretical reasons 
would not be evidence that the claim was non-moral. This is because if (Z*) were true, 2nd 
order claims could be moral claims. If 2nd order claims could be moral claims, 2nd order claims 
which were believed for theoretical reasons could also be moral claims.  After all, 1st order 
moral claims can be believed on the basis of theoretical reasons. For instance, I can assert the 
1st order claim that monogamy is good for human beings on the basis of the theoretical claim 
that monogamy explains social stability. There does not seem to be any relevant difference 
between 1st order and 2nd order claims which would allow a 1st order moral claim to be 
justifiably believed on theoretical grounds while not allowing this for 2nd order moral claims. 
If (Z*) were false, 2nd order claims by their very nature, could not be moral claims.  This 
seems to be what Ehrenberg assumed in constructing this argument. 
 (KUHQEHUJ¶VFULWLTXHRI'ZRUNLQ¶VDWWDFNRQDUFKLPHGHDQVHFRQGDU\TXDOLW\WKHRULHV
IDLOHGEHFDXVH(KUHQEHUJDVVXPHGWKHIDOVLW\RI=(KUHQEHUJ¶VRZQVXSSRVHGO\PRUDOO\
neutral version of secondary quality theory had what looked like moral implications. 
(KUHQEHUJGLGQ¶WGLVFXVVWKHVHLPSOLFDWLRQVRUVKRZWKDWWKH\ZHUHDFWXDOO\QRQ-moral in 
some important way. Ehrenberg could have given some sufficient conditions of non-moral 
claims and asserted that his version of secondary quality satisfied those conditions. However, 
he did not do this. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume he must have thought that all he 
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needed to show in order to demonstrate that a secondary quality was morally neutral was 
show it was a 2nd order theory that lacked counterfactuals of the sort Dworkin worried about. 
If (Z*) were true, the lack of counterfactuals of the sort Dworkin worried about would not be 
HYLGHQFHWKDW(KUHQEHUJ¶VVHFRQGDU\TXDOLW\ZDVPRUDOO\QHXWUDO7KLVLVEHFDXVHWKHODFNRI
implied moral counterfactuals of the sort Dworkin accused secondary quality of would not 
H[FOXGHWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIRWKHUPRUDOLPSOLFDWLRQV(KUHQEHUJ¶VVHFRQGDU\TXDOLW\WKHRU\
might have. 
 ,Q(KUHQEHUJ¶VUHVSRQVHWR'ZRUNLQ¶VFULWLTXHRITXDVL-realism, he also assumes the 
falsity of (Z*).  As we recall, Ehrenberg claimed that Dworkin failed to see that the quasi-
realist could affirm a moral claim at the 1st order that he simultaneously deny at the 2nd order.  
This would not result in a contradiction, according to Ehrenberg, because there are different 
levels of justification at which a claim can be affirmed or denied.  Ehrenberg conceded that 
there could be tensions between claims that were affirmed at the 1st order and denied at the 2nd 
order. However, he denied that these tensions were contradictions. If (Z*) were true, the 
tensions that Ehrenberg describes between levels of moral justification could be 
contradictions. This is because the 2nd order claims made in meta-ethical theories could be 
just as moral as the 1st order claims they were trying to explain. In this scenario, both the 1st 
order and the 2nd order would have an equal capacity to morally justify a given claim, since 
they would both be moral claims. There would be no reason to assume the 2nd order was a 
more trustworthy source of moral justification than the 1st order.  
'5(,(5¶6)$,/85(72127,&(5$64 
In the end, Dreier misses Dworkin as his target because he assumes, rather than 
defends the assertion that claims about how one should evaluate moral standards are morally 
QHXWUDOQGRUGHUFODLPV+RZHYHU'UHLHU¶VDUJXPHQWVLOOXVWUDWHDQLPSRUWDQWSRLQWWKDW
neither Dworkin nor Dreier seem to grasp. It appears that (Z*) is true. We can envision a 2nd 
order claim that LVDOVRDPRUDOFRPPLWPHQW'UHLHU¶VDUJXPHQWVLOOXVWUDWHWKLVEHFDXVHRQFH
we examine claims like (ASQ) it seems apparent that we have a moral commitment to a claim 
that DPRXQWVWRDUHMHFWLRQRI$64/HW¶VFDOOWKLVFODim (RASQ).  (RASQ) states that for 
every X, necessarily, X can fail to be wrong if X is wrong according to my actual moral 
standards. This claim amounts to an assertion that it is a necessity that an agent can be wrong 
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regarding his own moral standards he uses to make a moral judgment about X. This is a claim 
we certainly have to presuppose in virtue of engaging in moral practice.  The reason we must 
SUHVXSSRVHLWLVLIZHGRQRWZHGRQ¶WDVVXPHWKDWRXUVHOYHVRURWKHUDJHQWVDUHFDSDEOHRI
making moral mistakes. If we fail to assume that we or other agents are capable of making 
moral mistakes, moral debate becomes a truly useless procedure. In the absence of moral 
debate, agents never take seriously the constraints that other suggest they use during their 
moral deliberations. If agents have this attitude, it is unlikely they will develop the moral 
sentiments that allow them to make good decisions and behave in a moral manner towards 
others. What is important here is there are powerful reasons to interpret (RASQ) as a claim 
which is both a 2nd order claim and a moral commitment.  
 The above reasons explain why (RASQ) is a moral commitment.  However, they do 
not explain how (RASQ) is a 2nd order moral claim. If we interpreted (RASQ) as a 1st order 
moral claim, we would be ignoring the properties of (RASQ) that put it in the class of 2nd 
order claims. Those properties include the fact that it is a moral claim about moral claims 
rather than just a moral claim. This means rather than just tell us which moral claims are true 
or false, it puts a constraint on the way we attempt to differentiate true or false moral claims. 
7KLVFRQVWUDLQWLVRQHZKHUHZHGRQ¶WH[FOXGHPRUDOFODLPVIURPEHLQJQRWZURQJLIWKH\DUH
wrong according to my actual standards.  
 The second property of (RASQ) which suggests it is in the class of 2nd order claims 
is the fact that it gives us semantic information about the sufficient conditions of any moral 
claim not being wrong. Specifically, it tells us that necessarily, x can fail to be wrong even if x 
is not wrong according to my moral standards. That is semantic information about what 
constraints there are on when a moral claim can be asserted. It tells us there is a class of not 
ZURQJ[¶VVXFKWKDWEHLQJZURQJDFFRUGLQJWRP\DFWXDOPRUDOVWandards is compatible with 
WKH[¶VIDLOLQJWREHZURQJ%HFDXVHP\DFWXDOPRUDOVWDQGDUGVDUHXQVSHFLILHGWKLVFODLP
could hardly be considered a 1st order moral claim. This is because claims of the 1st order 
deal in the specification of moral standards, principles, and values.  (RASQ) does not do this. 
It only specifies the conceptual relationship between my actual standards and wrongness. We 
would be hard pressed to imagine a 1st order claim that only specifies the conceptual 
relationship between some unspecified standards, principles or values and wrongness. The 
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third property of (RASQ) which suggests it is in the class of 2nd order claims is it is 
incompatible with (ASQ).  This is not because 1st order moral claims are incapable of being 
evidence against a meta-ethical theory.  Rather, it is because, more often than not, it is 2nd 
order claims which imply the denial of other 2nd order claims. The final reason that suggests 
that (RASQ) is a 2nd order moral claim is it is not a correctness condition of moral claims. We 
GRQ¶WKDYHWRSUHVXSSRVH5$64LQRUGHUWRDIILUPFRUUHFWPRUDOFODLPVRUGHQ\LQFRUUHFW
moral claims. If a claim with the properties of (RASQ) is a moral commitment but not a 
correctness condition, this leaves only two options left.  Either it is a 1st order moral claim.  
The above reasons jointly make that speculation implausible.  The other option is it is both a 
2nd order claim and a moral commitment.  Given the above observations of (RASQ), that 
seems like the more plausible scenario. 
5.10 CONCLUSION 
 Dworkin did not, in this debate, adequately defend a possible objection to  
(C) For any meta-ethical theory that is true, that theory must either be an explanatory moral 
realist theory or a theory that is compatible with explanatory moral realism. 
The fascinating thing about the exchange between these theorists was the ways in 
which none of the arguments defended by one of the theorists hits its target. Dworkin 
presented a challenge to archimedean moral philosophy that he could not meet. DwRUNLQ¶V
arguments failed to hit their target because they relied on the very archimedean claims they 
LPSOLHGZHUHLPSODXVLEOH(SURSRVLWLRQV'UHLHU¶VDUJXPHQWVDJDLQVW'ZRUNLQIDLOHGEHFDXVH
Drier assumed an unduly narrow interpretation of what a moral stDQGDUGLV(KUHQEHUJ¶V
objections to Dreier failed because of his assumption that moral commitments could not be 2nd 
RUGHUFODLPV0RUHRYHU'UHLHU¶VH[DPSOHRI$64LQDGYHUWHQWly suggested another claim 
that was plausibly interpreted as a 2nd order moral commitment.  
 What explains all these mistakes? It seems the most reasonable answer is that moral 
theorists who work in the analytic tradition have a difficult time consistently questioning the 
traditional characterization of the distinction between 1st and 2nd order claims. On the 
traditional characterisation of the distinction, 2nd order claims have more of an ability to 
validate or undermine moral claims than 1st order moral claims do. This characterisation of the 
justification capacities of the 2nd order archimedean claim is at the heart of archimedean 
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moralising. Even a theorist like Dworkin who was challenging the traditional characterization 
of the distinction between 1st and 2nd order claims could not help but rely on 2nd order 
archimedean claims. The way he relied on them implied that 2nd order archimedean claims had 
a greater ability to justify 1st order moral claims than other 1st order moral claims. He even 
relied on 2nd order archimedean claims to argue for the claim that the moral field thesis, 
interpreted literally, was implausible. He did not rely on 1st order moral claims or 2nd order 
moral claims that were not archimedean in order to do this.  
 Dreier relied on the traditional characterization of the 1st and 2nd order distinction in 
his attacks on Dworkin.  His example of a meta-ethical claim that had moral implications but 
was not morally committing involved making the assumption that moral standards could not 
be standards about how to evaluate moral standards.  Thus, he seemed to be implicitly 
assuming that moral claims are only made at the 1st order.  This comports with the traditional 
characterisation of the distinction between the 1st and 2nd order.  Dreier also failed to notice 
that a rejection of (ASQ) was itself a claim plausibly understood as a 2nd order moral 
commitment. This, again, is consistent with the traditional characterisation of the distinction 
between the 1st and 2nd order. It is understandable that Dreier did not notice (RASQ) since on 
the traditional characterisation of the 1st and 2nd order distinction, 2nd RUGHUFODLPVFDQ¶WEH
PRUDOFRPPLWPHQWV:HFDQDOVRVHHZK\(KUHQEHUJ¶VFULWLTXHRI'ZRUNLQIDLOHGZKHQZH
see how Ehrenberg assumed that 2nd order moral claims cannot be moral commitments.  All of 
this is terribly consistent with the traditional characterisation of the 1st and 2nd order moral 
claim.   
 In order for any theorist in this discussion to have hit their multiple targets, they 
would have had to question this traditional characterization of the distinction between 1st and 
2nd order moral claims. If they did question the traditional characterisation of the 1st and 2nd 
order distinction in the manner described above, it is unlikely any of them could reject the 
moral field thesis if it were a genuine moral commitment. This is because each of them relies 
on some aspect of archimedeanism to reject the moral field thesis. Dworkin relies on 
archimedean 2nd order moral claims to show that the moral field thesis is implausible. If he 
were to consistently reject archimedean claims, the grounds from which he could make this 
judgment would disappear.  Dreier relies on archimedeanism in both his assumption that 
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PRUDOFRPPLWPHQWVFDQ¶WEHnd RUGHUDQGWKDWPRUDOVWDQGDUGVFDQ¶WFRQVLVWRIVWDQGDUGV
about how to evaluate other standards. Ehrenberg relies on the assumption that moral 
FRPPLWPHQWVFDQ¶WEHnd RUGHULQYLUWXDOO\DOORIKLVDWWDFNVRQ'ZRUNLQ¶VDQWL-archimedean 
arguments.  
 The fact that the rejection of the moral field thesis hinges on aspects of archimedean 
characterisations of the 1st and 2nd order distinction seems to explain why all three theorists 
fail either to defend or challenge archimedeanism. Moreover, the fact that the rejection of the 
moral field thesis hinges on aspects of archimedeanism illuminates a more important feature 
of archimedeanism.  Archimedeanism is what allows the meta-ethicist the capacity to 
challenge moral commitments when other 1st order moral claims are insufficient for doing the 
job. The archimedean perspective is a perspective that is purportedly invulnerable to moral 
criticism. This is because of the archimedean characterization of the 1st and 2nd order 
distinction.  
 That characterization allows the meta-ethicist to consistently affirm moral claims at 
the 1st order level that he can reject at the 2nd order level. Moreover, this characterization 
allows the meta-ethicist to affirm that his 2nd order rejections of moral claims are morally 
neutral. In traditional meta-ethical practice, the 2nd order moral claim is thought to have an 
ability to justify the objectivity of 1st order moral claims that the 1st order claim itself does not 
have.  This is why meta-ethicists like John Mackie can begin a meta-ethics discussion by 
noting the distinction between a meta-HWKLFLVW¶VDIILUPDWLRQRIDparticular moral claim and 
that meta-HWKLFLVW¶VYLHZDERXWWKDWFODLP¶VREMHFWLYHMXVWLILFDWLRQ7KHst order moral claim is 
traditionally thought to be an affirmation of the face value of moral practice.  It is the 2nd order 
claim that is traditionally thought to have the power to objectively justify the face value or 
show that the face value lacks objective justification. This creates a justification hierarchy for 
the traditional meta-ethicist. The justification capabilities of the 1st order moral claim are 
constrained by what the justified 2nd order claim says about the 1st order claim.  This means 
that on the traditional practice of meta-ethics, the 1st order moral claim can only give the meta-
ethicist information about which moral claims are correct or incorrect, in a manner that is 
neutral with regards the objective justification of those claims. The information which gives 
the meta-ethicist explicit knowledge about the objective justification of a moral claim comes 
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from the 2nd order moral claim. It is this facet of archimedeanism that all three theorists want 
to hold onto.  This is what explains why they either beg the question against arguments that 
challenge archimedeanism or they fail to consistently attack archimedeanism.  
Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to defend the claim that we are morally 
committed to constraints on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive. Namely, I have 
argued that we are morally committed to the meta-ethical claim (C) that states that for any 
meta-ethical theory that is true, that theory must either be an explanatory moral realist theory 
or a theory that is compatible with explanatory moral realism. (C) is a 2nd order meta-ethical 
claim that gives us constraints on which meta-ethical claims are consistent with morality. On 
the other hand, it is a moral commitment. This means that (C) is a variety of 2nd order meta-
ethical claim that Dworkin, Dreier, and Ehrenberg assume is an impossibility. The assumption 
of the impossibility of (C) ultimately rests on the view that the objective justification of 2nd 
order meta-ethical claims cannot come from our moral commitments. This is because the 
denial of this view presents us with the paradoxical situation of moral commitments justifying 
2nd order meta-ethical claims. What (C) suggests is that this unusual reversal of typical meta-
ethical practice is actually part of our moral commitments. If (C) is one of our moral 
commitments, this means we are morally committed to denying the commonly held tenant of 
meta-ethical practice which states that moral claims must be justified from an archimedean 
2nd order perspective.  
This is the aspect of Dworkin's anti-archimedeanism that is fundamentally sound. As 
we saw earlier, Dworkin's fundamental mistake is in his inconsistent attempt at ridding ethics 
of the 2nd order archimedean claim. What is of importance is that the factor that motivates 
Dworkin to attempt this move is an attempt to harmonize two desires. The first desire is a 
desire to not have the truth of 1st order moral claims contingent on the pronouncements of 
archimedean claims that are external to 1st order moral practice. The second desire is to 
adhere to a morality that does not commit us to a meta-ethics that could contain a potentially 
extravagant metaphysics. If (C) is correct, the harmonization of these two desires is 
impossible. This is because the truth of (C) implies that there is no moral position from which 
one could delegitimize potential metaphysical commitments of morality. Of course, this does 
not mean that explanatory moral realism itself commits its proponents to an extravagant 
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metaphysics. It may or may not, depending on what additional features of explanatory moral 
realism it turns out we are committed to.  
What is of importance is that if there turned out to be moral commitments to features 
of explanatory moral realism that were metaphysically extravagant, there would be no moral 
position from which one could criticize these features. There could, of course, be theoretical 
positions form which one could attack such extravagant metaphysics. But there would be no 
moral position precisely because the extravagant metaphysics would be coming out of moral 
commitments. They would not be mere ways of explaining such commitments that one could 
jettison if one found the explanations unappealing in some respect. Only a non-moral 
theoretical perspective would allow this move.  
If (C) is correct, such a non-moral theoretical perspective would no longer be what 
we call meta-ethics. This is because (C) implies that the only ethical perspectives that exist are 
perspectives which are incapable of delegitimizing moral commitments. If the arguments 
presented for (C) are sound, this means Dworkin's second desire is inconsistent with our moral 
commitments. We cannot adhere to a morality that allows us to dispense with moral 
commitments if those commitments turn out to be meta-ethical claims that imply an 
extravagant metaphysics. On the other hand, the soundness of the arguments presented for (C) 
implies that Dworkin can have his first desire. If the arguments for (C) are sound, it turns out 
that the truth of 1st order moral claims is not contingent on archimedean claims that are 
external to moral practice.  
This puts Dworkin in an uncomfortable position. On the one hand, Dworkin does not 
want moral commitments to be held hostage to the demands of an economic metaphysics. On 
the other hand, Dworkin wants to say that moral commitments don't demand any metaphysics 
to begin with. If the arguments for (C) are sound, Dworkin can accept that moral 
commitments cannot be held hostage to the demands of an economic metaphysics. However, 
he cannot expect from moral commitments that they only commit users of moral language to 
claims that most philosophers or natural scientists would find plausible. If the arguments for 
(C) are sound, morality is a package deal. One must accept all our moral commitments in 
order to consistently affirm moral claims. Either Dworkin must accept moral commitments 
with all their potentially implausible sub-commitments or he must reject moral commitments. 
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He cannot have it both ways.  
6. CONCLUSION OF THESIS 
This thesis began with an attempt to answer the question of whether our moral 
commitments commit us to constraints on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive. The 
meaning of 'moral commitments' here meant any claims we must affirm or presuppose in 
virtue of engaging in moral practice. The meaning of 'moral practice' here meant the social, 
psychological, phenomenological, and linguistic activities that constitute being a moral agent. 
The meaning of 'constraints' on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive here meant what 
presuppositions we must accept as criteria for finding a meta-ethical theory attractive.  
It was decided that in order to show which moral commitments commit us to 
constraints on what meta-ethical theories we find attractive, we would have to answer two 
supplementary questions. Those questions were (A) (Can meta-ethical theories be criticized 
on moral grounds?) and (B) (What meta-ethical claims does morality commit us to?). It was 
decided that we must answer (A) before we answer (B) because any answer to (B) 
presupposes an affirmative answer to (A). This was because a meta-ethics must be capable of 
being criticized on moral grounds in order for there to be moral commitments to meta-ethical 
claims. Thus, the first half of this thesis was devoted to first giving an answer to (A) and then 
giving an answer to (B).  
Chapter one gave an answer to (A). The answer was that meta-ethical theories can be 
criticized on moral grounds because meta-ethical theories can affirm incorrect moral claims 
and deny correct moral claims. This capacity of meta-ethical theories was not taken to be the 
only reason why a meta-ethical theory could be criticized on moral grounds. However, it was 
taken to be a sufficient condition of a meta-ethical theory warranting moral criticism. The 
capacity of meta-ethics theories to deny correct moral claims and affirm incorrect moral 
claims was demonstrated through the analysis of a debate by three mid-twentieth century 
meta-ethicists over the issue of whether meta-ethics was itself normative. These three mid-
twentieth century meta-ethicists were Mary Mothersill, Alan Gewirth, and R.C. Solomon. 
Each theorist, in their own way, tried to demonstrate that meta-ethics was itself normative.  
Mary Mothersill attempted to show that meta-ethics was normative by claiming that 
the meta-ethical procedure of correctly interpreting a meta-ethical theory so the interpretation 
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specifies which set of normative ethics claims that meta-ethical theory is not compatible with 
is a normative procedure. Alan Gewirth attempted to show that meta-ethics was normative by 
identifying the meta-ethical procedure of differentiating the moral from the non-moral. R.C. 
Solomon attempted to show that meta-ethics was normative by identifying the meta-ethical 
procedure of developing a model of ethical language so as to differentiate between those 
claims which are truly moral and those claims which are believed to be normal by a society at 
a given time.  
We saw that each of these three theorists were unsuccessful at demonstrating that 
meta-ethics was normative because each, in their own way, committed the same mistake. Each 
assumed that because they could interpret a meta-ethical procedure in a manner that was 
normative, this showed that meta-ethics itself was normative. They each failed to consider that 
just because they could interpret a particular meta-ethical procedure in a manner that was 
normative, that same procedure could be interpreted in a manner that was not normative. 
Hence, the attempt by each theorist to demonstrate that meta-ethics was normative failed. 
However, each of their failures inadvertently demonstrated that a meta-ethics could be 
criticized on moral grounds. This was because the procedures identified by each theorist 
demonstrated that a meta-ethics theory was capable of denying correct moral claims and 
affirming incorrect moral claims. Thus, by the end of chapter one, we had answered the 
question of (A).  
Chapter two attempted to answer (B) (What constraints on the attractiveness of a 
meta-ethical theory does morality commit us to?). The answer presented was (C) (For any 
meta-ethical theory that is true, that theory must either be an explanatory moral realist theory 
or a theory that is compatible with explanatory moral realism). The answer was derived on the 
basis of explanatory moral realism being a correctness condition of moral claims. Here 
'correctness condition' was taken to mean a claim we must presuppose in order to consistently 
affirm a moral claim. It was assumed that part of engaging adequately in moral practice is to 
engage in moral practice in a manner that is not self-undermining. To engage in moral practice 
in a manner that is not self-undermining, we must presuppose the correctness conditions of 
moral claims. Otherwise, we wind up either denying the very moral claims we assert or we 
wind up agnostics about the moral claims we assert. In either scenario, our lack of consistency 
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is self-undermining because we destabilize our psychological responses towards moral claims 
we affirm if we simultaneously deny them. Hence, in chapter two we assumed that correctness 
conditions for moral claims are also moral commitments.  
The strategy for demonstrating the moral commitment to explanatory moral realism 
was to use a rehabilitated version of the Argument from Moral Experience (referred to as 
AME). The argument from moral experience attempts to show that the experience of moral 
practice implies or is best explained by moral realism. As noted earlier, the argument from 
moral experience is not an attempt to show merely that the phenomenology of making moral 
claims gives us presumptive evidence in favour of moral realism. Rather, the argument 
attempts to show that the experience of moral practice (which includes both its 
phenomenological and linguistic components) implies or is best explained by moral realism. 
0RUHRYHUWKHVWUDWHJ\IRUFUHDWLQJDYDULDWLRQRQWKLVDUJXPHQWZDVLQIRUPHGE\'RQ/RHE¶V
criticisms of two influential versions of AME. The version of AME created in this thesis was 
not a version designed to be a presumptive argument for moral realism. Rather, the version 
defended in this thesis merely entailed that explanatory moral realism is implied by 
correctness conditions of moral claims. As was shown, to say that moral realism is implied by 
correctness conditions of moral claims is to say that correct moral claims depend on the truth 
of explanatory moral realism in order to consistently retain their status as correct moral 
claims.  
 The version of AME created in this thesis avoided the pitfalls of the traditional 
formulations of the argument pointed out by Don Loeb. These included the fact that 
proponents of AME overlook observations of moral practice that imply non-objectivism or are 
compatible with moral anti-realism. The other criticisms Loeb directed at AME 
arguments was that they ignore the degree to which characteristics of moral practice are 
compatible with moral anti-realism.  From this I constructed two requirements of any 
successful version of AME.  These requirements were that any successful version of AME 
must acknowledge:  
(L) The experience of moral phenomenology is not uniform enough to present a 
presumptive case for the commitment to moral realism. 
and 
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(M) Even if the experience of moral phenomenology possessed the characteristics 
proponents of AME have claimed it does, those characteristics would only imply 
moral objectivism, not moral realism. 
The version advocated in this thesis consisted of 3 correctness conditions of moral claims. 
These correctness conditions, when conjoined, implied explanatory moral realism. These three 
correctness conditions were:  
(D) For any correct moral claim X, X is not determined by any agent's judgments         about 
X. 
(E) For any correct moral claim X, the only appropriate explanation is one that is irreducibly 
moral.  
and 
(F) For any correct moral claim X, the only appropriate irreducibly moral explanation is one 
that is a final 2nd order explanation.  
The conjunction of (D), (E), and (F) gave us the conclusion we are committed to final 2nd 
order explanations of moral claims which are either explanatory moral realist explanations or 
explanations that are compatible with explanatory moral realism.  
 At this point, we arrived at the halfway mark of the thesis. In chapters one and two, 
we had worked out answers to questions (A) and (B). It had been argued in chapter two that 
we have a moral commitment to (C) (For any meta-ethical theory which is true, that theory 
must either be an explanatory moral realist theory or a theory which is compatible with 
explanatory moral realism). Chapters three and four were spent looking at objections to a 
presupposition of (C). This presupposition was that moral practice can commit us to meta-
ethical claims regarding the moral realism/anti-realism debate. The famous set of objections to 
WKLVSUHVXSSRVLWLRQFDPHIURP6LPRQ%ODFNEXUQ%ODFNEXUQ¶VTXDVL-realism is the most well 
known meta-ethical theory whose justification depends on the claim that moral practice does 
not commit us to any meta-ethical claims.  
 In the first half of chapter three, we critiqued the considerations Simon Blackburn 
raised which purport to show that Quasi-Realism is true and is a more attractive theory than its 
rivals. The reason we chose this group of considerations (apart from their notoriety) is that if 
they are sound, the arguments in section one and section two will fail. Because quasi-realism 
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depends on the claim that moral practice cannot commit us to moral claims, arguments in 
favour of quasi-realism are arguments in favour of the claim that moral practice cannot 
commit us to moral claims. Thus, we attacked these considerations on the grounds that they 
beg the question by relying on the plausibility of assumptions that other theories call into 
doubt. These assumptions included: 
 (G) Morality is incapable of giving us any evidence of anything external to  
morality. 
 (H) Morality is compatible with all possible meta-ethical truths a theorist could  
advocate. 
 (I) Philosophical naturalism is true  
               and 
 (J) Quasi-Realism is true.  
We argued that Blackburn must defend each of these assumptions in order to show that Quasi-
Realism is a more attractive meta-ethical theory than its rivals. We attacked five of the main 
considerations Blackburn presents in favour of quasi-realism. The first consideration was the 
fact that quasi-UHDOLVPDOORZVWKHWKHRULVWWRDFFHSWWKHPHWDSK\VLFDOFRPSRQHQWVRI0DFNLH¶V
queerness argument while simultaneously accommodating 1st order moral discourse. We 
argued that this combination of claims presupposes (G).  
The second consideration we attacked was the argument from 1st order meta-ethical 
neutrality. According to this argument, one can incorporate all the features of 1st order moral 
discourse into a meta-ethical theory without making any metaphysical assertions. Therefore, 
according to the argument, 1st order moral discourse is meta-ethically neutral. We critiqued 
this argument on the grounds that it does not show what it needs to show; namely, that a meta-
ethically neutral interpretation of 1st order moral claims is evidence that 1st order moral 
claims are meta-ethically neutral. Moreover, such an interpretation is compatible with 1st 
order moral claims committing agents to constraints on how one should characterize a meta-
ethical theory. To assume that this is an impossibility is to presuppose, rather than defend (H) 
(morality is compatible with all possible meta-ethical truths a theorist could advocate).  
 The third consideration we attacked was the argument from moral psychology. 
According to this argument, motivational internalism and the Humean account of moral 
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motivation are the most plausible views of moral psychology. According to the Humean 
account of moral motivation, non-cognitive states are completely distinct. According to 
motivational internalism, moral judgments necessarily motivate agents. The conjunction of 
these two views entails that moral judgments must either be non-cognitive states or be 
cognitive states which entail non-cognitive states. Because of the plausibility of this 
conjunction, Blackburn believes it is reasonable to think that cognitive states such as moral 
EHOLHIVFDQ¶WHQWDLOQRQ-cognitive states. Therefore, moral judgments must be expressions of 
non-cognitive states. This is an argument for the superiority of quasi-realism over its moral 
realist competitors.  
 We attacked this argument because the claim that moral judgments necessarily 
motivate is derived, in part, from the claim that desires are what explain moral motivations. 
The difficulty with relying on any version of motivational internalism to argue against all 
forms of moral realism is that motivational internalism presupposes (G) (morality is incapable 
of giving us any evidence of anything external to morality). If morality were capable of giving 
us evidence of things external to morality, it would not be obvious that desires are what 
explain moral motivations. The obvious explanation of moral motivation would be the 
interaction agents had with moral phenomena (be they moral properties or moral facts) that 
were external to agents. If (G) were false, the interactions agents had with moral phenomena 
would be what morality gave agents (among other things) evidence of. Motivational 
internalism is only plausible if (G) is true.  
 7KHIRXUWKRI%ODFNEXUQ¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQVLQIDYRXURITXDVL-realism that we attacked 
was the argument from supervenience. According to this argument, it may be the case in our 
world that there is a moral relationship between torture and wrongness. However, the 
argument proceeds, there is no conceptual reason why in some other world, there is not a 
moral relation between torture and wrongness which is not the relation that holds in our world. 
Blackburn then claimed that moral changes regarding the correctness of moral claims, 
QHFHVVDULO\GRQ¶WKDSSHQZLWKRXWVRPHFKDQJHLQWKHIHDWXUHVRIWKHVLWXDWLRQWKDWXQGHUOLHV
the correctness of the moral claims. This meant it is a conceptual impossibility that there 
should be a possible world where two things are identical in every non-moral respect but one 
is better than the other. Blackburn asserted that quasi-realism could explain this ban on mixed 
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worlds where moral realism cannot. We attacked this argument without challenging its 
premises. Rather, we challenged it on the grounds that it presupposed that moral realism gives 
us an unattractive explanation of the ban on mixed worlds. This characterization of moral 
realism as an unattractive explanation itself assumed (I) (naturalism is true). We showed that 
Blackburn could not afford to assume naturalism in an argument against all forms of moral 
realism. This is because some forms of moral realism reject naturalism.  
 The final consideration we attacked that Blackburn cited in favour of quasi-realism is 
the argument from practical needs. According to this argument, quasi-realism satisfies the 
practical needs of morality for a meta-ethical theory. Blackburn asserted that there are two 
practical needs of morality for a meta-ethical theory. The first was that the theory describes 
how morality functions correctly. The second was that the theory is consistent with truth 
tracking methods from the natural sciences and analytic philosophy. We attacked this 
argument by showing that the way a meta-ethical theory characterizes morality will, in part, 
determine what the needs of a meta-ethical theory are. Hence, we showed that one cannot 
invoke a practical needs argument in favour of quasi-realism unless one assumes (J) (quasi-
realism is true).  
 In the second half of chapter three, we argued that quasi-realism has an additional 
factor that counts against it. This factor is it does not justify moral objectivism. Because 
objectivism is compatible with both realism and anti-realism, objectivism is a view Blackburn 
believes quasi-realism can account for at the 1st order level. We argued that quasi-realism 
cannot do this because no anti-realist theory can justify moral objectivism. We argued that this 
is for two reasons. The first reason was that one must defend (G) (morality is incapable of 
giving us any evidence of anything external to morality) in order for moral practice to have 
any resources to defend objectivism. The second reason was that scepticism regarding 
objectivism is such that it requires a 2nd order meta-ethical claim for the scepticism to be 
overcome. Such a 2nd order claim, we showed, could only be realist.  
 In chapter four, we examined a different objection to the claim that moral practice 
can commit us to meta-ethical claims regarding the moral realism/anti-realism debate. This 
objection came from Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin advocated a position we characterized as 
moral anti-DUFKLPHGHDQLVP$FFRUGLQJWR'ZRUNLQ¶VPRUDODQWL-archimedeanism, there are no 
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2nd order claims which can validate or undermine 1st order moral claims. Dworkin takes this 
to mean that the moral realism/anti-realism debate is constructed out of 2nd order claims that, 
according to Dworkin, are best characterized as 1st order moral claims. For Dworkin, there 
are no moral commitments to meta-ethical claims regarding the moral realism/anti-realism 
debate. This is because there are no 2nd order moral claims from which such a debate can be 
had. :HFULWLTXHG'ZRUNLQ¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKHEDVLVWKDWKLVDUJXPHQWVwere inconsistent. We 
argued that Dworkin relies on 2nd order claims that are used in the moral realism/anti-realism 
debate. Moreover, he does this without first interpreting such 2nd order claims as 1st order 
claims. Dworkin cannot do this since his thesis involves the claim that there are no 2nd order 
claims that can be used to vindicate moral realism or moral anti-realism. He cannot rely on a 
variety of 2nd order moral claims to establish the thesis that there are no such claims. 
 In the second half of chapter four, we analyzed objections to Dworkin by Jamie 
'UHLHUDQG.HQQHWK(KUHQEHUJ'UHLHUREMHFWHGWR'ZRUNLQ¶VGHIHQFHRIPRUDODQWL-
archimedeanism by attempting to show, using matrices from the literature on analytic 
contingencies, that 2nd order claims can be morally non-committing. If they are morally non-
committing, according to Dreier, there is no reason to interpret them as 1st order moral claims. 
Dreier, as we saw, believes his argument stands even if 2nd order claims have moral 
implications. Kenneth Ehrenberg, on the other hand, advanced a different set of criticisms at 
Dworkin. Ehrenberg accused Dworkin of failing to discredit the theoretical perspective from 
which the meta-ethicist discussing the realism/anti-realism issue makes his claims. Ehrenberg 
also accused Dworkin of failing to give good reasons for the interpretation of 2nd order moral 
FODLPVDVVWRUGHUPRUDOFODLPV/LNH'UHLHU(KUHQEHUJWRRNLVVXHZLWK'ZRUNLQ¶VDWWHPSWV
to show that meta-ethical claims made in the moral realism/anti-realism debate are morally 
non-QHXWUDO(KUHQEHUJDOVRFKDOOHQJHG'ZRUNLQ¶VDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHPRUDOUHDOLVPDQWL-
realism debate does not deal with issues that are above and beyond the issues dealt with in 1st 
order moral discourse. Ehrenberg attempted to give counter-examples that show that there are 
metaphysical issues being dealt with during 2nd order moral debates that are distinct from 
anything discussed at the 1st order.  
 :HWKHQVKRZHGWKDWERWK'UHLHUDQG(KUHQEHUJ¶VDWWDFNVRQ'ZRUNLQIDLO7KLs is 
because both Dreier and Ehrenberg assumed some component of moral archimedeanism. 
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These components, we saw, were related to the traditional characterization of the 1st and 2nd 
order distinction assumed by moral archimedeans. Dreier assumed that meta-ethical standards 
about how one ought to evaluate moral standards are not themselves moral standards. He also 
failed to see that one of his own versions of secondary quality theory was actually a moral 
claim that there are 2nd order moral commitments againsW(KUHQEHUJ¶VYDULHGFULWLFLVPVRI
Dworkin all failed because Ehrenberg assumed the falsity of (Z*) (there can be 2nd order 
moral commitments). At the end of chapter four, we explained how Dworkin, Dreier, and 
Ehrenberg either failed to attack archimedeanism or failed to defend it because they 
presupposed components of it.  
We ended chapter 4 with an explanation of why Dworkin, Dreier, and Ehrenberg 
presented arguments that radically missed their targets. The explanation was that each theorist, 
in a different way, does not question the traditional characterization of the distinction between 
1st and 2nd order claims. Within that characterization, 2nd order claims have more of an 
ability to validate or undermine moral claims than 1st order moral claims do. This 
characterisation of the justification capacities of the 2nd order archimedean claim is the basis 
of archimedean moralising. Even a theorist like Dworkin who challenges the traditional 
characterization of the distinction between 1st and 2nd order claims finds himself relying on 
2nd order archimedean claims in a manner that implies that archimedean claims had a greater 
ability to justify than 1st order moral claims.   
Dreier relied on the traditional characterization of the 1st and 2nd order distinction 
during his attacks on Dworkin. His example of a meta-ethical claim that has moral 
implications but is not morally committing requires the assumption that moral standards 
cannot be standards regarding how to evaluate moral standards. Thus, Dreier seemed to be 
implicitly assuming that moral claims are only made at the first order. This comports with the 
traditional characterization of the distinction between the 1st and 2nd order. Dreier also failed 
to notice that a rejection of (ASQ) was itself a claim plausibly understood as a 2nd order 
moral commitment. This failure, again, is consistent with the traditional characterization of 
the distinction between the 1st and 2nd order. It is understandable that Dreier did not notice 
(RASQ) since on the traditional characterisation of the 1st and 2nd order distinction, 2nd 
RUGHUFODLPVFDQ¶WEHPRUDOFRPPLWPHQWV$VZHVDZPRVWRI(KUHQEHUJ¶VFULWLFLVPVRI
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Dworkin failed because he also assumed that there could be no 2nd order moral commitments. 
This, again, is consistent with the traditional characterisation of the 1st and 2nd order moral 
claim.  
Chapter 4 ended with a summary of the aspects of Dworkin's anti-archimedeanism 
that are sound and contrasts these aspects with the aspects the fail. I claimed that the aspects 
of Dworkin's anti-archimedeanism that succeed are the aspects that insist that it is not that 
case that 1st order moral claims must be justified from an archimedean perspective. Dworkin's 
fundamental mistake is his inconsistent attempt at ridding ethics of 2nd order archimedean 
commitments. I explained Dworkin's simultaneous failure and success by looking at 
Dworkin's project as an attempt to harmonize two desires. The first desire was a desire to not 
have the truth of 1st order moral claims contingent on the pronouncements of archimedean 
claims that are external to 1st order moral practice. The second desire was a desire to justify a 
morality that could not potentially commit us to an extravagant metaphysics. I explained that 
if (C) is correct, the harmonization of these two desires is impossible because the second 
desire is infeasible. This is because the truth of (C) implies that there is no moral position 
from which one could delegitimize potential metaphysical commitments of morality.  
7. EPILOGUE 
 Throughout this thesis, it has been repeated that one difficult consequence of 
accepting (C) is it seems to be at odds with philosophical naturalism.  It is at odds with 
philosophical naturalism because naturalism seems to be inherently archimedean. On a 
naturalist world view, insofar as there is room for an account of morality at all, there must be 
non-moral reasons given for the attractiveness of this account.  Furthermore, on a naturalist 
ZRUOGYLHZPRUDOFRPPLWPHQWVGRQ¶WKDYHWKHDELOLW\WRMXVWLI\RQWRORJLFDl claims that (C) 
gives moral commitments. If (C) is true, any moral commitment, no matter how crazy, gives 
us a moral reason to accept the commitment. This is perhaps, the primary intuitive difficulty 
with (C).  
 A related difficulty that has been discussed is that (C) is at odds with the 
methodological assumptions of the natural and social sciences. After all, no physicists or 
biologists interpret moral commitments as sources of evidence about the world. Hence, no 
physicist or biologist, when constructing a theory, wonders if there is any evidence against it 
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resulting from clashes with moral commitments.  Also, social scientists and evolutionary 
ELRORJLVWVZKHQFRQVWUXFWLQJWKHRULHVRIKXPDQEHKDYLRUGRQ¶WFRQVLGHUPRUDOFRPPLWPHQWV
as evidential.  
 Thus far, it looks like archimedeanism is the more plausible view.  However, when 
we consider some consequences of affirming archimedeanism, the situation becomes much 
murkier.  For instance, one consequence of affirming archimedeanism is it seems as though 
we can deny moral commitments just because they cease to constitute philosophical or 
scientific explanations we find attractive.  A moral commitment, we should remember, is a 
claim we must affirm or presuppose in virtue of engaging adequately in moral practice. It 
seems odd that the archimedean should not warrant any moral criticism for this.  Why is there 
nothing wrong with denying a moral commitment as long as one does it in the name of 
affirming an attractive explanation of morality? After all, moral commiWPHQWVGRQ¶WVHHPOLNH
the sort of thing we can justifiably deny for explanatory reasons.  
 Here, the archimedean might object that we should separate moral commitments into 
WZRFODVVHV0RUDOFRPPLWPHQWVOLNH³VHQWLHQWEHLQJVRXJKWQRWEHFDXVHGXQQHFHVVDU\SDLQ´
are commitments we cannot deny without warranting moral criticism. However, commitments 
OLNH³H[SODQDWRU\PRUDOUHDOLVPLVWUXH´DUHFODLPVZHVKRXOGEHDEOHWRGHQ\ZLWKRXW
warranting moral criticism. The problem with this rejoinder is the burden of proof is on the 
archimedean to explain what the relevant moral difference is between the two moral 
commitments which makes the latter acceptable to deny. If the archimedean insists that he can 
GHQ\³H[SODQDWRU\PRUDOUHDOLVPLVWUXH´ZLWKRXWKXUWLQJRWKHUVHQWLHQWKXPDQEHLQJVWKLV
response will be unconvincing.  This is because denying the sentient beings claim does not 
require that the archimedean hurt anybody either. In fact, the archimedean could affirm the 
sentient beings claim in a manner that is totally removed from the good standards he uses in 
interacting with others, the good way he votes, or his good cultural values. Likewise, the 
archimedean could negatively change his character after realizing that a moral scepticism he 
espouses implies the denial of all correct moral commitments. It is true that the latter scenario 
is less likely thaQWKHIRUPHUEXWOLNHOLKRRGLVQ¶WUHDOO\WKHUHOHYDQWLVVXH 
 The relevant issue is that moral commitments are subsets of moral claims. 
Affirmations and denials of moral claims are moral acts.  Whether or not the affirmations and 
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denials lead to the harm of others is an important consideration for determining whether these 
moral acts are good or bad.  But they are not the only consideration.  Sometimes, denying a 
FRUUHFWPRUDOFODLPLVSUDFWLFDOO\KDUPOHVV<HWWKDWGRHVQ¶WVWRSXVIURPEHOLHYLQJWKDWWKe 
person who denies this correct moral claim warrants moral criticism. We can imagine 
individuals who believe women are less valuable than men but never reveal this belief nor act 
in ways that involve the mistreatment of others. We can imagine people who think that the 
homeless deserve to be kicked in the face.  Yet we can imagine these people never revealing 
this belief to others or mistreating others as a result of it. We can imagine neo-fascist deniers 
of the holocaust who never reveal or act on their beliefs so as to lead quiet, uninterrupted lives 
with family and friends. We can imagine people who think a sexual attraction to children is 
normal and healthy although they never reveal or act on this belief.  More importantly, it is 
hard to imagine these moral agents not warranting moral criticism.  The moral criticism that 
these individuals warrant is not a criticism for having harmed another human being.  It is a 
FULWLFLVPIRUKDYLQJGHQLHGVRPHWKLQJLWZDVLPSRUWDQWQRWWRGHQ\,W¶VDVLIWKHUHDUHFHUtain 
moral states of affairs that these individuals are disrespecting by failing to affirm them.  
Within philosophy, archimedeanism seems like it could be a high minded excuse for this kind 
of disrespect.  
Of course, affirming a justification for acts of pedophilia will upset people more than 
affirming a meta-ethical theory that implies the denial of all moral commitments.  At the same 
WLPHWKHUHGRHVQ¶WVHHPWREHDQLGHQWLILDEOHPRUDOGLIIHUHQFHLQWKHDFt of affirming either of 
those claims that makes archimedean scepticism look any better.  The archimedean claim is 
just at a higher level of abstraction than the pedophilia claim. If anything, the archimedean 
claim seems worse, since it implies the negation of a much bigger range of correct moral 
claims. It seems odd that someone who affirms that pedophilia is not wrong is met with 
outrage.  And yet someone who says that there is no such thing as wrongness should be met 
with moral indifference.  After all, the person who affirms that there is no such thing as 
wrongness is, ipso facto, affirming that pedophilia is not wrong.  
,W¶VGLIILFXOWWRLPDJLQHKRZLWFDQEHPRUDOO\MXVWLILHGWROHDUQDERXWWKHnd order 
truths of morality, if one of those truths may be that all moral commitments are false. 
Simultaneously, it is difficult to imagine why we should affirm moral commitments if they are 
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false.  After all, the demonstration that a moral claim is false we normally take as an ethical 
(and not just rational) reason to stop affirming the claim. Except in very rare cases, we find 
any claim's falsehood a moral reason not to affirm the claim. As noted earlier in this thesis, we 
look to the facts of the world to determine what moral claims we should affirm.  We take the 
truth of Hitler's extermination of 6 million Jews as a reason to think the moral claim "Hitler 
was a great man" is a false claim.  Moreover, we see it's falsehood being at least one of the 
primary moral reasons for us not to affirm such a claim. The falseness of moral claims is 
normally an indicator that such claims are hazardous in some way to affirm.  This explains 
why truth is valued so highly in moral discourse and practice.  
What are we to do, however, if truth turns against all moral commitments? It is not as 
simple as siding with truth on the grounds that it is more useful to do so.  This is for two 
reasons.  The first reason is that it is difficult to conceive of how the act of affirming that all 
moral commitments are false could be useful. Additionally, it is difficult to conceive of how 
'usefulness' could be a reason to consider something morally acceptable if it turns out that all 
moral commitments were false. In the absence of true moral commitments, the concept of 
'usefulness' would wither away in a quagmire of intractably subjective perspectives.  For some 
agents, it might be useful to discover the truth that all moral commitments are false.  For other 
agents, it might be useful to deny this. There would be no way of determining which kind of 
'usefulness' was better than any rival conception of 'usefulness'.  
It is worth noting that an archimedean could be sympathetic to the worries I am 
outlining here. In fact, as goes without saying, an archimedean need not be some variety of 
moral sceptic. An archimedean could affirm that truth supports rather than undermines our 
moral commitments. An archimedean meta-ethicist could be an explanatory moral realist. 
Furthermore, an archimedean could affirm a moral metaphysics more extravagant than 
anything advocated in this thesis. What an archimedean could not do is affirm: 
(C) For any meta-ethical theory that is true, that theory must either be an explanatory moral 
realist theory or a theory that is compatible with explanatory moral realism. 
This is because the archimedean perspective prohibits the archimedean from making 
the moral assumption that a true meta-ethical theory must be a certain way.  For the 
archimedean, it is a contingent matter which meta-ethical theory turns out to be true. The 
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archimedean examines the evidence and then decides upon a meta-ethical theory he thinks the 
evidence favours. He does not pronounce that all true meta-ethical theories must be a certain 
way because we are morally committed to meta-ethical theories being this way. For the 
archimedean, it is truth, rather than moral commitments, that settle the matter.  Moreover, the 
archimedean believes it is truth, rather than moral commitments, that justify whether or not we 
have moral commitments. 
This is troubling because this suggests that the archimedean ultimately values truth 
more than his moral commitments, whatever those commitments turn out to be.  If truth 
supports moral commitments, the archimedean will side with morality. If it does not, the 
archimedean will side with truth alone while trying to find ways for this not to negatively 
affect his moral decisions as a human being. This is why it is normally assumed that morality's 
commitment to truth is so strong that it is morally permissible for the archimedean to affirm 
true claims at the expense of denying the set of all moral commitments.  If the arguments in 
this thesis are correct, the moral commitment to truth is not this strong.  If (C) is a genuine 
moral commitment, the supplementary moral commitment to truth is still very strong.  
However, it is not so strong that it holds even if truth turns against morality.  
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